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The manuscript of this book was written during the years 1988-1993 and
published in Danish in 1994 under the title, »Tanke, Sprog og Maskine - en
teoretisk analyse af computerens symbolske egenskaber«. The manuscript has
been revised and slightly abridged in connection with the translation.
References to sources only available in Danish have been kept to a minimum.
In addition, a number of clarifications of chief points of view have been carried
out and, with regard to some points - particularly in connection with the
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1.1 Framing the question
Throughout what is now the more than 50-year history of the computer a
great number of theories have been advanced regarding the contribution this
machine would make to changes both in the structure of society and in ways
of thinking.
Like other theories regarding the future, these should also be taken with a
pinch of salt. The history of the development of computer technology
contains many predictions which have failed to come true and many
applications which have not been foreseen.
While we must reserve judgement as to the question of the impact on the
structure of society and human thought, there is no reason to wait for history
when it comes to the question: what are the properties which could give the
computer such far-reaching importance?
The present book is intended as an answer to this question.
The fact that this is a theoretical analysis is due to the nature of the subject.
No other possibilities are available because such a description of the properties
of the computer must be valid for any kind of application. An additional de-
mand is that the description should be capable of providing an account of the
properties which permit and limit these possible applications, just as it must
make it possible to characterize a computer as distinct from a) other machines
whether clocks, steam engines, thermostats, or mechanical and automatic
calculating machines, b) other symbolic media whether printed, mechanical, or
electronic and c) other symbolic languages whether ordinary languages,
spoken or written, or formal languages.
This triple limitation, however, (with regard to other machines, symbolic me-
dia and symbolic languages) raises a theoretical question as it implies a
meeting between concepts of mechanical-deterministic systems, which stem
from mathematical physics, and concepts of symbolic systems which stem from
the description of symbolic activities common to the humanities. The
relationship between science and the humanities has traditionally been seen
from a dualistic perspective, as a relationship between two clearly separate
subject areas, each studied on its own set of premises and using its own
methods. In the present case, however, this perspective cannot be maintained
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since there is both a common subject area and a new - and specific - kind of in-
teraction between physical and symbolic processes.
It immediately becomes obvious that such a description of an interaction
between physical and symbolic processes can be of significance for theories
of consciousness and the way this problem presents itself in existing research
has also given rise to the formulation of hypotheses regarding cognition and
consciousness. The question as to the significance of theories of
consciousness, however, is not simply whether we are considering a form of
interaction which can be regarded as a model of human consciousness - or the
other way around, whether the machine can think. It is also a question of the
conceptualization of physical and symbolic phenomena which have been of
significance as preconditions for the discovery and development of computer
technology and, perhaps most decisively with regard to the result, of the con-
ceptualizations used in the hypotheses on consciousness and thereby in the
definition of what is interacting. The description must therefore also include a
theoretical and historical account of the concepts used in describing the
physical, symbolic and conscious.
In consequence the book takes its point of departure in a description of the
theoretical preconditions for the modern computer with emphasis on two se-
parate, yet parallel tracks.
One of them runs from Ludwig Boltzmann’s statistical thermodynamics
from the latter part of the last century to Claude Shannon’s definition of the
information concept in his mathematical communication theory from 1948. The
other originates in mathematical logic from the first third of this century with
Gödel’s proof as the theoretical turning point from which the English
mathematician Alan Turing started in 1936 when he described the principles of
a universal computing machine by showing how any finite formal procedure
can be carried out as a sequence of very few and simple, mechanical processes.
While these innovations in the history of mechanical theory are remarkable
in themselves and are regarded as necessary preconditions for the
development of the modern computer, the analysis leads to the conclusion that
mechanically based symbol theories are neither adequate to describe the
symbolic properties of consciousness nor those of the machine.
The basic argument for this position - as far as consciousness is concerned -
is to be found in the fact that the concept of human consciousness and intel-
ligence must at least include the ability to generate its own symbolic units of
expression, while the precondition for mechanical theory is an already given
set of invariant units.
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If there is a similarity between the computer and human consciousness, it
will thus consist in the fact that neither of them are subject to a definite,
invariant set of rules for the representation of meaning.
While consciousness can be described as a rule creating system possessing
the ability to produce symbolic rules, the computer can be described as a rule
free system which, by virtue of this, can be used to represent and process an
indeterminately large number of symbolic representations and a certain class of
rules.
Where the machine is concerned the basic argument can be found in the
condition that any rule whatsoever which must be carried out by a computer
must appear in the same notational form and be treated in exactly the same
way as all other data. It is therefore not possible - as is a precondition in
mechanical theory - to define any invariant borderline between the machine
and the material processed in the machine, between the rule and the regulated,
between programme and data and between the knowledge implemented in the
functional architecture of the machine and the knowledge processed in this ar-
chitecture.
As a description of these characteristics cannot be carried out on a mechani-
cal or formal basis the point of departure will be taken in sign theoretical con-
cepts.
As sign theories - just like mechanical theories - are anchored in a dualistic
thesis regarding the relationship between the physical and the symbolic, they
do not provide a complete conceptual basis either. They have, however, two
advantages which appear incompatible with a mechanical theory. First,
because the existence of a once-and-for-all given set of rules for creating signs
is not a precondition for the sign concept, whereas a mechanical system can
only be imagined with the precondition of an invariant and preordained
system of rules. Second, because a definite a priori assumption of the
relationship between the physical and the symbolic is not a precondition for
the sign concept either, whereas a given mechanical theory cannot be
imagined without some sort of a priori assumption regarding this. In other
words, by taking the point of departure in sign theories it becomes possible to
include in the analysis the axioms which are a precondition for a mechanical
theory. As sign theories on the other hand do not exclude the description of
mechanical and other formal symbol systems in advance, they allow the
theoretical openness which the subject demands.
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The main thesis of this book is that the properties which characterize any
use of computers and also characterize the computer as distinct from other me-
chanical technologies, other symbolic media and other symbolic languages, are
determined by the symbolic notation form. This is primarily defined by the de-
mand for mechanical execution, but - by virtue of this - it acquires a number of
properties which justify referring to it as a new, independent notation system -
called informational notation in the following - which differs both from formal
and common language notation systems.
As this thesis implies an assertion to the effect that a computer is defined by
this - unique - notation system, it also implies a negative assertion to the effect
that it is impossible to provide a description of the computer’s properties at a
higher logical or semantic level (e.g. as a logical or thinking machine), if the
description must both be valid for any application and be capable of charac-
terizing this machine as distinct from other machines, media and languages.
I am thus claiming that a description of the computer as a logical machine is
a description of a dedicated machine without the property of universality,
while a description of a computer as a thinking machine is rejected because a
computer - unlike a human being - does not possess the ability, so decisive for
human intelligence, to produce its own notation system.
On the other hand I am claiming that a computer can be defined as a multi-
semantic machine, by which I mean:
• That it is possible to use this machine to process symbolic expressions
which belong to different semantic regimes - whether these are linguistic,
formal, visual or auditive - with one restriction, that the expression
processed can be represented in a notation system comprising a finite
number of semantically empty notation units.
• That it is possible to control this machine with various semantic regimes
subject to the same restriction, as this control can only be effectuated
automatically for a limited class of procedures, while for others the
precondition is continuous human intervention.
• That every process performed by the machine is carried out as a
relationship between at least two semantic regimes, namely those which are
laid down in the system and those which are contained in its use.
In continuation of this definition the conclusion will be drawn that the compu-
ter represents a new, general medium for representing knowledge, as it:
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• is both a medium for the production, editing/rewriting, processing,
storing, reproduction, distribution and retrieval of knowledge. It is thus
possible to integrate the means of the production of knowledge (pen, paper,
typewriter, calculating devices etc.), copy machines, books, book sales,
libraries and postal services into a single and integrated physical and
symbolic system.
• that it is both a medium for the representation of auditive and visual forms
of knowledge, whether these belong to common languages, are formal, pic-
torial or auditive (e.g. music). It is thus also possible to incorporate in it mo-
dern society’s most important symbolic languages and forms of knowledge
in one single symbolic system.
• it is a medium for communication.
As a new, general medium for representing knowledge the computer is cha-
racterized by - what is in itself - an epoch-making integration of physical,
social and symbolic functions which were formerly distributed among separate
machines, institutions, media and symbolic languages. As this is not just a
question of integration in one and the same medium (such as television, for
example), but in one and the same notation form, which is defined by the
demand for mechanical execution, this medium for knowledge representation
has in addition a set of independent properties which also change the
conditions and possibilities in each of the possible areas of use. These
conditions and possibilities cannot be described under one heading and are
therefore outside the framework of this book, but it is possible to point out at
least four aspects of significance in all areas, namely:
• That a computer operates with an independent symbolic language which
may also contain other symbolic languages.
• That there is no invariant borderline between the knowledge contained in
the machine’s symbolic architecture and the knowledge processed.
• That the symbolic control of the mechanical process allows a multiplicity of
new forms for processing, organizing and retrieving knowledge.
• That a number of restrictions which were formerly attached to the invariant
physical forms of symbolic media are here transformed into - free -
facultative, symbolic restrictions, because the symbolic representation is
available in a permanently editable form.
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The following pages contain a presentation of the relationship of this thesis to
previous theories, a broader description of the content of the thesis and an
account of the construction of the book.
1.2 Earlier theories
If the existing scientific literature is grouped in accordance with its approach,
it is possible to point out four different main sources which have made their
mark on the understanding of computer technology.
First, there is a large group of sociological theories concerned with the
transition from the industrial society to the post-industrial information and
knowledge society. While the term information society itself appears to have
been used for the first time in a Japanese futurological study,1 the basic con-
ceptualization stems from Daniel Bell, 1973, who emphasizes three overall
features in the development: first, the growing extent of information work,
second, the use of theoretical knowledge as a »strategic resource« and third,
the development of new »intellectual technologies« such as the computer, the
two last features, according to Bell, make a social diagnostics possible which
can also be used to predict and hence prevent crises.
Where Bell in 1973 wrote cautiously of »axial principles« for future
developments, only 13 years later James R. Beniger could show that it had
now become almost trivial to refer to existing society as an information society
(Beniger, 1986). Unlike Bell, who defined the new society in contrast to the
industrial society, Beniger also stresses continuity, in that he sees computer
technology as the latest step in the series of - energy-based - control
technologies which have been created as a part of the establishment and
stabilization of the modern industrial societies.2
                                                
1 The Plan for Information Society - a National Goal toward the Year 2000. Japan Computer Usage
Development Institute, Tokyo 1972. Source: Göranzon & Josefson (eds.) 1988: 5.
2  A great number of corresponding works could be mentioned. In a list of this literature Beniger, 1985:
4-5, mentions more than 80 different suggested descriptions for that state of society which is now
generally referred to as the information society. A few examples will illustrate common features and
breadth: Posthistoric Man (R. Seidenburg 1950); Postcapitalist Society (Dahrendorf, 1959); End of
Ideology (Bell 1960); Computer Revolution (Edmund C. Berkeley, 1962); Knowledge Economy
(Machlup, 1962); Postbourgeois Society (Lichtheim 1963); The Global Village (McLuhan, 1964); The
Scientific-technological Revolution (Radovan Richta et al., 1967); Neocapitalism (Gorz, 1968); The
Age of Information (Helvey, 1971); Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972); Post-industrial Society
(Touraine, 1971, Bell, 1973); The Third Industrial Revolution (Stine, 1975, Stonier 1979); Telematic
Society (Nora & Minc, 1978); The Gene Age (Sylvester & Klotz, 1983).
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Second, there is a group of cultural and philosophical analyses, partly lin-
ked to the concept of the postmodern, partly to concepts of thinking
machines. As an exponent of postmodern theory, mention can be made of
Francois Lyotard’s description (Lyotard, 1979) of information as a radical
break-up of the conditions for knowledge structures - a new, postmodern
scene where hope is linked to the sublime, beyond the rational, deterministic
islands in the postmodern ocean.
Where the postmodern understanding alludes to a contrast between
controlling, mechanizeable rationalism and human thought, the theories of
thinking machines are built up around the idea that it is also possible to
describe consciousness as a finite, reproducible information or symbol system.
There is thus clear agreement regarding the understanding of the machine, but
of the opposite with regard to human thought.
The theories of thinking machines can be traced back to Turing, 1950, but
are given a more elaborate and ambitious formulation by Newell, Shaw &
Simon, 1961, and Newell & Simon, (1976) 1989. The philosophical aspects are
discussed on the basis of different perspectives by such authors as Bruce
Mazlish (1967) 1989, Hubert Dreyfus, (1972) 1979, H. & S. Dreyfus, 1986,
Pamela McCorduck, 1979, Douglas Hofstadter, 1979, John Searle, 1980, David
J. Bolter, 1984, John Haugeland, 1985 and Theodore Roszak, 1986.
A third approach to the computer can be found in the literature on the hi-
story of technology, but this is particularly concerned with the development
of hardware and consists largely of descriptions in which the computer is seen
as a further development of the automatic calculating machine, such as in
Herman Goldstine, 1972, N. Metropolis et al. (eds.), 1980 (with a number of
contributions from computer pioneers), René Moreau (1981) 1984, Bryan
Randell, 1983, Michael R. Williams, 1985.
Although this literature provides widely differing descriptions and evalua-
tions of the significance of the computer, there is a general consensus in seeing
it as a key technology which - for better and/or worse - allows an epoch-
making leap forward concerning the possibilities for social regulation and
control. Despite all other disagreement, the computer appears as the almost
perfect - perhaps not fully developed - automatic calculation, control and
prediction machine.
  This common, and basically control-theoretical understanding of the
computer is not completely unfounded, on the contrary, it is clearly in
harmony with the ideas which dominated the fourth group of main sources re-
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garding the understanding of the computer up to the 1980’s, namely those
theories which created the basis for computer development research.
Among the earliest exponents, mention can be made of Alan Turing’s
theoretical description of the universal computer (1936) and John von
Neumann’s and others’ description of what has since become known as the
von Neumann machine (Neumann 1945), (Goldstine & Neumann, 1947-48).
But the first general formulation of a control-theoretical understanding makes
its appearance in Norbert Wiener’s interpretation of the computer as a
cybernetic system, (Wiener, 1948 and 1950). Wiener also laid the foundation
for the later discussion regarding social implications in raising the question as
to whether the machine could be used as a centralistic, bureaucratic
administration instrument which would make Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan
look like a pleasant joke.
The control-theoretical understanding can be rediscovered in new forms in
the classic AI description (Allan Newell, Cliff Shaw & Herbert A. Simon, 1961),
in the reformulated AI descriptions which appear in Cognitive Science (e.g.
Zenon Pylyshyn, 1984) and a number of accounts on information theory, (e.g.
Børje Langefors, 1966) where the machine is defined by its computational pro-
cess which is described as an independent, finite, mechanically performed sym-
bolic procedure which operates on the basis of a previously established rule
structure.
The core of this literature was created around the basic symbol-theoretical
thesis of classic AI, according to which a »physical symbol system« comprises
a set of physical units of expression which can be joined together in
sequences and of a set of rules which can transform a given sequence to
another.3 But the group also includes theories which transfer concepts which
were developed to describe other linguistic media (whether general or formal
languages) to the description of the computer and theories which consider
concepts developed to describe computational processes as general symbol
concepts. All these theories assume, implicitly or explicitly, that informational
notation builds upon the principles of formal notation.
Loosely speaking, the control-theoretical descriptions cover what happens
in the time that elapses from the moment a programme is started until it has
been carried out as an automatic - and here that also means mechanical -
procedure. They are founded upon the basic assumption that the programmer
                                                
3 Newell & Simon, (1976) 1989: 112-113. The thesis is quoted and discussed in chapter 5, 9 and the
epilogue.
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and the user can be ignored in the description of the symbolic properties and
thus see the machine as an autonomous, linguistic or cognitive agent.
In this respect the control-theoretical understanding also includes the »con-
nectionist« theories of Cognitive Science (e.g. J.L. McClelland, & D.E. Rum-
melhardt (eds.) 1986) as the symbolic process is also described here as a finite,
mechanically performed procedure. But as these relinquish the essential
control-theoretical demand for a rational description of the symbolic rule
structure, the latter group of theories can also be seen as a phase in the break
with the control-theoretical understanding which, for the past ten years, has
also been the subject of growing criticism from other quarters.
In continuation of this a number of other theoretical descriptions of the
computer have emerged in which the idea of describing the machine as an
independent and automatic manipulator of symbols has been abandoned in
favour of a description of various forms of relationships between system and
use. Where the machine was formerly understood as an automatic calculating
machine, a mathematical and/or logical manipulator of symbols, or literally as a
thinking machine, it is now also understood as a tool, as a plastic, freely
designable material or as a (communicative and interactive) medium.
Exponents of these views include Alan Kay & Adele Goldberg, 1977, the
American Human Computer Interaction tradition, such as Norman & Draper,
1986, Terry Winograd & Fernando Flores, 1986, Scandinavian system
development theory, for example Pelle Ehn,  1988, while P. Bøgh Andersen,
1991 and Andersen, Holmqvist and Jensen (eds.) 1993, describe the computer,
on a semiotic basis, as a medium.
This development in the theoretical description of the computer can be
regarded as a differentiation between an increasing number of competing
descriptions, but can also be seen as a theoretical expression of a
differentiation of possible kinds of use, not least promoted by the appearance
of small, inexpensive personal computers which at one blow made a broad
range of previously poorly exploited applications accessible to a much greater
group of potential users.
While the control-theoretical approaches correspond to uses which empha-
size automatic procedures (numerical control of other machines, the
performance of complex calculation and control tasks, mechanical pattern
recognition etc.), the tool and medium- oriented approaches correspond rather
to uses based on continuous human interaction (whether text and image
processing, database retrieval, the use of decision supporting systems, virtual
reality etc.).
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Both points of view imply, however, that it is a question of a differentiation
in the understanding of the computer which raises doubts regarding that
understanding of the machine on which the analysis of its social and cultural
implications have been based.
In recent years a number of analyses have appeared which place consi-
derably more emphasis on the many human choices which can have a signi-
ficant influence on these implications - thus, for example, Shoshana Zuboff,
1990, who in addition to the automatic perspective emphasizes the informative
perspective, as well as Andrew Feenberg, 1991. A similar tendency is evident
in a number of detailed studies of the use of computers in companies, including
analyses which stress the social and constructive elements in technological
development.
By stressing human choice, the understanding of computer technology be-
comes linked to the question of the relationship between the respective com-
petence of machines and humans and the relationship between control and
democracy in the business community and in society.
Even if we subscribe to the - good - intentions in these confrontations with
a deterministic understanding of technology, we still lack a description of the
computer which will account for the properties which are common to every
possible type of use and will explain how these properties can be exploited for
the many - both good and less good - possible applications. The machine
cannot simply be understood on the basis of the intentions implied in its use, it
is also necessary to take into account the form these intentions will receive
when  implemented in this machine.
In other words we need a description that provides an account of the com-
mon platform which is the condition for the use of the computer, both as an
automatic control and calculating machine, as a logical manipulator of symbols,
as a tool, as a plastic, freely designable material, as a communicative and/or
interactive medium (whether for word processing or virtual reality) and also
describes the characteristic differences between these uses.
In its simplest form the problem is to explain how it is possible to use this
machine both as a calculator and a typewriter. But the question must be
treated subject to the condition that we can also use the machine to re-present
an indeterminately large number of other both symbolic and non-symbolic
processes. The description can therefore not take its point of departure in one
or another specific use. Although the computer was created as a further
development of the automatic calculating machine, it can no longer be
understood by using the calculating machine as a model. We must rather say
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the opposite, because that which separates the computer from the automatic
calculating machine is precisely that which also makes it possible to use it as a
typewriter.
While the computer and the calculating machine are both machines which
can be used for calculation purposes, the computer can also be used to repre-
sent and perform other symbolic processes and a great number of non-
symbolic processes. It is therefore necessary to describe how this machine
differs both from automatic calculating machines and how it differs from other
symbolic media and languages.
Mechanical procedures have also formerly been used for symbolic purposes
(e.g. in the form of machines such as the calculating machine and the clock, or
in the form of organized energy processes such as the telegraph, telephone
and television). In all these cases, however, we are considering applications
which are characterized by a single - or a limited set of - finite, invariant me-
chanical procedure(s) which establish the functional structure of the machine
or tool in a repetitive process. The individual machines and tools can
correspondingly be characterized on the basis of these finite procedures and
these are again linked to a limited set of possible applications. A calculating
machine cannot be used as a typewriter, a clock as a telephone and so on.
Where the telephone, the telegraph, the typewriter, the clock and the
television are concerned the mechanical procedure is completely independent
of the symbolic content, whether this be the meaning or the symbolic rules.
Where the calculating machine is concerned the symbolic rules (rules of
arithmetic) are implemented in the invariant physical structure of the machine.
In all these cases we can therefore speak of a clear, invariant division between
the mechanical and the symbolic, between the physical apparatus and the
symbolic material which is handled by this apparatus. In the computer, on the
other hand, the mechanical procedure which establishes the machine’s
functionality is defined by the symbolic material which is processed.
This difference has sometimes been cited as a reason for describing the com-
puter as a machine which is not defined by its physical organization but on
the contrary by its - symbolic - programmability. Although this definition is
both suitable and perhaps even necessary, it is inadequate for many
constructive purposes. As a description of the machine’s basic features it is
also misleading, because the computer as mentioned can only carry out a
programme by representing and treating it in exactly the same way as all other
data.
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While a decisive factor in the use of other mechanical technologies has
been to avoid or minimize the material’s effect on the machine’s organization
and mode of operation - or in some cases - to define invariant physical limits
for such effects - the use of computers is based on continuous interference
between material and machine.
It has sometimes been claimed that this property is not peculiar to the com-
puter and reference has been made to such areas as the cybernetic feedback
procedure used in physical thermostats. The comparison is excellent because it
can contribute to a more precise definition of the difference. While a precon-
dition for informational feedback in a thermostat is that the same physical state
- for example the temperature - always has the same informational meaning
and mechanical effect, the computer on the contrary is characterized by the
fact that the same physical state - in the electronic circuit - can have changing
informational meaning and be connected with changing effects. While the
thermostat is defined by an invariant and closed body of information which
has been implemented once and for all, the computer is defined by a variable
and open body of information as there is no invariant borderline for
interference between the knowledge which is part of the machine’s
construction and the knowledge which is part of its use.
The computer, however, is not the only tool which is characterized by this
type of interference between tool and material. The same is also true of
common languages and this characteristic thereby links these two media for
the expression of knowledge.
1.3 The structure of the book
The general sequence of this book moves from a description of the
development of mechanical theory on local, finite systems, partly in mechanical
physics (chapters 2-3 and 6) and partly in mathematical logic (chapters 4-5) to
a description of the informational sign’s physical, notational, algorithmic-
syntactic and semantic levels (chapters 6-9). In the book’s penultimate
chapter (chapter 9) the analysis is outlined in relationship to more recent,
semiotically-based descriptions of the computer, one an American, Peirce
inspired, the other a European, Hjelmslev inspired description, namely those of
James H. Fetzer (1990) and Peter Bøgh Andersen (1990). The final chapter, the
epilogue, contains an account of the theoretical considerations on the nature
of symbolization which have been of significance for the present analysis.
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As the book concerns subjects which are traditionally classed as mutually
separate areas the following contains a short summary intended to provide an
overall perspective of its sequence.
It has generally been accepted that the various post-war information
theories have their roots in theories of physics and particularly in the German-
Austrian physicist Ludwig Boltzmann’s statistical formulation of
thermodynamics from the end of the last century. In interpreting this
connection authors have often been content to supply a rather short summary
of Boltzmann’s work emphasizing his mathematical-statistical definition of
entropy as a yardstick for the degree of »disorganization« in a closed physical
system. The many references to, but few expositions of, Boltzmann’s
deliberations have motivated a more extensive treatment. This treatment led
my attention to another area which has been overlooked in discussions of
information theories, namely the break-up of the physical theories on
mechanical processes, which is a central theme in Boltzmann’s theoretical and
philosophical considerations regarding mechanical theory. Although
Boltzmann has had no influence on the reinterpretation of the mechanical
theory contained in Alan Turing’s theory on the universal computer, (which is
discussed in chapter 5) he nevertheless anticipated many of the questions that
arise in this connection, just as he established a theoretical model for
describing local and closed systems based on an arbitrary subdivision of an -
imaginary - finite space.
Where nature was understood in classical physics as a huge, coherent ma-
chine, Boltzmann’s view is rather a question of an understanding of nature as
a number of small, finite machines and, as perhaps the most far-reaching point
considered in retrospect, of the germ of a break with classical physics’
definition of matter on the basis of its - outer - extent and form. While this
definition binds form to its material substratum, (expressed, among other
things, in the demand that physics should supply a mathematical abstraction
corresponding to physical reality), Boltzmann’s statistical description model
paved the way for an emancipation of the form concept which would become
the point of departure for what - considered as a whole - can be described as a
neo-Cartesian paradigm of information theory.
The paradigm of information theory, which has been of decisive importance
for the emergence and development of computer technology, takes over the
mechanical and dynamic process perspective formulated in the energy theories
of 19th century physics, but at the same time releases the understanding of the
mechanical process from the physical binding to matter with the resulting
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development of an abstract, mechanical description model which can be
applied to an arbitrary area of matter - whether physical, biological or
psychological.
Whereas the mechanically based information theory follows Descartes in
the sense that it describes informational processes in the way Descartes would
describe the external, physically extended world, for the same reason it breaks
with the Cartesian construction because it now includes the - for Descartes
detached - consciousness in the same world of time and space.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the development of the physically-
based information concept - from the physical to the symbolic - up to Claude
Shannon, while in chapter 4 there is an overview of a parallel line of
development - but now from the symbolic to the mechanical - in mathematical
logic which leads to Alan Turing’s theory of the universal computer - with a
glance at the almost contemporary sign theories of Ferdinand Saussure and
Charles Peirce.
Turing’s theoretical description of the principles of an universal computer
are discussed in chapter 5. This theory, which occupies a central position in
any discussion of the theory of computers, is treated here with particular
emphasis on its new interpretation of 1) mechanical theory, 2) the
informational notation form and 3) the use of algorithmic procedures for the
mechanical linking of mutually separate physical-mechanical individual states,
in that his contribution regarding these three points is central to the
description of the physical and algorithmic levels of the informational sign
system. The point of view taken gives rise to a partial reinterpretation of the
theory as emphasis is placed on features which Turing himself did not accord
the same weight and because the conclusions which are drawn are of a nature
he would hardly have been able to imagine. This is first and foremost true of
the description of the notation form which is necessary for mechanical
performance and of the character of the universality of the machine.
This re-reading of Turing can naturally be discussed. But the choice of
Turing’s theory as a point of departure for the description of the physical basis
of the informational sign system can also be discussed - a) because the »Turing
machine« is not subject to the same finite conditions as actual, physical com-
puters - b) because Turing did not exploit the properties connected with the
separation of programme from control unit - c) because he was unable to take
into consideration the later developed random access memory - d) because he
worked within the image of a traditional, physical-mechanical machine - and e)
because he worked on the presupposition that all symbols were perceptually
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identifiable. The analysis of Turing’s work, however, provides several
important results; among them:
• That on the basis of his understanding of a mechanical procedure as a local
determination between two and only two steps, he laid the foundation for a
radical dissolution of the physical-mechanical machine into its smallest »ato-
mic« components.
• That with his description of how a formal expression could (and should) be
converted to a mechanically active notation form, he laid the foundation for
the informational notation system although he failed to notice the decisive
distinction between formal and informational notation.
• That he found the syntactic means - namely algorithmic organization -
which could be used for organizing both the physical process and the
mechanical handling of semantic values. While Turing believed that
algorithmic organization itself must be controlled by an integrated
mathematical or logical semantics, later developments have shown that the
algorithmic organization of a »Turing machine« is open to a multiplicity of
semantic regimes whether mathematical, logical, linguistic or pictorial.
• That his theory, although he and many who came after him understood it as
a theory of a universal automaton, nevertheless contains a more
comprehensive description of computers, as the automatic function alone is
linked to the performance of a certain - comprehensive, but not universal -
class of calculation tasks. Confronted with other tasks, Turing characterizes
the same machine as a choice machine. Whether we wish to use this term or
not, it does indicate a more comprehensive functionality.
In later chapters it will be claimed that the possibility of choice is decisive for
an understanding of what is called here the computer’s multisemantic
potential.
Turing’s’ description of the computer, however, lacks two significant fea-
tures. One is a description of the properties related to the separation of pro-
gramme and control unit. This separation was explicitly described for the first
time in 1945 by John von Neumann and Herman Goldstine and implies that
any part of a programme whatsoever can become an object for processing, just
as any data element can be utilized in a programme function. That a
programme can only be carried out when it functions as data, however, was
first clearly formulated at the end of the 1950’s by John McCarthy in his
description of a programme as a simple list of instructions and his creation of
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the programming language, LISP, on this basis. In the present work the theme
is treated in connection with the more general development of algorithmic
handling competence which is described as a transition to a second-order
handling or algorithmic handling of algorithms.
The second feature lacking in Turing’s theory is the physical definition of
the machine’s notation system which is independent of human perception. Al-
though Turing mentions this aspect in a footnote - and makes it clear that me-
chanical »reading« depends entirely on the definition of the symbols’ physical
form - he fails to take into account the possibility of completely ignoring the
demand for perceptual recognition and the possibility of utilizing an entirely
arbitrary definition of physical values and, as already mentioned, failed to note
any qualitative difference between formal and informational notation either.
The definition of notation units independent of perceptual recognition, on
the other hand, were familiar in the technical sphere, where for half a century
work had been performed on invisible information transport in connection
with such media as the telephone, radio and television. It was also an engineer,
Claude Shannon of Bell Telephone Laboratories, who formulated the first the-
ory on invisible informational entities, defined solely on mathematical-physical
criteria. Shannon’s theory has also had great influence in other ways, both on
later information and computer theory, but is used in the present context par-
ticularly as a primary source for describing the informational notation system
and the redundancy functions which belong to it.
This understanding of Shannon’s information concept as a theoretical
definition of a - new - informational notation system breaks with Shannon’s
own, more general understanding of the information concept, but it also differs
from much - not least - linguistic criticism of Shannon’s a-semantic information
concept because the concept, seen as a contribution to the construction of a
new notation system, is maintained here as an extremely useful theoretical and
operational asset.
These deviations from former interpretations of Shannon’s information
theory have set their stamp on the following part of this account because they
raise several questions regarding the theoretical basis for describing
informational signs. This is true with regard to Ferdinand Saussure’s and Louis
Hjelmslev’s distinction between the concepts of expression substance and
expression form and the relationship of the expression substance to the sign
function, as well as with regard to Umberto Eco’s distinction between
»signals« and »signs«.
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From a linguistic point of view it would perhaps be tempting to keep to an
established, theoretical foundation for as long as possible and thereby make a
point of maintaining or adjusting the individual concept in rigorous
accordance with the existing conceptual inventory. But with the point of
departure given here it might be more appropriate to see the relationship
between the informational sign system and existing linguistic theory as a
contrapuntal relationship where the concepts used to describe the
informational sign system have, on the one hand, roots in  linguistic theory, but
on the other have their meaning established in relative freedom in order to
prevent that which is new from drowning in old meanings.
The problems which emerge in connection with a linguistic description of
the computer can hardly be collected in a general form as they not only
depend on the computer’s properties, but also on the linguistic theory chosen.
The only practicable course has therefore been to include the linguistic theory
on the basis of its relevance to the description of the informational sign
system.
These sources (primarily Ferdinand Saussure, 1916, Louis Hjelmslev, 1943,
Umberto Eco, 1968 and 1976 and Eric A. Havelock, 1982) were not chosen to
ensure linguistic representativeness, but because they were considered
suitable for illustrating various aspects of the relationship between common
language, speech and writing, and the informational sign system.
The linguistic material is primarily included as part of a comparative analysis
of various forms of the use of notation systems (spoken and written language
and formal language) and the relationship between various forms of
redundancy used in these systems.
Redundancy is understood in a broad sense as a sounding board which ma-
kes distinctive expressions possible. The concept is used in music theory to
describe such things as recurrent patterns which are varied. It is evident from
this that the sounding board itself is part of the musical expression manifested
which can be separated from the physical background noise. While the
concept on the one hand is thus defined by the demarcation between the
symbolic sounds (of music) and other sounds, on the other it is defined by the
demarcation between the »more« distinctive from the »less« distinctive musical
symbols.
In a sense, the two definitions are circular because the musicality as such is
manifested in distinctive musical symbols. A given musical sequence can in
one sense belong to the redundant sounding board for other distinct musical
expressions, while in the other sense it manifests itself as such a distinct
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expression. Due to this structure a given element in an expression system can
therefore also manifest itself as redundant and distinctive at one and the same
time.
Although - or precisely because - it is impossible to define redundancy as a
concept with an invariant feature it may well fill the bill in the description of all
symbolic expression forms. However, as redundancy is regarded as a key con-
cept in describing structural differences between expression systems, a more
precise definition is also given according to which redundancy is understood
as repeatable patterns, structures or systems which:
• are characterized by the possibility for optional variation in the strength of
meaning of a given pattern and/or variation in the meaning content of a
given pattern
• allows - or depends on - optional use of pattern deviation and pattern va-
riation as a means of content variation.
The concept of redundancy is used here as an alternative to the concept of lin-
guistic structure. At a theoretical level the most important purpose is to dis-
solve the conceptual borderline between the concept of linguistic structure
and usage which has had axiomatic status in many areas of linguistics in the
20th century. This dissolution is first and foremost motivated by the fact that
the rule structure of language can itself become the object of semantically
motivated changes, including in addition the creation of new rules which are
not defined by the established rule structure, but also by the relationship to
the non-linguistic substances - whether the expression substance or the
meaning.
It may be possible to claim that this loss of conceptual precision, which will
necessarily be transmitted to other concepts, is an expression of a more precise
picture of the relationship between language rules and usage, but in any case
the redundancy concept allows a better understanding of the relationship be-
tween the different levels of the symbolic expression, from the physical,
through notation, to the syntactic and semantic, as the common question at all
of these levels is how to bring about expression distinctiveness in a given
symbolic language, partly relative to the underlying level and partly relative to
other distinct expressions at the same level.
As the primary aim has been the analysis of the informational sign system,
emphasis has been placed on a comparative description of structural dif-
ferences to other symbolic redundancy structures at the level of notation
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forms. The intention was thus not to fulfil the need for a more exhaustive
analysis of the redundancy structures of different symbolic languages.
The overall result of this analysis is that the different symbolic expression
media, spoken and written language, figurative and formal representation, are
characterized by the differences in redundancy structure at all levels, in the
physical articulation, in the notation system, at the »syntactic« and semantic
levels.
Although there are considerable differences between the redundancy struc-
tures of spoken and written language, they do have a common feature which
both separates these symbolic expression formats from both figurative and
formal formats, as the smallest expression units in the former languages
manifest themselves as redundant and distinctive expressions at the same time.
This double articulation is closely connected with the fact that the smallest ex-
pression units, which are also the smallest semantic variation mechanisms, are
smaller than the smallest content units.
On the other hand figurative and formal expressions are characterized by
the absence of specific, redundant expression manifestations.
Where pictures are concerned this absence is described as a consequence of
the fact that there is no fixed, pictorial notation structure in the form of a
limited set of expression units, as the creation of pictures depends on the
creation of form through an indeterminately large number of possible colour
variations.
Where the formal expression is concerned, on the other hand, the absence is
described as the result of a semantic operation: The formal expression depends
on the declaration of prescriptive rules or values which establish invariant,
semantically distinctive values for each individual expression unit. The formal
expression has a fixed notation structure and an arbitrary number of
expression units each demanding a specific declaration as a member of the
notation system. The smallest unit of the formal expression cannot be
manifested as redundant and distinctive at the same time. The prescriptive
declaration thereby allows the intended elimination of the linguistic
redundancy structure and takes the place of the linguistic redundancy by
manifesting itself as a stabilizer of meaning.
The meaning of the redundancy concept in the informational notation was
demonstrated for the first time in Shannon’s theoretical analysis of physical
information transport, as the physical definition of informational entities
includes both a definition of the informational entity relative to the physical
medium and relative to other informational entities.
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Shannon, however, confined himself to an analysis of redundancy at the
notation level with the result that while he could certainly define a physical
scale for informational entities in the form of fixed, recurrent physical signals
which appeared with a calculable, statistical probability, he could not separate
distinct, meaning-carrying physical notation forms from the occurrence of
noise in the same physical form.
Although his intention was to formulate an a-semantic theory Shannon as-
sumed - apparently unconsciously - that this distinction would be carried out
on semantic lines.
He thereby overlooked the fact that the semantic level is not only of signifi-
cance for the choice of distinctive notation elements, but also for the redun-
dancy structure which is a condition for semantic distinctiveness. Shannon’s
redundancy concept can not therefore be used in the analysis of the syntactic
and semantic structures which characterize different uses of a given notation
system. Nevertheless he indicates a method by which the semantic legitimacy
of informational notation can be ensured by adding an extra coding, which is
independent of (and has no disturbing effect on) the semantic content of the
message, to the informational expression. Shannon therefore refers to this
procedure as a means of ensuring the content of the message by increasing the
redundancy.
Shannon’s analysis thus shows not only that the redundancy function
plays a central role for the stability of the informational notation system -
which is not the case with formal notation -  but also that the redundancy
function is completely different to linguistic redundancy functions because
informational redundancy can, on the one hand, be defined independently of
the semantic regime in which the message appears and, on the other,  must be
expressed as an independent sequence of notation units which is added to the
given message. This is thus also solely a question of redundancy in
relationship to the meaning content of the message and not in relationship to
the notational expression. This use of a formal semantic as a redundancy
function is unique to informational notation. As the formal coding which is
added does not change the meaning of the message, Shannon’s analysis
shows in addition that the content of a formal procedure can be a function -
variable to the point of weakness of content - of other semantic regimes.
While the mechanical performance of the algorithmic procedure
presupposes informational notation, the algorithmic procedure is itself a
precondition for the simultaneous, mechanical and symbolic use of
informational notation. It is this relationship between informational notation
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and algorithmic syntax which differentiates the computer from other dynamic
media such as the telephone, radio and television and gives the machine its
unique symbolic properties. Implemented in this machine, however, the
algorithm takes on new properties at the same time because - due to the
synchronically manifested representation - it becomes possible to work
systematically with the algorithmic handling of algorithms.
The description of algorithmic syntax therefore includes a general
description of the dynamic and arbitrary second-order handling of algorithms
and a description of the linguistic dependency of the algorithmic structure.
The fact that the term algorithmic second order handling is used here
instead of the commonly used notion of algorithmic complexity, is due to three
factors in particular.
First, the term points directly towards the new qualitative moment which is
linked to the self-referential aspect: the algorithmic expression is handled with
the help of - other - algorithmic expressions, while the notion of complexity
primarily refers to a more complicated algorithmic handling of something
which is non-algorithmic.
Second, the term points, albeit indirectly, towards an underlying connection
to more comprehensive developments within the history of ideas, often
referred to as »the linguistic turn« characterized by the assimilation of
linguistic representation in the subject area of a number of disciplines.
Third, the term »second-order handling« is a more precise expression for the
dynamic procedure as it is realized in the computer, as every step here is
defined as a relationship between two elements. Although each of these
elements is related to a multiple of algorithmic structures, there can be only one
relationship at each step, where one element from one informational sequence
appears in one relationship to one element from another.
This definition of the algorithmic second-order procedure is not exhaustive,
but makes it possible to point out two invariant features which differentiate it
from the algorithmic first-order procedure.
• While the algorithmic first-order procedure can be characterized by the pos-
sibility of uninterrupted execution, the algorithmic second-order procedure
is characterized by the possibility of an arbitrary interruption. As such an in-
terruption allows a facultative continuation, the algorithmic second-order
procedure is described as a semantically open, syntactic structure. Chapter
9 contains an argument that this openness, which creates the foundation for
multi-semantic potential, not only includes different formal semantic regimes,
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but also informal regimes, in so far as they can be articulated in a notation
system with a finite number of expression elements.
• While the uninterrupted execution of first-order procedures is based on an
established sequentially progressing regularity, where a given element is
either defined by the preceding step in the algorithmic procedure or by pre-
viously established rules and definitions, the individual element in a compu-
tational algorithm is exclusively defined by the actual state of the total sy-
stem. To the extent that previous states have not been deleted, the syn-
chronic structure therefore allows an arbitrary use of previous states. The
previous states, on the other hand, have no influence on the later which
cannot be suspended or ignored.
As the synchronically manifested expression contains all rules, any rule can
become the object of a semantically motivated modification, alteration or sus-
pension. The synchronic structure, however, can only be handled through a
diachronically organized process which is subject to the demand for step-by-
step transition which is defined by the relationship between the total system’s
actual state and the next - binary - notation unit.
We can therefore conclude that the informational sign system at the
syntactic level is characterized both by a synchronic and a diachronic
redundancy structure. The synchronic redundancy structure comprises the
total system as manifested in a given state, excluding the notation which
defines the next step. Nor, as this notation can consist in a new input, does the
diachronic »syntax« only include the internal computational structure, but also
the chosen input structure. Within the diachronic structure, the synchronic
structure does not therefore appear as an ordinary syntactic structure either,
but rather as a - complexly composed - singular notation unit which can be
subordinated to another, complexly organized input structure, which again
can be an expression of different semantic regimes or purposes because the
input structure not only allows formally finite - calculative or logical - regimes,
but also informal regimes. In the diachronic sequence the smallest expression
unit (and smallest semantic variation mechanism) consists of the actual state of
the total system plus the next notation unit.
In continuation of this description, I claim finally that the semantic
restrictions of the informational sign system alone are contained in the demand
that a given semantic expression be present in a notation system with a
finalized, established number of expression units.
29
In addition to the general restriction there is also a technological and histo-
rical restriction, as there is a semantic restriction in the relationship between
the time taken by physical processing and the time taken by human
perception, because different semantic articulation forms demand a different
degree of dissolution and rebuilding in order to be represented in a discrete
notation system. It is thus insufficient to subdivide a picture into informational
entities. Pictorial representations also presuppose that the machine can operate
sufficiently rapidly to transpose the serial representation in what is to us a
simultaneous, visually recognizable form. As the time occupied by physical
processing is not restricted by the speed of human perception, this restriction
is relative to technological competence and not to that of the speed of human
perception.
The informational sign system can therefore not only be subordinated to all
the semantic regimes which already use fixed notation systems, but also -
through a suitable subdivision of the expression form - semantic systems
which do not. It is thus characterized by the fact that not only the notation
system, but also the syntactic structure have a multi-semantic potential.
Finally I claim that the multi-semantic potential of the syntactic structure
differentiates the computer from other machines and expression media and
confers on it its far-reaching civilizing significance, just as this structure also
guarantees that the medium always retains that form of unpredictability which
holds good for speech, writing, arithmetic and pictorial art. Although it is pos-
sible to describe the properties of these symbolic media and describe certain
restrictions on the type of knowledge which can be expressed through them,
it is impossible to predict the knowledge content expressed. Unlike other
mechanical media it is true of the computer, as also previously mentioned, that
there is no invariant borderline between the knowledge which is included in
the functional architecture of the medium and the knowledge which can be
expressed.
In the penultimate chapter there is a more detailed description of the informa-
tional sign system compared to James H. Fetzer’s Peirce-inspired description of
the computational process as a formal symbol process, characterized by the ab-
sence of the referential and interpretational functions in Peirce’s sign concept
and Peter Bøgh Andersen’s Hjelmslev-inspired theory of computer-based
signs.
With regard to Fetzer’s theory, which was formulated in opposition to the
classic AI concept, the central objection is that with his acceptance of Newell
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and Simon’s symbol definition as an adequate definition of the computational
processes (but not of the semiotic) he has in fact excluded a semiotic under-
standing of the computer medium.
Where Fetzer’s theory is formulated in opposition to consciousness-theo-
retical elements in the classical AI concept, but not with the idea of the compu-
ter as an autonomous symbol machine, Bøgh Andersen’s theory is formulated
as a contribution to the development of new areas of application (e.g.
»narrative systems«) based on a semiotic analysis, as he takes his point of
departure in the interaction between the programmer, the machine and its user.
Although the latter work was an important source of inspiration for the
present work, the emphasis has been placed on differences and deviations.
In relationship to the description provided here, the most important diver-
gence is that Bøgh Andersen (with reference to the linguistic definition of the
expression form as the perceptible expression) assumes that the computer-
based sign can be described at the interface level, while the underlying
processes are regarded as expression substance or sign candidates which can
be utilized in sign production. While this emphasis contributes to the
development and analysis of the visually expressed semantic potentialities, it
also creates an obstacle to the utilization of the non-visually expressed aspect
of the informational sign.
The theoretical criticism of this definition of the borderline between sign
and non-sign is based on the fact that the borderline between »system« and
»interface« itself is manifested as a result of sign work, namely the
programmer’s. As the programmer, who creates the system and selects an
interface, is himself a user and any sufficiently competent user can also take
the programmer’s place and alter the programme, the entire existing system
must be regarded as part of the informational sign. The relationship between
the programmer and the user must correspondingly be regarded as a
relationship between several different - and always at least two - semantic
relationships - for the same expression form and this expression form is, unlike
other familiar symbolic languages, not defined by the demand for
perceptibility, but by the demand for mechanical execution.
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2.  The origin of a new concept of information
2.1 Missing information - the thermodynamic demon
Modern information theories are in agreement concerning their origin in
thermodynamics in the last part of the 19th century, more precisely the
statistical thermodynamics of the Austrian physicist, Ludwig Boltzmann in
1872.1
In spite of many references, however, most are more than sparing, often
restricted to quoting Warren Weawer’s remark that:
Boltzmann’s observation in some of his work on statistical physics (1894)
that entropy is related to »missing information« inasmuch as it is related to
the number of alternatives which remain possible to a physical system after
all the macroscopically observable information concerning it has been
recorded.2
A laconic, but apposite clue. Information theory takes its point of departure in
considerations of the way in which it is possible to calculate the indeterminate
by describing indeterminacy as a quantity of a finite number of alternative, not
yet decided possibilities. The hunt for the thus more narrowly defined, missing
information became a central theme within both physics and the later
information theory.
What is missing, however, and what more precisely takes its starting point
here, is in dispute. The dispute is not simply concerned with the localization of
a definite body of missing knowledge, but also with the interpretation of the
epistemological implications. This is the reason why one and the same problem
has given rise to different interpretations within physics and created the
starting point for the paradigm of information theory. It is the latter clue which
is central in this connection, but it cannot be pursued without a glance at
physics, because the paradigm of information theory is not only derived from
                                                
1 Boltzmann, 1872. Both Kronig, Clausius and Maxwell had anticipated the statistical point of view in
thermodynamics during the 1850’s, but it was Boltzmann who was the first to give it a precise
mathematical form. Cf. P. & T. Ehrenfest (1912) 1959: 1-2, Prigogine, 1983: 405, Cohen & Thirring,
1983: V.
2  Warren Weawer, (1949) 1969: 3. Despite a certain amount of work, I have not succeeded in verifying
the term »missing information« in Boltzmann.
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the concept of missing information in physics, but also appropriates other
concepts from the thermodynamic reformulation of mechanical theory.
This chapter contains an account of Boltzmann’s contribution to this
reformulation, as he not only identified missing information with his foun-
dation of statistical thermodynamics, but also established the conceptual
framework which is the starting point for the paradigm of information theory.
This is first and foremost true of his description of the physical problem of
observation which is connected with the discrepancy between macro-physical
order and micro-physical (molecular) »disorder«, his use and interpretation of
statistical methods and his contribution to the development of the concept of
finite space as an abstract and arbitrary system.
Together, these elements contain a basic renewal of the mechanical pa-
radigm, because the mathematical description is developed here as an abstract
model which can be applied to both physical and non-physical phenomena
and processes. Thermodynamics hereby breaks with the understanding of the
relationship between matter and form in classical mechanics and at the same
time opens the way for the emancipation of mechanical theory from physics.
In classical mechanics physical matter is defined on the basis of form and
extent, the form is understood as the defining  property of matter and diffe-
rence in form is interpreted as material difference. In statistical thermodyna-
mics, on the other hand,  form is defined as an independent structure which
can organize an arbitrary material and the material is regarded - in Boltzmann
still only latently - as amorphous and without structure. The same forms and
structures can thus also be imagined as being incorporated in different
domains/substances. Mechanical theory can now be thought of as a purely
formal system of mathematical relationships which can be applied to an ar-
bitrary physical, biological or mental substance. It is true that the demand of
classical physics for a mathematical abstraction which corresponds to physical
reality is not abandoned, but the demand is manifested as a descriptive ideal
which cannot be fulfilled within the framework of classical physics.
The abandonment of a materially bound form concept, which opens the
way for the development of mechanical theories in a number of new domains,
also gives rise to another difficult problem, however, because the concept of
amorphous matter removes the justification for a distinction between different
domains - such as between the physical, the biological and the mental.
Given these far-reaching innovations, it is hardly surprising that several mu-
tually different interpretations and answers are given. There are also two
different paths which lead from Boltzmann’s thermodynamics to the later
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information theories. One takes its point of departure in the concepts of mis-
sing information and entropy and leads - as Weawer pointed out - directly to
Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication. The concept of finite space
is here interpreted as physical space. The second path takes its point of
departure in the concept of formally defined, finite space and passes, via
mathematical logic, to Alan Turing’s theoretical description of a universal
computer. The concept of finite space is interpreted here as logical space.
The two different paths from the problem of observation in physics would
later meet again, as both arrived at the idea that it must be possible to describe
both biological, perceptual and conscious processes, as well as the content of
consciousness as local, finite physically-mechanically performed processes
which take place in time and space. The two paths together thus comprise a
significant - although not the only - precondition for post-war information
theories, cybernetics, theories of artificial intelligence, cognitive science and
artificial life. As Boltzmann’s theoretical deliberations took the same direction,
his work also provides an early account of the epistemological problems
which arise in the later efforts to use one and the same mechanical paradigm in
the description of physical and biological processes, of the processes of the
brain and consciousness and of the content of consciousness.
Boltzmann’s presentation of the problem
Boltzmann’s work as a physicist took its point of departure in thermodynamic
theory as it had been formulated in the middle of the last century. According
to the first law of thermodynamics the amount of energy in the world is
constant and, according to the second law - the law of increasing entropy -
nature is subject to a law of irreversible development which will gradually lead
to the so-called »heat death«, where all differences in energy - and hence all
kinds of organization - have been neutralized.3
                                                
3  The entropy concept (»transformation content« Greek: en + tropein) was formulated in 1865 by
Rudolf Clausius, roughly at the same time as the energy concept (»work content« Greek: en + ergon).
Both concepts were created as part of the recognition of the connection between the material forces of
nature: mechanical, electrical, magnetic force and heat. Entropy is defined as a reduction of available
energy as it degrades into unavailable (heat) energy. The relationship between the different types of
energy was described as a relationship between higher and lower forms of energy. The idea was first
formulated by Carnot who established a utility principle on the criterion of accessibility or
inaccessibility, but this was gradually reformulated to a distinction between forms of energy of different
ranks and quality by Lord Kelvin - alias William Thomson - and Clausius. Mechanical energy can be
transformed into heat energy, while heat energy cannot be fully transformed into mechanical energy,
which has a higher rank. The same is true of electricity, while chemical energy (e.g. combustion)
occupies an intermediate position. The first formulation of the law of entropy as »heat death« stems
from physicist Helmholtz in 1854.
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The theory, however, could only be confirmed at a macro-physical level
through a measurement of temperature and pressure conditions, it was impos-
sible to account for the order of the individual particles in the thermodynamic
system. Here, spectroscopic analyses had on the contrary provided evidence
of a complicated micro-physical structure that could not be described on the
basis of ordinary theoretical assumptions.
It was James Clerk Maxwell who had formulated the problem. Although it
was not possible to observe the micro-physical processes, it was possible,
noted Maxwell, to imagine an ideal observer, a »demon«, equipped with such
refined, but scientifically describable means of observation that this, unlike the
physicist, could observe each, individual molecule which moved within a
closed physical system. He then demonstrated how such a demon could work
as a kind of perpetual motion machine as it could move energy from a colder
to a warmer place without performing any work, thereby undermining the
second law of thermodynamics - on the degradation of energy. This does not,
however, undermine the law of the constancy of energy, which means that
there can be no question of a perpetual motion machine which is capable of
producing energy from nothing.4
The talent of the hypothetical demon not only raised the question of micro-
physical order, but also of how the micro-physical system, comprising a very
large number of molecules moving in mutually uncoordinated paths and
unceasingly colliding with one another, can still, at the observable, macro-
physical level, show unchanged, constant properties.
Molecular thermal motions are most probably such that a given state of
motion is not shared by a large group of neighbouring molecules, but that
in spite of constant mutual influence each molecule pursues its own
independent path, appearing as it were as an autonomously acting indi-
vidual. One might therefore think that this autonomy of the parts would at
once have to show itself in the external properties of bodies for example
                                                
4  Maxwell illustrated his argument with a suggested experiment: The starting point is the experimental
knowledge that gas molecules in a closed container at a uniform temperature move at unequal speeds.
The container is divided into two parts, A and B with a divider in which there is a small hole and it is
assumed there is an observer (the demon) who can see the molecules and open and close the hole. If the
observer opens and closes the hole so that the faster molecules are able to pass from A to B and the
slower molecules from B to A, the temperature in B will rise, while it will fall in A. He has moved
energy from a colder to a warmer place without performing any work, which is at variance with the
second law of thermodynamics on the irreversible growth of entropy (in that his own operations are not
seen as part of the system): Maxwell, (1871) 1970: 308-309. Cf. Goldmann, 1983: 122 ff. and Klein,
1973: 74-77.
35
that in a horizontal metal bar the right and now the left end must become
spontaneously hotter according as the molecules happen to vibrate more
intensely at one or the other place, or that if in a gas a large number of
molecules happen to be moving towards the same point at the same time, a
sudden increase in density must occur there. However, we observe none of
this, and the reason why this is so is nothing other than the so-called law of
large numbers.5
In another, more recent formulation, the question is posed as follows: how can
a system made up of particles which obey mechanical laws that are invariant
with regard to the direction of time nevertheless develop in a certain
direction?6
Boltzmann’s thesis was that it was necessary to give up traditional methods
of description for the benefit of statistical methods designed to calculate the
probability of a molecular system being in one or other of its possible states
and then explain why a system could not move from a probable state to
another, equally probable, state, but only to a more probable state.
Boltzmann assumed that there was a corresponding number of different
combinations (imagined micro-physical states) for every macro-physical state.
He hereby describes a given macro-physical state as a closed - spatial - system
which is subdivided into an - arbitrary - number of smaller »phase spaces« so
that it would be possible to describe the micro-physical (molecular) state on
the basis of the distribution of the molecules in these phase spaces.
In the micro-physical system the most improbable state is characterized by
the highest degree of order. This state corresponds to a situation where all
molecules are concentrated in a single phase space. Entropy here is zero and
the number of possible combinations assumes the minimum value 1.7 The most
probable state is the opposite and characterized by maximum disorder, the
energy has degraded to heat energy, the molecules are »spread throughout the
system« and the number of possible combinations here assumes the maximum
value for a given system depending on the number of molecules in the system.
                                                
5  Boltzmann, (1886) 1905: 33-34. English translation: Boltzmann, 1974: 19-20.
6  S.R. Groot, Boltzmann, 1974: 3.
7  The salient point here is that this description does not emphasize the question as to where molecules
are gathered in the space - in which of the imagined phase spaces - but only as to the combinatory or
structural distribution of the molecules relative to the phase space. It is also a precondition that the
molecules move in discrete and instantaneous transitions between states, so that each particle at all
times is in a certain phase space.
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Boltzmann thus abandons a classic, fully deterministic prediction. But, he
claims, entropy can be regarded as proportional to the number of possible
combinatory states, expressed in the formula:
S = k log W
where S is entropy, k a mathematical constant (later designated Boltzmann’s
constant) and W the thermodynamic probability which expresses the possible
number of molecular combinations with the same macro-physical properties
(same distribution structure).8
With this description of the system »as though« it comprised a large number
of independent particles, each behaving individually in accordance with
mechanical principles, Boltzmann had indicated a method for predicting the
total state of the system with exactly the degree of statistical precision
required, even though it was not possible to describe the behaviour of the
individual particle.
The system was characterized by increasing molecular disorder (equal
distribution of molecules throughout the system) or »progressive elimination
of all original asymmetry«9 and it behaved, in spite of the molecular chaos, in
accordance with the law of increasing entropy.
Hereby, Boltzmann believed, the problem of missing information in ther-
modynamics had been solved. The statistical and probabilistic description of
the state of the thermodynamic system was a complete, exact description
which could also reconcile the law of entropy with a classical, mechanistic and
deterministic theory of motion.
The means to this was a new method where a number of - atomic - particles
was described in relation to a finite physical space which was divided into
smaller units and included all possible spatial positions. The idea of the finite
space itself was presumably quite obvious as it is the epitome of the containers
which were used to store various gases. Similarly, the purely formal or arbitrary
subdivision of the space resembles a simple reference to the three-dimensional,
spatial system of co-ordinates. But it nevertheless implies a break with the
classical conception of nature as one - infinite - cohesive mechanical universe
in favour of a conception of nature as a number of locally limited, finite
                                                
8  The - final - notation given here is from Max Planck. Thermodynamic probability is calculated as the
possible distribution of molecules in a three-dimensional, geometric model of a given system which is
imagined as divided into cells in which a given number of molecules can be placed. In the improbable
state the molecules are gathered in one cell (thereby giving only one possible state). In the most
probable state they are equally distributed in all cells (which would be the case for the maximum
number of possible states of the system). Cf. Witt-Hansen, 1985: 49-50. Flamm, 1983: 265.
9  Witt-Hansen, 1985: 50.
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systems. The break occurred as Boltzmann abandoned the description of the
individual molecule’s individual state in favour of the probable distribution
state of the total system relative to a formal lattice structure in a closed space
with a finite number of possible positions.
With this break the method of analytical subdivision becomes a completely
arbitrary method, as the analytical procedure is no longer a means to
dissolve a phenomenon into its component parts, but on the contrary, a
means to structure a formal reference system for describing - statistical
properties of - phenomena independently of individual variations.
But the solution had its price. The statistical description of molecular
»chaos« could not be understood as a phenomenological description of
molecular nature. Boltzmann’s answer to the information that was missing on
the individual particles meant that the door opened up on another area of
missing information of a more fundamental, epistemological character. Namely
the missing information which manifests itself as a difference between a
deterministic, physical description and a statistical and probabilistic
description.
There were two areas in particular which - notwithstanding the interpre-
tation - were difficult to handle on the basis of the classical Newtonian
paradigm in which force was described as an - in itself immaterial - function of
discrete particles’ mass and speed (or distance). One was the discovery and
description of the many different types of energy. It was impossible to
reconcile the Newtonian laws of motion, that described the meeting of par-
ticles as a collision, with the experimental examples of wave interference and
transformations between the different energy forms. The second was the
transition from a description of physically visible or perceptible phenomena to
the description of physical micro-processes which could not become the
object of directly perceived observations, but only be studied indirectly
through macro-physical, recordable effects.
Both of these problems were generally acknowledged, the dispute was
about - and is about - their implications. The most obvious - and at the time
most common - starting point would have been a reformulation of physics
based on wave theory, because thermodynamic theory pointed to energy as
the basic physical substance. But Boltzmann, starting with a statistical
description of the micro-physical system on an atomic basis, chose a different
path.
His solution to the specific problem of description therefore necessarily
brought about a re-interpretation of scientific epistemology and during the
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1880’s he turned increasingly away from the work on thermodynamics to
questions connected with the epistemology of physics in general. This change
of direction meant that he absented himself from the history of physics for a
very long period. During this period his deliberations are seldom referred to
and when they are, they are treated rather as an expression of a more outgoing
personal and philosophical interest which had little relevance to physics.10 It is
hardly possible to decide whether this was also the reason why he became
tired of life, but a certain bitterness in his latest work indicates something of
the sort. Boltzmann committed suicide in 1906.11
2.2 The price of information - Boltzmann’s dilemma
If Boltzmann experienced problems in gaining a deserved hearing for his
theoretical deliberations, this was not least due to the fact that he was unable
to accept the inability to solve a problem which - still unsolved - would
become central to 20th century physics, namely the relationship between the
descriptions of inorganic, micro-physical nature based on the wave and
particle theories respectively and the relationship between the micro-physical
and macro-physical levels.12
In his attempts to solve this problem Boltzmann started with the successful
statistical description of molecular systems. This description was based on
classical atomistic premises which now, however, had to be formulated as a
statistical and probabilistic description. The mechanical procedures which
were part of the description could not be understood as mechanisms which
existed in nature:
If the molecules and atoms of the old theory [Newton’s] were not to be
conceived of as exact mathematical points in the abstract sense, then their
                                                
10  A large part of this work was published under the not particularly apposite title Populäre Schriften
in 1905. According to Klein, 1973, Boltzmann’s difficulties in making himself understood were due to
the fact that he reformulated his position several times without explanation. Another of Boltzmann’s
problems, however, was that many physicists - including Maxwell, who was otherwise concerned with
similar questions - considered him prolix and quasi-metaphysical.
11  Flamm 1973: 13 and 1983: 274.
12  The problem had already manifested itself in the divergence between Newton’s and Huygen’s un-
derstanding of light as respectively a particle or wave phenomenon. It became more urgent, however,
because no progress had been made in clearing it up in spite of an increase in knowledge. It was no
longer enough to »simply« differentiate between what was known and what was not yet known. The
problem now lay in the relationship between the acknowledged laws of physics.
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true nature and form must be regarded as absolutely unknown, and their
groupings and motions, required by theory, looked upon as simply a process
having more or less resemblance to the workings of nature, and
representing more or less exactly certain aspects incidental to them. With
this in mind, Maxwell propounded certain physical theories which were
purely mechanical so far as they proceeded from a conception of purely
mechanical processes. But he explicitly stated that he did not believe in the
existence in nature of mechanical agents so constituted, and that he
regarded them merely as means by which phenomena could be reproduced,
bearing a certain similarity to those actually existing... Maxwell himself and
his followers [continued Boltzmann, thinking not least of himself] devised
many kinematic models, designed to afford a representation of the
mechanical construction of the ether as a whole as well as of the separate
mechanisms at work in it: these resemble the old wave mechanisms, so far as
they represent the movements of a purely hypothetical mechanism. But while
it was formerly believed that it was allowable to assume with a great show
of probability the actual existence of such mechanisms in nature, yet
nowadays philosophers postulate no more than a partial resemblance
between the phenomena visible in such mechanisms and those which appear
in nature.13
By looking at mechanical theory as a mental model which always and in
principle only expressed an approximation »bearing a certain similarity«,
according to Boltzmann a number of old questions disappeared of their own
accord.
As we know that both material »points« and »forces« are simple mental
images, we no longer need to speculate about how it is possible for a force to
be  emitted from a point which is simply a mental construction, or how points
can be united and become extended. As it was also possible to refine the
description of points and forces »as closely as we please« to an image of the
spatial world, this re-interpretation could be depicted as a practical expansion -
rather than a theoretical loss - of possible cognitions. This bore a similarity to
the old dispute on the relationship between matter and energy. By looking at
the theoretical concepts as mental images it was possible to avoid falling back
on the old metaphysical debates as to whether matter or energy is »truly
existent«.14
                                                
13  L. Boltzmann, (1902) 1974: 217-218.
14  L. Boltzmann (1899a), 1905: 216, 219. English translation, Boltzmann 1974: 91, 93.
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Correspondingly, from another article:
All our ideas and concepts are only internal pictures, or if spoken, com-
binations of sounds. The task of our thinking is so to use and combine them
that by their means we always most readily hit upon the correct actions and
guide others likewise. In this, metaphysics follows the most down-to-earth
and practical point of view, so that extremes meet. The conceptual signs that
we form thus exist only within us, we cannot measure external phenomena
by the standard of our ideas. We can therefore pose such formal questions
as whether only matter exists and force is a property of it, or whether force
exists independently of matter or conversely whether matter is a product of
force but none of these questions are significant since all these concepts are
only mental pictures whose purpose is to represent phenomena correctly.15
The theory thus allowed the Newtonian model to be preserved by under-
standing the concepts of both energy and matter as mental pictures which, in
principle, were only capable of providing an approximative expression of
certain traits in nature’s organization.
The idea of the mental, pictorial character of mathematical physics itself is
reminiscent of Descartes’ theory of consciousness, but with the difference that
the mathematical picture is now understood as a hypothetical approximation,
the legitimacy of which depends on its appropriateness. Mathematical
consistency is no longer a secure basis for a correspondence between concept
and the conceived.
It can be mentioned in passing here that Descartes saw this correspondence
as divinely given and certain. Boltzmann was also very much aware of the
religious foundation of the epistemology of science, but attempted to eliminate
its significance by pointing to the common - and inadequate - anthropocentric
basis of all the different ideas of god inherent in epistemological conside-
rations.
Here, too, belongs the question of the existence of God. It is certainly true
that only a madman will deny God’s existence, but it is equally the case that
all our ideas of God are mere inadequate anthropomorphisms, so that what
we thus imagine as God does not exist in the way we imagine it. If therefore
one person says that he is convinced that God exists and another that he
                                                
15  L. Boltzmann (1899b), 1905: 257- 258. English translation, Boltzmann 1974: 104.
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does not believe in God, in so saying both may well think the same thoughts
without even suspecting it. We must not ask whether God exists unless we
can imagine something definite in saying so rather we must ask by what
ideas we can come closer to the highest concept which encompasses
everything.16
There is no direct connection between the truth and the mental representation
- human consciousness - but it is possible to draw them closer together with
the help of an increasingly sophisticated and complex model construction and
the experimental experience of »facts«.
This was true both of classical mechanics and statistical thermodynamics
and Boltzmann took an emphatic stance as one of the few advocates of a
classical atomistic physical theory of his period, but re-interpreted as a suitable
mental model which could not be abandoned for the present. At the same time
it should also be mentioned that he often emphasized the great probability
that the mechanical model might have to be rejected - or radically changed - at
some future date. The postulate was simply that at the time there was no basis
for doing so.
2.3 The sign and the designatum
It is still a matter of debate whether Boltzmann represented a realistic/mate-
rialistic theory or broke with the idea of a mimetic/realistic correspondence
between the description and the described.17 A decision regarding this dis-
cussion can hardly be made because he expressed himself as an adherent of
both positions. We will probably not be much mistaken if we assume that his
original point of departure was within the realistic tradition, but it is equally
clear that he was in favour of retaining the atomistic model even though it
could no longer be seen as a realistic theory. This is the schism which is at the
heart of his theoretical work and it increasingly forced him to exchange the
choice between two different theoretical ideas of nature for a transition from a
classical idea of direct representation (mimetic reflection or Cartesian
correspondence) in the relationship between the world and the scientific
                                                
16  L. Boltzmann (1897b), 1905: 187. English translation, Boltzmann 1974: 75.
17  The two points of view are represented by respectively Broda’s and Klein’s contributions in Cohen
and Thirring, 1973.
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description to a new idea of the approximative description as a principle and
unavoidable epistemological condition.
... it cannot be our task to find an absolutely correct theory but rather a
picture that is as simple as possible and that represents phenomena as
accurately as possible. One might even conceive of two quite different
theories both equally simple and equally congruent with phenomena, which
therefore in spite of their difference are equally correct.18
Furthermore, Boltzmann is almost prepared to desert the idea of analogical
representation in favour of a semiotic description where scientific concepts are
seen as an independent sign system (where the greatest possible mathematical
determinism must be attempted) which does not represent, but refers to
another - natural - system.
Hertz makes physicists properly aware of something philosophers had no
doubt long since stated, namely that no theory can be objective, actually
coinciding with nature, but rather that each theory is only a mental picture
of phenomena, related to them as sign is to designatum.19
He had, however, at best only a vague idea that there was a great deal of
slippery material in the matter he had taken up. Even though, for example, in
introducing his lectures on mechanical principles he carefully corrected himself
and suggested the sign concept rather than the concept of mental pictures, he
failed to go into further detail regarding the implications of sign theory.
Nobody surely every doubted what Hertz emphasizes... namely that our
thoughts are mere pictures of objects (or better, signs for them), which at
most have some sort of affinity with them but never coincide with them but
are related to them as letters to spoken sounds or written notes to musical
sounds.20
He was not aware that the relationship between the sign and the designatum,
far from being given, would on the contrary become a main theme of the 20th
century. He was by inclination a realist and appears, in spite of his emphasis on
                                                
18  L. Boltzmann (1899a), 1905: 216. English translation, Boltzmann, 1974: 91.
19  Ibid: 215-216. Respectively: 90-91.
20  L. Boltzmann, (1897a), 1974: 225.
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the figurativeness of mental representation, to have regarded the character of
figurative and verbal representation as an already clarified, obvious matter.
The comparison of the relationship between the spoken sound and written
letter was not simply intended as a pedagogical reference to an assumedly
well-known matter from a different area of experience. It was a direct
expression of the fundamental idea in his understanding of the character of
mental construction of all theoretical and particularly mathematical-physical
thinking. That he did not - like Charles Peirce, similarly prompted by
thermodynamics - take the further step towards a general sign theory is
connected with the fact that he had a different view of the way in which it
might be possible to negotiate the gulf which opened up between the sign
and the designatum. The mental picture which pointed the way to physical
nature was not simply a sign, it was also itself physically manifested in time
and space.
2.4 The physics of thought
It appears as though this idea grew out of his deliberations on mechanical
principles, which did not simply exist as conceptual, mental pictures, but in the
form of independent mechanical apparatuses. Boltzmann saw these
apparatuses (machines, instruments etc.) as materializations of our mental
representations which not only - as for Descartes - included the inner repre-
sentations, but also the physical models and tools we surround ourselves with
and use:
When therefore we endeavour to assist our conceptions of space by figures,
by the methods of descriptive geometry, and by various thread and object
models our topography by plans, charts and globes and mechanical and
physical ideas by kinematic models - we are simply extending and
continuing the principle by means of which we comprehend objects in
thought and represent them in language or writing. In precisely the same
way the microscope or telescope forms a continuation and multiplication of
the lenses of the eye and the notebook represents an external expansion of
the same process which the memory brings about by purely internal means.21
                                                
21  L. Boltzmann, (1902) 1974: 214. My emphasis.
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This is remarkable because here Boltzmann expresses the opinion that there is
no path from the one »great machine«, nature, to the small machines, except
through human consciousness and sign creating competence. This also
explains why a universal mechanical paradigm must regard consciousness as a
function of the »great machine« in order to allow the existence of the small,
while a »local« mechanical paradigm for well-defined finite spaces both
provides the space for a finite consciousness and for a finite machine. On the
other hand, this point of view provides no answer to the question of how a
finite mechanical system can create an extension of itself which is at the same
time an independent, closed system.
Boltzmann insisted, however, on the mechanical idea and would not himself
describe it as a semiotic understanding of technology either. Rather, he
regarded the possibility of externalizing mental pictures as experimental
confirmation of the utility of the mental picture and - something that certainly
had a far-reaching perspective - as an expression of  continuity behind the
distinction between the concept and the conceived. The technological
materialization of mental ideas was a kind of confirmation of the validity of
these ideas. That the familiar mechanical technologies had no obvious
similarity to other visible phenomena in the surroundings produced no further
deliberations.
In regarding models and mechanical apparatuses as implemented con-
sciousness Boltzmann exceeded the bounds of the Cartesian distinction be-
tween the inner, which has no extension, and the outer, which has, precisely in
keeping with his repeated insistence that behind the apparent jumps in nature
there are gradual or continuous transitions, »nature knows no jumps«.22 This
had, he claimed, been confirmed experimentally time after time both in physics
and chemistry. Now, however, the question arose as to whether the same also
held true of the relationship between physics, biology and consciousness?
Descartes’ idea that human consciousness, although it belongs to the na-
tural world, but floats freely in a separate substance, had not only been
contested by Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century, but also early on in the
19th. Hobbes believed that thinking was a purely mechanical system like all
other phenomena in the world. He therefore saw no problem in the
relationship between the physical and mental aspects of thought processes.
This theme was raised, however, in the 19th century. While both Goethe,
Romantic philosophy and scientifically-oriented sensory physiology, as well
                                                
22  L. Boltzmann, (1886) 1905: 47. English translation. Boltzmann 1974: 29.
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as physicists such as Müller and Helmholtz attempted to describe the physics
of sense perception,23 Boltzmann, inspired by Darwin’s biological theory of
development, goes a considerable step further and claims that not only
sensation, but also consciousness and the thinking process can be understood
as physical processes:
The intimate connection of the mental with the physical is in the end given
to us by experience. By means of this connection it is very likely that to every
mental process there corresponds a physical process in the brain, that is,
there is an unambiguous correlation and that the brain processes are all
genuinely material, that is, are representable by the same pictures and laws
as processes in inanimate nature. In that event, however, it would have to be
possible to predict all mental processes from the pictures that serve to
represent brain processes. Thus all mental processes must be predictable
from the pictures used for representing inanimate nature without change of
the laws that govern it... All these circumstances make it extremely likely
that an (objective) world picture is possible in which the processes in
inanimate nature play not only the same but even a much more
comprehensive role than mental processes, which latter are then related to
the former only as special cases to general ones. Our aim will not be to
establish the truth or falsehood of one or the other world picture, but we
shall ask whether either is appropriate for this or that purpose while we
allow both pictures to continue alongside each other...
The brain we view as the apparatus or organ for producing word
pictures, an organ which because of the pictures’ great utility for the
preservation of the species has, conformably with Darwin’s theory, de-
veloped in man to a degree of particular perfection, just as the neck in the
giraffe and the bill in the stork have developed to an unusual length. By
means of the pictures by which we have represented matter (no matter
whether the most suitable pictures will turn out to be those of current
atomism or some others) we now try to represent material brain processes
and so to obtain at the same time a better view of the mental and a
representation of the mechanism that has here developed in the human
head, making it possible to represent such complicated and apposite
pictures.24
                                                
23  Cf. Jonathan Crary, 1988.
24  L. Boltzmann (1897b) 1905: 178-179, English translation. Boltzmann, 1974: 68-69. The English
translation, probably correctly, regards the German edition’s »automistik« as a printer’s error for
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The idea of technology as an externalized materialization of mental pictures is
thus closely connected with the idea that mental processes are not only
physically materialized, but can also be described with the concepts of
physics. That he ventured upon such deliberations was not least due to the
fact that the thermodynamic description of physical systems had reached a
new stage of higher complexity which better allowed ideas on complex or
hierarchic physical systems in which the higher levels possessed other - more
well organized - properties than the simpler, but less organized systems. If such
a description of biological phenomena could be given it also implied that it
would be possible in principle to construct artificial organisms, including
organisms which think like people.
Imagine there could be a machine25 that looked like a human body and also
behaved and moved like one. Inside it let there be a component that receives
impressions of light, sound and so on, by means of organs that are exactly
built like our sense organs and the nerves linked with them. This component
is further to have the ability of storing pictures of these impressions and by
means of the pictures so to stimulate the nerve fibres that they produce
movements that are totally similar to those of the human body. Unconscious
reflex movements would then naturally be those whose innervation did not
penetrate so deeply into the central organ as to generate memory pictures
there. It is said to be a priori clear that this machine behaves externally like
a man but does not sense. It would indeed retract the burnt hand just as
quickly as we do, but without feeling pain...
...In our fictitious machine every sensation would exist as something
separate. Similar sensations would have much in common and dissimilar
ones less. Their course in time would be that given by experience. Of course
no sensation would be simple, each would be identical with a complicated
material process, but  for one who does not know how the machine is built,
sensations would again not be measurable by length and measures, he
could no more represent them by spatial and mechanical pictures than we
can our own sensations. However nothing more is given by experience. Thus
                                                                                                                                           
»atomistik«.
25  Boltzmann adds in a footnote: By a machine I naturally mean merely a system built up from the
same constituents according to the same laws of nature as inanimate nature, but not one that must be
representable by the laws of current analytical mechanics; for we are by no means sure that the whole of
inanimate nature can be represented by these latter. (1974: 76, note 12).
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everything we are empirically given of the mental would be realised by our
machine. The rest we arbitrarily add in thought or so it seems to me. Like
any other person, our machine would say that it is aware of every existence
(that is, it had thought pictures for the fact of its existence). Nobody could
prove that it was less aware of itself than a human. Indeed, one could not
define consciousness in some manner such that it applied less to a machine
than to men...26
With this - hypothetical - idea of a reconstruction of a human being based on
the complex laws of physical nature Boltzmann not only anticipated the
theoretical and practical efforts of the 20th century to construct intelligent
machines, he also formulated three central criteria for this project. First, that
this would have to be built on the basis of the concepts we use in describing
physical nature, because all mental and biological phenomena have a basic
physical realization. Second, that such a reconstruction would necessarily
include a reconstruction of the human sensory apparatus, because sensory and
experimental experience are conditions for knowledge and thinking, and third,
that the possibility of such a project is entirely dependent on the definition of
consciousness.
The point that Boltzmann saw, however, was also that definitive arguments
can never be produced against this possibility because any definitive
argument would contain such a specific definition of consciousness that
consciousness could be reconstructed with the help of the identical, testable
specifications. We can never say never. As will appear in chapter 5, this is
exactly the same consideration that Alan Turing uses as an argument for the
future possibility of being able to refer to the modern computer as a thinking
machine without expecting contradiction.
Whether it is possible to manufacture such a copy is still a question of belief,
but it is quite legitimate to discuss the basis for doing it. Boltzmann’s human
machine implies the precondition that we are able to reconstruct human
organs on the basis of their micro-physical parts and functions. However, not
only do we not possess that knowledge, we do not possess the means to
handle the necessary amount of knowledge either. On the other hand we
know that we can only obtain these means if it is possible to carry out some
kind of - mathematical, for example - synthesis of the necessary knowledge.
This conflicts with two of Boltzmann’s central premises. First, a mathematical
                                                
26  Ibid: 183-184. English translation. Ibid: 72f.
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synthesis would only be an approximation which expressed certain, limited
aspects of what is described. Second, the very idea of a mathematical synthesis
is incompatible with his demand for a precise correspondence between the
thought and its physical manifestation. A mathematical synthesis could not
have the same extent as the unsynthesized expression.
The condition for carrying out Boltzmann’s project is thus that his
precondition, the unambiguous correspondence between the physical and
mental aspects of thought processes, is not valid. The project dissolves into a
paradox, it is only possible if it is impossible and this is due to the fact that
Boltzmann, in a circular fashion, ignores his own starting point: mental
representation, even in the most rigorous mathematical synthesis, is only an
approximation which in principle cannot reproduce all relevant physical
properties. This understanding of approximation is incompatible with a
deterministic theory.
In the final analysis, the paradoxical in Boltzmann’s project was connected
with the attempt to avoid the threatening indeterminism of the physical
theories with the help of a deterministic theory of consciousness. Even if the
physical restrictions are ignored, the idea of a deterministic theory of
consciousness appears to be extremely difficult to reconcile with the idea that
thinking has a content. As it can only refer to its own, previously known,
determined preconditions the thought would not be able to produce anything.
Prediction is reduced to a simple, meaningless articulation, a sign which is only
capable of referring to its own preconditions - or in Boltzmann’s case: its
physical manifestation - is not a sign of anything at all.
Boltzmann’s paradox, however, cannot simply be explained away as the
result of a one-off blunder. It must rather be understood as an early formu-
lation of an epistemological field of tension which has retained its para-
doxicality in the 20th century. Behind the paradox lies also an extension of
the scientific field of reflection which is still far from being thoroughly worked
out. This is true both of his idea of a physics of thought, the idea of an artificial
reconstruction of biological and mental systems, and a preliminary semiotic




Boltzmann built up his idea of a hypothetical machine-human on two central
theoretical preconditions. One was the new, more complex picture of physical
- especially micro-physical - nature and the thermodynamic theory of
development in particular. The second was Darwin’s theory of biological
evolution. Also propounded in this hybrid is the idea of biological evolution
as a function in and of the thermodynamic.
The basic idea is that, seen from a thermodynamic perspective, biological
organisms can be described as highly-organized physical systems. The fact
that this - from a cosmic point of view - extremely improbable situation
actually exists and even, according to Darwin’s theories, continues to develop
towards still higher forms of organization, can be explained partly on the basis
of the assumption that the universe as a whole is enormous and can therefore
contain local, more highly developed systems, partly on the basis of the
assumption that a continuing degradation of energy takes place within such
locally existing systems. The energy which comprises the conditions of life for
biological organisms is released through this process:
The general struggle for existence of animate beings is therefore not a
struggle for raw materials - these, for organisms, are air, water and soil, all
abundantly available - nor for energy which exists in plenty in any body in
the form of heat (albeit unfortunately, not transformable), but a struggle for
entropy, which becomes available through the transition of energy from the
hot sun to the cold earth. In order to exploit this transition as much as
possible, plants spread their immense surface of leaves and force the sun’s
energy, before it falls to the earth’s temperature, to perform in ways as yet
unexplored certain chemical syntheses of which no one in our laboratories
has so far the least idea. The products of this chemical kitchen constitute the
object of struggle of the animal world.27
The idea that human intervention in the natural process of energy trans-
formation could be of great significance for conditions of life must have been
rather remote to Boltzmann. It is more remarkable that three-quarters of a
century would elapse before the entropy-ecological clue he hints at here as a
possibility would attract broader scientific interest, particularly because
                                                
27  L. Boltzmann (1886) 1905: 40. English translation, Boltzmann, 1974: 24.
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physics, during the course of this century, has produced a dramatic expansion
of energy releasing technological potential.
Even without this development, which includes both a quantitative ex-
pansion of 19th century macro-physical energy releasing techniques and a
qualitative expansion with the 20th century’s micro-physical, Boltzmann’s
theory would have been far from adequate, however, and his premises are also
doubtful. The inadequacy lies, among other things, in the physical approach.
Universal heat death is irrelevant by comparison with the - much narrower -
biological boundary conditions which are neither within the scope of
Darwin’s nor Boltzmann’s ideas. The doubtful premises lie in the idea of
development.
The idea of development is beset with two uncertainties - both in Darwin
and Boltzmann. One is the lack of a possibility for pointing out or defining
certain natural initial conditions. The other is lack of an explanation of how a
cell, or a more complex organism, creates itself as a biological entity and how
this type of physical condition can again produce mental phenomena. For
example Darwin assumed in On the Origin of Species28 that there was an
original (divine) creation of a few biological species, (or perhaps only a single)
while Boltzmann believed that it was sufficient to assume that very complex
atomistic processes could reduplicate themselves
...by forming similar ones around them. Of the larger masses so arising the
most viable were those that could multiply by division, and those that had a
tendency to move towards places where favourable conditions for life
prevailed.29
This is the same idea of an already existing, mechanically executed »tendency«
(»instinct« or »intentionality«), i.e. a force which motivates a complex of atoms
to reproduce themselves as a whole which can then search for »the favourable
conditions for life« - which is the prerequisite in Boltzmann’s hypothesis on
the origin of consciousness or intentionality:
Sensitivity led to the development of sensory nerves, mobility to motor ner-
ves sensations that through inheritance led to constant strong compelling
messages to the central agency to escape from them we call pain. Quite
rough signs for external objects were left behind in the individual, they
                                                
28  Charles Darwin, (1859) 1964: 484. Facsimile of the first edition.
29  Boltzmann(1886) 1905: 49. English translation, ibid: 31.
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developed into complicated signs for complex situations and, if required,
even to quite rough genuine internal imitations of the external, just as the
algebraist can use arbitrary letters for magnitudes but usually prefers to
choose the first letters of the corresponding words. If there is such a
developed memory sign for the individual self, we define it as
consciousness.30
The lack of a possibility for defining the initial conditions, however, not only
implies what Boltzmann is quite aware of, that the theory is hypothetical, but
also that the hypothesis takes as its point of departure that - biological or
cognitive - phenomena which it will explain as the result of a physical
development must already exist before this development takes place. Darwin
assumed the existence of a few divinely created biological cells and simple
organisms, while Boltzmann assumed that molecular systems of a certain
physical complexity would receive the properties we describe as biological
and mental, including a purpose-oriented autonomy. The only question the
hypothesis fails to answer is that which motivated it, namely what can make a
mechanical-physical system produce biological and mental properties which
allow the system, among other things, to »escape« or avoid what we call
»pain«?
This objection tells not only against Darwin’s and Boltzmann’s attempts to
reformulate and expand a deterministic theory of nature, it also reveals the
weakness which appears in any deterministic theory in the unavoidable
meeting with consciousness. Not because any specific criticism can be made of
determinism, but because any deterministic theory of consciousness is a
contradiction in terms. If consciousness is determined by physical or
congenital, hereditary or mutated biological processes, there is no sense in
talking of human perception of the world’s organization because no statement
in such a case can be related to anything else, it is exclusively a passive
function which is in rapport with the physical or biological  system in which it
is realized at a given - already disappeared - time in a certain place.
Haugeland makes a similar criticism of Thomas Hobbes’ and David Hume’s
philosophical models of the mechanical structure of thought in pointing out
that, each in his own way, they end precisely by not being able to explain the
trait which makes thinking thinking, unlike the mechanical processes which
are not.31
                                                
30  Ibid: 49. English translation, ibid: 31.
31  Haugeland, (1985) 1987: 23-44. According to Haugeland the problem for Hobbes, who regarded con-
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Haugeland calls this »the paradox of mechanical reason«, but apparently
believes that it either is, or soon will be, capable of solution.
Perhaps the idea of automatic symbol manipulation is at last the key to
unlocking the mind...
he says in his conclusion, but does admit that another possibility can be
imagined
Perhaps the programmable computer is as shallow an analogy as the
trainable pigeon - the conditional branch as psychologically sterile as the
conditioned reflex... after thirty years, the hard questions remain open.32
When Haugeland, who in all honesty acknowledges his dislike of what he
calls the »intellectual anaemia« of scepticism, finds himself forced to come to
such a sceptical conclusion, it is well founded. A theoretical determinism
concerning consciousness cannot be saved by replacing the mechanical motor
with a formal automaton, however many built-in conditional clauses it
contains, because the formal procedure, unlike human consciousness, cannot
describe the rule structure of the formal procedure or interpret its significance.
The cognitive void which manifests itself as a logical circularity - even an
automatic circuit - at the same time makes deterministic theories of con-
sciousness immune to criticism.
It is perhaps slightly more paradoxical in Boltzmann’s case than in others
because of the degree to which he directed his physical research precisely
towards the questions which in particular undermine the classical deterministic
assumptions of natural science and because, philosophically, he placed such
                                                                                                                                           
sciousness as part of the corpuscular world, is that in order to explain the mechanics of thought
processes he must differentiate between the individual thought units (parcels) and the laws of motion
which regulate the movement. These, however, have the character of thought themselves (rules of
calculation) and their activity must therefore also be explained, which again demands an underlying
motor whose activity must be explained so that this results in an endless recurrence or in an
unexplained assumption of an inner homunculus which makes the system move. Hume attempts, says
Haugeland, to avoid Hobbes’ problem by denying that thinking refers to the surrounding world. He
»simply« sees the mechanics of thought as an analogy to mechanical physics and thus ignores the
question of what separates this mechanical system from other mechanical systems, but is still far from
providing an answer to what gives this mechanics its content of thought. Where Hobbes has a
homunculus, Hume has nothing.
32  Haugeland, (1985) 1987: 253-254.
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emphasis on the freedom and fallibility of thought - also with regard to the
perceptions of natural science.
Boltzmann takes great pains to emphasize that it is not only the senses, but
also human thinking that is fallible, but claims that this can also be explained
on mechanistic premises on the basis of Darwin’s theory.33 This is true both of
fallibility and the surmounting of its limitation. The idea appears to be that this
development, also within the realm of thinking, has the happy logic that the
fittest will win. In mechanical theory, however, there is no room for any
criterion of fitness. Another problem with Darwin’s theory is that it is purely
retrospective, it derives the prehistory of the later development which itself
can only be explained on the basis of an even later development. As it thus
contains no indicators for the future, it provides no means to decide what is
valid in the present.
It is not easy to understand how it is possible to reconcile the idea of
consciousness as an unambiguous function of physical laws with the idea of
correct and incorrect scientific theories. But it is also remarkable because
Boltzmann, as a corollary to Maxwell, so strongly emphasizes mathematical
physics’ character of mental pictures, which in the best case can represent an
approximation of certain selective traits in the physical world. It was here more
than anywhere that Boltzmann saw missing information of a more
fundamental and unavoidable character than that missing information which is
concerned with the number of alternative, micro-physical possible states.
2.6 Mathematics as an approximative model
Boltzmann gave several reasons for this schism. One lay in physical theory.
Although the formulation of a number of mechanical models of physical
energy processes had succeeded, it was clear that they should be interpreted
as conceptual analogies, they did not express nature’s actual »inner struc-
ture«.34 It is possible to express laws for both interference and collision in
                                                
33  Boltzmann understood Darwin’s theory as an - exhaustive - mechanical theory even though Darwin’s
evolutionary logic is filled with intentional and instinctual forces (both individual and with regard to
species) and assumes a divine creation long after the origin of the physical universe.
34  Paul Feyerabend draws a direct parallel between Boltzmann’s and Maxwell’s understanding of form
analogies and Bohr’s understanding of the “figurativeness” of wave and particle concepts. Feyerabend
1981, I: 12 (and note 29). It is perhaps more surprising that Einstein, in spite of his fundamental
determinism, also expressed great scepticism of the »precision« of applied mathematics. The differences
between pure and applied mathematics are very great, indeed, wrote James H. Fetzer and adds, As
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mechanical models, but not join them together to a theoretical whole. This
perhaps initially affected only the understanding of energy, but subsequently
also the realistic understanding of mechanistic particle theory and the idea of
nature as one great machine. The understanding of theory as no more than a
model was a consequence of the thermodynamic description.
Another reason lay in the understanding of mathematical representation
itself. Paradoxically, this limitation emerges from the success of mathematical
description. It became evident that it was possible to describe many, quite
different physical processes using the same mathematical formulas:
It often happens that a series of natural processes - such as motion in
liquids, internal frictions of gases, and the conduction of heat and electri-
city in metals - may be expressed by the same differential equations and it is
frequently possible to follow by means of measurements one of the processes
in question - e.g. the conduction of electricity just mentioned. If then there
be shown in a model a particular case of electrical conduction in which the
same conditions at the boundary hold as in a problem of the internal
friction of gases, we are able by measuring the electrical conduction in the
model to determine at once the numerical data which obtain for the
analogous case of internal friction.35
Physics was later able to confirm, to a great extent, that this applicability also
held true of the equations which in particular ensured Boltzmann a place in
the history of physics.36 But the advantage is connected with the fact that the
mathematical procedures have no reference to what separates the represented
systems. The same mathematical expression can only describe different
physical processes because it does not describe all the significant physical
aspects of any individual process. Connected therefore to each individual,
specific use is a detailed explanation of the specific conditions for use. Here,
Maxwell expressed himself more distinctly as - to a greater degree than
Boltzmann - he emphasized that the analogies based on the mathematical
equivalence between different physical processes were specific and that any
extended generalization of this equivalence must be based on step-by-step
                                                                                                                                           
Einstein remarked, insofar as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain, and insofar
as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. Fetzer 1990: 259.
35  L. Boltzmann, (1902) 1974: 220.
36  Cf. Cohen and Thirring, 1973 and Groot in Boltzmann, 1974.
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experimental instances.37 The choice of which mathematical expression that
expresses general laws of nature lies outside the scope of the mathematical
description.
The use of the same mathematical expression in describing different phy-
sical processes thus does not indicate that these processes can be subsumed
under one, general law. This multiple application is only possible because it is a
question of different physical processes which, under certain conditions, can
be regarded from the same reductive point of view. Conversely, a
generalization of the mathematical description must represent the physical
differences.
This is not only true of qualitatively different physical phenomena, but also
of purely quantitative differences:
...a mere alteration in dimensions is often sufficient to cause a material
alteration in the action, since various capabilities depend in various ways
on the linear dimensions. Thus the weight varies as the cube of the linear
dimensions, the surface of any single part and  the phenomena that depend
on such surfaces are proportionate to the square, while other effects - such
as friction, expansion and condition of heat etc. vary according to other
laws.38
Mathematical precision for Boltzmann is neither a certain nor sufficient basis
for physical knowledge. The mathematical formulas are rather excellent
schemes or models for handling things because they are independent of both
the conceptual ideas from which they are derived and of the specific physical
processes which are handled with these models and with the calculative
possibilities which are connected with them.39
Boltzmann’s deliberations on the approximative character of mathematical
description - notwithstanding their preliminary and tentative form - are not far
removed from the views of newer mathematics on the arbitrary, symbolic
                                                
37 According to Feyerabend, Maxwell distinguished mathematical formulas from physical hypotheses
and from form analogies. He believed that the mathematical formulas lacked heuristic potential. They
can help to trace the consequence of given laws, but at the expense of the »visibility« and »context«
(connections) of phenomena. Hypotheses are useful as guides, they keep sight of the physical subject,
but also confuse because they are generalizations expressed in a conceptual, theoretical medium. The
concept of form analogies serves to emphasize the need to test the constituent parts of all hypotheses,
step by step. Feyerabend 1981, 1: 12.
38  L. Boltzmann (1902) 1974: 220.
39  Cf. Boltzmann (1897c) 1905: 158-162 and (1890) 1905: 80. English translation, Boltzmann, 1974,
54-56 and 1974, 36.
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character of mathematical idealizations and it is possible to discern in them the
beginnings of a thematization of the epistemological problems which lie in the
application of mathematics to physics.
2.7 Summing up
When we read Boltzmann today it is almost impossible not to be struck by the
consistency with which he formulated and pursued the epistemological
questions which are still under discussion in relationship to the interpretation
of the physics of thermodynamics. It is not only Boltzmann’s still discussed,
specific results and answers, but also the methodical procedure and a broad
range of the problems discussed that have retained their topicality.
If we join Warren Weawer in claiming that Boltzmann was the first to point
out a specified relationship between missing information and physical entropy,
we can also add that he thereby not only laid the foundation for an
understanding of the indefinite as a number of alternative possibilities which
could be calculated with the help of statistical probability methods;40 with his
concept of the formal, arbitrary variable and finite reference system, he also
laid the foundation for a new mechanistic model of description and raised
many of the epistemological problems which were attendant on this method,
although not all.
Statistical description meant that he had to refrain from describing the
individual particles. He thereby left unsolved the main question, the rela-
tionship between micro and macro-physical order, but also added a new,
namely that of the epistemological status of statistical description. Boltzmann
attempted to answer this question in several ways. First, by claiming that
statistical description was just as precise and deterministic as classical atomistic
description, but the price was that neither of them could be considered as
phenomenologically valid. He continued to accept mathematical description as
explicatively valid, but still maintained that it could only be approximative. He
hereby conferred a new form on the epistemological problem, namely that of a
general problem of observation and description.
It was as an answer to this that he formulated his draft of a physics of
thought. Although he formulated this idea on the basis of deterministic and
physical thinking and therefore ran into the problem of deterministic descrip-
tion in the form of mutually conflicting premises, he still paved the way for the
                                                
40  Warren Weawer (1949) 1969. See chapter 6.
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scientific use of the philosophical idea of consciousness as a dynamic system
which would later give rise to distinctive theoretical innovations.
What he thus attempted to make cohesive can be summed up in the
following themes, each of which has attained central significance as an area of
discussion in the 20th century, but seldom in a similar, collected form:
• The relationship between the micro and macro-physical levels.
• The problem of observation in mechanical theories.
• The status of mathematical representation as a schism between the appro-
ximative character and explicative validity.
• The idea of the formal, arbitrarily variable, finite system of reference for
describing mechanical processes.
• The separation of the concepts of matter and form and thereby the break
with classical mechanics’ definition of matter through form.
• The relationship between information, energy and entropy.
• The relationship between the physical and mental order of consciousness.
In the clue pointed out by Warren Weawer, the connection between thermo-
dynamics and information theory lies first and foremost in the connection
between the concepts of entropy and information. This connection, however,
is not quite as simple as Weawer appeared to assume and for Boltzmann it
already implied a number of more far-reaching considerations on the
epistemology of physics and the possibility of describing biological and
mental processes (including the content of the latter), as well as the physical
execution of these processes on a physical basis.
Although both Boltzmann and Weawer believed that the problem of
missing information had been solved, they had completely different ideas both
of the problem and its solution. For Boltzmann this involved finding a
mathematical expression for an (invisible) physical process, which could not
be described exhaustively. He sought a method for extracting knowledge on
the way in which such physically indefinite micro-processes could manifest
themselves as a physical whole with well-defined physical properties and
believed that he had found this with the statistical and probabilistic
description.
For Weawer, who interpreted Claude Shannon’s mathematical information
theory, it involved on the contrary defining a general mathematical goal for
the frequency of occurrence of physically well-defined informational entities.
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Here the problem was not the extraction of knowledge either, but the stable
transport of knowledge.
Both Shannon and Weawer appeared - as will be shown in chapter 6 - to
understand mathematical information theory as a generalization of
Boltzmann’s thermodynamic definition of entropy, as Shannon »simply«
eliminated the physical constant (Boltzmann’s constant) in the formula. It was
precisely this constant, however, that contained the connection to the entropy
concept. The mathematical formula which the two theories had in common has
nothing to do with the entropy concept, but is exclusively a - relative -
yardstick for a statistical (im)probability, the calculative result of which
incidentally rests entirely on and varies with the chosen area of application.
The mathematical yardstick itself has no content.41
Where »missing information« in thermodynamics stems from the lack of a
possibility for establishing the initial conditions for a physical system - and
thereby also the lack of possibility for predicting the movements of the
individual molecules - mathematical theory is interested solely in physically
well-defined quantities. These quantities, however, are not concerned with the
organization of nature, but with - physically defined - symbolic notation forms.
The question of physical-phenomenological precision and the question of the
validity of knowledge, are not included in the mathematical information
theory.
The path from Boltzmann’s to Shannon’s theory thus traverses a gulf
which involves both the missing information and the problem of observation
in physics. That Shannon did not become involved with these questions can
first and foremost be explained by the fact that his own path back to
Boltzmann went via the Hungarian physicist, Leo Szilard, who at the end of
the 1920’s had proposed a theoretical analysis which was intended to explain
how it would be possible to maintain thermodynamic principles if the analysis
included a measurement of the energy used to transfer information from the
system to the observer.
Szilard proposed the theory with a - debatable - postulate to the effect that
it contained a solution to the theoretical problem of observation. But it also
contained a more precisely - and narrowly - defined concept of physically
defined information, as information is defined as a measurable amount of
energy.
                                                
41  Cf. Donald McKay, 1983: 489.
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As the information concept with this definition becomes a synonym for a
physical phenomenon, it has no place as an independent concept in physics.
On the other hand the definition contains the conceptual basis for a de-
scription of physical and informational systems as parallel mechanical systems
because the physical and informational entities are joined like two sides of a
coin.
As Szilard’s theory thereby becomes an important link in the transformation
of the mechanical paradigm from a physically to a mechanically founded
informational paradigm, it will be returned to in chapter 3, while Shannon’s
theory will be gone into in greater detail, but in chapter 6, as the intervening
chapters concern the - simultaneous - theoretical development of the idea of
the finite, mechanical symbol procedure towards the symbiosis of mechanical
and symbolic thinking in modern information theory.
Prior to this, the discussion of Boltzmann will be rounded off with a glance
at a couple of the other clues which, during the course of this century, have
secured him continued - and for the past 25 years growing - attention both in
and outside physics.
While the English physicist, J.D. Bernal, completely ignored Boltzmann in
his voluminous history of science from the 1950’s,42 there is widespread
agreement today that the honour of having introduced statistical-mechanical
description into the history of physics should be ascribed to him. Since then,
statistical thermodynamics has pursued another path, laid out almost at the
same time, independently of Boltzmann, by the American physicist, J.W. Gibbs,
who instead of describing a single system with many interacting molecules,
described a number of such systems with the whole system as an entity.43
But a lasting significance is ascribed to Boltzmann for his two more specific
contributions to thermodynamic theory, namely his description of the entropy
concept as a mathematically well-defined yardstick for the disorder, or
probable state, of a molecular system and his formulation of the so-called
Boltzmann equation, a mathematical expression of the state of equilibrium of a
system comprising a great number of particles.44 Certain mathematical
equations accompany both of these more durable results, which have since
                                                
42  J.D. Bernal, (1954). Norwegian edition, 1978.
43  Cf. P. and T. Ehrenfest (1912) 1959, which contains a detailed discussion of Boltzmann’s and
Gibbs’ works, John von Neumann (1932) 1955: 360.
44  The formulation given here summarizes S.R. Groot’s characteristic in Boltzmann, 1974: IX-X. In
E.D.G. Cohen and W. Thirring, 1973, the editors emphasize in the introduction that the Boltzmann
equation provided the first-ever precise, mathematical basis for a discussion of the conditions for a state
of equilibrium.
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acquired - and are still acquiring - many new areas of use. Shannon’s theory is
an example of such use.
There can be little doubt that these - rather tardily recognized - results will
secure a more visible place in the history of physics for Boltzmann, but his
rehabilitation is less interesting than the discussion and disagreement that
have emerged in the discussion of the implications of these results, which
concern both the understanding of thermodynamic irreversibility and the
relationship between mechanistic and statistical methods of description. The
thermodynamic entropy theorem as it was formulated by Boltzmann is still an
object of discussion, as he showed how macro-physical irreversibility could
appear as a - statistical - result of a mechanical (and thereby reversible)
description of molecular processes.
Boltzmann thereby synthesized, says Ilja Prigogine, three forms of descrip-
tion which had arisen separately, namely the dynamic description based on the
laws of mechanics, the probabilistic and the thermodynamic descriptions.45 But
that synthesis which was the answer to the problem for Boltzmann was rather
the new question itself.
Boltzmann’s influence can be traced not only in statistical mechanics in
physics and in Shannon’s and Weawer’s mathematical communication theory,
but also in Ilja Prigogine’s thermodynamic theory, which is a new attempt to
surmount the conflict between the reversible chronological symmetry of
mechanics and the asymmetry of thermodynamic chronology.
According to Prigogine the concept of dissipative structures makes it pos-
sible to eliminate the stochastic, probabilistic element in Boltzmann’s theory.46
Thermodynamic entropy, irreversibility, is explained here on a causal-dynamic,
mechanistic basis which presumably contains an asymmetric time concept.
Mechanical reversibility is hereafter a borderline case.
Another, far-reaching actualization of Boltzmann’s work can be found
outside the realm of physics and information theory - in a comprehensive
treatise, Filosofi, by Danish philosopher Johs. Witt-Hansen. Boltzmann’s
statistical thermodynamics is described here as a radical break with classical
dynamics, as the statistical point of view - used as an explanatory principle -
implies a new understanding of the concept of order. According to Witt-
                                                
45  Prigogine, 1973: 407.
46  Prigogine, 1973: 443-445. Prigogine’s theory is also statistical, as the molecular processes are de-
scribed as »ensembles« and not as the movements of singular molecules. The phenomenological or
realistic interpretation of the statistical foundation is also disputed. Cf. Danish physicist Torben Smith
Sørensen, who points out that it is impossible to ignore the lower limit of description in quantum 
mechanics. Sørensen, 1987: 48.
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Hansen, order is understood here as a combinatory phenomenon which can be
described on the basis of statistical probability, while classical Newtonian
mechanics was founded on a causal deterministic idea of order where every
phenomenon can be localized in a well-defined time-space connection.
Witt-Hansen sees Boltzmann’s statistical description of the thermodynamic
principle of irreversibility - today often called »the arrow of time«, after Arthur
Eddington47 - as a first and prototypical example of what he calls »ma-
thematical generalization«, or logically based extension of the conceptual
framework. He sees herein a general principle for transcending the
explanatory limitations of a given scientific paradigm. In Boltzmann’s case the
limitations of classical, mechanical description.
Although Witt-Hansen refers directly to Prigogine as a precondition, he
draws a different - less realistic - conclusion in that he sees the value of
Boltzmann’s efforts in another area, namely in his contribution to the develop-
ment of the principle of mathematical generalization, which according to Witt-
Hansen constitutes the only stable foundation for science and today is
becoming »fruitful in biology, sociology and futurology«.48
That he thereby presents a less critical interpretation of Boltzmann than we
otherwise find in present-day discussions, does not necessarily affect his
argumentation for regarding the principle of mathematical generalization as
the proper answer to explanatory limitations of a scientific theory, but it does
indicate a problem. Boltzmann’s statistical explanation of thermodynamic
irreversibility was later rejected as inadequate, the status of statistical
description is still an object of discussion and the law of thermodynamic
entropy cannot be regarded as definitively proven. Like Boltzmann, Witt-
Hansen also glides from purely epistemological to ontological reasons because,
among other things, he places so much emphasis on the concept of natural
constants.
When considered together these theories first and foremost indicate that
even more recent research has failed to lead to any final evaluation either of
Boltzmann’s results, or of his own interpretations. Boltzmann’s topicality lies
not only in some of the answers he provided, but also in the questions and
                                                
47  Arthur Eddington (1928) 1930.
48  Johs. Witt-Hansen, 1985: 44-52. Witt-Hansen’s theory stems from a discussion of thermodynamics
which intensified within physics and in the area between physics and biology, among other things due
to the fact that many physicists, especially after World War II, began to take an interest in biology. Cf.
S.B. Dev, 1990. Flamm, 1983, believes he can demonstrate that there is a direct line from Boltzmann
to quantum physicist Erwin Schrödinger who published his famous What is Life? in 1943, which
provided inspiration in such areas as the development of information-theoretical molecular biology.
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new points of view he formulated. The reach and character of these questions




3.1 Information as a function of energy
When we consider the conceptual tensions in Boltzmann’s reflections on ther-
modynamics, it  will hardly be surprising that he was later evaluated in many
different ways, that he did not found a school and, that his work has only
become the object of more comprehensive consideration within the past 20-25
years. It is more remarkable that there has been no clarification either of the
interpretation of what he meant himself, or of the answers to the questions he
discussed.
It is the ghost of the missing information and the proper interpretation (of
this) which still has not been laid. Boltzmann believed that the statistical de-
scription of molecular chaos was sufficient because it made it possible to
predict the general behaviour of the system with great mathematical precision,
although very little was known about »molecular chaos«, not even the fact
that it was molecular. Until the last years of Boltzmann’s life the concepts of
molecules and atoms were doubtful and of an extremely speculative character.
With the breakthrough of atomic theory, however, it also became necessary
to be able to predict the behaviour of the individual particles in the molecular
system.1 Although Boltzmann’s theory could describe how the micro-physical
system could affect the macro-physical level it was not adequate to describe -
and manipulate - the micro-physical system itself. The statistical description
had to be adjusted in such a way as to make it phenomenologically precise.
Lying in wait behind this was Maxwell’s demon. If Boltzmann’s description
of molecular disorder was exhaustive it would still, at the micro-physical level,
be possible for the demon to construct a perpetual motion machine - albeit
bogus - which would imply that the second law of thermodynamics would
have to be rejected. As atomic theory in addition made it impossible to simply
desert the mechanical description, a way had to be found to explain why
Maxwell’s demon still could not realize the utopia of work which cost
nothing.
                                                
1  Later there was also a need to describe thermodynamic systems of greater density. Boltzmann, who
worked with gases, assumed that the individual molecules could move freely with relatively long
periods elapsing between collisions and that collisions occurred »instantaneously« as collisions between
only two molecules »at a time«.
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An answer to this was first provided in 1929 by the Hungarian physicist
Leo Szilard who claimed that it would be possible to maintain the thermody-
namic maxim if the energy used to transfer the information from the system to
the observer were included. The energy used would compensate for the
increase in the system’s organization which was supposed to be achievable
through the activity of the demon.2
According to Szilard it should thus be possible to solve the observation
problem of mechanical physics by regarding the process of observation as a
physical process. Where the problem of observation had formerly been a
threat to the concept of a mechanical-deterministic system, it now became part
of the foundation of this concept instead. Observation could be included in a
fully deterministic manner in what was still a well-delimited system.
Although Szilard uses the information concept and talks about a physical
system which possesses a kind of »memory«, as a given piece of information
from the system also contains information on former states,3 his conclusion was
that the concepts of information and memory had no independent content.
The question as to whether there could be any sense at all in working with the
idea of a local, closed physical system belonged to a later date,4 but the
question of the relationship between the observer and the observed did not.
Szilard assumed that this problem had been solved insofar as it concerned
observation with the help of mechanical instruments which allowed a
                                                
2  That is, the energy which was necessary to inform the demon when it should perform its operations,
corresponding to the light energy which must be transferred from the system to the observer in order to
make observation possible, whether this be energy transferred to the human sensory apparatus or to a
physical measuring apparatus.
3  ...so behält der Parameter y zunächst seinem Wert 1 unverändert bei, so dass sich das »Molekül«
vermöge des Parameters y während des ganzen späteren Prozesses daran »erinnert«, dass x ursprünglich
in das hervorgehobene Intervall fiel. Szilard, 1929: 848. The postulate is that one parameter (x) can be
measured indirectly through the other because they are »indissolubly« connected through a measurable
entropy production. Later in the article Szilard talks of a connection endowed with a memory - without
inverted commas. Goldmann rejects Szilard’s phenomenological and deterministic interpretation
(without mentioning it) as he claims with arguments derived from quantum mechanics that the premise
assumed by Szilard, that the system contains memories of a former state, cannot be maintained. The
generally held opinion now is that the demon cannot work; to see the fast and slow molecules arriving
he would have to receive light from them, and, by the precepts of quantum mechanics, bouncing a
photon of light off a molecule alters its velocity, so the demon could no longer tell if it was fast or
slow. Goldmann, 1983: 123.
4  The truth is that isolated systems are not found at the microscopic level. The effect of the weak
disturbances coming from outside would be such  that the newly-formed speed correlations would be
continuously destroyed and the finely-drawn trajectories would be smeared as though by a big eraser,
wrote thermodynamician Torben Smith Sørensen, but here in a criticism of Ilja Prigogine. Sørensen
1987: 50. Boltzmann incidentally had also more speculatively pointed out that no sharp borderline
could be drawn between a local system and the total cosmic system.  
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complete observation of all desired, quantifiable relationships, but his argu-
ment was based on two dubious premises. First, the theory presupposed that
this was a question of a simple mechanical transfer of energy from an object to
- a passive - means of observation. That is, classical conditions which cannot
be fulfilled within quantum physics, for example. Second, the theory
presupposed that it was possible to describe the use of a mechanical
measuring apparatus as a physical-mechanical process. A measuring apparatus,
however, can only measure something if it contains a symbolically defined
yardstick which establishes the legitimate scale of physical sensitivity. Nor can
the measuring apparatus simply receive signals. It must also be possible to read
it, as it cannot read itself.
The description of the physically organized transfer of information must
therefore, claimed the Hungarian born quantum physicist and mathematician,
John von Neumann, also be capable of following the energy process through
the human sensory apparatus:
First, it is inherently entirely correct that the measurement or the related
process of the subjective perception is a new entity relative to the physical
environment and is not reducible to the latter. Indeed, subjective perception
leads us into the intellectual inner life of the individual, which is extra-
observational by its very nature (since it must be taken for granted by any
conceivable observation or experiment)... Nevertheless, it is a fundamental
requirement of the scientific viewpoint - the so-called principle of the
psycho-physical parallelism - that it must be possible so to describe the
extra-physical process of the subjective perception, as if it were in reality in
the physical world - i.e., to assign to its parts equivalent physical processes
in the objective environment, in ordinary space.5
von Neumann visualized a situation in which taking a temperature reading
would therefore in principle first involve taking the reading, then giving an
account of the heating of the mercury column, its expansion and the resultant
length registered by the observer and then, by taking the reflection of light
into account, measuring the quantity of light which reached the eye, the
refraction in the lens of the eye and describing the picture on the retina. If
                                                
5  John von Neumann, (1932) 1955: 418-419. von Neumann, who later became a main figure in the
development of American computer technology, was born in Budapest in 1903. He studied in Berlin,
Zürich and Budapest. Taught at the universities of Berlin and Hamburg respectively 1927-1930, then at
Princeton University. He later became an American citizen.
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physiological knowledge had not been so limited, it would then also be
possible to trace the chemical reactions which produce the picture impression
in the brain.
The point, however, was not that it would be possible in this way, without
further ado, to substitute the concept of an observer with a description of the
sequence of physical laws in the observation process. The point was that in
possessing these possibilities for describing the various parts of the process,
we make it possible to freely establish several different limitations between the
observer and the system. He therefore sought to solve the problem with the
mathematical proof that by choosing several different limitations it would be
possible to arrive at the same result.6
Both Szilard and von Neumann placed great emphasis on the demand for a
phenomenologically valid description, but their demonstrations were of a
mathematical-logical and theoretical character. Their answer to the problem of
observation bequeathed by Maxwell and Boltzmann presupposed that the
acceptance of the mathematical description be understood as a
phenomenologically valid representation, in von Neumann’s case supported
by the idea of psycho-physical parallelism, which presented the demand for
representation as fulfilled if, in principle, it was possible to take into account
the physical dimension of human observation.
This, however, is not easy. The problem of observation had come to stay.
3.2 The problem of observation in 20th century physics
It is undoubtedly irreversibility that has dominated the idea of thermody-
namics during the 20th century, not least outside physics, but the interpre-
tation of irreversibility is not the only epistemological problem which has been
raised.
Thus nobody has yet succeeded in connecting the irreversibility of thermo-
dynamics with the physics of quantum mechanics in which a description
related to classical assumptions of reversibility has been maintained, but which
at the same time relinquishes the idea of a complete description, understood as
a simultaneous description of the speed and position of subatomic particles.
                                                
6  Ibid: 420-445.
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The two theories, however, concur in according a central position to the
problem of observation and share this concurrence with a third new energy
paradigm of the period, the theories of relativity.
There is nothing new or strange in the fact that these theories also take up
the problem of observation, all theories which aim at reaching a generalized
statement do so. The remarkable lies rather in the fact that physical research
into micro-physical energy processes gave rise to a treatment of the problem of
observation in three very different - and still incompatible - ways.
All three theories agree - as something new in physics - in regarding the
observation situation as an integrated component of that phenomenon or the
phenomena which are observed and all three theories identify the observer
with the physical measuring apparatus without »subjectivistic« implications, as
the observer is seen as an equally »pure« physical category as the phenomena.
The theory of relativity and quantum physics also assume the same -
synonymous - relationship between information and energy that was
formulated in thermodynamics, because in both cases the problem of
observation is treated as a question which exclusively concerns acquiring a
knowledge of the energy process between the means of observation and the
system. But here the agreement ends and the information concept only
appears within thermodynamics.7
Einstein had no need of an information concept, but could stick to a rein-
terpretation and extension of the energy concept because he maintained the
classical assumption of realistic theory that a complete physical description of
a system was possible. The concept was also out of the question in quantum
mechanics because here it was maintained that it was impossible in principle to
                                                
7  The formulation in quantum mechanics of the problem of observation »the difficulty of diffe-
rentiating between subject and object« (Niels Bohr) has often been described as unsatisfactory due to its
»subjectivistic implications«. But if there are subjectivistic elements in Bohr, they do not lie in his
view of the observation situation (where the problem is one of giving an account of the micro-physical
processes/phenomena, which are inextricably bound up with the observation). They lie rather in his
constant emphasis on the fundamental border of knowledge and the provisional character of scientific
theories. Cf. Paul Feyerabend, 1981, 1: chapters 16-17. The border which disappears, says Feyerabend,
taking his example from Bohr’s formulations and as a criticism of Karl Popper’s positivistic criticism
of Bohr’s subjectivism, is not between the observer and the »world«, but between the atomic
phenomena and the physical means of observation: There is no ‘ghost’ to be exorcized from quantum
mechanics. Feyerabend, 1981, 1: 280. That there is no ghost is due, according to Feyerabend, to the
fact that the indefinable border between subject and object does not involve the observer’s
consciousness, but only the physical arrangement of the observation. In the meantime, however, it has
become more difficult to talk of a well-defined border between cognitive, sensory and physical
processes. Psycho-physical parallelism is still unable to give an account of how it could be possible for
a physical-mechanical system to come into possession of mental properties.
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obtain any other knowledge of the system than that which could be obtained
through measurements of those energy states which could be measured.
Although the problem of observation is thus treated as a purely physical
problem of energy measurement in all three theories, the physical observer (sy-
nonymously termed the experimental test set-up, or the observation situation)
is included in three completely different ways.
In thermodynamics the observer is understood as a receiver to which the
system gives off a certain amount of energy in a manner that can be described
in ordinary deterministic terms. The thermodynamic system from which the
energy is given off must, however, be described in statistical terms and the
system is characterized by a non-classical irreversibility.
In theories of relativity the observer is understood as a physical body with a
determinable velocity and position which must be taken into account in its
relationship to the velocity and position of the observed phenomena. Here it is
not the observation process, but the observer, that is included in the physical
system which is described on the basis of a classical deterministic
representation theory.
In quantum mechanics, on the other hand, the observer is included in such a
significant interchange with that which is observed, that it is regarded as
impossible to speak of a phenomenon which exists independently of the
observation, just as it is regarded as impossible to provide a total description of
the observation situation’s effect on the observed surroundings. In quantum
mechanics the observer can no longer be reduced to a passive or well-defined
receiver. Quantum mechanical theory also further assumes that there is a lower
border threshold for the validity of scientific concepts and thereby turns the
relationship between the language of description and the described into a
chronic epistemological problem.8
The problem that motivates the use of the information concept, is thus
included in all three theories as an important interpretation theme, but the
                                                
8  The assumption by quantum mechanics of such a lower border threshold is defined by the lack of
possibility for simultaneous determination of a particle’s position and momentum while observation
rests on the use of traditional measuring apparatuses which depend on »classical« assumptions. This
limit for description indicates that the »classical« concepts of particles and energy cannot be applied to
subatomic nature. This is expressed in Bohr’s warning that there seems to be »an essential failure of the
pictures in space and time on which the description of natural phenomena has hitherto been based«.
(Here quoted from Feyerabend, 1981:283). This limitation is thus not identical to the conceptual limit
Boltzmann touches on with his concept of the approximative character of mathematical description,
which on the one hand was a general trait of any mathematical application, but on the other a trait
whose significance could be reduced to the verge of disappearance through an increasingly refined »ap-
proximation«.
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theories look at the problem on the basis of different epistemologies. A diver-
gence that can initially be justified because this is a question of descriptions of
different aspects and levels of physical nature.
We hereby obtain an explanation of why the information concept remained
rudimentary in physics even though the problem of observation which
underlies it became central both to relativity theories and to quantum physics.
And we also obtain an equally clear expression of the fact that the use of the
information concept within the world of theoretical physics requires a non-
deterministic theory.
But as the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics eliminate the infor-
mation concept - and the threat of indeterminism - in two mutually con-
tradictory ways, together they provide a reason to maintain that the problem
which brought about the use of the information concept still exists. The
general validity of their respective solutions of the problem of observation
must therefore also still be disputed.9
The information concept disappeared again from the history of physics, but
the problem of observation remained in physical theory, where it had been left
behind when the physically defined information concept was later taken up in
an information theoretical context.
3.3 Energy and information
Notwithstanding the explanatory value accorded to mathematical demon-
stration, there was a new accentuation in Szilard’s use of the information
concept. Although Boltzmann had pointed to a connection between the phy-
sical system and the possibility of obtaining information on the system and in
spite of his attempts to sketch a general physicalistic theory of consciousness,
he failed to make a connection between certain physical and informational
entities. This was not a question of a break with more traditional views of
information as a concept for general - e.g. physically relevant - knowledge. In
Szilard the beginning of such a break is hinted at both in the sense that here
only information as a measured expression for a quantity of energy is being
considered and in the sense that there is a reference to a description of the
                                                
9  This also appears to create problems for the suitability of the mathematical generalization procedure
to solve epistemological problems. Witt-Hansen, op. cit. describes both Einstein’s and Bohr’s theories
as examples of this procedure, which implies that the fulfilment of its criteria, even within two such
closely related areas, may well have inconsistency as its product.
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transference of information as a physical process, subject to - and therefore
calculable on the basis of - the laws of physics. This, however, requires a more
explicit thematization of the problem of observation, which in Boltzmann was
described as a general epistemological problem connected with the creation of
mental pictures as a cognitive precondition.
Szilard’s emphasis on the observer’s significance for the observation is far
greater than Boltzmann’s, which is hardly surprising, as the way this problem
presents itself had in the meantime merged into the foreground of physics. In
Szilard this is a question of a growing clarification won at the expense of a
considerable narrowing the of the information concept.
This exclusively concerns the information on a physical system’s energy
state which is contained in the system in the form of energy. The question was
the extent to which the information could be measured. A precondition for
this, on the one hand, is that the energy which is released as information from a
system is the only exchange of energy between the system and the
surrounding world and, on the other, that the sought-after information on the
state of the system is an exhaustive fund of information on the system. The
information concept is thus defined solely on the basis of the parameters
which are included in the given measurement of physical energy processes.
That it was assumed that a certain amount of released energy is syno-
nymous with a certain quantity of information is due to the fact that the search
was for information on the released energy and the system it was released
from, but this assumption also implies a limitation in the way the information
concept is regarded, as it excludes all considerations of information which are
not information on the physical entity which bears the information. The
information concept is thus only the other aspect of the energy concept, the
concept of what we can discover about energy by measuring it. When
information is understood as information on the quantity of energy, it can
therefore also be measured and treated as energy.
If the concept of information is defined as a mimetic reflection of the energy
which transports the information, there is no obvious reason at all to introduce
the concept as an independent concept in physics either.10
According to this definition a physical information concept only has an
independent content in physics if - as was the case of thermodynamics after
                                                
10  The degree to which a more comprehensive physical information theory is possible, or has meaning,
can be discussed. But as we know, on the one hand, that the same information can have different
physical representations and that the same physical quantity of energy can transfer different quantities of
information as well as information with different contents, it is clear that a theory based on the
synonymity of energy and information can at best only concern a borderline case.
71
Maxwell - we have a problem of observation which concerns the possibility of
maintaining a deterministic understanding of physical nature itself, which in a
different light means that the use of the information concept was an indication
of an epistemological conflict in relationship to classical physical theory.
The justification of the concept (or the meaning of its use) lay in the fact
that it expressed this problem in discourse. In responding to this no attempt
was made to extend physics by introducing a new concept, on the contrary,
efforts were directed towards  making it superfluous by reducing its possible
content in such a way that it could be expressed by establishing a measu-
rement of physical energy. The problem of description could be solved by al-
lowing the information concept to disappear. It was thus a concept which at
once cloaked and kept open a place for a problem which is concerned with
establishing a connection between a certain physical form and a certain
meaning. In this sense the apparently paradoxical idea of »missing
information« was rather a pleonasm. The concept of information only had
meaning as a concept of something that was missing.
The physical information concept thus becomes established in a tension
between that which motivates the concept: the indefinable with regard to the
physical as well as to knowledge and that which defines the concept: the
definite physical form. It is therefore hardly surprising that this duality
reappears later in Shannon’s theory. The surprise lies rather in the way
Shannon exploits this duality to describe an informational process without
regard to its content. While Shannon thereby retains Szilard’s equivalence
between the physical and informational entities, he at the same time emanci-
pates the physically defined information concept from the restriction which
lay in Szilard’s idea that the content of information was a statement of its own
physical value. It is thus only from Shannon’s engineer’s point of view that
the physically defined information concept exists in a general form in the
sense that it is not defined by a determinable knowledge content.
Although Maxwell’s demon is a brilliant observer that can see the individual
molecule’s movements in a closed molecular system, it cannot at the same time
see itself and thermodynamics introduced not only a new model for a physical
determinism, it also raised the germ of two other epistemological problems
which contest the validity of the same determinism. This was not only the first
time the concept of time in physics was given a direction, it was also the first
time the information concept was described as a concept which could be
determined by its physical form and the first time the observation situation was
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included as an integral part of the object field with the fall of the idea of the
detached, ideal observer as a consequence.
Although the physical approach to a description of the information concept
is based on a very narrow and specific concept, which exclusively concerns a
very special type of information (on physical energy) which is far removed in
meaning from the older, general concept of information (as determinable
knowledge which can be about anything at all) at the same time the physical
information concept indicated a completely new, general dimension which is
valid for any information concept, namely that all information is manifested in
a physical expression. In physical information theory interest was focused on
the special cases where information was the evidence energy gave about
itself. Energy, so to speak, bore the information. The classical dualistic
assumption that there is a clear distinction between information and energy,
based on the belief that there is a well-established order of representation, now
expressed in the idea of psycho-physical parallelism, was maintained.
As soon as it is no longer possible to maintain that the relationship between
meaning and physical expression is a fixed, simple representational
relationship, the dualistic conceptualization of the relationship between spirit
and matter is brought into play as an object for exploring a connection in a
place where in thought we assume there is a dividing line.
With thermodynamics, modern European physics therefore came a step
closer to contesting the validity of the idea of a fully causal or logically orde-
red and describable nature.11
The core of the way in which this problem presents itself is the question of
the implications of the observation situation for our understanding of the cha-
racter of and conditions for the representation of knowledge. Included here
are questions of a) the epistemological interpretation of the subject-object
relationship, or of the relationship of cognition to the cognized, b) the idea
that finite systems can be characterized on the basis of their internal structure
and c) the possibility of a complete description of both locally limited systems
and the cosmological-universal world »system« and d) the impact of linguistic
structures on the representation of knowledge about the world and e) the
question of the relationship between the content of human cognition and its
physical manifestation.
                                                
11  Cf. physicist Peder Voetmann Christiansen (1988) who pleads that thermodynamics’ acknowledge-
ment of the impact of measuring procedures on the result of the measurement must be regarded as a
precondition for the indeterminism of quantum mechanics, in that he refers to Charles Peirce’s criticism
of »necessitarianism« which, prompted among other things by thermodynamics, was formulated by
Charles S. Peirce (1892).
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All these questions far exceed the bounds of the physical information the-
ory which helped to move the presentation of the problem from philosophy to
science, but did not solve it.
The thesis here is that this establishment of the information concept as an
indicator for a problem of determinism connected with the discovery of certain
limits to knowledge in thermodynamic physics at the end of the previous
century is a prototype of the later, far more comprehensive use of the concept.
The thematization of the epistemological dilemma between form and meaning
is released from its narrow bondage to the relationship between energy and
information and is reformulated in many other areas of research. It is, runs the
viewpoint, the acknowledgement of a similar, basic disruption of the balance
of meaning which lies behind the breakthrough of information theory.
While the preceding chapters have followed the clues which lead to here
from mechanical physics, in the next two chapters our attention will be
concentrated on the clues which lead to here from formal symbol theory.
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4. The language of logic and the logic of language
4.1 The truth of a sentence
With the invention of arithmetic, which cannot be dated, it became clear that
mechanical procedures could be incorporated in human thinking. With the
invention of the counting-board, which was known in such countries as
ancient Babylon, now Iraq, approximately 5000 years ago, it also became clear
that we are able to implement such mechanical thought procedures in physical
instruments to our own advantage - but without finding it necessary because
of this to refer to these or other mechanical apparatuses as capable of thought.
The reason for this may be philosophical or religious, human thought has
always been seen in an eternal, spiritual light and thus superior to the finite
world. But it may also be for practical and experientially conditioned reasons.
Throughout the history of arithmetic people have handled mechanical
procedures with the help of different, non-mechanical thinking - whether they
were carried out mentally, manually or with the help of artefacts.
This is still the case. A mechanical procedure or calculation is always
preceded by an analytical explanation which must at least include a definition
of the components of the calculation and a motivated choice of compositional
structure. Similarly, after a mechanical procedure there follows a non-
mechanical handling of the result.
Confronted with this massive historical experience there would appear to
be little room for the idea that all human thinking is mechanical or calculative.
Nevertheless it was precisely this idea that was to become a main theme in
much of 20th century science and philosophy.
In a peculiar way the breakthrough of this idea was based on mathematical
physics. It is from here, on the one hand, that the idea arises that human con-
sciousness can be regarded as a - complicated - physical system, that every
mental process has a physical manifestation which should consequently be de-
scribable in mechanical terms. On the other hand, there is a manifest
destabilization of the mechanical description of physical nature which also
stems from here. Mathematical physics loses its ontological foundation while
the question of truth is transformed from a question of nature’s order to that of
language.
On the face of things, these two traits would appear to contradict one
another and in themselves provide no reason for regarding language - and un-
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derlying this, thinking - as a mechanical calculation procedure. However, they
did actually occasion a dialectical effort to resolve the contradiction by
formulating it at a higher level.
The epistemological problems in physics had arisen as a new uncertainty
concerning the interpretation of mathematical formulas as models of physical
phenomena. Rejecting the mathematical description of physical processes was
out of the question. On the other hand it was conceivable to imagine that it
might be possible to solve not only the problem of mathematical physics, but
all epistemological problems by constructing a more comprehensive and
independent mathematical or logical language.
With this idea in mind a number of philosophers and mathematicians
including Charles S. Peirce, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, David Hilbert, the
logical positivists and the young Ludwig Wittgenstein took up an idea which
had been previously taken up by Leibniz, but whose roots are lost in Arabian
mathematics and medieval alchemy.
Although both the German Orientalist, Wilhelm Schickard, and the French
mathematician and philosopher, Blaise Pascal, anticipated Leibniz with their
calculating machines, Leibniz was the first to see in the calculating machine
the fundamental form of the thinking machine. Although his own computer
was only able to handle the four basic arithmetical operations, his
philosophical system contained the idea that human consciousness was pre-
programmed - like the mechanism of a clock - and that it should be possible to
formulate the logic of this mechanism in a language characterized by the
precision of mathematics.1
Leibniz imagined that with such a reduction of logic to mathematics it
would be possible to solve all conceivable problems, from the proof of God’s
existence and world order to the clearing up of any moral dispute. This
depended, however, on the paradoxical precondition that all these and other
relationships had been decided in advance, as Leibniz assumed that God had
created a precisely co-ordinated synchronism between an external, physical
                                                
1  C.f. Bolter, 1984: 143 and Davis, 1988: 150. Leibniz was one of the first European philosophers to
take the binary system into consideration. Among other things, he believed that it provided an almost
exemplary proof of the existence of God as it was a system which allowed the Almighty to create
everything out of nothing. Augarten, 1984: 34. The idea of using the binary system in a calculating
machine should perhaps have occurred to him, but would hardly have been possible to utilize at the
time. The binary system is almost impossible to handle without the help of extremely complex
mechanical or electronic apparatuses, its use as notation in a universal calculating machine also
demands - as will be shown in chapters 5 and 7 - a conceptual break with the understanding of the
binary form as a system of notation with fixed relationships between the notation unit and its value (as
number or rule).
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world clock and a clock of consciousness. Thus, if we feel pain when we cut a
finger this is not due to any causal connection between the external event and
the inner experience, but on the contrary to the divinely instituted
synchronization of the two clocks which each controls its own domain. For
Leibniz there was no other connection between the external and internal than
this pre-ordained synchronization.
But this idea did not originate solely with Leibniz. He refers to the Spanish
mystic, Ramon Lull, also called Doctor Illuminatus, as the first to broach the
idea of a universal algebra. It was the goal of Doctor Illuminatus - long before
Descartes - to emancipate philosophy from theology, because reason should
be founded on doubt, not faith. For this purpose he built an apparatus - Ars
Magna - comprising a number of concentric circles to which were attached a
series of words and ideas in accordance with a specified order. By arranging
these words in different ways it was possible to form questions and, by so
doing, produce another series of words which presumably expressed a more
precise delimitation of the logical character of the problem.2
This logic - referred to disrespectfully by Descartes as »the art of Lully«3 -
which was ostensibly thought up as a defence for sceptical reason against the
illusions of faith, had thus as automatic logic also the property of  freeing the
individual from a significant amount of difficult thinking. In this perspective
the picture of the complete refinement of thought appears as the cessation of
thinking.
However we balance the inherited accounts there is - for us at least - one
immediately obvious difference between the ideas of Doctor Illuminatus and
Leibniz on the one hand and mathematical logic, which makes its
breakthrough at the beginning of the 20th century, on the other. What was
once a theme for quaint alchemistic and philosophical excursions becomes -
refracted through the prism of mathematical physics - the axis of a tech-
nological scientific revolution, which since World War II has assumed the
character of a permanent revolution.
Regarded as a change in the history of scientific-utopian thinking this is not
simply a question of a leap from utopia to reality, but also of a conceptional
change-over. While the utopian dream has ancient roots, it assumes a new
                                                
2  Cohen, 1966: 33.
3  »But on further examination I observed with regard to logic that syllogisms and most of its other
techniques are of less use for learning things than for explaining to others things one already knows or
even, as in the art of Lully, for speaking without judgement about matters of which one is ignorant.«
Descartes (1637) 1985: 119.
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shape expressed in particular as new, more rigorous demands on de-
monstration. The result of this was not only the loss of the dream, but also the
first description of the principles of a real universal calculating machine.
4.2 The logic and the life of the sign
Attempts to construct a complete mathematical-logical language constituted
only one of the new symbol theories which came into being around the turn
of the century. During the same period Ferdinand Saussure presented the idea
of a general semiology which also laid the foundation for structuralist theories
of language while Charles S. Peirce presented his ideas of a general semiotics.
All three projects have a common and general theoretical ambition, but are
mutually very distinct. The mathematical-logical project differs partly in its
marked constructive and innovative aim, partly in the peculiarity that it hardly
concerns itself with language as its subject area. The real subject is logic,
which is also the basis of reflections on common language, to the extent that
this is taken up at all, as in Rudolf Carnap. The same is perhaps true of Peirce
who does not, however, see his draft of a sign-theoretical relational logic as
the construction of a new language, but rather as an inherent principle in all
symbolic activities.
While mathematical logic became of direct significance for the development
of information theories, Saussure’s and Peirce’s theories have only been of a
less direct and later significance. As they were formulated within the same
scientific-historical context and play a part in the present description of both
information theory and computer technology, it will be appropriate to define
the different approaches more closely.
In Peirce’s general model of cognition the classical subject-object figure is
replaced by a so-called triadic sign concept. The established understanding of
a sign as an expression which stands for something else is replaced by a
tripartite relationship between firstness, »the signal« or quality as it is, se-
condness, the relationship of the signal to an object and thirdness, the
interpreter that defines the connection between the signal and the phenome-
non. As the interpreter comprises all the ideas included in the understanding of
the sign, it resembles a colossal scrap-bin with a completely arbitrary content.
But not for Peirce, who claimed that it was possible to define all imaginable
logical relationships between the three sign aspects, which only together
78
comprised what Peirce called »genuine signs« as opposed to »degenerate
signs«. Underlying this is again the thesis that all sign relationships can be
described as more or less complex combinations of triads. Corresponding to
the genuine sign’s general triadity there is therefore also a triad of possibilities
for each of the parts. There are three possible types of signal (qualisign, sinsign
and legisign), three possible referential relationships to objects (icons, indexes
and symbols) and three possible types of interpreter (rhemes, dicisigns and
arguments/argusigns).4
As all we are concerned with here is representing the general sign model it
is not appropriate to run the scholastic risk of giving a more detailed account
of the individual categories. For the moment it is sufficient to note the new
epistemological emphasis on the interpreter function which can be understood
as a reflection of - and an attempt to solve - the problem of observation in
physics. The interpretation of the sign is included in the definition of the
concept of observation.
Given Peirce’s interest in the logical relationships of signs it is hardly
surprising that he - who was characterized by Cohen as a reincarnation of Dr.
Illuminatus - was also interested in the idea of a logical, thinking machine.
The secret of all reasoning machines is after all very simple. It is that
whatever relation among the objects reasoned about is destined to be the
hinge of a ratiocination, that the same general relation must be capable of
being introduced between certain parts of the machine.5
Peirce understood - like all his predecessors - the logical machine as a mimetic
reconstruction of the structure of logical thought, but had, on the other hand,
no illusions that human thinking as such could thereby be reproduced:
Every reasoning machine, that is to say, every machine, has two inherent
impotencies. In the first place, it is destitute of all originality, of all
initiative; it cannot find its own problems; it cannot feed itself. It cannot
                                                
4  Both in Peirce and later, changing terminology is used in referring to the individual components of
the so-called sign trichotomy. The terminology here is from a number of manuscript fragments printed
in Peirce: Collected Papers, volume 2. The fragments were collected by Justus Buchler under the title
Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs and printed in his selection of Peirce texts in Buchler, 1940:
98-119. C.f. also Gorlée, 1990, who describes the development of terminology and meaning in Peirce’s
view of monadic and dyadic (»degenerate«) signs which include such things as biological and bodily
signs and mental signs in which the triadic element is missing.
5  Peirce, 1887: 168. Cohen’s characterization is from Cohen 1966: 112.
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direct itself between two different possible procedures... And even if we
succeed [in the latter] it would still remain true that the machine would be
utterly devoid of original initiative... In the second place, the capacity of the
machine has absolute limitations; it has been contrived to do a certain
thing, and it can do nothing else.6
This is indeed also true, adds Peirce, of consciousness, but in a different way,
which is illustrated by our ability to continue to develop algorithmic
calculations indefinitely. As will appear in the next section Gödel incidentally
used very similar reasoning in his argumentation regarding the incompleteness
of formal description.
As a consequence of these limitations, which were related to analogue ma-
chines, the point lay not in the possibility of replacing human thinking, but in
the possibility of freeing us from boring routine work and particularly in the
possibility of obtaining new knowledge of logical thinking by studying such
machines. The question was, how great a part of thinking could such a
machine carry out?7
According to Peirce, however, mechanical procedure also possesses a pro-
perty which means that it cannot solely be seen as a simple, repetitive
procedure. When the various parts of a machine interact, relationships also
arise which have not necessarily been intended or anticipated. Peirce sees
these relationships as »reasonings« which express a law which has thus been
formulated by the machine. This argument goes not only for the logical
machine, where laws are of a logical character, but, says Peirce, also for many
physical machines where the interaction is an expression of physical or
chemical laws:
In this point of view, too, every machine is a reasoning machine, in so much
as there are certain relations between its parts, which relations involve
other relations that were not expressly intended. A piece of apparatus for
performing a physical or chemical experiment is also a reasoning machine,
with this difference, that it does not depend on the laws of the human mind,
but on the objective reason embodied in the laws of nature.8
                                                
6  Peirce, 1887: 168-169.
7  Peirce, 1887: 169 and 165.
8  Peirce, 1887: 168.
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In a narrower linguistic sense the new sign theoretical clues are laid down
rather by Ferdinand Saussure’s draft of a structuralistic sign theory which, in
spite of its general aim to be a »a science which studies the role of signs as part
of social life«9 was constructed around an investigation of linguistic signs with
the definition of the sign as an - arbitrary - unit of expression and content: »A
linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a
concept and a sound pattern.«10 This definition of the sign concept contains
the entire basis of Saussure’s theory of language: No matter how we look at a
linguistic phenomenon it always contains two complementary facets. There is
thus not only an indissoluble - but also variable - bond between a concept and
a sound pattern, as well as between articulation and acoustic impressions,
between the auditory-articulatory unit and the idea, between physiological
and psychological, between the individual and social aspects of language,
between language as ever ongoing evolutionary process (diachrony) and as
institutional system (synchrony) and between language as an invariant
structure or system (langue) and use (parole).11 As language use is understood
on the one hand as the sole manifestation of the invariant linguistic structure
and also, on the other, as the sole manifestation of meaning-giving variation,
the different interpretations of the meeting between system and meaning con-
stitute an important dividing line between different linguistic theories.
Where Peirce introduced an interpretant as a kind of bridge builder be-
tween the expression and the content, Saussure saw the sign relationship as a
series of units between the two sides. Both theories implied that any study of
signification and meaning should be based on a study of the structural
representation of the content. But they did so in two different ways. Where
Saussure’s theory directs attention towards the specific linguistic sign
function, Peirce attempted - as pointed out by Linda Gorlée - to formulate a
universal symbolic logic on the basis of the assumption that it is possible to
identify thought content with the symbolic expressions.
Logic needs no distinction between the symbol and the thought for every
thought is a symbol and the laws of logic are true of all symbols.12
                                                
9  Saussure (1916) 1983: 15 (33).
10 Saussure (1916) 1983: 66 (98).
11  After Saussure (1916) 1983: 8-8 (23-24). The most common translation of parole seems to be
»speech«, which accords with Saussure’s concept of language as spoken, not written. But since it is
sometimes necessary to include or refer to the manifestation of written language, it will also be
translated - in agreement with Hjelmslev’s terminology - as language use or usage.
12  Peirce (1865, Writings. 1.166) quoted here after Gorlée, 1990: 72.
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For Peirce the linguistic form of expression therefore simply becomes in itself a
less significant manifestation of an underlying, universal logic of sign
relationships, while Saussure viewed linguistics as a beginning and
contribution to a general theory of signs - a semiology - including different
sign systems whose respective places in human consciousness would later
have to be determined by psychology.13
To do this, however, the psychologist would have to have both a theory of
signs and a sign system with which to express his analysis. In spite of all
caution Saussure also paved the way - with his draft of a more precise defini-
tion of language as a distinct subject area - for an acknowledgement of the
central place of the sign system in epistemology. The delimitation of the
concept of language as a phenomenon with its own separate structure at the
same time instates this structure as a condition for human cognition of the
non-linguistic.
Saussure formulated his theory in a break with the comparative linguistics
of the 19th century, because »they never took very great care to define
exactly what it was they were studying«14 and they were therefore unable to
develop a systematic method. But the definition of language as a stockpile of
sound patterns, signs which are composed of a connection between
expression and content is not only a new, improved foundation for the same
linguistic science, it also becomes the starting point for a methodological
polarization which, in its general form, results in a distinction between a
synchronic and diachronic description of language, each covering its own
point of view with the sign concept as the only connection.
For Saussure the distinction is primarily methodological, a necessity which
makes it possible to carry out a more precise description and the choice of
point of view is in principle only a question of what we are interested in. If we
study a slowly evolving language, we will take note of the synchronic traits,
but if the language evolves rapidly, a diachronic approach will not only be
more obvious, it will also be considerably more difficult to separate an area for
a synchronic description:
Of two contemporary languages, one may evolve considerably and other
hardly at all over the same period. In the latter case, any study will ne-
                                                
13  Saussure (1916) 1983: 16 (33).
14  Saussure (1916) 1983: 3 (16).
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cessarily be synchronic, but in the former case diachronic. An absolute state
is defined by lack of change.15
This simply shows how difficult operating with an isolated synchronic
description is. Saussure also supports the distinction by allocating the diachro-
nic and synchronic perspectives to two different domains of language. The
synchronic is anchored primarily in grammar, while the diachronic is anchored
in phonology.16 In the later structuralist interpretation the diachronic
perspective has, as a general rule, been completely abandoned or regarded as a
less decisive, modifying factor.
Saussure himself set the stage for this consequence in that he assumed that
diachronic changes - sound shifts, for example - primarily involve indi-vidual
elements in the language system. Although such changes undoubtedly
affected the entire system there was no »inner« connection between the
partial, diachronic changes and the total system. The two aspects could not be
studied simultaneously and language was primarily understood as a system
with emphasis on the synchronic connections between its components.
The central, still unsolved problem on both sides of this polarity, however,
turns out to be the same, namely the relationship between a language as a
system and the manifested use of language. The synchronic language system
must not only be separated from the diachronic time axis of the phonological
expression variation, it must also be separated from the semantic variation
which is manifested in the same usage as the language system. Unlike
phonological variation, semantic variation cannot be described as a particular,
delimited variation of a single link in a language system. Semantic variation is
not only manifested as individual variations, but is also expressed as a trait of
genre and style. Hence, it is difficult to see why semantic variation should not
occupy a place at the level Saussure delimited as language system or language
construction. In other words, there is no basis for the concept of an invariant
language system.
                                                
15  Saussure (1916) 1983: 99-100 (142).
16  Saussure (1916) 1983: 99 (141), 133-142 (185-197). It should also be mentioned that Saussure also
expanded and re-interpreted grammar by adding lexicology to morphology and syntax and by describing
these - mutually overlapping - aspects on the basis of what he believed was a more basic distinction
between syntagmatic and associative relations. Syntagmatic relations exist in relationship to the
surrounding signs in the speech chain. Associative relations are concerned with the relationship to other
possible candidates for the same place.
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Saussure also concedes that the diachronic perspective cannot be reduced
to phonological or other subordinate changes regarding the synchronic
description.
When the phonetic factor has been given its due, there still remains a
residue which appears to justify the notion that there is a »history of
grammar«. That is where the real difficulty lies. The distinction - which must
be upheld - between diachronic and synchronic calls for detailed
explanations which cannot be given here.17
A more detailed explanation along these lines has still not appeared and we
could therefore ask whether this indeterminacy in the relationship between
language system and language use, which appears to be valid for all languages
sometimes referred to as »natural« languages, is not a - perhaps even very
central - property which at the same time separates them from mathematical,
algorithmic and logical languages?
This question will be taken up for further discussion in chapters 6-9, where
it will be claimed that the concept of an invariant language system cannot be
valid for languages that allow an indeterminate semantic variation of the
utilized notation system’s smallest units of expression because in this case,
such a semantic variation would also be able to include the established rules of
the system.
The relationship between the diachronic and synchronic description was
neither included as a problem in mathematical logic nor in Peirce’s semiotics.
But according to Saussure the problem is manifested in disciplines which, like
linguistics and economy are concerned with »a system of equivalence
between things belonging to different orders. In one case, work and wages in
the other signification and signal«. Such systems are characterized by
simultaneously manifested, different‘values’ which together comprise the
system at a given stage, while the individual components vary individually
over time.18
The three sign theories were in many ways extremely different mutually.
Mathematical-logical symbol theory is concerned with the relationship be-
tween mathematical and logical representation, each of which is understood as
                                                
17  Saussure (1916) 1983: 141 (196-197).
18  Saussure (1916) 1983: 79-86 (114-123).
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a well-established and consistent symbol system that, in one or another
combination can comprise a general sign theoretical foundation. Peirce’s
theory contains a draft of a new sign theoretical logic, while in this connection
Saussure sets his sights - rather uncharacteristically - on a more modest goal, a
narrower definition of a new starting point for a later general sign theory.
Although these theories emerged independently of one another and are
mutually incompatible in their original form, their direction was the same: The
attempt to describe language as an independent system with immanent laws
which were either independent of or actually controlled the semantic
reference. Sign production came to be regarded as a result of sign relationships
contained in the language system. Semantics was regarded either as invariant
in relationship to the language system, or as a function of language use and
language system.
Herein lies the implicit and - it will be claimed in a later chapter - also du-
bious postulate: that the semantic dimension of language is completely mani-
fested in the symbolic expression system - wholly contained or expressed in
language use and surrounded by the language system which, conversely, is
postulated as inaccessible to semantically motivated variation. The common
goal was thus to describe an independent, closed system of rules for the
articulation of meaning.
Saussure’s theory was formulated against the background of the »pre-
scientific foundation« of historical linguistics where although language had
been regarded as a form, the form was seen as an external vehicle for the
articulation of meaning. Instead, he claimed, that thought, before it is ex-
pressed in the distinctions of language, must be understood as an amorphous
mass, »chaotic by nature«. The semantic content can therefore only exist
through the linguistic oppositions, »the contact between [sound and thought]
gives rise to a form, not a substance« which again implies that the semantic
level is allocated to the individual signs.19
For Peirce and the formal, mathematical-logical symbol theory, the back-
ground was a destabilization of the representational validity of the mechanical
description of nature.
There were apparently two equally disagreeable alternatives. If the aim was
to maintain a systematic or mechanical model, a loss of referential validity
would have to be accepted. If the aim was to maintain the demand for
                                                
19  Saussure (1916) 1983: 110 ff. (155 ff.). Here there is a parallel with the movement of physics from
the idea of matter defined by form to the idea of amorphous matter and pure form.
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referential validity, the method of systematic or mechanical description would
have to be abandoned.
The main currents of 20th century linguistics thus take on the appearance
of an emancipation from an understanding of language as submerged in the
pre-ordained meaning content of history and nature. Hume’s philosophical
critique of the concept of causality had, so to speak, caught up with
linguistics, the semantic bond to the described world was broken.
When a fixed correspondence between the concept and the conceived is
no longer regarded as given, conceptualization, linguistic representation,
emerges as a separate substance and as the place where the question of truth
is decided. With the transformation of ontology to epistemology the reference
of language to the world outside language becomes woven into the reference
of language to itself. Referentiality no longer exists as an assumed or obvious
possibility, instead it becomes an object for linguistic reflection, while at the
same time language emerges more clearly as an independent, autonomous
system of pure forms.
In spite of the mutual divergences, which will appear again in later chapters,
together they represent the first marked - as yet only theoretical - expressions
of a secularization of the relationship of science to language. This
secularization has traits in common with older, nominalistic assumptions which
similarly doubted that language refers to an order outside language, but it is
distinguished by the objectivizing view of language as a self-reliant
phenomenon that can be described.
While Saussure aimed at a systematic description of the mechanisms of com-
mon language, the logical and mathematical symbol theories attempt to
respond to the lost referentiality by formulating a new, formal and consistent
symbolic language. Hereby the idea itself of an abstract and formally defined
symbolic system became firmly anchored in many other disciplines beside
mathematical physics.
4.3 The idea of a mechanical decision procedure
It might be thought that logically oriented philosophers would be the first to
cast doubt on the idea of a mechanical logic which makes the logician
superfluous, robs his previous efforts of any connection with the more
elevated mental occupations and relegates philosophical logic to civilization’s
prehistoric archive for happily done with, now superfluous business. But this
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is far from being the case. Nobody else has proposed - let alone attempted to
develop - the idea of a mechanical logic with the same disinterested fervour
and perseverance as can be found in the history of logical philosophy. In
addition, the most ambitious and powerful expression of these efforts is to be
found precisely at the point where the mechanical paradigm, with its
background in physics, really got into difficulties. There can be little doubt
that inspiration was to a great degree derived from the speculative daring
which in its time led to the successful formulation of the basis of mathematical
physics. Galileo’s »measure what can be measured«, Descartes’ analytical
geometry and formulation of mathematics as the critical, sceptical weapon of
reason against ignorance and Newton’s largely successful application of a
relatively simple system of axioms to a description of the planetary system,
which was in itself an expression of the fact that it was possible to develop
general methods of description which must clearly take precedence over
questions of empirical evidence.20 The problems of mechanical physics had to
be regarded in this perspective and the central theme of philosophical logic
therefore became the relationship between logic and mathematics itself. The
overall goal was to provide a proof theory, that is, a general, formal proof that
it was possible to decide whether a procedure carried out in a formal, symbolic
logical language was correct or incorrect.
The meta-mathematical programme - of David Hilbert - resulted in a number
of precisely formulated questions proposed at two international mathematical
congresses in 1928 and 1930. Among the questions raised there were three in
particular which came to occupy people: Can mathematics be regarded as
complete in the sense that every mathematical statement can either be proved
or disproved? Can mathematics be regarded as consistent in the sense that a
valid operational sequence will never lead to incorrect statements (such as, for
example, that it will never be possible on arithmetical lines to arrive at results
such as 2 + 2 = 5)? And can mathematics be regarded as decidable or
provable, i.e. is there a finite method which in principle can be used on every
assumption with the guarantee of a correct decision as to the truth of the
assumption? The last problem is the so-called Entscheidungsproblem.21
Hilbert himself was convinced that all these questions could be answered in
such a way as to make it possible to declare that it had been proved that
                                                
20  Empiricism too assumed (and developed on the basis of) such a theoretical-constructive
epistemological foundation, necessitated by the attempt to penetrate the prejudices of immediate
experience.
21  C.f. Hodges 1983: 90-92.
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mathematical logic was a complete and consistent descriptive language. At the
1930 congress he rounded off his lecture by declaring that ein unlösbares
Problem überhaupt nicht gibt.22
But far from everyone shared Hilbert’s optimistic expectations regarding
formal mathematical description. Mathematician E. L. Post had thus as early as
the 20’s been on the trail of formal problems which could not be decided with
the help of any finite method. Others - such as John von Neumann - had,
similarly in the 20’s, argued that there was not only no known proof that all
mathematical problems in principle had a finite solution, there was no reason at
all to believe that such could be found. On the contrary, the lack of such proof
was the raison d’être of mathematical thinking:
...the contemporary practice of mathematics, using as it does heuristic
methods, only makes sense because of this undecidability. When the
undecidability fails then mathematics, as we now understand it, will cease
to exist; in its place there will be a mechanical prescription for deciding
whether a given sentence is provable or not.23
Even before Hilbert had been able to present his whole programme at the
1930 congress, the two first of the three questions mentioned had found a
clear and equally surprising answer.
On the previous day, mathematician Kurt Gödel presented one of the 20th
century’s most epoch-making mathematical proofs, Gödel’s theorem, which in
a nutshell states that arithmetic is either inconsistent or incomplete, as he
showed that there are »relatively simple« arithmetical sets which contain at
least one assumption the validity of which cannot be decided within the
premises of the given formal system.24
With Gödel’s proof culminated the idea of a mathematical-logical episte-
mology and logical positivism lost its philosophical foundation. Instead of a
general truth function there was now a formal proof that there was a problem
                                                
22  Quoted after Robin Gandy, 1988: 63.
23  Von Neumann, 1961: 265-266. Quoted here from Robin Gandy’s translation, 1988: 66. The original
quotation is as follows: ...die Unentscheidbarkeit ist sogar die Conditio sine qua non dafür, daβ es
überhaupt einen Sinn habe, mit den heutigen heuristischen Methoden Mathematik zu treiben. An dem
Tage, an dem die Unentscheidbarkeit aufhörte, würde die Mathematik im heutigen Sinne aufhören zu
existieren an ihre Stelle würde eine absolut mechanische Vorschrift treten, mit deren Hilfe jedermann
von jeder gegebene Aussage entscheiden könnte, ob diese beweisen werden kann oder nicht.
24  Gödel, (1931) 1965: 6 and Hodges, 1983: 91 ff. Gandy, 1988: 68. Gödel’s proof was printed in 1931
and expanded in 1935. Quoted here from a reprint in Davis, 1965.
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of description and decision which could not be solved within the framework
of formal logic - as Gödel wrote:
The true reason for the incompleteness which attaches to all formal systems
of mathematics lies... in the fact that the formation of higher and higher
types can be continued into the transfinite... while, in every formal system,
only countably many are available.25
While Gödel closed one door with this conclusion, he opened another with his
method, the formal treatment of formal systems.
As such this method had already been developed in the various attempts to
connect the mathematical and logical descriptions. The assumption here,
however, was that there was a logical relationship: that mathematics is logic
(Frege-Russell) or that mathematical problems could be handled with a meta-
mathematical logic (Hilbert). In both cases the method was deductive, an
attempt to reach the mathematical expression through analytical reduction.
Gödel took a different path as he simply numbered the individual sentences in
a formal system: »we now set up a one-to-one correspondence of natural
numbers to the primitive symbols of the system«26 and then proceeded to
handle the demonstration process on the basis of number theory. Gödel thus
demonstrated how it was possible, with a simple and arbitrary coding or
addressing procedure - »Gödel-numbering« to handle a logical-symbolic
system in a numeric system, where the first system was represented only by an
address. As a whole the demonstration was extraordinarily complicated, but
the coding procedure itself was almost hair-raisingly simple.
The methodical principle, arbitrary re-coding, contains at least in germ a
number of formal procedures which have since found widespread use. In the
present connection it is particularly interesting that the method contains a
general model for the algorithmic handling of formal procedures, among them
also other algorithms - second-order handling - and that it exploits a »scanning
principle« as a coding procedure.27
                                                
25  Gödel, (1931) 1965: 28-29.
26  Ibid: 13.
27  By scanning I mean here that a phenomenon is represented or handled via an arbitrary symbol - just
as a wardrobe number represents a coat. The scanning concept has since spread together with the
information concept and is used both of cognitive and visual processes and as a term for certain
investigation procedures (such as search procedures in computer science, the eye’s search procedure in
perceptual psychology, by among others, Gregory and Gibson, each with his own interpretation, and
ultra-sound scanning in medicine). It could be said that the scanning perspective, which is a principle of
fragmentary representation, today plays a role as a cognitive and visual paradigm, which resembles the
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The method, however has - still - not been emancipated from that limitation
which was the first result of its use. It is impossible to formulate a general,
formal demonstration procedure for the completeness of a formal description.
In this way Gödel’s theorem is part of 20th century mathematical logic in
the same paradoxical way as quantum physics is of 20th century physics, as a
method of description which extends the descriptive potential by limiting the
validity of the description.
Gödel, however, answered Hilbert’s two first questions with his method.
The third remained. Gödel had introduced a distinction between formally
correct, demonstrable sentences on the one hand and non-demonstrable sen-
tences on the other and presented a new method of demonstration which
extended the area of use for formal demonstrations, which depended on the
performance of a finite number of formal, step-by-step operations with fully
deterministic rules of arithmetic. But he had only shown that any known
formal system was incomplete because it must contain at least one sentence
which could not be demonstrated within the system’s own framework. He had
not invalidated the possibility that there could be a general, finite method to
decide whether an arbitrary mathematical sentence could be demonstrated or
not. But this problem too - Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem - was now
coming close to solution.
If it were possible to confirm Hilbert’s thesis, it must be assumed that it
should be possible to perform any logical procedure along mathematical-al-
gorithmic lines with the help of mechanical procedures. »It is well known«,
wrote Gödel in 1931,
... that the development of mathematics in the direction of greater precision
has led to the formalization of extensive mathematical domains, in the sense
that proofs can be carried out according to a few mechanical rules.28
But, it appeared, a confirmation of Hilbert’s thesis required not only the
description of a mechanical demonstration procedure, it must also be shown
that this procedure could be performed with a finite number of operations. It
must be possible to decide when it could conceivably be stated that there
never would be a decision. This again required a precise definition of what
was understood by a finite mechanical procedure.
                                                                                                                                           
role of system perspective in the 19th century and that of central perspective in the 17th and 18th
centuries. C.f. Finnemann, 1989: 163-172 and 1991: 170-172.
28  Gödel (1931) 1965: 5.
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In the middle of the 30’s no fewer than three different suggestions for such
a definition emerged. It could quickly be shown that the three suggestions
were equivalent even though they had been worked out in different ways and
that they implied that it was not possible to formulate a general method to
decide whether an arbitrary sentence could be proved. One of these
definitions distinguished itself, however, by being formulated on the basis of
an arbitrary theory of numbers.
It was with this definition of a finite mechanical procedure based on the
theory of numbers  - developed in an attempt to answer Hilbert’s third
question - that, in 1936, the then 24 year-old English mathematician Alan
Turing supplied the first theoretical formulation of the principles of the
»universal« computer.29
                                                
29  The three definitions are Church-Kleene’s, Gödel-Herbrand’s and Alan Turing’s. C.f. Kleene, 1988:
34-36. Gandy, 1988: 69-88 and other contributions in Herken, 1988. The coincidence of time has given
rise to much speculation regarding the possible direct and indirect lines of inspiration. It has, however,
been reasonably well established that Turing formulated his proof without knowledge of the others.
Turing came last, but his article was published because his method was different to Church’s.
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5. The universal computer
5.1 The demand for physically defined symbolic forms
Turing presented his answer to Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem in the article
On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem
in 1936.1 The answer was negative. It could be demonstrated that there is no
general calculation procedure which can decide whether an arbitrary, well-
defined arithmetical or formal logical problem can be solved in a finite number
of operations. It is true that this piece of news was already a month old, as
Alonzo Church had shortly before published a similar demonstration. Turing’s
demonstration, however, was formulated in a different way and contained two
original results.
One was that Turing’s definition of finite, formal procedures did not - like
Church/Kleene’s and Gödel/Herbrand’s - depend on a specific set of formal
axioms. This meant, maintained Alonzo Church in 1937, that Turing’s
definition had...
...the advantage of making the identification with effectiveness in the
ordinary (not explicitly defined) sense evident immediately - i.e. without the
necessity of proving preliminary theorems.2
Church therefore viewed his own thesis as a theoretical definition which was
proved by Turing’s analysis. It was ostensibly also this independence of
specific formal axioms which convinced Gödel that his own and Church’s
definitions were not simply heuristic theorems.3 He certainly emphasized a
number of years later that Turing’s definition had a distinct epistemological
value.
With this concept, one has for the first time succeeded in giving an absolute
definition of an interesting epistemological notion, i.e. one not depending
on the formalism chosen.4
                                                
1  Turing, (1936) 1965: 115-154.
2  Quoted here after Gandy, 1988: 85.
3  Feferman, 1988: 117 f.
4  Kurt Gödel, (1946) 1965: 84.
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This theoretical gain and the evaluation of its implications belong to mathe-
matical logic.5
The second main result in Turing’s article was contained in the tool he
developed to carry out his demonstration. This tool comprised a description of
what he called himself »the universal computing machine«, later often referred
to as a Turing machine. The key to this also lay in his definition of the finite,
formal procedure in that he showed that any such procedure could be divided
into a series of step-by-step operations which could be performed
mechanically.
Turing himself understood the two results as being mutually connected, just
as the later literature also exhibits a tendency to view the Turing machine
solely in a mathematical-logical perspective.
Although the tool was developed as part of a mathematical-logical demon-
stration, it has an independent character, however, which can be described -
and used - independently of mathematical logic.
This postulate implies on the one hand that mathematical-logical interpre-
tations are regarded as valid descriptions of certain delimited classes of com-
putational processes. On the other, the thesis implies that Turing’s - and later
others’ - mathematical-logical descriptions of the computer contain restrictions
which are not conditioned by the properties of the tool, but on the contrary
by the mathematical-logical interpretation, which can consequently only be
seen as a special case within a more general description.
Mathematical-logical descriptions of the Turing machine can thus be under-
stood as descriptions of dedicated machines where the mechanical procedure
is subordinated to a closed, formal - mathematical or logical - semantics. The
Turing machine, however, is not defined by any demand on a formal semantics.
It is, on the contrary, defined by the demand that the symbolic expression must
be available in a physically and mechanically executable form.
                                                
5  C.F. Michael J. Beeson, 1988: 194-198. There appears to be agreement that Turing’s result accords
with Church’s thesis: that effectively calculable functions in general are recursive. The thesis is
sometimes referred to as Church’s and sometimes as Church-Turing’s thesis. C.f. Kleene, 1988.
Haugeland, (1985) 1987 assumes that the two analyses are equivalent. Church, as mentioned, believed
that his thesis had been demonstrated by Turing’s analysis, but its status is still under discussion.
Gandy thus objects that it cannot be excluded that it may be possible in the future to formulate non-
recursive mathematical-logical algorithms and demonstrations and that the thesis can therefore not be
regarded as having been proved. Gandy, 1988: 78-79. Gandy also emphasizes that Turing’s analysis also
contains another independent thesis, usually called Turing’s theorem: Any calculable function (in
Church’s sense) which can be performed by a human, can also be performed by a machine.
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The demands made on the physical form are, as will become evident, not
only independent of the meaning and semantic organization of the expression,
they also imply that any symbolic expression which is to be handled must be
available in a notation system which is not subordinated to the semantic
restrictions which hold true for formal notation systems.
The analysis which follows in sections 5.2-5.4 will thus result in three
connected conclusions, namely that:
• A Turing machine is distinct from other known machines because the rules
which establish its functional architecture are not defined as part of the
machine, but on the contrary are included and defined in the description of
the task. A Turing machine can thus only be used as a calculating machine
(or to carry out a formal procedure) because it is not itself subordinated to
the restrictions which are contained in the rules of arithmetic (or in the
formal procedure).
• The physical demand for mechanical performance implies that both the rules
which define the functional architecture of the Turing machine and the data
that are to be processed must be represented in a notation system
comprising an invariant, finite number of notation units, each of which is
individually semantically empty. The central leap from the automatic
calculating machine to the universal computer is brought about in and by
the construction of a notation system which is principally different to formal
notation systems. This notation system will be designated informational
notation in the following.
• Informational notation, which makes it possible to use a Turing machine to
simulate an automatic calculating machine, also makes it possible to use this
machine to simulate an indeterminately large quantity of both formal and
informal symbolic expressions, as well as a multiplicity of non-symbolic
processes and phenomena.
As will be shown, the unique properties of the Turing machine are founded on
a new form of exchange between physical-mechanical and symbolic pro-
cedures. As Turing discovered the foundation for this construction in a
number of assumptions connected with human cognition, which have also
played a central part in later interpretations, they will be discussed in sections
5.6-5.9.
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The Turing machine in its basic form is a quite simple model for performing
mechanical calculation procedures. The leading idea is that any such calcu-
lation subsists in running through one or another, possibly large, but for a
given task, finite, number of repetitions of very few and individually simple
operations. The demands on such a machine can be specified in the following
points:
• It must perform its operations step by step.
• It must be able to receive instructions in the form of symbols on a tape
divided into a number of squares where a given square can contain one
symbol (or be empty). This tape should in principle be endless, but it will at
all times contain only a finite number of squares and symbols.
• Each symbol must have a physically well-defined form, as it must be able to
produce a physical-mechanical effect. The number of permissible symbolic
units must be finite as they must comprise an invariant part of the machine.
• It must be able to »scan« the squares on the tape one by one, either by
moving forwards or backwards, but always only one step at a time.
• A scanning must result in - similarly very few - different effects, either on the
tape or on the state of the machine:
∗ It must be able to write symbols in empty squares, delete a symbol which
has been read in, leave it there, or change it.
∗ It must be able to move the tape forwards or backwards to the next
square.
∗ It must be able to change the machine’s »figuration«.
• Finally, in addition, it must also be possible to describe the machine - not the
tape - using a finite number of distinct states and each individual state,
»machine figuration«, must be addressable.6
The description can be compressed, as any Turing machine can be described as
a finite set of sequences, each with the form:
FαβMG
as the form expresses that a machine in a given figuration, F, with α in the
actually scanned square will replace this α with a β, move the tape, marked by
                                                
6  C.F. Kleene, 1988: 23 and Gandy, 1988: 81 for slightly varied specifications of the operational
structure of the Turing machine. On practical grounds, Turing introduced on the way several operational
mechanisms, among them a division of the tape so that every other square was reserved for auxiliary
signs which could be deleted and which were used during the operations.
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M, one place to the left, right, or remain in the same place and change its
figuration to G.7
As the machine’s behaviour is in this way determined by its actual state
(machine figuration) and the actual scanned symbol, this specification is ade-
quate to describe the behaviour of the total system (the configuration) at any
given moment.
Using this inventory, Turing then went on to show how it was possible to
draw up a table for any arbitrary computable sequence which  would indicate
the necessary configuration in a standard form so that the calculation could be
performed solely with the help of the operations indicated by the table. As the
machine can begin by reading a description of the standard form for a given
computable sequence, there lies in this a new possibility, since referred to as
Turing’s thesis or theorem:
It is possible to invent a single machine which can be used to compute any
computable sequence.8
The idea is thus not only that any - possible - calculating procedure can be
performed mechanically, but that with suitable programming it can be per-
formed by one and the same machine »the universal computing machine«.9
Looked at from Turing’s - and mathematical logic’s - point of view this de-
scription of the machine is exhaustive. What remained was to give an account
of its possible uses which, as far as Turing was concerned, primarily involved
two questions. One was the question of which calculation tasks such a
machine could carry out. The other was the meta-theoretical question of how
the theoretical model could be exploited to clear up Hilbert’s Entscheidungs-
problem and eventually other meta-theoretical problems in mathematical logic
as well.
Neither of these questions gave occasion to regard the machine’s physical
method of functioning as a central element in understanding its basic form. In
later literature it has often been claimed that, among its other merits, the purely
                                                
7  This specification is from Martin Davis, 1988: 155, who presents it in three variants - one for each
of the three possible movements. It should be noted that α and β can have the same value, so that the
result of the operation will be that the value remains unchanged, corresponding to nothing being
written. In this form α and β cannot be replaced by 0 and 1. Turing uses the form as a starting point for
a conversion of the programme to »machine language«, Turing (1936): 126-127.
8  Turing, (1936) 1965: 127.
9  Turing uses the term computer of a person who performs calculations, in accordance with its then
ordinary meaning. The machine is called a »computing machine«.
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formal description of the machine was that it was not determined by specific
physical properties. In general it is acknowledged, however, that a physical
realization contains certain restrictions, among them that which lies in the
difference between Turing’s infinite tape and the finite capacity which
characterizes any real machine, just as formal procedures in real machines are
subject to the restrictions of time.
But the physical realization not only plays a central role for an under-
standing of modern computers, it also plays a somewhat overlooked, but
nevertheless fundamental role for an understanding of the functionality of the
Turing machine.
5.2 The demand for universality and the dissolution of mechanical and
symbolic procedures
If Turing had been asked how he would describe the relationship between the
symbolic and the physical process, he might have answered that the physical-
mechanical processes were simply divided into a series of individual steps
which were regulated by a finite and deterministic symbolic procedure. Such
an answer would be in agreement both with the classical understanding of
physical-mechanical processes and fulfil the purpose to use the machine to
solve finite calculation tasks, just as it incidentally places the Turing machine
in the company of other, already familiar calculating machines.
There can be little doubt either that Turing himself saw the universal com-
puter as a calculating machine and considered the main point to be the
arithmetical analysis of finite procedures, as this analysis implied a considerable
increase in the types of problem which could be made the object of automatic
calculation. With this overstepping of the hitherto known limits for calculating
machines, Turing took the idea of the automatic calculating machine to its
theoretical completion.
There were others who were going in a similar direction. The German en-
gineer, Konrad Zuse, thus built the first automatic calculating machine (with
memory, control unit and a punched tape as input medium) during the years
1936-1938, while the American engineer, Claude Shannon, published a thesis
in 1938 in which he used George Boole’s logical algebra to describe and
organize physical relay systems as logical functions.10
                                                
10   Zuse’s first and subsequent machines are described in Williams, 1985: 216-224.
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Turing’s description, however, contained a far more radical innovation, as
he not only described how to construct an automatic calculating machine, or a
logically controlled relay system, but also how any finite formal procedure
could be performed by one and the same machine. He thereby also took the
fundamental theoretical step which led from the automatic calculating machine
to the universal computer.
The principle difference between these machines stems from the demand for
universality, as this implies that the operational rules of the machine are
described together with the task. They can therefore not be built into the
machine’s invariant physical architecture which, on the contrary, must func-
tion completely independently of any definite calculational rule of arithmetic
as, if it does not, the machine will be limited to a finite set of built-in
rules/formal axioms.
It is precisely at this point that Turing’s theoretical machine differs from
Zuse’s, which used a built-in mechanical calculator while the punched tape
only contained the calculating task itself.
Now this was not simply a question of separating the definition of the
machine from the definition of the rules of  calculation it was to follow. Or
rather, this separation immediately raises a very radical question, namely
whether and how any finite formal procedure can be described in such a way
that it can be carried out by a machine which is only capable of repeating the
same few, very simple mechanical operations again and again?
The answer to this can be obtained by looking more closely at the tape
where the dividing line is drawn between machine and task and where the
transition from the formal expression to the physical-mechanical performance
takes place. It appears from this that the mechanical performance of a finite
formal procedure requires that the formal expression - the task as well as the
rules which are to be effectuated - be converted to a notation system which
consists of a finite number of notation units individually empty of meaning.
That Turing himself understood the mechanically executable notation form
as absolutely equivalent to formal notation, makes it necessary to look more
closely at his conversion procedure and the »machine language« which is
produced as a result.11
In the examples he provides he uses a quite arbitrary notation. In some
cases he uses the two symbols (0-1) of the binary number system as a notation
for the number system (and only for that), the letters L (left), R (right), N (none)
                                                
11  The relationship between Turing's notation and binary notation as used in modern computers will be
discussed later in this chapter.
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for rules of movement, P (print) for the writing operation, E (erase) for a
deletion operation and a number of auxiliary signs for addressing and other
functions. In other cases both number values and functions are expressed by
letters - all in accordance with the principles of formal notation. The quantity
and types of sign are directly derived from what is necessary for the given
calculation procedure and each symbol has its own semantic value. As the
symbols and functions can also be described physically, they can as such
perfectly well be implemented in a machine.
This machine, however, is not a Turing machine, but a calculating machine,
as it operates with a limited number of functions/rules and with a specific
semantic content connected to the individual physical units of expression. The
universal machine, on the other hand, demands that this formal notation be
converted to a standard notation which, in its form, is quite independent of the
rules of calculation and the meaning of the symbols.
Turing described the conversion with a starting point in the previously
mentioned description of finite calculation procedures as a list of the total
number of operations of the form FαβMG, as each of these is given a number
which indicates the sequence so that the complete list comprises a set in the
form of
FiαjαkMFm
to which is added a punctuation mark between the individual sequences.12
To enable the machine to identify a given figuration (sequence no. i) the
expression is converted to a new form. The machine figuration (before = F and
G) is represented by the letter D, while the figuration’s number in the list (i) is
represented by another letter, A,  appearing i times.
The actual symbol is similarly defined partly by the same letter, D, partly by
a number (j) which is similarly represented by allowing another letter, C, to
appear (j) times. There is a differentiation between (i) and (j) because the sym-
bol in a given square can change during the procedure. The combination
DA...A thus indicates the actual figuration, while the following DC...C
indicates the actually scanned symbol which is again followed by a new
sequence DC...C, which indicates the new symbol value in the actual square.
Then follows one of the symbols for the next movement (L, R, N) and finally
a new DA...A sequence which contains the address of the next figuration to
be processed. To differentiate between the two functions covered by DA...A
                                                
12   In Turing the expression is given in the form qi Sj SkRq m , where R (right) can be replaced by L
(left) or N (none).
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sequences (which partly mark the beginning of a figuration, partly the next
actual figuration) a punctuation mark? is introduced to the left of the first and
to the right of the second DA...D.
This produces an unambiguous and serial representation which can be per-
formed mechanically step by step in the form of a long list with very few
different letters (A, C, D, L, R, N) and the separating character which indicates
the beginning of a new figuration. As an example he presents the standard
form
DADDCRDAA;DAADDRDAAA;DAAADDCCRDAAAA;DAAAADDRDA;
which can produce the expression 0 1 0 1 as a result.
By converting the letters to numbers in accordance with an established
code (1 for A, 2 for C... and 7 for the separating character) a corresponding de-
scription number is produced which can stand as an unambiguous description
of the sequence of machine figurations which can perform a given calculation
task.
Turing’s point with this description is to show that it will always be pos-
sible to express a given calculation procedure in (at least) one such standard
form with an accompanying, unambiguous description number which,
conversely, will also correspond to only one given calculation procedure:
To each computable sequence there corresponds at least one description
number, while to no description number does there correspond more than
one computable sequence.13
This is a truth which must be modified because it presupposes that the  se-
quence is seen from the point of view of the given formal task. Turing thereby
overlooked the principle difference between the notation units of the standard
form which are defined on the basis of their mechanically effective, physical
form and the formal notation units which are defined by a semantic value
determined in relationship to the task.
The explanation is naturally that this difference played no part in the ma-
thematical-logical perspective, where the whole point was to show that the
formal expression could be converted to the mechanically executable form.
                                                
13   Turing, (1936) 1965: 127.
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The demands the mechanical performance makes on notation, however,
imply that the expression appears in a form which can be processed indepen-
dently of the semantic content and this provides the universal computer with a
number of properties which are beyond the scope of even the most
sophisticated automatic calculating machine. These demands constitute the
only principle restriction on the universal computer and they can be described
by taking yet another look at Turing’s tape.
Now looking at this tape is not exactly a straightforward matter, as Turing clai-
med that it had to be infinite and thereby possess an abstract, physically
unrealizable property. He did this because it is impossible to define an upper
limit to the number of squares which may be necessary in order to construct a
machine that must be able to perform all imaginable finite calculation tasks.
But he also made the provision that the tape is a thoroughly concrete and
mechanically effective physical entity.
Turing defended this dualism in the conceptualization of the tape by saying
that the machine would always only carry out a finite number of operations
and therefore also only needs a finite number of squares on the tape. The
infinite tape simply indicated that the necessary number of squares varied with
the given task. Since a finite formal procedure is defined as one that can be
performed through a finite number of steps, it would be possible to do so with
a machine equipped with the corresponding number of squares.
The answer implied that, as such, there is no demand for an infinite tape, but
only for a tape with an indefinitely large number of squares. It is therefore
rather surprising that Turing raised the theoretical problem of the infinite tape
at all.
He does so, however, because the problem exists, even though it has no
significance for the machine’s construction and mode of operation. The reason
for this is that it was impossible to determine beforehand whether an arbitrary
task could actually be performed through a finite number of steps and
therefore impossible to decide how long it would be necessary to continue to
supply the machine with more squares.
Mechanical theory offers no solution to Turing’s problem as it does not
allow a material representation of the infinite, or physically active bodies to
have an infinite extent. Turing’s tape cannot be imagined on the basis of
classical mechanical physics and his re-interpretation of mechanical proce-
dures would hardly have a purpose if it merely concerned building ordinary
physical machines. The reward, on the contrary, was the possibility of building
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a machine which could be regulated through mechanical procedures which
were not built into the invariant physical structure of the machine.
Nor did he derive the unique ideas of the tape and the step-by-step pro-
cedure from mechanical physics. They were derived as a result of a phe-
nomenological analysis of a certain type of human symbol manipulation,
namely practical arithmetic as carried out with a pencil and paper.
Here he also found another theoretical argument which it is true did not
solve the problem of the infinite tape, but which provided a completely new
dimension, as he used the physical image of a closed, finite world to describe
consciousness as a closed, finite system. He then concluded that the universal
computer would be capable of performing any calculation which could be
performed mechanically by man. The problem of the infinite tape fades behind
the limitations of human consciousness. It first emerges beyond our own
reach.
Turing used not only the contemporary - human - computers as an illu-
strative analogy, but also as a starting point for a more detailed analysis of the
arithmetical process.
The argument regarding theories of consciousness, which will be taken up
in section 5.6-5.9, thus plays a central role for Turing, but none at all for the
Turing machine’s actual mode of operation. Turing uses the hypothetical
assumptions regarding human calculation as a source of inspiration - and
draws a veil across the problem of the impossible tape.
What remains is the activity carried out on the physical and finite part of the
tape. Looked at from a physical perspective this is a question of two process
levels. First, the tape as a whole is moved step by step as it leads a new square
into the reading mechanism. The movement halts here while the reading
mechanism reacts - mechanically - to the physical form, a symbol which is
manifested in the given square. A mechanical effect is now produced, as the
physical form may remain unaltered, be deleted or replaced by another symbol,
after which the tape is moved another step so that a new square reaches the
reading mechanism.
In any given state the relationship between a given square and the symbol
it contains is bound and fixed, but the bond is only local. The next step may
be an alteration of the symbol in a given square, or an alteration of the square
and thereby also the, in this case, invariant symbol’s place. The relationship
between the square and the symbol itself is variable whether the symbol is
actually altered or not. This functional property is possible because the square
and the symbol comprise two separate physical levels which are not part of a
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physically bound determination, even though the symbol can only exist as a
physical manifestation in a square. The connection is subject to an optional
regulation which makes it possible to make a symbol in a given place change
itself into another.
It is evident that all these mechanical procedures depend on physical forms
we ourselves understand as symbols, but appearing here and working as
purely physical-mechanical entities and that these symbols therefore belong to
the physical, invariant part of the Turing machine. The physical symbol forms
must therefore be defined prior to and independently of the task to be
performed. It is also clear for the same reasons that there must be a
predetermined finite number of permissible physical symbolic units - which are
independent of the task to be performed.
The mechanical process is thus independent of the symbolic interpretation
of the physical forms and depends entirely on the effects created by the phy-
sical form of these symbols. Whether the symbol symbolizes something outside
the system (and if so, how) is of no importance for the machine’s physical
mode of operation.
It is also at the same time clear that not all these mechanical parts of the
machine can be included in its construction, as the individual mechanically
effective symbol’s - changing - location, sequence and mechanical effects on
the tape and on other symbols is first defined by the task the machine is to
perform. The tape and the symbols on it are at all stages both part of the
machine and part of the material that is to be processed. As far as the tape is
concerned the necessary number of squares is determined by the task while as
far as the symbols are concerned it is the task which determines their sequence
and the semantic value of the total procedure. The machine, on the other hand,
determines the structural division of the tape into squares and the permissible
number of physically determined, semantically empty symbols.
The central point is thus the distinction between the definition of the phy-
sical and semantic value of the symbols, as the one definition is part of the
machine and the other part of the task.
The physical symbol definition was not in itself a theoretical innovation. This
type of definition had long been familiar in such areas as the Morse alphabet
used in telegraphy. Here, however, the physical definition still went hand in
hand with the declaration of unambiguous and invariant semantic values. Nor
did the physical definition particularly interest Turing. He touches upon it only
in a footnote where he remarks that it is possible to describe the symbol as a -
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measurable - set of points corresponding to the form of the ink within each
square and thereby defines the necessary criteria which make the machine
capable of differentiating between the individual symbols.14  This definition
indicated not only a general theoretical solution of the problem of mechanical
reading for a few chosen symbols, it allowed the use of an arbitrarily large
number of symbols with a single restriction, that it had to be a finite number,
because the difference between symbols approaches zero in step with
increasing numbers.
Turing thus appears to have imagined that a very large number of notation
units might be necessary for solving complicated tasks. The decisive point for
him was that there must be a finite number because the permissible symbols
had to be included in the building of the physically invariant machine. This is
also a reflection of the fact that he still understood the number of notation
units as a function of the task and the individual notation unit as loaded with
a semantic content of its own.
Notwithstanding this he could not avoid the conversion from formally and
semantically defined to physically defined symbol sequences, as the
conversion to »machine language« is the condition for mechanical, step-by-
step performance and thereby also the Turing machine’s conditio sine qua
non.
The demand for universality not only implies that there must be a prede-
termined and therefore limited number of notation units defined by the me-
chanically effective form, the same - few or many - units must also be capable
of manifesting themselves as expressions with different meanings as they must
both be able to represent an arbitrary quantity of changing data and an
arbitrary number of changing rules. As no distinct limits can be defined for this
demand on the possible semantic variation of the notation units, there can
consequently be no definite semantic value in the definition of the individual
notation unit. This cannot represent anything definite as it must be able to
successively play a part in representing everything.
Turing thus passes over the crucial point in the conversion of the determi-
nistic symbol procedure to the mechanically executable form, as he reads the
two forms as equivalent. At the same moment a given formal procedure is
available in the standard form it is available in a form where the individual
notation unit is accessible to manipulation and where its meaning is solely
determined by the - optional - preceding and succeeding units.
                                                
14   Turing, (1936) 1965: 135 (footnote).
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The universal computer not only requires the mechanical procedure to be
carried out as a series of semantically empty single steps, it also requires a
corresponding subdivision of the task as well as of the rules of calculation that
are to be used.
Turing’s theoretical description thus shows not only that it is an advantage
to specify the rules of calculation together with the task rather than to in-
corporate them into the machine, it also shows that this advantage, which is a
necessary precondition for the universality of the machine, implies that these
rules must be expressed in a form in which they can be processed
independently of their semantic content. This means that the rules of
calculation can become an object of calculation in themselves and that at each
stage of the process they can be modified or suspended independently of the
previous steps and of the original rule structure.
The universal computer can only be universal because it is not defined by
the symbolic logic of the task it is to perform. The universal properties of the
machine are on the contrary contained in and determined by the demand that
it must be possible to re-present the task in a notation system which is defined
by the notation’s physical - mechanically effective - form, independent of the
symbolic meaning and logical structure of the notation.
Where the automatic calculating machine builds on the mechanical
execution of deterministic arithmetical rules, the Turing machine builds on a
dissolution or breakdown of the deterministic rule structure into separate
mechanical steps.
While the machine is subordinated to the demand for a well-defined
alphabet, it is not subordinated to any demand for a specific syntax, or
semantic. It thereby allows a treatment of symbols which completely lacks the
determination which defines the calculation procedure.
This difference also appears when we look at what Turing calls the ma-
chine’s memory, as the total memory, whose content can be described and
calculated on the basis of the symbolic description, cannot be contained in the
Turing machine because it continuously erases or changes some of the
symbols and continuously increases the number of used squares.
Although it is true that the system’s memory at any given time can be de-
scribed on the basis of the machine’s (i.e. the tape’s) total state at a given
stage in the process, this definition does not contain all the existing and erased
information which has been or will be on the tape’s other squares. Thus no
finite representation of the whole system’s total memory exists. The
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deterministic character of the system is only local.15  As erased and changed
symbols are also included, the determination is at the same time irreversible.
The point is naturally that the machine has no use for such a memory, as
long as the necessary instructions are present at the time they are to be used.
What this demand implies can only be established, however, through a
symbolic reading, it cannot be decided through reading in the - mechanical
form - the machine is bound to.
The paradoxical result of Turing’s analysis is therefore that the symbolic
rule determination he used to dissolve the physical-mechanical process into
facultative individual steps must itself be dissolved before it can be performed
mechanically. This reduction at the same time constitutes the decisive dividing
line which separates it from all earlier attempts to create a universal calculating
machine or logical symbol manipulator - from Raymond Lull through Leibniz
to Charles Babbage.
The independent physical definition of the form of symbols is thus not
simply a technical detail which is only connected with the mechanical per-
formance either, it is also the foundation of the previously mentioned principle
difference which separates the universal computer from all calculating ma-
chines, as it determines:
• That any given sequence of individual steps can be performed inde-
pendently of its symbolic meaning.
• That one and the same sequence of notation units can, in principle, repre-
sent facultative variable symbolic values and/or logical structures.
• That the symbolic procedure »the programme«, which is used to control the
mechanical process, must be an explicit expression and converted to the
standard description’s form as a series of individually manipulable notation
units similarly to all other kinds of data.
Turing’s postulate that a given sequence which is available in a standard form
can only correspond to one definite computational process thus primarily
reflects the fact that he interpreted the universal machine on the basis of a
deterministic (mathematical-logical) understanding of symbols which allowed
no room for describing these three properties. These properties are, conversely,
necessary preconditions for the ability of a computer to solve a multiplicity of
                                                
15   C.f. Kleene, 1988: 30. Turing, (1936) 1965: 118.
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tasks, such as word processing, represented by the present work, for example,
although there is no formal mathematical-logical description of these tasks.
5.3 Formal and informational notation
As will be evident from the preceding, the demand for computational uni-
versality implies that the machine must work independently of any specific
rule of arithmetic or formal procedure. The price for this necessary freedom is
that the formal expression must be converted to a mechanically executable
form which demands a notation with a predetermined, finite set of physically
defined notation units which are individually empty of meaning.
With these two demands the conversion of a given task to the mechanically
executable form becomes identical with a complete conversion from a
formally-defined to a physically-defined notation system, which depends upon
other principles for meaning attribution and allows several forms of meaning
representation, as this notation is not subordinated to the demand for a
complete formal description of the meaning represented.
Turing provides no complete description of these notation conditions as he
only makes explicit the demand for a finite number of physically defined
notation units, but not the demand that the individual notation units be
defined without any intrinsic semantic value. This demand is only an implicit,
not explicit, but necessary precondition in Turing’s analysis.
Together, however, these two demands imply the use of a notation system
which does not build upon formal notation principles. As this also - as will
appear from chapters 7-8 - differs from linguistic and other previously
described notation systems, it will be regarded in the following as a new, inde-
pendent notation system.
As Turing’s notation is distinct from the - binary - notation which is used in
modern computers, there are reasons to include the latter already at this point.
This will also provide the opportunity to illustrate the difference between
formal and informational notation principles with the same (binary) notation
set as an example.
In the binary number system both notation units always have a definite
numerical value determined by their position in the expression. If the same unit
appears in another position it has a correspondingly, different predetermined
numerical value. A set of general, invariant rules is a prerequisite of all
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arithmetical notation systems for attributing values to each individual notation,
just as it is a prerequisite of formal notation that the individual notation units
are connected with a definite value which is either a data value or a rule value.
Rule and data values are thus each expressed through their own distinct set of
notation units (or rules of positioning) and any change of a single notation
unit is connected with a change - determined by the semantic value of the
new notation - in the total content of the expression.
There are only two notation units in the binary number system, but as it is
also necessary to use an - arbitrary - number of rule notations, binary number
notation can only be used in connection with a more comprehensive notation
system where, in principle, new notation units for operators can be introduced
arbitrarily on the single condition that each individual notation unit is ascribed
a certain content value at the same moment as it is introduced. There is no
definite invariant limit to the number of notation units in formal notation
systems, on the other hand a notation can only become a member of a formal
notation system through a declaration of its semantic value.
This also holds true of formal expressions which use notations with variable
values, as this makes it necessary to indicate well-defined, formal rules for
value variation. A variable value, x, can only appear in connection with a
declaration of variation thresholds and it cannot at one moment appear as a
variable numerical value and at the next as a rule of arithmetic.
Arithmetical notation systems are, like all mathematical and formal notation
systems, based on explicit and unambiguous declarations of the individual
content value of the notation units. These values are again determined in
relationship to an overall set of rules for semantic variation within the given
formal system.
None of these conditions is valid for the use of binary notation as infor-
mational notation used in computers. On the contrary, here, as previously
shown, it is a question of a notation system comprising semantically empty
notation units without general rules for the values which can be attributed to
the individual units. In the binary version only two notation units are used,
which is not, however, a necessary condition, as long as their number has been
predetermined. Nor can any differentiation be made between separate rule and
data notations. The same two units must represent both parts of numbers, parts
of arithmetical rules, or logical relationships. In some cases they must act as
parts of an address in the system, at others as parts of a procedure for
producing an output. In other words, they appear with changing values in the
same sequence. These values are never bound to the individual notation unit,
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but only to the given sequence as a whole. Thus no separate rule notations
appear, nor can new notation units be introduced during a given procedure.
Rule and data must on the contrary be expressed with the same notation units
and the rule can only be effectuated through a sequence of individual steps
carried out at the level of the notation units, which means that the rule can
only be effectuated by being represented and processed exactly as all other
data.
It is also evident from this that the concept ‘data’ is not an adequate
concept for the operationally active notation unit, if we thereby infer that
there is an equivalence between the minimum unit of expression and the
minimum content value.
While such an equivalence is the foundation of formal notation, infor-
mational notation is defined by non-equivalence which - as will appear from
chapter 7 - is a property informational notation shares with common language
notation. The principle of such notation systems is expressed by the concept
‘double articulation’, by which is understood notation systems where the
minimum expression unit is a semantic variation mechanism which is smaller
than the minimum content value.
It is natural to illustrate this relationship by starting with a well-established
representation standard such as the ASCII code which establishes a
convention-determined (freely chosen) binary representation of up to 256
notations derived from other notation systems in a constellation of 8 bits,
which can each assume one of the two values 0-1 corresponding to 28 bit
patterns. As long as we concentrate solely on the ASCII code itself there is a
clear equivalence: each individual represented notation unit has an unam-
biguous binary equivalent. The point of informational notation, however, is
that it must not only be possible to represent letters, numbers and operators,
but also to effectuate the operations mentioned. Where we can  simply write
1+1, the machine must express both the two numerical values and the
operator as well as effectuate a mechanical process which produces the ASCII
value for a total with the help of two and only two notation units. These thus
appear in this process both as partial elements in the binary expression of the
number  /1/, the letter /a/ and the notation /+/  and the arithmetical rule of
addition. The ASCII code also shows that the individual notation unit never
has an  intrinsic semantic value. The meaning is only connected with the total
constellation - in this case by 8 bits - but the meaning variation is nevertheless
manifested through the variation of a single bit.
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This difference between formal and informational notation also holds true in
the cases where binary notation is interpreted as a logical relationship
between two possible alternatives. Although the alteration of a single bit in
the informational notation sequence can have semantic effects, these cannot
be described by interpreting the binarity as an alternative between the two
semantic content values, yes or no. The individual bit is a unit of expression
which is smaller than the smallest content value, as the smallest content value
(a numerical value or a logical yes, for example) always requires a sequence of
bits before it can be performed in the machine. While the rules in a formal
system are always defined outside the system, the rules must be explicitly
contained in an informational expression and they can only work as rules if
they appear themselves through a number of step-by-step, mechanical stages.
The rule effects appear here as an integral part of that process we say that they
regulate.
While it is thus possible to describe formal, (symbolic or mechanical) pro-
cesses as rule determined processes where the rules are predetermined and
given outside the regulated system, the process in the Turing machine must be
described as a process in which rule formation and execution is an integral
part of the result of the process.
The difference between formal and informational notation is finally em-
phasized by the fact that it is not the physical form of the formal notations, e.g.
the binary numbers, but their numerical value which determines the effect on
the calculation process, whereas informational, e.g. binary, notation works
solely by virtue of the physical form of the notation, no matter whether the
entire sequence has been imagined as a logical value, a rule structure, or a
numerical value.
When we take these differences into account there appears to be no pos-
sibility of understanding informational notation within the framework of
formal notation principles. The conversion of the formal expression to a
mechanically executable form implies that the structure of the formal ex-
pression can only be retained in a form in which the determination of the
structure assumes a resoluble, freely editable and variable form in line with the
material that is structured.
It is also evident that this structural dissolution of the expression form not
only goes much further than the aims which motivated it, but also exceeds the
understanding of formal notation. It was not by chance that Turing
overlooked the demand for semantically empty notation units and that he
failed to arrive at the binary notation form.
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It is therefore doubtful whether Gandy is right in presuming that Turing
relinquished the idea of suggesting a purely binary notation out of regard for
the reader.16  It is true that nobody can be certain what unspoken consi-
derations Turing may have taken into account, but there is no indication that
in 1936 he would have been able to imagine such a complete binary
representation.
If he had, it would have complicated the explanation and produced
problems in the description of the machine. This is because he would not only
have had to specify how it could decide which were numbers, which were
arithmetical rules and which were rules for movement, instead of sticking to
the intuitive advantage which lay in the use of a more arbitrary choice of
easily recognizable symbols where the physical form was still directly
connected with functional semantic values, it would also have created a
conceptual break for which there was, at the time, no motive.
5.4 The automatic, the circular and the choice machine
The lack of a distinction between formal and informational notation principles
was of no direct significance to Turing’s project and reflects his formal
perspective regarding the machine.
The limitations of the perspective, however, became evident in his formal
definition of the mechanical procedure, as he introduced here two central
modifications which, each in its own way, showed that he was unable to
demonstrate the necessary theoretical distinction between the universal
machine and the specific tasks.
The first modification comes to expression in his distinction between what
he refers to as the automatic machine - which in his eyes was the genuine
universal machine - and what he called »the choice machine«. While the
automatic machine is presumably determined completely by the given
figuration, the choice machine is characterized by the fact that in certain states
there is a need for a choice made by an external operator.
                                                
16   Gandy, 1988: 90 note 38.
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When such a machine reaches one of these ambiguous configurations, it
cannot go on until some arbitrary choice has been made by an external
operator.17
States thus occur in this machine where the next step is not determined by the
actual configuration.
Turing clearly understood the choice machine as a less interesting and more
limited version of the automatic machine. The choice machine is dealt with
only in a single footnote which mentions that it can be simulated on the
automatic machine.
The interesting point here, however, is that Turing’s distinction between the
automatic machine and the choice machine has nothing whatever to do with
the properties of the universal computer.
His introduction of the distinction is not due to the fact that this is a case of
machines which work in different ways, but on the contrary that there are
different tasks. The two machines are identical. The introduction of the
distinction rested on a theoretical problem connected with the question of
whether all formal systems could be represented in a set of distinct, finite
operations.
For Turing the potential of the choice machine lay exclusively in the need
for the intervention of an external operator in the handling of certain formal
systems. Although he described the necessity of the choice as a consequence
of the fact that the next step was not determined, he quite naturally assumed
that the possibility of choice alone was of relevance for the handling of - a
certain group - of formal symbol systems.
As this possibility of choice is not connected with a machine which differs
in any way from the automatic machine and as the possible choices are solely
limited by the demand that the symbolic meaning must be expressed in a finite
notation system, it becomes clear that Turing is only capable of defining the
universal computer as an automaton by defining the machine on the basis of a
certain class of task. He thereby draws a veil across the properties which make
the machine universal, whether this universality is seen in its specific
mathematical-logical meaning, or in a more general symbolic way.
Turing saw the difference between the automatic machine and the choice
machine in the light of different classes of deterministic symbol processes, but
the potential of the choice machine goes further than this difference, because
                                                
17   Turing (1936) 1965: 118.
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the machine itself makes no demand that the formal expression must represent
a closed or unambiguous semantic message.18  It only makes a demand on the
form of the notation. The potential of the choice machine is therefore only
limited by the external operator’s ability to express a message in a finite set of
distinct expression elements. It is also perfectly possible - as is shown by any
word-processing programme today - to control the computational process
with a symbol system where no unambiguous deterministic relations exist
between the individual symbols used by the external operator.
The automatic Turing machine represents only a special case of a more
universal symbol manipulating machine. It realizes only a limited spectrum of
the machine’s potential. This spectrum is characterized by the operator
allowing the mechanical procedure to be controlled by a precept which con-
tains a deterministic description of a given problem area. In other words the
automatic machine is a dedicated machine devoted to a previously limited set
of tasks which determine all its operations. In this form it approaches the
classical machine, but also in this case there is a basic difference, as the
automatic procedure’s determination is symbolic - not physical - and thereby
accessible to new choices.
Turing’s distinction between the choice machine and the automatic ma-
chine emerged as a consequence of the theoretical problem which was his
starting point, namely the question of whether it is possible to break down
formal procedures into a finite number of distinct mechanical steps. It was
possible in many cases, but not all.
The other central modification came, on the other hand, from the result.
Turing decided the Entscheidungsproblem by demonstrating that there is no
algorithm which can determine whether an arbitrary formal procedure fulfils
the demand that it can reach a conclusion with the help of a finite number of
operations. This proof of what later became known as »the stop problem« not
only demonstrated that there are formal procedures which cannot be carried
out with finite means, it also demonstrated that there is no general method for
determining whether an arbitrary, given procedure has such a finite solution.
Turing himself hereby supplied a theoretical proof that there it is not possi-
ble to limit a universal calculating machine to the status of an automatic
calculating machine.
                                                
18   Turing’s view of the choice machine is incidentally too narrow, even if only the machine’s ability
to simulate calculations is taken into account. By allowing the operator to provide new input it also
becomes possible to use new or unforeseen information. It may not only be difficult or impossible to
realize the ideal dream of including these possibilities in an automatic process, it may also be
inappropriate.
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If it is not possible to determine in advance whether an arbitrary formal
procedure has a finite solution, a machine capable of carrying out any finite
calculating procedure must work independently of this criterion. The stop
condition cannot be built into the machine. This also explains how Turing
»happened to« break down the concept of mechanical and symbolic
determination into facultative decisions which can be made step by step, in
conflict with his own basic theoretical assumptions.
He bypassed this problem by introducing a distinction between what he
called respectively »circular« and »circle-free« machines. These machines are
also identical, however, the difference lies exclusively in the character of the
task presented. If the task can be carried out with a finite number of
operations, it is a circle-free machine, if not, it is a circular machine which either
comes to a standstill, runs in a circle or continues without yielding new
information.
From Turing’s mathematical-logical perspective such a »circular machine«
would have no purpose, but this is solely due to the mathematical-logical
perspective, as he understood circularity as an expression of the fact that the
machine had come to a standstill (ran in a circle) in a calculating process. That
a circular Turing machine could be used to simulate other machines was
entirely outside the sphere of his attention and interest. Furthermore, the term
circular is used - rather confusingly - both of the sequences where the machine
runs indefinitely in a circle without yielding new information and of the
sequences where it comes to a standstill and demands new input (as a variant
of the choice machine).
That the Turing machine can simulate the structure of the classical machine,
including that of the calculating machine, does not reduce the difference
between them. It increases it, as the possibility of simulating the classical
machine depends on a property which the classical machine does not possess.
The property which makes the simulation possible must thus also be regarded
as more basic than the phenomenon simulated, whether this be a machine, or in
Turing’s case, a formal calculation procedure processed in the circle-free
machine, which is defined by procedures which bring the machine to a stop
when it has reached the result of the calculation.
Turing’s distinction between the circular and the circle-free machine is still
justified when seen in the light of his purpose and in connection with the
performance of automatic calculating procedures. It has considerable
mathematical-logical relevance, but is also central because Turing demon-
strates that it is incapable of playing any part in the construction of his ma-
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chine. As there is no general method for deciding whether a calculation can
actually be completed, the demand for non-circularity cannot be built into the
physical layout of the machine. On the contrary, the physical layout must be
independent of this criterion.
Turing saw the circle-free machine as the genuine universal computer, once
again because of his interests and aims. But he overlooked the fact that the
freedom of the circle-free machine from circularity depends on the character of
the task and not of the machine, by which he robs the machine of its universal
properties. He also overlooked the fact that his own definition of the formal
procedure implies that it can only be described as a finite, deterministic
procedure if a purposeful task is included in the description. Without such a
specified purpose the procedure breaks down into random steps which are
devoid of meaning. The Turing machine can only function as an intentional
machine. Its prerequisite condition is an intention, but if the task is included in
the definition of the machine it is no longer universal. If instead the symbolic
level is left out entirely, it will hardly be a machine at all, but simply an
imperfect  radiator.
It is not the purposefulness itself which separates this machine from other
physical machines, as they are similarly characterized by the fact that their
finite character is brought about through the implementation of a purpose. The
difference appears on the contrary because the Turing machine does not
demand - nor allow - these purposes to be built into the invariant structure of
the machine. It is thus not only the stop conditions which are not incor-
porated, the starting conditions are not incorporated either.
As the machine itself can neither define the starting conditions nor the stop
conditions, in its general form it is always a choice machine and never an
automaton. The closest that this machine can come to a completely automatic
procedure is when it runs in a closed loop where it never encounters any stop
condition.
5.5 The universal computer as an innovation in the history of the machine
and of mechanical theory
Turing’s theoretical description of mechanical procedure as a step-by-step
procedure where the physical determination is limited to the relationship
between two steps, together with his description of the way in which the in-
dividual steps could be connected by linking them to corresponding, step-by-
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step symbolic choices, represents a far-reaching innovation in mechanical
theory.
This appears directly from Turing’s own account, but the reach appears
with even greater clarity if we look at Turing’s description in relationship to a
physical-mechanical process which prior to Turing existed in one of two basic
forms. A mechanical process could either be understood as a regular, universal
and deterministic natural process (first clearly and generally formulated by
Pierre Laplace) or as a sequence of a definite number of finite physical
operations which comprise a mutually connected and outwardly delimited
whole, such as exists in the form of actual, physical machines in well-defined
laboratory experiment arrangements and in the concept of Ludwig Boltzmann
and that of later physics of local, completely delimited finite space.
The two points of view were usually interwoven to a greater or lesser
degree in spite of the theoretical contradiction between the image of the
universal, deterministic system (nature as a whole) which permits no kind of in-
tervention (man is smaller than the system and is within it) and the image of
the finite, local system which can both be interrupted and produced as a
selective and constructive choice and combination of mechanical processes
with limited and local effect (man is greater than the system and stands - as
before God in front of the huge machine - outside it).
The Turing machine partly represents a polarization between and partly a
break with these conceptualizations.
In classical  mechanical theory the determination between the individual
steps is seen as an effect of the general laws which operate throughout the
system. The difference between two steps is a simple function of a time
variation in a system where each possible state is established on the basis of a
set of predetermined, well-defined starting conditions. The relationship
between the individual steps in the process is such that they are bound
together so that the individual step is only an intermediate link with the next
and whose effect on the following step is completely determined by the
starting conditions. The individual step cannot itself influence the previous
and following steps.
In the Turing machine the mechanical determination is clearly of a different
character, as its physical movement is defined solely by the relationship
between the actual state and the actual symbol. The physical determination is
local and never includes more than one step at a time. A new instruction can
be called for at each step and the transition to the next step must be specified
for each individual step.
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Turing’s contribution to mechanical theory thereby comprises a proof that
it is possible to break down any finite mechanical system into a sequence of
step-by-step, facultative operations in which physical determination is limited
to the relationship between one step and the next and, conversely, that every
further step can be made accessible to a free choice.
The Turing machine, however, cannot be described within the framework
expressed in the description of classical machines as a sequence of a finite
number of delimited physical operations which comprise a mutually connected
and outwardly delimited whole.
Although traditional machines are often based on the use of many different
- physical - laws, each governing a fraction of the operations, the functionality
depends at the same time on the fact that the various mechanical effects on the
individual steps are connected in a repetitive system in a pre-established and
physically bound way.
It is quite true that it is theoretically possible to describe the Turing ma-
chine’s repetitive physical operations step by step, but this description only
includes movement from square to square and the mechanical operation on the
actual physical notation. Such a description, however, is not a description of a
Turing machine as it does not include the continuous changes in the physical
notation units and thereby the effect of the mechanical operation on the
individual square. At the same moment the notation units and their mechanical
effect are included, the limit to the description of the invariant mechanical
process has been reached, because this is a machine in which the sequence of
steps has not been pre-established, is not repetitive and not unambiguously
bound by the physical layout of the machine.
The physical process of the machine - the number of steps and the con-
tinuous mechanical changes in the location and sequencing of the physical
notation units - depends on and varies with the task to be performed.
Rules are not simply allocated step by step in the Turing machine, they are
also allocated in another way which appears from the fact that the - symbolic -
rules which determine the individual steps can not only be made conditional -
as is familiar from such equipment as the thermostat - they can also be
modified. The - mechanically effective - instruction which controls a given
step must thus either be produced by a previous step or a new input, but can
also be re-activated and thereby altered by a subsequent step.
The key to the machine lies in the double character of the tape, which is at
one and the same time part of the machine and the material and the place of
exchange between the physical-mechanical and the symbolic procedures.
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As a consequence of this the invariant borderline between the machine and
the material processed, which constitutes classical physical machines, is broken
down. As the material not only can but must contain the rules which control
the machine’s operations, this is a radical extension of the concept of machine.
The Turing machine thus differs from previously known physical machines
at two central points. One point is contained in the step-by-step procedure
which limits physical determination to a simple relationship between two steps,
by which the classical machine is broken down into its »atomistic«
components. The other point is contained in the breaking down of the
borderline between machine and material, as the machine not only demands
that the rules governing the sequencing of the physical steps must be contai-
ned in the material, but also that they must be contained in a form in which
they can be effectuated as a chain of - variable and facultative - individual
steps in the course of the process they regulate.
The two machines, therefore, do not differ because the rules which are
incorporated in the classical physical machine originate in physics, while the
rules governing the symbolic machine originate in mathematics or logic, they
differ because the rules are implemented in two different ways. While a tradi-
tional machine can be described as a machine in which a number of causal
processes are collected and ordered under a single, overall final intention
which is implemented in the machine’s invariant physical architecture, the
Turing machine can be described as a mechanical apparatus in which an
arbitrarily large number of different final intentions can be implemented
continuously in arbitrarily small portions.
Turing’s theoretical analysis of the principles for a universal computer thus
contains marked renewals of mechanical theory and of the history of the
machine and leads finally to a radically new way of presenting the problems
regarding the concepts of rules and regularity.
The renewals appear in direct connection to the description of the machine,
as this description assumes 1) that mechanical theory is understood and
formulated as an abstract, theoretical model and not as a model of the physical
world and 2) that the abstract rules of procedure are effectuated through a
physically performed process. Where mechanical theory previously
represented physical nature, it is now seen as a model for the physical
execution of formal, symbolic procedures.
The first link in this conversion consisted of emancipating mechanical the-
ory from physics and it appeared, when Turing simply transferred the mechani-
cal model of nature as a universal and deterministic system to the understan-
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ding of the computer as a deterministic, finite, formal system. In a later article
he draws a direct parallel to Laplace’s formulation of the ideal ambition of
mechanical theory: to predict all previous and later states on the basis of a
single, given state, in remarking that this ambition is closer to fulfilment in the
computer than in the physical world where infinitesimal inaccuracies in the
starting conditions create huge disturbances.19
With the abstract re-interpretation of mechanical theory the conflict be-
tween universal and local mechanical theory assumes a less contradictory
character, as it is now expressed in the distinction between infinite and finite
procedures, of which only the last can be performed mechanically, as it is only
here that it is possible to speak of a complete establishment of the conditions
for starting and stopping. In return for this freedom from contradiction,
however, the theory only concerns formal systems which are defined on the
basis of axiomatic criteria of validity. The inner consistency with regard to
meaning and validity is thus achieved by abandoning all demands on
referential validity.
The second renewal lies in the demand for physical execution of the formal
rules, as this demand implies that the rules must be made explicit in a form in
which they become regulable themselves. In other words, here the rules
assume the character of freely defined, chosen and variable laws or con-
ventions. They no longer stand outside the regulated system as trans-
cendentally preordained and invariant laws, but are included on the contrary
as step-by-step performed sequences which can be influenced through inter-
vention at the - lower - level of physical notation, i.e. independently of the
content of the given rules.
In this respect the Turing machine represents a model of a mechanical sy-
stem in which at any moment outside impulses, which are not only capable of
changing the further sequence, but also any previously given rule, can make
an appearance.
While formal, deterministic symbol theory was a necessary prerequisite for
constructing an idea - and the first description - of  the universal computer, it
not only fails in describing the result, it is also undermined because mechanical
performance implies that the symbolic procedure is emancipated from the
concept of determination, so that the connection alone expresses a semantic
choice which is connected to specific tasks and purposes.
                                                
19   Turing 1950: 440. This equally pioneering article is discussed in greater detail in sections 5.6-5.8.
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There are several reasons why Turing did not pay attention to these aspects.
The most obvious lay in his mathematical approach and the mathematical-
logical purposes he had in view. These purposes meant that he had to
overlook this aspect because the whole point of his work was to show how it
would be possible to carry out any finite and deterministic symbolic procedure
with an »ordinary« mechanical machine. This meant, so to speak, that he had
cut himself off in advance from concerning himself with the dissolution of the
fusion of the concepts of mechanics and determination.
5.6 Written down by a machine
In the previous sections the Turing machine has been described with the
emphasis on the new type of exchange between physical-mechanical and
symbolic procedures and it has been demonstrated that the notation Turing
used to provide the formal expression with a mechanically executable form
was not simply - as he believed - a practical notation technique, but comprised
an independent notation system with properties that separated it from formal
notation systems.
While Turing saw the new notation technique as an - almost trivial -
equivalent to formal notation because it was possible to derive the informa-
tional form of the formal expression from  simple, unambiguous procedures, on
the other hand he used some less trivial assumptions from theories of
consciousness as a starting point for the new construction of the relationship
between mechanical and symbolic procedures. Although Turing’s universal
calculating machine worked because
of its mechanical properties and therefore quite independently of our
understanding of the organization of human consciousness, certain ideas on
this are included in the theoretical assumptions Turing used as a precondition
for the construction of the machine. As these assumptions also played a
central role both in Turing’s and others’ later interpretations of the machine,
they will be discussed in the following sections before the analysis of informa-
tional notation is continued in chapters 6-9.20
One thing can be established immediately however. The universal Turing
machine does not work in the same way as Turing’s consciousness did. His
article from 1936 provides excellent documentation of this, as it unites
                                                
20   Among them, cybernetics, classical AI research and Cognitive Science research.
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stringent theoretical analysis with a presentation containing a number of errors
due to sheer carelessness in the details. Martin Davis thus introduces his 1965
reprint of Turing’s article with a well-meant warning:
This is a brilliant paper, but the reader should be warned that many of the
technical details are incorrect as given.21
A few years later Gandy supplements this with more imagery and greater
tolerance:
The approach is novel, the style refreshing in its directness and simplicity.
The bare-hands, do-it-yourself approach does lead to clumsiness and error.
But the way in which he uses concrete objects such as exercise books and
printer’s ink to illustrate and control the argument is typical of his insight
and originality.22
It is only reasonable that well-informed colleagues are ready to make such
allowances. It shows not only that the erroneous, mechanical procedure is
regarded as a far less significant part of human thinking than the originality,
brilliance, simplicity and imagination necessary to transcend the previous
conceptual frameworks, it also shows that human consciousness is capable of
working in ways which would bring any Turing machine to a standstill.
Although later analyses based on theories of consciousness are mistaken in
ignoring or underrating this difference, they are correct in placing the theories
of consciousness on the agenda in connection with the Turing machine. This
is the case because Turing’s theory confirms that there is no path from
classical, universal mechanical theory regarding the organization of nature to
the machine which does not pass through human consciousness.
It was therefore not by chance that Turing himself - in the middle of the
busy road between mathematics and physics - had to make an epistemological
leap by initially using mechanical theory in the area occupied by theories of
consciousness.
It was the problem of the stop condition which made this leap necessary, as
he showed that it was impossible to determine in advance whether a formal or
mechanical procedure would reach a conclusion. As any classical machine is
                                                
21   Davis, 1965: 115.
22   Gandy, 1988: 85.
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characterized by the fact that it constitutes a delimited and closed system it
was not possible to find a solution to this stop problem within the world of the
machine. Nor, conversely, was it possible to derive the construction of the
machine directly from universal mechanical theory which, it is true, contains no
precondition regarding a stop condition, but which for the same reason
represents a system which it is completely impossible to delimit and which is
infinite, whether we believe that it reflects the order of the universe or simply a
mental picture.
A theoretical leap was necessary in order to find a solution which was
possible in practice.
The reader first receives notice of this when Turing, almost in passing,
concludes the introductory survey of the general content of the article with
his definition of computable numbers which can be written down by a ma-
chine. The article begins:
The »computable« numbers may be described briefly as the real numbers
whose expressions as a decimal are calculable by finite means. Although the
subject matter of this paper is ostensibly the computable numbers, it is
almost equally easy to define and investigate computable functions of an
integral variable or a real or computable variable, computable predicates,
and so forth. The fundamental problems involved are, however, the same in
each case, and I have chosen the computable numbers for explicit treatment
as involving the least cumbrous technique. I hope shortly to give an account
of the relations of the computable numbers, functions and so forth to one
another. This will include a development of the theory of functions of a real
variable expressed in terms of computable numbers. According to my
definition, a number is computable if its decimal can be written down by a
machine.23
Simple and neat. Everybody knows how a machine works. But the abrupt in-
troduction of the machine is not due to the familiarity of the image and its
obvious pedagogical advantages. What Turing is introducing here with the
concept of a machine is not the mechanical writing function, but the demand
that through mechanical means a result of a calculation must be produced in
the course of a finite number of procedures, the stop condition, which
separates the finite from the infinite formal procedure.
                                                
23   Turing, (1936) 1965: 116.
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This is not exactly the first evocation given of the idea of a machine, nor is it
the physical proficiency in writing, but the mental mechanics of the
proficiency in arithmetic which is the source.
As with the last sentence of the introduction, so with the first, apparently
even more trustworthy sentence where the computable numbers are defined
as numbers which can be calculated through finite means.
Underlying this idea are two assumptions derived from theories of con-
sciousness, one a general theory of human memory as a finite system and the
other a more detailed and specific idea of how humans calculate.
Turing does not appear to have paid any great attention to this not very
obvious introduction of the machine, but when it comes to the unusual
assumptions derived from theories of consciousness, he is perfectly clear. It is
from here that he takes his point of departure:
We have said that the computable numbers are those whose decimals are
calculable by finite means. This requires a rather more explicit definition.
No real attempt will be made to justify the definitions given until we reach §
9. For the present I shall only say that the justification lies in the fact that
the human memory is necessarily limited.24
Turing has thus, in the first and last sentences of the introduction, carefully
placed, but not developed, the two conceptual frames from which he obtains
the ingredients for his definition of the finite, formal procedure, namely
classical, universal mechanics as formulated by Laplace and human proficiency
in calculation as analysed by - Turing.
In his introductory resumé, for some reason, Turing introduces the two
images, the mental and the physical-mechanical, as though they were two
poles which delimit the article’s space. In the continuation they become
completely fused:
We may compare a man in the process of computing a real number to a
machine which is only capable of a finite number of conditions.25
There is a paradoxical point in this construction, as it is not possible to derive
the idea of human consciousness as a finitely delimited system from universal
                                                
24   Turing, (1936) 1965: 117.
25   Ibid: 117.
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mechanical theory (whose preconditions are that the universe is one great,
cohesive machine and that a given system which is left to itself can continue
indefinitely) or from an analysis of formal arithmetical procedures (as Turing’s
own analysis showed that infinite, formal procedures did exist).
Nor does the structure of the classical machine correspond to a fungible
Turing machine, but rather to Turing’s circular machine which runs in a circle
without yielding any output.
Turing also equipped his machine with an infinite tape and limited the use
of the idea of finite consciousness to the finite arithmetical procedures. The
infinite tape is not part of Turing’s model of consciousness, which is more
reminiscent of Boltzmann’s theoretical model of finite, thermodynamic space
and of Hilbert’s idea of a completely closed, formal system.
Paradoxical or not, by transferring mechanical theory’s tension-filled com-
bination of the idea of the single, great universal machine and the many small,
specific machines from the domain of physics to that of consciousness, Alan
Turing got the idea that it must be possible to construct a machine which
would be capable of carrying out any finite mathematical symbol
manipulation.
Taking into account the result - this must be considered an extremely pro-
ductive exploitation of the theoretical contradiction, but there is no marked
confirmation of its relevance to theories of consciousness. On the contrary, the
idea of a finite, step-by-step operating consciousness is a less plausible part of
Turing’s theory. As it is also an idea which has in particular given rise to later
schools of theories of consciousness, his formulation and exploitation of the
idea deserve a more detailed investigation.
Turing’s idea of finite consciousness served two more specific purposes - over
and above the possible motifs of theories of cognition. One was to create a
basis for the idea that it might be possible to reduce a large part of logic and
mathematics to the premises of mechanical physics. It is highly probable that
this idea played a pioneering and necessary role in the development of his
theoretical description, just as it is also clear that he did not maintain the idea
in this form, as he equipped his machine with an infinite tape.
As will be evident from the following, Turing never, neither in 1936 nor in
his later work, subscribed to the idea that his own theoretical machine or the
later computers worked similarly to human consciousness. On the contrary, he
distances himself increasingly from the idea of describing consciousness as a
closed system characterized by a finite set of discrete states.
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Nevertheless, this idea serves yet another important purpose in Turing’s
theory, as he also uses it in his phenomenological analysis of arithmetical
procedure. He thereby made the theoretical leap which definitively and
rightfully takes the use of mechanical thinking into the area of theories of
consciousness.
In Turing’s analysis of arithmetical procedure the idea of finite - calculating
- consciousness is utilized in five different elements, which comprise:
• The idea of consciousness as physically processed in time and space.
• The idea of finite consciousness as a set of distinct, mechanically connected
states.
• The idea of step-by-step, locally determined procedure.
• The criterion of readability, i.e. the demand for breaking down into simple
expressions which can be recognized »immediately« and the demand for a
limited number of actually possible »readable« squares.
• The idea of a completely explicit representation of the contents of the
calculation which is developed on the basis of the observation that an
arithmetical procedure can be interrupted and notes taken which contain all
the information necessary for a later continuation.
The question now is whether this model of conscious processes can be seen as
a general model of the way in which consciousness works, or as a model for
certain types of conscious processes, such as arithmetical processes and other
mechanical conclusion procedures, or whether it is rather a question of a
model which describes how, with the help of outside aids, we can arrive at the
same results which we could arrive at ourselves in other ways?
It is reasonable to take our point of departure in the arithmetical procedure
itself, as we can both perform many arithmetical procedures with a calculating
machine, a Turing machine and without outside aids. And it is also here in
particular that Turing utilizes the assumptions of theories of consciousness in
more specific criteria which are especially connected with the concept of
memory and concrete arithmetical procedure.
The question is not yet whether all forms of thinking can be broken down
into simple, step-by-step sequences, but conversely whether human
consciousness performs some of its activities by breaking down complex,
formal expressions in the same way that they are broken down in a Turing
machine.
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There is no doubt that certainly in 1936 Turing believed that there was a
clear relationship here, as he simply gives the grounds for the breaking down
procedure by referring to the empirical experience that we are unable to
differentiate large numbers which resemble one another without breaking
them down into smaller units.
The differences from our point of view between the single and compound
symbols is that the compound symbols, if they are too lengthy, cannot be
observed at one glance. This is in accordance with experience. We cannot
tell at a glance whether 99999999999999 and 999999999999999 are the
same.26
When we make a calculation we work serially and step-by-step forward
through a number of discrete states and must therefore break down any more
complex symbol into a finite sequence through subdivision. The fact that we
do not lose our way in this process may similarly be because the individual
step is determined by the relationship between the actual memory state and
the single symbol observed at the given stage:
The behaviour of the [human] computer at any moment is determined by the
symbols which he is observing, and his »state of mind« at that moment. We
may suppose that there is a bound B to the number of symbols... which the
computer can observe at one moment. If he wishes to observe more, he must
use successive observations. We will also suppose that the number of states
of mind which need be taken into account is finite. The reasons for this are
of the same character as those which restrict the number of symbols. If we
admitted an infinity of states of mind, some of them will be »arbitrarily
close« and will be confused. Again, the restriction is not one which
seriously affects computation, since the use of more complicated states of
mind can be avoided by writing more symbols on the tape.27
That this description of arithmetical procedure can actually create a basis for
the performance of calculations is not in doubt. If we accept that what is
referred to here as »state of mind« only includes the relevant information for
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the specific arithmetical procedure, it also appears, on the face of it, as a quite
plausible model for a description of how human beings can do arithmetic.
A more detailed consideration, however, gives rise to considerable doubt. It
is not only improbable that the description corresponds to the way in which
we perform calculations ourselves, it is also doubtful whether we will be able
to perform many calculations in this way.
The central point in Turing’s description of the arithmetical process consists
in breaking down the task to its smallest components, as such, a classical and
familiar analytical procedure which could hardly find a more suitable area of
use.
The critical points in this procedure are similarly familiar. They lie partly - as
mentioned previously - in the establishment of premises, i.e. the starting condi-
tions, and partly in the question of how we can define the optimum or
maximum degree of breaking down.
It is also at these two points that Turing’s model of the arithmetical process
differs most markedly - but from both human calculation and from the way in
which the Turing machine works.
With regard to arithmetical procedure carried out by a human being, the
most striking difference is that Turing’s ideal model can only function if the
task is actually broken down into its smallest expression components. This
condition is not ultimately binding on human calculation. Even though we
can break down large numbers into smaller components, there is no evidence
that we break down these numbers into their smallest expression components.
On the contrary, it is far more characteristic - normally - that we find it both
difficult to handle large numbers and to reduce them to their smallest
expression components. While many people for the same - or other - reasons
completely give up doing arithmetic, others, at precisely this point, begin to
use external aids such as counting boards, abacuses, pencils and paper.
Turing’s analysis actually helps to illustrate one of the reasons, as it is
evident that the radical breaking down of the expression into its individual
components requires a dramatic expansion of a stable and reliable memory.
The number of symbols which must be remembered is not only increased, they
must also be located in precisely defined places on a tape where the access to
each square is unambiguously established as a mechanical procedure and
where the values in the individual places can be varied.
We are quite simply incapable of handling the simple, serial manifestations
of the complex expression which comprise the core of Turing’s model. Not
only do we find it extremely difficult to reduce an arithmetical task into its
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smallest components - with the exception of quite simple operations involving
whole numerical values from perhaps -100 to +100, or thereabouts - we are
not bound to do so either.
Turing’s model does not reveal much - if anything at all - about mental
arithmetical processes. Nor is his model a model of a human being doing
mental arithmetic, but of someone working with paper and pencil and, more-
over, he immediately replaces ordinary squared - two-dimensional - paper and
the decimal system with a one-dimensional tape and the binary representation
of numbers, while the other symbols and rules of arithmetic are not made
explicit at all. He assumes that we have them in our heads.
What he showed in this respect was that it was possible to arrive at the
same results in other ways and particularly that it was possible in this way to
perform calculations which we can only perform ourselves with the greatest
difficulty - if at all - with other aids.
Nor has it subsequently been possible to identify an equivalent to the
Turing tape and a mechanical reading unit, neither in the human brain nor in
the mind.
The human arithmetical procedure thus approaches the Turing model in the
area of very simple tasks where the model is least relevant, while Turing’s
model comes into its own exactly in connection with arithmetical tasks we are
unable to perform without the use of aids, of which Turing’s machine is
undoubtedly the most perfect hitherto.
That this is the case, however, is due to the fact that it does not work in the
way Turing describes in his model either.
While Turing’s arithmetical model is based on the breaking down of the
arithmetical procedure into its smallest components of formal notation units,
the Turing machine is based on this expression being further broken down
and subdivided into components which no longer possess any intrinsic
semantic value.
As will be evident from the preceding sections in this chapter, this state is
closely connected with the demand that both the description of the task and
of the rules for its performance must be contained in the same notation, which
must itself have a form that is independent of the task. As will also be evident,
this demand was fulfilled by separating the physical definition of the symbols
from the definition of their value.
That this is far from being a banal condition, however, appears not only
from its significance for an understanding of the Turing machine, but also from
the fact that the ability to construct such definitions of the physical forms of
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symbols is a unique human ability, beyond any computational competence,
as this competence itself assumes one or another minimum number of such
previous definitions.28
The demand for a definition of the physical form of the symbol, independent
of its function and value, can also be seen as a distinctive criterion in
understanding the relationship between the Turing machine’s processes and
human intelligence. As human intelligence includes the ability to create and
define delimited, physically-defined symbolic forms, we possess a mental
competence which the Turing machine cannot possess.
As this more far-reaching conclusion affects both Turing’s point of view
and a general main assumption in later theories of information and cognition, it
will be considered in more detail in the following section.
5.7 Turing’s machine, consciousness and the Turing test
According to Turing’s biographer, Andrew Hodges, it was Gödel’s demon-
stration in particular and the problem of description in quantum mechanics
which inspired Turing to describe consciousness as a finite system, because he
saw both elements as a manifestation of the fact that human consciousness
was subject to decisive limitations: Although humans are living organisms,
which apparently possess free will, they must, at a more fundamental level, be
subjected to deterministic restrictions. Consciousness itself must be a
»machine«, although much more complex than other physical, chemical or
biological »machines«.29
Hodges thus understood Turing’s description of human consciousness as
an abstract generalization of the deterministic limitations common to
mechanical physics, formal logic and effective calculation procedure - or what
Turing calls computability.
It can certainly be taken for granted that Turing gave a new turn to the old
dream of reproducing the human thinking process in an appliance by starting
with the idea of a limited, finite consciousness, rather than with its sovereignty
and that a radical expansion of mechanical handling competence lay in his
                                                
28   The separation of the definition of physical form from the definition of the symbolic value also has
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29   Hodges, 1983: 96 ff.
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proof that it was possible to reduce all finite logical, formal and mathematical
procedures to pure mechanics.
With this new turn he became the first person capable of showing how it
was possible to construct a machine which could perform all the finite
arithmetical and logical procedures which humans can perform with the
brain.30
If the machine were able to carry out this reduction itself, we would be able
to use it to free humankind from a great civilizing burden, as it would
immediately become possible to remove arithmetic, a large part of mathematics
and logic from the necessary repertoire of human competence and therefore
also from the obligatory curriculum in schools.
What we might otherwise think about such a possibility, it will never under
any circumstances be furthered by Turing’s machine which, on the contrary,
produces a growing need for increased human competence in interpreting,
handling and producing algorithmic procedures. The explanation is naturally
that the machine is not subject to the same limitations as is human
consciousness.
What Turing himself thought about these questions in 1936 is not clear, but
it is absolutely clear that his view of thinking, including mathematical thinking,
took exactly the same direction in 1939 when he wrote:
Mathematical reasoning may be regarded rather schematically as the
exercise of a combination of two faculties, which we may call intuition and
ingenuity. The activity of the intuition consists in making spontaneous
judgments which are not the result of conscious trains of reasoning... I shall
not attempt to explain this idea of »intuition« any more explicitly.
The exercise of ingenuity in mathematics consists in aiding the intuition
through suitable arrangements of propositions, and perhaps geometrical
figures and drawings.31
For Turing, »intuition« and »ingenuity« are the two typical mathematical tools.
The fact that he mentions them is not because he believes that thinking can be
reduced - nor mathematical thinking either - to these two concepts, it is rather
because he is taking stock of the programme of logical formalism.
                                                
30   Hodges, 1983: 96.
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Where, in pre-Gödel times, as he writes, the goal had been to replace all the
intuitive judgements of mathematics with a limited set of formal rules of
inference thereby making intuition superfluous, great progress had now been
made in the direction of the diametrically opposite result. It was not intuition,
but organizing reason, ingenuity, that was being replaced, as it was the
reasoning, systematic endeavour which now, to a great degree, could be
reduced to a mechanical procedure:
We are always able to obtain from the rules of formal logic a method of
enumerating the propositions proved by its means. We then imagine that all
proofs take the form of a search through this enumeration for the theorem
for which a proof is desired. In this way ingenuity is replaced by patience.
In... heuristic discussions, however, it is better not to make this reduction.32
There is nothing here to provide any indication that Turing had mistaken the
Turing machine’s formal procedure for the general form of human thinking.
Mechanical symbol procedure is a specific thinking (and proof) procedure
derived from formal logic. Not only does intuition remain unchallenged, Turing
also indicates - in an introductory footnote - that here he is completely
ignoring »that most important faculty which distinguishes topics of interest
from others«.
Here, in the description of mathematical thinking, Turing establishes a -
quite traditional - concept of consciousness with no visible trace of the model
he used in 1936. It might appear as though he had completely abandoned the
question of the relationship between the Turing machine and human
intelligence.
He had undeniably abandoned one thing, namely the idea that human
beings and machines think in the same way. When, some years later, he re-
turned to the question in his now classical article Computing Machinery and
Intelligence,33  he begins by rejecting the question because it is impossible to
provide a precise definition of the concepts »intelligence« and »machine«.
Instead he suggests that the question: can a machine think? should be
replaced by the question: can a human being differentiate between an answer
he receives from a machine and one received from another human being? - as
he establishes the precondition that the subject of the experiment be kept in
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ignorance of everything except the content of the answer which is passed on
in a neutral, technical form.
Although Turing proposed his experimental test criterion because there was
no clear definition of the concepts of intelligence and machine, the test itself
relied on such definitions. The most decisive definition of human intelligence
lay in the assumption that it is an advantage to differentiate between a human
being’s physical and intellectual capacities:
The new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line between
the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man.34
This definition provided Turing with a reason for placing the subject in
another room without direct sensory contact with the test arrangement. Turing
also admitted that the machine could possibly perform something which must
be described as thinking, even though performed differently to human
thinking. He claimed that such limitations, however, were only problematical if
the machine failed to live up to the demand on intelligence presented by the
test. If it could pass the test, i.e. produce the impression in the subject that he
was communicating with another person, there would be no need to take
these differences into consideration.
As far as concerns the machine the most important definitions are that it can
be constructed using any technique, that the constructors need not ne-
cessarily be able to describe its mode of operation, as they must be allowed to
use experimental methods and, finally, that the concept ‘machine’ does not
include humans »born in the usual manner«. The three criteria cannot all be
completely fulfilled because the possibility of constructing a human being
from a single cell cannot be ruled out. As in this case it would not be possible
to claim that a thinking machine had been constructed, as the thinking
mechanism would perhaps already be contained in the cell, Turing only
accepts digital computers.
The Turing test has no meaning, however, if we assume that the relationship
between the computer and human thinking is connected with a more or less
common way of functioning. The test is exclusively based on the result, the
process is regarded as an irrelevant black box.
There is thus no support for the assumption that Turing believed that the
structure of human thinking could be described in terms of computational
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processes. On the contrary, in 1950 he only stated that it was possible to
imagine a machine which would be capable of producing the same results that
humans could arrive at and that this could be taken as an argument for saying
that it could think »like« a human.
As the Turing test assumes that there is someone withholding relevant in-
formation from the subject of the test, it is first and foremost suitable for testing
the human art of illusion.
5.8 Consciousness in Turing’s hall of mirrors
Turing’s purpose with the experimental test was not to produce a new theory
of human consciousness or intelligence in the form of a philosophically
consistent summary of an empirical material. His purpose was to ask the
question as to whether a machine could think in such a way that it could
create a basis for a new research project or programme in which it would be
possible to use human consciousness as a model from which ideas regarding
the mechanical imitation of human thought processes could be extracted.
He did not imagine, however, that this programme would lead to any serious
answer to the question of whether machines could think. He believed, on the
contrary, that in the course of fifty years it would be possible to design
machines which - in the given test arrangement - would often be confused
with humans and that this would imply such a change in the ordinary use of
language that a contradiction would seldom follow the assertion that
machines think. This clearly formulated, but often overlooked, perspective
deserves to be given in his own words:
I believe that in about fifty years’ time it will be possible to programme
computers, with a storage capacity of about 109 , to make them play the
imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than
70 per cent. chance of making the right identification after five minutes of
questioning. The original question, »Can machines think?« I believe to be
too meaningless to deserve discussion. Nevertheless I believe that at the end
of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have
altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without
expecting to be contradicted. I believe further that no useful purpose is
served by concealing these beliefs. The popular view that scientists proceed
inexorably from well-established fact to well-established fact, never being
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influenced by any unproved conjecture, is quite mistaken. Provided it is
made clear which are proved facts and which are conjectures, no harm can
result. Conjectures are of the greatest importance since they suggest useful
lines of research.35
It is remarkable that Turing completely rejected the possibility of - seriously -
discussing the relationship between the computer and human intelligence, but
also that he formulated the much vaguer cultural expectation that the
computers of the future would bring about a state of affairs in which this
distinction would simply disappear from the language. He thus did not possess
the imagination necessary to conceive that the attempt to imitate human
thinking could possibly lead to new arguments for differentiating between the
computational process and human thinking. The explanation may be that he
would not have dreamt of claiming that humans think in the same way as
machines.
It is certainly striking that in the same passage Turing reveals a charac-
teristic of scientific thinking containing an aspect which cannot be accommo-
dated in his picture of the computational process. The latter corresponds
exactly to the popular, but according to Turing inaccurate, view of scientific
processes as systematic, step-by-step procedures.
Turing also utilized this difference in a specific criterion connected with
human intelligence, as he claimed that this included the ability to differentiate
between surmise and fact. But he failed to formulate any criterion by which it
would be possible to decide whether the computer possessed such a discri-
minative competence, just as he also failed to consider »that most important
faculty which distinguishes topics of interest from others«, to which he had
called attention in 1939. It is quite true that the test concerns the ability to
differentiate, but it is not the computer’s ability which is being tested, it is that
of the test person. The result of the test shows exclusively the degree to which
he can decide whether he is talking to a man or a machine.
It is not difficult to find a pattern in this picture. That intelligence which
Turing makes the object is different from that intelligence which makes the
intelligence the object. It is neither his own intelligence, scientific thinking in a
broader sense, or the ability to formulate new thoughts and pose questions
which is produced here as a model for imitation, it is a much more narrowly
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conceived intelligence. There is no demand here to differentiate between
surmise and fact.
It was therefore on good grounds that Turing formulated his expectations
for a development in common-sense understanding which lay fifty years in the
future as a matter of personal belief. The question, however, is what justified
the inclusion of such a declaration in a highly esteemed scientific journal and
its later incorporation in the basic documents of an entire field of research.
The most obvious reason would probably be - taking the scientific context
into account - to provide a well-formulated research programme which, on the
basis of a relatively consolidated or clear theoretical basis, defined a number of
more distinct ways of presenting the problem which could become the objects
of investigation. But here too, Turing is remarkably clear. There are no
particularly convincing arguments for the idea:
The reader will have anticipated that I have no very convincing arguments
of a positive nature to support my views. If I had I should not have taken
such pains to point out the fallacies in contrary views.36
Another obvious possibility might be that his expectations corresponded so
closely to general contemporary expectations with regard to science. But this
is not the case either. The idea was epoch-making and contrary to time-
honoured scientific trains of thought. Turing himself introduced a great many
of the objections which presented themselves from various philosophical,
theological and scientific points of view and - in under 12 pages - he touched
upon as good as all the themes which have since been included in the
discussion. There is one central point in particular which is repeated in
Turing’s answers to these objections, as his general argument is not - as it is in
almost all later discussions - that there may be an answer to the question of
whether a computer can think, but on the contrary that the objections to this
possibility are just as illusory as the postulate.
The identification of this wide-open, undecidable question undoubtedly
comprises one of the two reasons for the later significance of the article.
Turing hereby staked out a new research-political Utopia where the dream of
reproducing human thinking ability was connected with - it appears - a
correspondingly open technological potential. The second reason lay in the
rather more prosaic suggestion for the first steps. In the final section of the
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article Turing described two possible strategies, namely the reproduction of
the logical-deductive procedure, the logic of chess, and the reproduction of
human perceptual and learning competence.
Here, on the other hand, all the problems which were ignored in the Turing
test make an appearance.37  First and foremost that any step which can be
taken as a facet of the construction of a machine capable of fulfilling the
Turing test contains a specification of human thinking which is in conflict with
the point of departure: that no well-defined and meaningful description of the
concept ‘intelligence’ as opposed to the concept ‘machine’ can be given.
This paradox is not due to a careless mistake which can easily be corrected. If
the latter postulate is abandoned we are faced with the demand that we must
make the concept of intelligence explicit, so that we can no longer simply
point out that the concept of intelligence is unclear and we can therefore not
content ourselves with the Turing test of human illusion. If, instead, we
abandon the first, we have on the other hand no possibility of pointing out
any specific step as a step towards such a machine.
Turing’s suggestion for a strategy, however, contains not a single - con-
sistent in itself - view of human intelligence, it contains several mutually
incompatible models which individually have their roots in older, more tra-
ditional and therefore, on the face of it, reasonably plausible assumptions. The
three most important models are 1) the description of consciousness as a result
of a Darwinian process of development, 2) the description of - the child’s -
consciousness as a well-delimited and blank page and 3) the description of
consciousness as a logical-deductive symbol machine.
There is no discussion in Turing’s article of the connection between these
three different models. They are referred to individually only in different
connections, but it should be noted that Turing clearly separates the logical-
deductive procedure as the object of a specific development project, while the
learning project is built up around the two other models. This line of
demarcation has since been maintained and further developed in two different
and - especially in the 1980’s - competing research strategies within Cognitive
Science.
That Turing with no further ado could juxtapose the two strategies as
equally reasonable and explicitly refrain from weighing them mutually was not
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an expression of a later misplaced clarity, it was rather an expression of the
fact that he failed to see that they were based on incompatible premises. That
this holds true of the relationship between the logical-deductive strategy and
the learning process strategy is documented in the later development. But
there is a corresponding conflict hidden in the two models Turing suggests as
starting points for the development of the learning machine. The Darwinian
model cannot easily be reconciled with the image of the individual organism’s
consciousness as a blank page.
The image of the - child’s - consciousness as a blank page at birth serves in
Turing’s argument as an instance of a differentiation between a very simple,
innate mechanism, the programme, and the subsequent experience, data. But
the page is not completely blank. While learning and other experience is
assumed capable of producing a more complex programme structure, the basic
programme is given in advance, it is invariant and independent of data.
Presumably the child brain is something like a note-book as one buys it from
the stationers. Rather little mechanism, and lots of blank sheets. ... Our hope
is that there is so little mechanism in the child-brain that something like it
can easily be programmed. The amount of work in the education we can
assume, as a first approximation, to be much the same as for the human
child.38
The background is naturally that the computer requires such a programme.
Turing overlooks the fact that precisely this programme cannot be an »inborn«
part of the machine, if the machine is to have universal properties. He also
overlooks the fact that the programme in the computer must be available in
exactly the same form as all other data.
The distinction between a preordained programme and data is incidentally
not reconcilable with the Darwinian model either. It is quite true that we can
imagine that the individual child has an inborn mental capacity, but it also has
parents who have parents who, at some stage or another of prehistory,
descended from organisms without this inborn capacity. The Darwinian theory
not only requires that we allow the development of increasingly complex
organizations of elements which already exist, it also requires that we assume
that biological and mental processes have their origins in a physical universe
in which these processes were not found before these origins. If there is
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anything that can be described as a mental programme, it must not only have
the property of developing into a more comprehensive and complex
programme, it must also have the »property« that it has originated from
something which is not a mental programme.
It will be of no help here to supplement with a description of reality as a
realization of a potential which has existed since the dawn of time, because in
such a case the potential will be more comprehensive than the realization,
which will not become more invariant on these grounds. The possible genetic
potential for consciousness must also have a history of origin and
development if we refuse to explain its existence as the result of divine cre-
ation.
Turing side-steps this problem, as he only uses the Darwinian model as a
metaphorical analogy without asking himself the question regarding the re-
lationship between the biological and the mental. The child’s mental pro-
gramme is equated with the hereditary material, the changes in the programme
made by scientists are equated with mutations and their evaluation of which
improvements in the programme they will use are equated with natural
selection.39  With one exception:
The survival of the fittest is a slow method for measuring advantages. The
experimenter, by the exercise of intelligence, should be able to speed it up.
Equally important is the fact that he is not restricted to random mutations. If
he can trace a cause for some weakness he can probably think of the kind of
mutation which will improve it.40
It is no longer the ideal observer who is here attempting to fill the position
once assigned to the divine creator, but nor is it - as for Niels Bohr - the par-
ticipating observer who appears, it is the ideal constructor. The paradox,
however, resides in the fact that he can only appear in this place because he at
the same time assumes that it is, and will remain, empty.
I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about
consciousness. There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected
with any attempt to localise it.41
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As with consciousness, so with an onion, wrote Turing. We can peel off one
(mechanically functioning) layer after another until we possibly have nothing
left in our hand,42  but he does not draw the conclusion that this emptiness is
the result of analytical subdivision and that what the onion and consciousness
have in common is their joint - but mutually different - corporeality.
To the conventional and problematic distinction between the biological and
mental processes corresponds a strikingly loose treatment of the human
perceptual apparatus. Turing assumes without further consideration that the
perceptual processes can be replaced by learning through a symbolic
language. This implies a postulate to the effect that the biological and
neurophysiological level has no independent significance for the understan-
ding of intelligence. This can naturally be discussed, but in the given case it
challenges his own use of biological theories in his definition of the mental
machine. Turing also claims elsewhere in the article that the human nerve
system is definitely not a digital computer, but rather a continuous machine.
This highly contradictory account rests on an underlying assumption which
Turing never explicitly discussed, namely that it is possible to produce a
description of all natural phenomena in a mathematical-algorithmic form. The
problem he raised with the continuous nerve machine can therefore be
reduced to the relationship between continuous and discontinuous
mathematical functions.
Turing does not, however, claim that the digital computer can provide
exactly the same answer as a continuous calculation, he simply claims that it
can provide an answer which is so similar that a test person would not be able
to decide what kind of a machine had calculated the result.43
He once again uses the limitation of human consciousness as an argument
for ignoring a difference he acknowledges as valid himself.
We may, but need not, wait for the future results of biological science.
Although Turing’s thesis in its general form consists of a debatable postulate
on the immateriality of consciousness, the elimination of the biological and
perceptual dimensions can be accepted. If they mean anything, this meaning
must also be manifested at the symbolic level.
As symbolic representation is at the same time an indispensable condition
for computational processes, this level comprises not only a necessary, but also
                                                
42   Turing, 1950: 454-455.
43   Turing, 1950: 451-452.
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an adequate basis for an understanding of both intelligence and machine,
given that we accept the idea that we can think ourselves.
5.9 Symbol generative competence as a criterion of intelligence
There can be no doubt that the »consciousness machine« that Turing modelled
in 1936 can contain a deterministic calculating machine. Nor can there be any
doubt that this machine, thanks to its memory function, the division of its
mechanical procedure into single steps and the possibility of programming
(and mechanical exchange of) mechanical instructions represented a machine
of a new type, both with regard to mechanical functionality and areas of use.
Although it can hardly be claimed that Turing played a decisive role in the
development of the early computers, he was the first to provide a theoretical
description and definition of this type of machine and this description did
have considerable influence on later developments.
Some of his predictions have also been fulfilled. It would be unreasonable
not to acknowledge that it is possible today to build computers which can
compete with humans, when it comes to chess, and it would be equally
unreasonable to claim that it is not possible to build computers which can be
trained to carry out many other thinking procedures which are very much in
keeping with the perspectives he drew in 1950.
There are also strong indications in favour of accepting Turing’s break with
the Cartesian construction of consciousness and its many unreasonable
dualistic implications. We do not know of any mental, spiritual or psychic
processes which are not corporeally realized in the physically extended world.
This is true of all experiences of timelessness, weightlessness, all perceptual
experiences, all hallucinations, all revelations, exactly as it is true of any
articulation of the idea of a god, of eternity, immateriality and immortality. We
are always able to give a time and date to any human experience.
Finally, there are also strong indications - along with Turing - that we can-
not draw the conclusion from this that human consciousness and thinking can
be described solely through a description of consciousness as a physical or
physiological system. A theory of consciousness must include a dimension
which attempts to provide an account of the course of the thought process as
a process of thought.
The remaining question, however, if we follow Turing this far, is whether
human consciousness under these preconditions can be described as a finite
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system with a finite number of distinct possible states and whether the
relationship between these possible states can be described with the help of
the concept of a mechanical process.
Turing’s answer to this question comprises an ingenious combination of
two arguments. One the one hand, he claims that we cannot exclude that there
is a basic equivalence between consciousness and the universal computer,
because the question cannot be formulated in a meaningful, i.e. precise form.
On the other, he claims that it seems possible to design machines which can
answer questions in such a way as to make it impossible for people normally to
decide whether they are receiving an answer from a machine or from a human
being. Among the arguments for this view, he mentions that it is possible to
make the machine capable of answering incorrectly and thereby increasing the
similarity to a human answer.
It may well be the case that Turing is correct, both in claiming that it is im-
possible to provide a precise description of consciousness and that it is
possible to build machines which can pass the Turing test. But he cannot be
correct when he claims that these two states are compatible with the postulate
that it is impossible to exclude an equivalence between consciousness and a
Turing machine. He hints at this himself when he  maintains that it is necessary
to allow the constructor to work with experimental methods which are not
predefined, which simply means that the idea of equivalence is an idea of
equivalence between two completely unknown entities.
The Turing test, however, can only be carried out when a machine has been
built, which again implies that we can give an account of the way in which it
is built. The question is therefore not one of a relationship between two quite
indefinite phenomena, but of a relationship between the non-defined
consciousness and a definite, specific machine which works on the basis of a
finite number of discrete states. Any equivalence is thereby excluded, as it is
possible to provide a precise description of how such a machine works, while
it is impossible to describe consciousness with the same precision.
The objection could now be raised that a description of the machine which
can pass the Turing test will therefore also provide a description of
consciousness and thereby solve the original problem. This objection will not
hold, however, as the Turing test can only reveal whether we can confuse the
content of the answers, not the way in which they are produced. It was
precisely because it is impossible to conclude from the result to the sequence
which produced the result that Turing constructed the test as he did.
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This is the reason why he did not predict that machines would be built
which would work in the same way as humans think, but only that it would be
possible to build machines which produced results which resembled the results
of human thinking to the point where the two were indistinguishable and that
he believed this would encourage people to accept the idea of thinking
machines as a natural part of common sense and common language usage.
The greatest problem in Turing’s construction, however, is not that
equivalence between consciousness and the discrete-state-machine must be
abandoned because we do not know how consciousness works, but do know
how the machine works. The greatest problem is that his own description of
the universal computer also makes it possible to describe the difference
between the machine and consciousness with a hitherto unknown precision,
which shows that consciousness quite simply cannot function as a Turing
machine.
While Turing uses the idea of the indescribable consciousness to keep open
a place for the idea that it can be described as a finite, discrete system, his
definition of mechanical procedure provides the possibility of drawing the
opposite conclusion.
It is not only possible with this definition to 1) exclude any possibility that
consciousness can only operate as a discrete, mechanical symbol system, it is
also possible 2) to exclude the idea that there may be a single, even if tiny or
bizarre mechanical procedure which itself can produce some form of symbolic
activity, if it falls within Turing’s definition. It is finally also possible with this
definition to prove 3) that human consciousness cannot be completely
manifested in a discrete physical system.
The first proof follows immediately if, instead of starting with the mystic
consciousness and the human art of illusion, we start with Turing’s description
of mechanical procedure.
It is evident from this definition that human beings can both formulate pro-
cedures which can be executed - and produced - as a result of a finite number
of step-by-step operations, and procedures which cannot be executed - and
therefore  cannot be formulated through - a finite number of step-by-step
mechanical operations either. If an attempt were made to get the machine to
execute these incomplete procedures mechanically, it would be unable to
conclude the process, as it cannot itself produce a stop condition
independently of the process. The machine is thus incapable of formulating
both the start and stop conditions of the formal procedure. These limitations
are not applicable to human consciousness which, on the contrary, also has
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the ability to formulate such conditions, just as we are capable of working
with undetermined conditions, undecidable questions and of interrupting a
process which has no built-in stop conditions.
These abilities are explained in mechanical symbol theories by looking at
consciousness as a more comprehensive system, where a procedure at one
level can be interrupted by a procedure at a higher symbolic level. If we take
into account the capacity of consciousness, it is also possible for us to imagine
a very great number of finite states.
Turing’s analysis, however, also provides the possibility of rejecting this
model with greater certainty, as he shows that any mechanical execution of
symbolic procedures depends on a physical definition of the individual
symbols which are included in the process.
This definition cannot be carried out by the machine itself and cannot in ge-
neral be produced as a result of a mechanical symbol procedure because any
such procedure is based on a previous definition of the symbols in which the
procedure is expressed and through which it is carried out.
It is obvious that the physical symbol cannot be explained as the result of a
process which presupposes that it already exists.
In other words, any mechanically performed symbolic procedure depends
on a symbolic activity which cannot be explained on the basis of a mechanical
symbol theory.
The physical definition must therefore be the result of a symbolic process
which is not itself bound to the use of discrete symbols, it must be produced
by a physical system which possesses the ability to create discrete symbols.
This system cannot, in the given case, be a mechanical system which works
step by step because such a system is bound to and limited by the
precondition that all effects can be derived mechanically from the given start
conditions.
If the system is defined as a mechanical system it is thus bound to comprise
a given set of physical entities and a certain set of rules regarding movement.
It cannot, at some later step in the process, move in such a way as to make it
capable of distinguishing some of the physical entities as symbolic, as the rules
governing its movement cannot provide the individual physical entities with
new qualities. Nor does the concept of the finite mechanical system allow the
introduction of new, physically effective symbols during the process.
If physical-mechanical systems possess a symbolic content this is because it
is given outside the system and if this symbolic content manifests itself as an
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independently operating force which can be distinguished from the given
physical rules  of movement, the system is no longer mechanical.
No matter whether we explain the ability to define the distinct symbols on
the basis of a symbolic competence which is not itself bound to operate with
distinct symbols, or as a property of the physical system in which the symbol is
created, the result will be that the symbol-creating activity is rooted in a
system which is not itself limited to working in distinct, mechanical steps.
This hereby completely excludes the possibility that a Turing machine or
any other machine, which only operates with distinct symbolic entities and
step-by-step defined, physical movements, itself can possess symbol-creating
competence.
As, on the other hand, we know that human consciousness exists in a
physical system which can distinguish certain physical forms as symbolic from
other, non-symbolic, physical forms in the same system, it is impossible for
symbolic competence, consciousness or human intelligence to be contained in
a discrete mechanical system, notwithstanding the incalculable number of
physical and symbolic possible states in this system.44
If we therefore wish to maintain the idea that consciousness is a finitely
extended system, we must abandon the demand that it can only operate in
distinct, mechanical steps and if, on the other hand, we wish to maintain this
demand we must - just as Turing allowed the infinite tape - accept that
consciousness is not subject to the finiteness of the physical world, while at
the same time admitting the ability of this transcendental force to continually
intervene in the physical world.
The attempt to use mechanical description on human consciousness thus
leads unavoidably to a complete dissolution of the constitutional premises of
this thinking. The explanation is, in fact, not particularly surprising, as
mechanical thinking both assumes the concept of infinite consciousness and
the divine creation of immaterial force as well as of material particles.
While it is easy to explain how it is possible to perform calculation
processes on a machine, namely by referring to our consciousness which is
capable of defining both the physical and semantic value of symbols, it is more
difficult - or as Turing claimed perhaps quite impossible - to explain how we
ourselves are capable of carrying out these symbolic operations. But it is not
                                                
44   This conclusion is strengthened as is can also be shown - as will appear from chapter 6 - that a
conscious system must necessarily possess the ability to decide whether a given physical form in an
arbitrary situation is only a physical form or whether it is also a symbolic form. In other words, it is
not possible to provide a purely physical or mechanical definition of the concepts (and distinction
between) ‘noise’ and ‘information’.
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particularly difficult to see that a mechanical description of physical systems,
which are capable of creating symbols, must describe this ability as a
transcendentally given, metaphysical precondition by which the entire
mechanical point is dissolved.
Even the simplest step-by-step symbol procedure presupposes a symbolic
competence the machine cannot possess, whereas human consciousness
possesses the ability to both 1) establish symbols in its own physical system
and in the physical surroundings, 2) formulate start and stop conditions for
finite procedures, 3) handle undecided and undecidable states, 4) formulate
expressions which cannot be produced through a finite number of simple
mechanical steps, and 5) possibly not work at all, but certainly not exclusively,
with a single, delimited and physically-defined notation system in its brain.
As Turing’s machine cannot describe its own physical system, it cannot
itself produce any distinction between physical forms which are symbolic and
physical forms which are not, either.
This competence must conversely be seen as a basic condition for intel-
ligence and must therefore necessarily be included in a theory of human
consciousness and thinking.
Exactly the same holds true of the relationship of the Turing machine to the
content of thought. It cannot itself formulate the concepts which must be
defined in order to make it fungible. His model does not include the ability to
establish the symbolic meaning of a symbol, just as any attribution of
functional, syntactic or semantic content depends on a symbol activity
produced by a human.
As the ability to create symbols depends on distinguishing between phy-
sical processes which are not symbolic, relative to physical processes which
are manifested as symbolic, it is tempting to propose the thesis that the human
ability to make such distinctions is connected with the fact that our
conceptual competence is not bound to a well-defined relationship between
the corporeal realization and a certain symbolic structure. It appears as if the
human brain - the physical, neurophysiological and mental system - can only
possess symbolic competence because the symbolic structure does not
coincide, or is not congruent with the physical structure in which it is
embodied.
The informational, mental or conscious level cannot, however, be comple-
tely separated from the physical-physiological as an absolutely separate level
with its own delimited, stable structure, because consciousness must also be
understood as the process in which the definition of symbols as symbols takes
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place. Such a definition can in many cases be derived from already established
symbols, but it cannot hold for all symbols. We must also include in the
concept of consciousness the physical-physiological »system’s« ability to
crystallize symbolic forms as well as symbolic meaning.
While it is true of human cognition that it takes place in a physical system
which in one or another - unknown - way has become capable of producing a
critical threshold for creating symbols itself, it is true of all known physical ma-
chines, including the computer, that they cannot of themselves produce such a
critical threshold.
Which physical explanation is necessary in order to introduce human con-
sciousness into the extended world can hardly be decided at present, but it is
difficult to see how it is possible to avoid concepts of indefinite transitions and
other non-mechanical concepts.
The demand on both formal and physically well-defined symbols comprises
the computational start condition, but not that of the consciousness. In itself it
comprises an irreducible and distinctive criterion for distinguishing between
human consciousness and all types of mechanical calculation procedures.
Turing incidentally also had the idea of transferring the concept of a critical
threshold from quantum physics to an understanding of consciousness. While
the consciousness of animals appears to be sub-critical, he writes, it is perhaps
possible to assume that human consciousness contains a special super-critical
threshold where a certain mental input produces an »explosive« chain reaction
which takes  the form of a production of new ideas.45
He limited himself, however, to discussing the critical threshold as an
analogy between the physical and the conscious planes. He overlooked the
fact that the first critical threshold which characterizes human consciousness is
that threshold which enabled the physiological system to create symbols by
itself at one stage or another in the history of development.
Although we cannot provide an exhaustive description of consciousness,
we are perfectly able to localize symbol creating competence as the common
minimum condition of consciousness, thinking and language.
It is therefore not only obvious or necessary to reject the intelligence crite-
rion of the Turing test (that which resembles something else is probably the
same as that which it resembles). It is also possible to formulate a more precise
test criterion, as we can make this - as yet unexplained - but evident
physiological property a central test criterion for a scientifically well-defined
                                                
45   Turing, 1950: 454.
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use of the term ‘thinking machine’. No ingenious experimental arrangement is
necessary to carry out the test. The demand is solely that we build a physical
apparatus which possesses the ability to develop symbol generative
competence with the help of components which do not possess such
competence.
With this criterion we not only avoid the unbecoming reference to a more
or less widespread terminological confusion, we can also emancipate the
understanding of the immanent character of symbolic processes from
mechanical reductionism.
We may wonder that Turing himself did not discover this criterion, as he
was perfectly at home in the borderland between the physical, biological and
psychological. The explanation can perhaps be found in the conceptual
tradition which is based on the development of separate conceptual
apparatuses for each area and discipline, which thereby become jointly
responsible for placing the borderlines between areas and disciplines as a
given precondition which thereby falls outside the area and scope of each
individual discipline.
Turing did not actually consider the physical manifestation of conscious-
ness, on the contrary he used - and reinterpreted - the mechanical model of
physics because it turned out that it was possible to exploit this model to
represent a considerable part of mathematical logic, which undeniably has its
place within the concept of human intelligence.
A similar - rather less subtle - figure can be found later in Newell and
Simon’s formulation of the theoretical basis for the idea of artificial intel-
ligence, although they actually describe their, possibly universal, symbol
theory as a theory of physical symbol systems, because:
... such systems clearly obey the laws of physics - they are realizable by
engineered systems made of engineered components... A physical symbol
system consists of a set of entities called symbols, which are physical
patterns that can occur as components of another type of entity called an
expression (or symbol structure). Thus a symbol structure is composed of a
number of instances (or tokens) of symbols related in some physical way.
Besides... the system also contains a collection of processes that operate on
expressions to produce other expressions.46
                                                
46   Newell and Simon (1976) 1989: 112-113.
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A physical symbol system is thus defined here as
• A given set of symbolic entities, each with a well-defined, finite physical
manifestation.
• A given set of sentences created by a constellation of such entities and
• A given set of rules for how one sentence can be transformed into another.
This model is generally consistent with formal logic and the basic theses of
formal linguistic theories, with the single addition that Newell and Simon
assume that the symbols are also physically manifested and that the entire
system obeys physical-mechanical laws. It can also be noted that its structure
is completely equivalent to Newtonian mechanics, as it is a system of physical
entities corresponding to Newton’s particles which are moved by an
immaterial or transcendental set of rules without a physical manifestation and
not themselves processed in time and space, corresponding to his trans-
cendental concept of force.
It is only the first two points, however, which are understood as physically
manifest, whereas the governing rules are understood as given outside the
system.
 Newell and Simon clearly attempt to bridge the gap between physical
process and mechanical theory by defining the symbols as physical »atoms«,
which together create »sentences« which again can be transformed with the
help of a number of »processes« which are apparently elevated above the
physical system as a Newtonian transcendental force that regulates the
physical symbol particles. Although they - naturally - consider which
properties are also necessary for such a system to be regarded as intelligent,
they take as little trouble as Turing to explain why certain symbolic entities are
physical while others are not and why certain physical entities are symbolic
and others are not.
The quasi-physical symbol theory which was the basis of classical AI re-
search thus begins by ignoring exactly that which delimits its subject area
from other areas, namely the symbol generative competence which separates
certain physical systems, including human consciousness, from others - among
them all known machines.
That Newell and Simon formulate their physical symbol theory in the image
of formal notation is not only inadequate, because it identifies the physically
defined expression form with an equivalent content form, it also gives a
completely incorrect description of how the symbolic rule structure is
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produced as the result of a physical-mechanical process in a Turing machine as
well as in an electronic computer. Like Turing they overlook the fact that rules
can only be effectuated if they are themselves represented as a sequence of
individually and freely editable, physically manifested notation units - in
exactly the same form as all other data.
These inadequacies and errors presumably partially explain the discrepancy
between the many proclamations on the theoretical explanatory force and the
actual results which have since been arrived at. But they do not explain the
considerable impact of the theory, which is surprising when we take into
consideration that far into the 1970’s and 1980’s - classical mechanics in the
manner of Laplace was
understood, in these theories, as a universal physical paradigm simply utilized
as though the great machine were the sum of many small machines.
Turing was not only more cautious, he was more precise because he main-
tained a distinction between the indefinable basic category ‘consciousness’
(or intelligence) and the definite machine. Although he therefore had no
illusions that the Turing test could be used to draw conclusions regarding the
way in which humans think - the inability to distinguish between, or the
similarity of two phenomena does not mean that they are produced in the
same way - he still became enmeshed in his own net. There is no room in the
world of mechanical concepts, neither in Turing’s nor Simon’s version, to
describe how symbol generative competence can arise in a physical system. In
fact, there is no room at all for events of this character. But it nevertheless
explicitly assumes such human symbol activity, without which there is no
machine.
Formerly, there was much criticism both of the Turing test and the
implications for theories of consciousness which were formulated as a
corollary to this. The criticism can be divided into three main positions.
First there are objections which start with a traditional, idealistic under-
standing of consciousness. These oppose the idea of describing the content of
consciousness as processes which are expressed in time and space, as this
presentation is understood as a mechanical-reductionist and materialistic idea
which cannot give an account of values and content. It is characteristic that
from this point of view there is no concern with the creation and development
of consciousness, but consciousness is taken as axiomatically given - usually
from an introspective viewpoint.47
                                                
47  Theodor Roszak can be mentioned as an exponent of this view,  (1986). 1988.
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Second come the objections which accept the idea that the brain’s
physiological activities can be described on the basis of mechanics, whereas
the possibility of deriving a description of consciousness - intentionality - from
the physiological description is contested. An exponent of this view is John
Searle, who formulated it briefly and clearly:
The brain, as far as its intrinsic operations are concerned, does not do
information processing. It is a specific biological organ, and its specific,
neurobiological processes cause specific forms of intentionality. In the
brain, intrinsically, there are neurobiological processes and sometimes they
cause consciousness. But that is the end of the story.48
It is characteristic here that the biological anchoring of consciousness is
acknowledged, but that the relationship between the biological and the
conscious is accessible (or necessary to take into account) is rejected.
Third come the objections which accept the idea that the brain and
consciousness both operate as a physically realized, finite system, but which
dispute that the - informational - processes of consciousness are rule
determined.49  It is characteristic that here it is accepted that the processes of
both the brain and consciousness are realized either in a single system, or in
two homologous systems which operate exclusively with a finite number of
discrete - physically definable - states.
The following criticism has connections with elements from all three
positions.
From the first and second positions I accept that there is no possibility of
deriving the content of consciousness from the underlying neurophysiological
processes, or of describing it as homologous or homomorphic to the physical
realization, certainly not if this realization is identical or analogous to
computational processes.
From the third position I accept that the content of consciousness is always
processed in a physical form manifested in time and space, but not the idea
that consciousness can be regarded as a system which operates exclusively
with discrete and finite states.
The decisive difference to previous criticisms comes when we accept the
idea that consciousness is physically processed and manifested in time and
                                                
48   John Searle, 1990: 19.
49   Exponents of this view can be represented by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, (1986), 1991.
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space, as a consistent implementation of this idea leads to the conclusion that
consciousness must possess symbol generative competence, which includes
the ability to produce the symbolic forms that are taken as axiomatically given
in the view of consciousness as a finite and discrete system.
Although it is not possible on the basis of our present knowledge to give an
account of the origin of this property in the physical and biological universe, it
has a character which implies that it is possible to draw the conclusion that
consciousness must necessarily possess at least one property which is
incompatible with the idea of a discrete, finite formal or physical system.
But this is not a question of rejecting the formal theories of cognition on the
basis of older assumptions of theories of consciousness. On the contrary, it is a
question of a criticism which appears when we take up the consideration of
Cognitive Science and follow it to its conclusion, which here means back to
the problem of the indefinite beginning.
While the models of Cognitive Science fall short as models of con-
sciousness, the attempt to use the conceptual world of mechanical physics on
consciousness gave rise to a remarkable transformation in the understanding
of the mechanical system itself, as we replace the reference of classical
mechanics to the physical universe with a functionalistic idea of a separate,
distinctly delimited symbolic world which is realized (in different or similar)
human and mechanical forms.
While the mechanical procedure in Newtonian theory is controlled by an
immaterial force, its effects are purely material. Conditions are reversed in the
symbolic interpretation of mechanical theory, as the relationship between
material entities is seen as the cause of symbolic effects. Although the
mechanical symbol theories do not provide an account of the force concept,
they apparently allow it to be understood both as an immaterial Newtonian
concept (as a kind of symbolic force) and as a concept of physical energy, as
long as the physical energy is described as pure form.
It was Boltzmann who took the first step in this transformation by
interpreting mechanical theory as an abstract, finite model of description.
While he still viewed the mechanical model as a physical model, however, it
was interpreted in other disciplines as a model of the their respective  domains.
The idea of the finite space is thus interpreted in mathematical logic as a logical
space and from here Turing could take the final step in this transformation as
he brought the logical space back into a mechanical-physical form, by
showing that it is possible to reduce all finite mathematical and logical
procedures to simple, mechanically executed steps. On this footbridge be-
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tween logic and physics mechanical procedure apparently becomes equipped
with a built-in symbolic meaning and the way is paved to the opposite
movement: from symbolic mechanics, where physical materiality no longer
means anything, to logic which, as the highest expression of human
intelligence, perhaps also contains its essence.
The result was a neo-Cartesian research paradigm which supplies the
Cartesian subject with finite and delimited physical-dynamic properties
derived from 18th century materialistic theories of energy and instinct, as the
concept of physical and/or biological forces is replaced by an immaterial
process concept.
This abstraction results in a new version of the Cartesian dualism between
consciousness and corporeality, as corporeality is removed from the room
under consideration and the form concepts derived from the study of
corporeality are used on consciousness. In this way the concept of the mental
subject and the physical object disappear into a formal - often mathematical or
information theoretical - transcendence. The relationship to the Cartesian
tradition is thus not characterized by a confrontation with its dualism, but on
the contrary by a confrontation with the use of this dualism in the polarization
between an immaterial, non-extended subject and a material, extended object.
In the neo-Cartesian paradigm everything is extended in time and space
and nothing is material. Matter is no longer accepted as a source of meaning, it
is manifested only as a tiresome restriction or a completely passive and
arbitrary medium. The system is at the same time deterministic and allows no
room for either will or instinct as potential sources of disturbance of a given
structure. But it is itself a theoretical system and was thought of in opposition
to other theories. In other words it is itself a product of tension and will. But
its existence must still be taken into account, just as for some time yet we must
probably come to terms with the fact that the source of this will is not only
reason, but also instinct.
The fact that this paradigm can provide new knowledge, and there is no
reason to deny this, is connected both with the theoretical, levelling one-
sidedness, which contributes to making a number of problems of cognitive
theory more acute, and with the well-documented circumstance that it is far
from the case that only valid theories are capable of providing knowledge of
the world.
It is hardly by chance that the neo-Cartesian paradigm takes the shape of a
highly speculative cognitive paradigm, as human cognition, unlike all other
areas of research, occupies a doubly exceptional position. First, the process of
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cognition is invisible and therefore inaccessible to direct observation. In this it
resembles much of modern physics which must also use instrumentally
mediated measurement procedures, the meaning of which can hardly be
separated from the phenomena measured. In both cases they are areas where
any type of observation is determined by complex, hypothetical assumptions
which are implemented in experimental arrangements, measuring and testing
apparatuses. And, as far as cognitive science goes, also that it is by definition
self-referential. The extent and properties of the research subject are identical
with those of the object.
The study of cognitive processes perhaps resembles, as Zenon Pylyshyn
wrote, the attempt of a blind man to study elephants, but more closely
resembles a blind man’s attempt to study blindness.50
These circumstances not only make the circular conclusion of neo-
Cartesianism understandable, they also show that cognitive science could
only achieve its modern breakthrough from the moment that an advanced set
of theoretical and hypothetical assumptions became available which would
make the necessary objectivization possible through externalized test
apparatuses.
While the idea of utilizing the description of conscious processes in the
construction of computers together with the idea of using computer models to
test empirical and theoretical material on mental processes may be two
individually well-reasoned, scientific paths, the interweaving of these ideas in
the idea of a constitutive similarity is a blind alley which creates an obstacle
for an understanding of the properties of consciousness and the computer
alike. A scientifically responsible comparison must start by conceptualizing the
differences which are the precondition for a comparison.
Turing’s mistake was not that he suggested a strategy for constructing an
apparatus which could serve as a tool for human thinking and also as a tool
for research into human thinking, in which case civilization as such is an error;
it was that he made the symbolic start and stop conditions, which are a
precondition for the machine, a precondition for that consciousness which is
the only known producer of such conditions. It is with this constitutive
mistake that the information theoretical paradigms of the 20th century - with
all due respect to the other many merits - take leave of the energy-theoretical
paradigms of the 19th century.
                                                
50   Pylyshyn, (1984) 1985. Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science.
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Turing was perfectly aware of this. There are, he wrote, no systems which
are characterized by discrete states:
(The discrete state machines) are the machines which move by sudden jumps
or clicks from one quite definite state to another. These states are
sufficiently different for the possibility of confusion between them to be
ignored. Strictly speaking there are no such machines. Everything really
moves continuously. But there are many kinds of machines which can
profitably be thought of as being discrete state machines.51
Everything moves continuously.
The discrete state is only a - rewarding - mental idea. For exactly the same
reason the double reflection of the idea of the discrete consciousness and the
discrete machine is a circular short-circuit which by definition ignores the
insoluble, research motivating basic problem - the relationship of the discrete
representation to the continuous phenomenon.
We could say that this is particularly an ecological error, but the correction
of this error must be located in symbolic theory.
A related conclusion, which however, is limited to providing an account of
the difference between the physical-mechanical and the formal logical
procedure, has also been presented by Robert Rosen in pointing out that there
is no formal method which can produce a statement on the congruence
between causal relationships in physical systems and the logical conclusion
procedures which define any formal simulation of a physical system:
Thus in formal systems, we already find that a purely syntactical encoding
will in some sense lose information. The information lost must then pertain to
an irreducible, unformalizable semantic component in the original
inferential structure. By changing the encodings, we can shift to some extent
where this semantic information resides, but we cannot eliminate it.52
Rosen’s objection is thus not simply that the physical »causation« and the
logical »implication« represent two different logical structures, but also that
the formal procedure is of a syntactic nature and is produced by an elimination
of the information on the system which is to be simulated (or represented).
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As will be shown in chapters 6 and 7 it is possible to provide an even more
precise definition of the information which is lost, as the formal procedure is
not produced as a selective choice (disposal) of more relevant information
from less relevant, but as a principle and constitutive elimination of
referentiality to the non-symbolic.
***
The general theme of Turing’s thinking is the relationship between matter and
consciousness. To this he added two fine distinctions, both closely connected
with the inversion which lay in the understanding of consciousness in the
image of matter.
The first distinction - clearest in its difference from a classical physical-
mechanical understanding - was that his materialistic model included both
memory, self-control and development mechanisms. At this point he was com-
pletely in line with the contemporary efforts of behaviourist psychologist,
Clark L. Hull, to design mechanical robots.53  Unlike these, Turing’s machine,
however, was not simply characterized by containing a memory function, a
control unit and a feedback mechanism - the three elements then considered as
the decisive obstacles to providing a mechanical description of biological and
mental processes - Turing’s machine was also characterized by a complete
dissolution of both mechanical determination and the invariant bond between
the mechanical function and its symbolic meaning.
The second distinction - clearest in relationship to classical mentalism - was
the use of the condition of finiteness as a question of physical-mechanical
execution. Turing believed that through a combination of these two trains of
thought it would be possible to place the significance of physical corporeality
in - a mathematical - parenthesis. Corporeality itself becomes an external,
arbitrary and replaceable vehicle.
In this way Turing eliminated the materialistic dimension from materialistic
thinking and thereby concluded an epoch in the history of materialistic
thinking, as he also opened the way for a new, at once »symbolic« and
practical technological epoch in the mentalist tradition.
He led the old dream of a mathematically perfect solution to the enigmatic
relationship between matter and consciousness to new limits - as a
mathematician, as one of the leading English cryptographers during and after
                                                
53   C.f. Roberto Cordeschi, 1991, who discusses Hull’s work in relation to Cognitive Science.
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World War II, with access to knowledge so secret that even its existence was a
secret - subject to military regulations of secrecy, sentenced to hormone
treatment for a homosexual relationship with a young man of proletarian
background at a time when the cold war was breeding a paranoid fear of
sexual perversion and communism, finally it is believed - perhaps, perhaps not
in accordance with his own basic beliefs - that he committed suicide on 7 June
1954.54    
                                                
54   Hodges, 1983.
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6. The breakthrough of information theory
6.1 Informational notation
The thread which runs from the physical to the later information concepts is
not continuous. One of the breaks in it is expressed by the lack of interest in
this area in the years up to World War II. In 1949, Warren Weawer in his
interpretation of Claude Shannon’s mathematical information theory   in
addition to Leo Szilard, who extended [Boltzmann’s] idea to a general
discussion of information in physics, only mentioned one other work on
information theory, namely that of John von Neumann on the information
concept in quantum mechanics and particle physics.1
A lack of interest is in itself a kind of break, but Shannon’s interest in the
information concept led to another, namely a break with the view of infor-
mation as a mere function of energy. He took the first step towards this in
1938 when he introduced the idea of using mathematical-logical principles
(symbolic analysis based on Boolean logic) in the construction of electrical
circuits. 2 Although no theory proper was presented here, there was an implicit
view of electrical circuits as functions of a logical - and not physical - order.
It had long been known that it was possible to use electricity to transfer
messages in a not directly perceptible form, which could both be analogue,
such as in the telephone and the radio or handled with a discrete notation sy-
stem such as in telegraphy where the Morse alphabet was used. But
Shannon’s idea of describing the electrical circuit as a logical mechanism
paved the way for a new, more complex use of electricity for symbolic pur-
poses. Whereas the Morse alphabet transferred messages as a sequence of
individual signals one by one, the logical description of the relay makes it
possible to introduce conditional relationships between the individual signals.
A given signal can thus produce a change in the following signals and the
following signals can produce a change in the effect of previous signals before
the total transport has been completed.
                                                
1  Shannon and Weawer (1949). Weawer refers to Szilard, 1929, but incorrectly gives the year 1925,
where Szilard had published another article in which he gave a phenomenological interpretation of
statistical thermodynamics where he ignored that information which could reside in the individual,
arbitrary deviations. Szilard, 1925: 757, note. John von Neumann, (1932) especially chapter 5.
2  Shannon, (1938) 1976. Davis, 1988b: 319.
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Shannon’s description involved a leap to higher level in the symbolic util-
ization of electricity. Where this utilization had formerly been based on a
definition of  physical threshold values for symbolic notation units, Shannon’s
description contained the basis for a formal, syntactic organization of electrical
circuits.
In itself, the linking of the mechanical and logical is related to the link
Turing had made in his description of the universal computer. But Shannon
did not have the same acute sense of theoretical reach and was also far more
concerned with the practical use of logic for handling electricity. Nevertheless
- or precisely because of this - his contribution contained a theoretical element
which is not found in Turing, but which would be of great importance to the
later computer technology.
Where Turing had worked on the basis of a traditional physical machine
which was controlled by a logical description, Shannon’s description con-
tained the elements of a machine with a built-in syntactic structure. Such a
machine is a far more complex physical construction than the Turing machine.
Nor is it immediately obvious that it can possess the same universal properties,
as the syntactic structure contains a set of restrictions which are not contained
in the physical construction of the Turing machine.
There is another difference, however, as the syntactic structure which is
incorporated in the machine prepares the ground for a conceptual distinction
between the syntactic and semantic levels, whereas Turing’s implicit precon-
dition was that the syntactic and semantic levels coincided and were ex-
pressed in the programme.
While Turing’s point lay in the description of how an entire class of
mathematical and logical operations could be performed by traditional me-
chanical means, Shannon’s point  lay in the description of the way in which
mechanical processes could be subordinated to a symbolic organization at a
formal syntactic level. He thereby paved the way for the complex physical
construction which is now found in modern computers.
That his description also contained one of the germs of a new information
theory first became evident when a group of American scientists, with
mathematical, technical and biological backgrounds - urged on by the advent
of World War II - discussed the more long-term scientific perspectives which
would be connected with the new computer technology.
After some more informal contacts during the first war years, on the initia-
tive of mathematician Norbert Wiener, a number of scientists gathered in the
winter of 1943-44 at a seminar, where Wiener himself tried out his ideas for
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describing intentional systems as based on feedback mechanisms. On the same
occasion J.W. Tukey introduced the term a »bit« (binary digit) for the smallest
informational unit, corresponding to the idea of a quantity of information as a
quantity of yes-or-no answers.3 In continuation of this meeting, The
Teleological Society4 was formed in 1944, the name of which was changed
after the war, to the Cybernetics Group. Among its members were such figures
as anthropologists Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead, engineer Julian H.
Bigelow, neuro-psychiatrist Warren McCulloch, physiologist Arthur
Rosenblueth, mathematicians Walter Pitts, John von Neumann and Norbert
Wiener.
Through discussions in this society the cybernetic paradigm, named by
Norbert Wiener, and - in a relatively vague and general form - the idea of
information as an abstract, quantifiable entity became crystallized.
According to Wiener’s formulation of the cybernetic paradigm, it should be
understood as a joint, basic paradigm for describing physical, biological,
psychological and sociological »systems«. It was believed that mathematical
description, which had been of such use in physics, could now be used in a
similar way to describe living systems. The central point lay in mathematical
description, but the decisive innovation lay in the idea that with the feedback
mechanism there was now finally a general (neo)mechanical basis for
describing self-regulating systems, including consciousness - which did not
lead back to the old reductionist rut.
As far as can be seen, there are only sporadic discussions of the episte-
mological problems inherent in the application of mathematics to energy phy-
sics. Norbert Wiener thus saw Werner Heisenberg’s statistical quantum
mechanics as a realistic and exhaustive synthesis of Newtonian particle
mechanics and Planck-Bohr’s quantum mechanics. But that he contented
himself with the statistical and non-phenomenological character of this de-
scription is exclusively due to the technical utility of the statistical description
which is bound to specific communication systems.
                                                
3  C.f. Shannon, 1949: 32 and Wiener, 1962: 6 ff. and 1964: 269. The idea of using binary represen-
tation is older. It is not clear who originated it. Wiener 1962: 4, writes that the idea was accepted in
accordance with a practice used by Bell Telephone Laboratories in another technical area. H. Goldstine,
1972: 123 wrote that John Atanasoff used binary representation in a calculating machine from 1940 and
later claimed to be its originator. It was the German computer pioneer, Konrad Zuse, however, who
came first. Zuse used binary representation in his first computer (Z1), which he developed during the
years 1936-1938, but only for numerical notation. C.f. Williams, 1985: 216 ff. Zuse’s work,
incidentally, was not known outside - and received little attention in - Germany until much later.
4  H. Goldstine, 1972: 275.
159
The relation of these mechanisms to time demands careful study. It is clear,
of course, that the relation in-output is a consecutive one in time and
involves a definite past-future order. What is perhaps not so clear is that the
theory of the sensitive automata is a statistical one. We are scarcely ever
interested in the performance of a communication-engineering machine for
a single input. To function adequately, it must give a satisfactory
performance for a whole class of inputs, and this means a statistically
satisfactory performance for the class of input which it is statistically
expected to receive. Thus its theory belongs to the Gibbsian statistical
mechanics rather than to the classical Newtonian mechanics.5
The epistemological problems are limited to a criticism of Bergson’s vitalistic
objections to classical mechanics. Although it is true that the vitalists,
according to Wiener, correctly claimed that the reversible time of classical me-
chanics was not suitable as a basis for a mechanical description of living
organisms, the thermodynamic and quantum mechanical descriptions offered
new images of irreversible and self-regulating mechanisms:
Thus the modern automaton exists in the same sort of Bergsonian time as the
living organisms and hence there is no reason in Bergson’s considerations
why the essential mode of functioning of the living organism should not be
the same as that of the automaton of this type. Vitalism has won to the extent
that even mechanisms correspond to the time structure of vitalism but as we
have said, the victory is a complete defeat, for from every point of view
which has the slightest relation to morality or religion, the new mechanics
is fully as mechanistic as the old.6
Wiener was correct in claiming that the new feedback mechanism on the one
hand was equally as mechanistic as the old, while on the other hand it con-
tained a considerable expansion of the concept of mechanical procedures. But
he was not aware that the growth in the number of mutually disunited
mechanical paradigms in physics had at the same time raised other completely
different problems for a realistic interpretation of any form of mechanical
description. He thus completely avoided the question - so critical for
Boltzmann and other physicists - of how it could be possible to connect a
                                                
5  Wiener, (1948) 1962: 37-44. Quotation: 43.
6  Wiener, (1948) 1962: 44.
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mechanical description of a closed, local system to a realistic and universalistic
interpretation of the mechanical paradigm.
A partial explanation probably lies in the pragmatic and technological per-
spective, but the fact that the cybernetic theory was presented as a universally
realistic description model is probably to an equal degree due to the
underlying idea of a unified science which, however, rapidly proved a failure.
The cybernetic society held ten conferences with invited guests during the
years 1946-1953, after which it was dissolved. After the eighth meeting
Wiener and von Neumann left and, at the tenth meeting, writes Steve J. Heims,
the participants had nothing new to say to each other.7
The reason for this is obvious today. If we wish to describe different
domains with the same conceptual apparatus, we must either ignore the
differences or modify the conceptual apparatus so that it becomes capable of
representing the differences. If we use the same procedure, such as the
feedback mechanism, to describe both physical and psychological processes,
we avoid the risk of taking one kind of phenomenon as a model for another
by identifying the two with each other. The procedure simply ignores the
difference which makes the comparison possible and the failure to make a
distinction erroneous.
The history of the cybernetic society also appears as the history of a con-
vergence, which immediately changes to a divergence. It was, as von
Neumann expressed it at one of the meetings, far from given that it was
possible to describe consciousness within the same logical categories as those
used to describe other, less complex phenomena. On the contrary, it could be
imagined that the phenomena of consciousness possessed an analytical
irreducibility, that an object of consciousness comprised its own smallest
description.8
The ambition of cybernetics to be the unifying science undoubtedly con-
tributed to an overestimation of the explanatory force of the feedback
mechanism, but the idea of a new - almost cosmological - world description
influenced a number of sciences, with the creation of information theoretical
                                                
7  Steve J. Heims, 1988: 75.
8  Quoted here after Heims, 1988: 73. In a later discussion, (an incomplete, posthumously published
manuscript) von Neumann emphasizes a number of differences between the digital computer and
consciousness (understood as the neurophysiological system) and concludes, »the Language of the Brain
[is] not the Language of Mathematics« J. von Neumann, 1958:80. Among his reasons for this
conclusion are that the neurophysiological system consists of an interplay between digitalized and
analogue processes. It can therefore not operate with the same numerical precision and is not subject to
the same vulnerability to singular signal disturbances as digital computers. Ibid. 68-78.
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paradigms in such areas as mathematics, biology, psychology, anthropology
and linguistics as a consequence. In spite of its short history, cybernetic
thinking thus comprises one of the central points of departure for the still
ongoing technical-scientific revolution which began around World War II. It is
therefore not surprising that this conceptual framework has also played a
central role in the description of the symbolic properties of digital computers.
It is not only true in a general sense that the computer has been seen as the
incarnation of a cybernetic system based on the use of the feedback me-
chanism as a conditional clause, but also in the sense that the symbolic pro-
cesses which are performed in the computer have been described as formal
procedures in line with other forms of algorithmic, mathematical and logical
procedures.
While such a description is adequate for any single, finite procedure which
can be performed automatically, it is not adequate to describe the way such
procedures are performed in the computer, as the formal procedure, as shown
in chapter 5, can only be performed in a computer if it is represented in a
notation system which is not subject to the semantic restrictions which
characterize a formal notation system.
At the time, nobody seems to have attached much importance to the prin-
ciple difference between formal and informational notation, much less to have
seen the new notation system as the most far-reaching or general innovation.
The most important reason for this seems to lie in the widespread idea that the
central point of this project was to perfect control theory, as this idea assumes
that the innovation lay in a more comprehensive and perfect representation of
the »world« rather than in the development of a new system of representation,
which contained a number of questions regarding the relationship between
what was represented and the forms of the representation.
The decisive point, however, is that it is neither possible to maintain the idea
of a direct equivalence in the relationship between formal and informational
notation, nor in the relationship between the symbolic and the physical
process. On the contrary, informational notation comprises an independent
link between the symbolic and the physical-mechanical.
The fact that this link - the informational notation system - was actually a
new alphabet which formed the basis for a new sign structure different to any
previously known sign structure - as will be explained in the following chap-
ters - only emerged during the course of later developments. The same goes for
the understanding of the new semantic potentialities and constraints of this
sign system compared to any other hitherto known systems.
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Although the acknowledgement of these aspects has only occurred slowly
compared with the speed of technical innovations, there are sound reasons for
assuming that they will represent the most far-reaching historical innovations
prompted by the appearance of computers. First, while the development of a
sign system is not subject to that technological obsolescence which affects
specific technical innovations (such as individual articulations in a sign system
compared to the system as such). Second, the properties of the new sign
system are more general and inclusive than those of any other known system,
which implies, among other things, that the latter can be represented in the
former.
Since anything represented in a computer is represented in a sequential
form and in the very same alphabet and sign structure, we can speak of a new
kind of textual technology.
And since we can represent knowledge in any known form, whether
expressed in common language, formal languages or in pictorial or auditive
forms and integrate the basic functions in the handling of knowledge, such as
production, editing, processing, retrieving, copying, validating, distribution and
communication, we can also state that the computer has the capacity to
become a new general or universal medium for the representation of know-
ledge.
Even if we cannot predict much regarding the knowledge content which
will be expressed in this medium in the future, we can predict that the ex-
pression of knowledge in this medium will have a cultural and social impact of
the same reach as the invention of modern printing technology, i.e. that
computerization implies a change in the basic means of knowledge
representation in modern societies, that is a - slowly but steadily developing -
change in the very infrastructure of society
Although the informational notation system possesses properties which
distinguish it from formal notation systems, it is nevertheless a product of the
efforts to extend the area of use of formal representation and to bring about a
generalized, universal system for formal representation, just as it is also such
efforts which have produced the most important methods for using the new
notation system.
These methods have primarily been developed at two levels: An algorithmic
level, where there is both a quantitative and qualitative development of new,
arbitrary syntactic methods of treatment and at the level of notation, where
there are new methods for handling informational notation.
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As these notation handling methods are themselves algorithmic, they can as
such be regarded as a special branch of development at the algorithmic level,
which will be discussed in chapter 8. They are also interesting because they
can help to reveal the characteristic properties of informational notation.
6.2 Information as random variation
A pioneering work within this area appeared in 1948 in the form of an article
by Claude Shannon under the ambitious title: The Mathematical Theory of
Communication. The article aroused a great deal of interest and was reprinted
in the following year together with Warren Weawer’s comprehensive
comments and his views of  its perspectives.9
In essence the article was of a purely mathematical and technical character.
Shannon’s ambition was to demonstrate that it would always be possible to
find a mathematical method for carrying out the optimum compression of a
given message on the basis of a statistical knowledge of the system in which
the message was expressed.
The main point at issue is the effect of statistical knowledge about the
source in reducing the required capacity of the channel, by the use of
proper encoding of the information.10
If the source is a linguistic message, in alphabetical or Morse alphabetical form,
the question would then be whether there was a mathematical method for
performing an optimum compression of the expression so that it would be
possible to omit the transferral of as many individual symbols as possible,
without the content being lost.
This, neither more nor less, is the subject of Shannon’s theory and it thus
appears quite directly, although it has often been passed over, that it is a the-
ory of the compression of symbolic notation systems. The background for the
theory included the well known fact that the different symbols in a notation
system, such as the letters in the alphabet, occur with irregular frequency and
that many sequences of letters are defined by the structure of the given
                                                
9  Shannon and Weawer (1949) 1969.
10  Shannon, (1949) 1969: 39.
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language, while others are »freely chosen«, i.e. defined by the specific
message.
The postulate was that expressions in a notation system can be regarded as
the result of a stochastic process where a given, discrete symbol is handled as
a unit which appears with a statistical probability characteristic of the chosen
notation system as a whole, notwithstanding the symbol sequence which
comprises the specific message.
No particularly precise description of the statistical structure as such is re-
quired. For instance, it can very well be assumed that the individual figures
appear with equally great statistical probability, although the optimization of
the compression will increase proportionally with the statistical knowledge of
varying frequency
Now it is also true of common language that many individual symbols
frequently appear  in fixed constellations with surrounding symbols, such as
»wh« and »th« and many suffixes in English. In these cases the probability of
a given symbol occurrence is thus determined by the preceding symbol
occurrence(s). In order to exploit the possibility for compression here,
Shannon used a special series of stochastic processes, Markoff processes,
which calculate probability with regard to the preceding »events«.
It is thus possible, writes Shannon, to regard any message, any source which
appears in a discrete form, as a stochastic process and any stochastic process
can conversely be regarded as a source which generates a message, as every
step in the process can be regarded as the production of a new symbol - by
which is meant here a notation unit.
Shannon believed that it would be possible to arrive at such a com-
prehensive description of language on a probabilistic basis that it could be
claimed that language was actually governed by a stochastic process.
He carried out a number of calculations which were intended to show that a
relatively simple stochastic model (where first, letter frequency was taken into
account, then dependency between two and then three succeeding symbols,
then word frequency and finally the dependency between two immediately
succeeding words in ordinary English) could produce linguistically plausible
symbol sequences to an extent that was twice as great as the statistical basis
of calculation. If, for example, the statistical bond between up to three
succeeding symbols was taken into account, linguistically plausible symbol
sequences of up to six letters could be produced and if the statistical bond
between two immediately succeeding words was taken into account, it was
possible to produce linguistically plausible expressions of up to four words.
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The idea of a complete approximation of the linguistically plausible has
given rise to many subsequent works, but as Shannon remarked, the work on
the next step would be colossal and he refrained from continuing the series of
approximations himself.11
This experiment in linguistic analysis, however, also served another, more
specific purpose. It would show that it was also possible to increase the
precision of a statistical analysis of apparently indeterministic systems by using
a special series of Markoff processes, namely ergodic processes, in  which the
statistical structure of a - reasonably large - sample of a sequence is the same as
for the entire sequence. It follows from this that all the sequences which can
be produced in an ergodic system have the same statistical properties.
If we can thus - through a series of approximations - describe a given mes-
sage with the help of an ergodic process, we can also describe a complete set
of possible messages which can be handled in the same way. The question
then is whether it is possible to exploit this statistical knowledge to compress -
or re-code - all the messages which belong to the given set.
In its simplest form this is a question of finding a standard formula for the
certainty with which we can predict what the next symbol will be, purely on
the basis of the probability with which each symbol occurs in a given set.
It is reasonable, writes Shannon, to claim that such a standard in the given
case must fulfil three demands:
• The measure of uncertainty (H) should be a continuous function of the
probabilities of the occurrence, (pi).
• If all pi are equal, then H should be a monotonic increasing function of the
number of symbols. With equally likely events there is more choice, or
uncertainty, when there are more possible events.
• If a choice be broken down into successive choices, the original H should
be the weighted sum of the individual values of H.
The only H satisfying the above assumptions is of the form
n
H = - K Σ pi log pi
i = 1
Where K is a constant related to the choice of the unit of measurement and pi
is the calculated probability for the occurrence of a given symbol.12 The
                                                
11  Shannon, 1951, Burton and Licklider, 1955, Mandler, 1955.
12  Ibid. 49-50.
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formula describes the uncertainty, »the entropy«, of the total system as a
function of the uncertainty valid for each occurrence. The fact that it is the
logarithmic value of the probability which appears as a factor is because of an
arbitrary choice, intuitively motivated by engineering and practical consi-
derations, as a great number of functions vary linearly with the logarithm of
the number of possibilities, just as the use of logarithmic values simplifies the
mathematical calculation.
An illustration of the usefulness of the choice is that by using the loga-
rithmic function with base 2 we get a binary unit of measurement cor-
responding to a relay with two stable positions which can contain one bit of
information, while a system with N relays, which thus has 2N possible states,
can correspondingly contain N bits, as log (base 2) of 2N = N. By using the
logarithm for base 2 as a factor, we thereby obtain uncertainty expressed in
bits.
In its mathematical structure Shannon’s formula is equivalent to
Boltzmann’s measure of physical entropy, as the constant in Boltzmann,
however, is a physical constant. Shannon provides no proof of this theorem:
It is chiefly given to lend a certain plausibility to some of our later
definitions. The real justification of the definitions, however, will reside in
their implications.13
The value of the formula is thus connected with its intuitively relevant
properties: H becomes zero if all signals except one appear with probability
zero and that one with 100% probability (or probability 1, when uncertainty is
expressed as a positive value between 0 and 1). In all other cases, H is positive.
H is conversely maximum in the case where all symbols occur with equally
great probability and H increases in this case linearly with the logarithm of the
number of symbols.
It can further be demonstrated that the formula accords with the intuitive
supposition that the probability of the occurrence of two given symbols in a
sequence is less than or equal to the probability of the individual occurrence
of the two symbols.
In the remainder of the article Shannon demonstrates how to apply the
general mathematical measurement for uncertainty, entropy, or what is
identical here: the amount of information in a given message, where the
                                                
13  Ibid. 50.
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information concept is identified with the relative improbability which is
valid for a decision as to what can occur as the next symbol. If we use base 2
for the logarithmic value, this corresponds to expressing uncertainty as the
number of bits necessary to identify a signal.
If we define the uncertainty of a given set of messages as an average of the
uncertainties that are valid step by step for the next symbol, weighed with
regard to the probabilities which are valid for the occurrence of the individual
permissible symbols, it is also possible to show that, through a series of
approximations, the uncertainty of the total system can be calculated with as
great an approximate precision as desired, simply on the basis of the total
statistical structure of the message, i.e. without taking into account the
variations which are connected with the transitions between the individual
steps.
If a given message thus contains a given, large number of signals, the
permissible symbols will occur individually with a probability which ap-
proaches that probability valid for its occurrence in the total set of possible
messages.
That uncertainty which is valid for a specific message will always be less
than that uncertainty which is valid for the entire set of possible messages in
the same stochastic structure and the relationship between these uncertainties
comprises what Shannon calls relative entropy.
This standard defines the amount of information contained in a given
message relative to the degree of freedom which is valid for the total
expression system. If a given message uses 80%, for example, of the free
choices which are permitted in a given system, the relative entropy is 0.8 and,
at the same time, comprises the maximum compression of the amount of
information contained.
Correspondingly, the system’s redundancy, i.e. that amount which is not
available to free choice, is determined as a residual factor of the relative
entropy.
This definition, however, does not appear to be quite clear, as relative en-
tropy expresses a relationship between the maximum possible and actually
utilized freedom of choice. Redundancy is thus defined here as a measure of
the freedom of choice not utilized and not as a measure of the number of
occurrences which are not accessible to choice.
Shannon’s exemplification fails to clear up the problem, as he refers to a
number of investigations into the statistical structure of the English language,
from which it appears that redundancy in »ordinary English« is around 50%
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and the amount of information therefore also 50%. Compared with this, Basic
English, which is characterized by a limitation of the vocabulary to 850 words,
has very high redundancy, while James Joyce is chosen to represent the
linguistic contrast with very low redundancy. In all these examples, the
redundancy concept is used of the number of symbol sequences that are
determined by the language structure and not of the maximum number of free
choices utilized.
That there are two different standards becomes clear if we consider a mes-
sage in ordinary English, where relative entropy approaches 1, i.e. the amount
of information approaches the maximum possible for the set of messages
which belong to ordinary English. While redundancy as residual between the
eligible and ineligible signals is, according to Shannon’s statement, constant,
equal to 0.5, when seen as residual to the relative entropy, it becomes very
low, approaching 0 as the relative entropy approaches 1. If, conversely, we
compare the possible choices used in ordinary English to the maximum
number of choices the English language permits as a whole, the result will be
that the relative entropy, the relationship between the possible choices utilized
and not utilized, approaches 0, while the relationship between eligible and
ineligible signals in the message remains 1:1 and the relative entropy is 0.5.
The relationship between the potential amount of information and the
amount used is not included in Shannon’s (nor in Weawer’s) examples, but it
is not possible on the basis of Shannon’s definition to speak of higher or
lower redundancy without placing it in relationship to a common - and
maximum - standard for the possible free choices, of which any given text only
utilizes some part or other.
If we therefore look at the different variants of English as different degrees
of approximation of the maximum number of possible choices in the total
system, the redundancy, which is expressed as residual to the relative entropy,
would be low for Basic English because Basic English only uses a small
number of the possible choices, while Joyce uses a greater number with a
correspondingly higher redundancy. In order to ascertain this portion,
however, we must take our point of departure in the maximum number of
possible choices the English language allows for symbol sequences, which far
exceeds any usage and has nothing to do with the 50-50 ratio which is
considered typical for the relationship between redundancy and information
in ordinary English, as in ordinary English nobody uses 50% of the  maximum
number of free choices in the English language as a whole.
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So we have here two different definitions of the concept of redundancy.
On the one hand, redundancy is defined as that part of the expression which is
determined by the structure of the language, as Shannon assumes that a
message can be divided into two portions, one of which is determined by the
language system while the other is the part that is accessible to a free,
meaning-bearing choice. This redundancy is defined in direct contrast to the
meaning. The definition leads to a paradox, as Shannon here identifies
redundancy with the system and rule determined part of an expression.
On the other hand, redundancy is defined as the unused possible choices in
a given text. Here, redundancy is also defined in contrast to the meaning of
the text, but where, in the first definition, this contrast was between the system
determined and the freely chosen parts, in the second definition it is drawn
between the freely chosen part and the unused, alternative possible choices in
the given language.
In order to arrive at this result Shannon first had to use a third definition, as
he could only determine the unused possible choices which characterize a
given text by first carrying out a statistical analysis of the relationship be-
tween regularly occurring and irregularly occurring signals in a - represen-
tative section - of texts from the given language.
This - statistically expressed - redundancy differs from the two preceding
definitions as it is not defined in contrast to, but completely without regard to
the meaning of the text. The statistical standard is carried out on the entire set
of messages no matter whether the individual notations occur because they
are determined by the rule structure or belong to the specific, eligible content
of the message. This determination also allows Shannon to avoid the question
of how it is possible to differentiate between rule and meaning determined
letters in a perfectly ordinary word.
Where redundancy in the two first definitions is defined in contrast to the
meaning, redundancy in the third definition is defined quite independently of
meaning. And while redundancy in the first definition is defined as the system
determined part of the expression - in the two others it is defined as the used
and unused parts respectively which are accessible to a free choice.
It is the first definition which comes closest to the traditional definition of
redundancy as repetitively occurring, superfluous, structures which are of no
importance for the content of the message. But this definition too is distorted
by Shannon, as in this connection he simply defines the superfluous,
meaningless structures as the regular occurrences, whereby they also come to
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include the occurrences determined by the rules of the system in which the
message is expressed.
To the traditional definition of redundancy
• as a repetitively occurring, superfluous structure which is of no importance
for the content of the message,
Shannon thus adds three new definitions:
• as the regularly occurring, system determined parts (in contrast to meaning)
• as the eligible, but unused parts (the alternative possible meanings - in
another contrast to meaning)
• as the statistically determined parts (without regard to meaning at all)
The relationship between these different definitions gives occasion for a more
detailed analysis of the redundancy concept which will be taken up in section
7.5.
We are also left, however, with the first part of a new definition of infor-
mational quantities, as these quantities are determined as residuals to quantities
which are established in a statistical structure. The smallest informational unit
is defined here by its degree of unexpectedness in relationship to a specified
expectancy structure which, in its stringent form, can be described as a
stochastic procedure.
The paradox in this definition appears when we become aware that the
informational quantity is a statistical function which itself has no specific ma-
nifestation. Uncertainty is concerned with the degree of unpredictability
whereby a symbol occurs at a given time, or the degree of unpredictability
whereby the total number of symbols occurs in a sequence, or is concerned
with the average number of units necessary to specify a symbol within a class
of possible symbols. The smallest amount of information here is thus not the
same as the smallest expression unit in a notation system.
The amount of information is, on the contrary, a specific attribute, or
property, of individual symbols or of sequences of symbols, as the amount
indicates the degree of unexpectedness in the occurrence of a given form. But
this is a peculiar property which only appears occasionally and, in principle,
independently of the existing message, as the degree of unexpectedness is not
a property of the message, but a function of the stochastic procedure which is
chosen to characterize the message. The same message thus contains different
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amounts of information if it is described or calculated on the basis of two
different stochastic procedures. Other things being equal, the more
complicated the procedure it is handled with the less information is contained
in the source.
Characteristically, this is an almost diametrically opposite result of a
semantic treatment in which the main rule would be that the more complicated
interpreter yields more information than the less complicated.
There is nothing surprising in the fact that the statistically defined amount
of information is independent of the semantic content, as this was the aim
itself. The interesting thing is rather that, quite contrary to his own
expectations, Shannon shows that the information which can be produced by
a stochastic interpreter is not only independent of the meaning content of the
message, but also of its notation structure, as the amount of information
depends solely on the interpreter. The less the interpreter is capable of
specifying the statistical properties of a message, the more information.
Of course it is correct that we can speak, in a certain vague manner, of such
a connection at the semantic level. The less we know, the more, in a sense, we
have the opportunity to learn. But this vague analogy obscures a significant
discrepancy because more knowledge in the statistical theory is identical with
less information. The knowledge which is absorbed in the statistical procedure
is thus for the very same reason no longer possible information. There is only
information in so far as it is missing.
Shannon’s problem here is that signals which occur with great statistical
regularity may well occur as the consequence of a free choice. Statistical
regularity, which is not information, can therefore both be the result of a
system determined order and of a semantic choice.
It is the definition of information as - the degree of - uncertainty which is
the source of these paradoxical implications. In her book, Chaos Bound, N.
Katherine Hayles writes of Shannon’s conceptualization that it contains a
transformation of the thermodynamic concept of uncertainty. While uncer-
tainty in the thermodynamic description is seen as an actual micro-physical
disorder, i.e. a state which cannot be known and where it is only possible to
describe the statistical probabilities of possible states, uncertainty in
Shannon’s theory is understood as a degree of the »unexpectedness« of an
actual event.14 In Shannon’s theory the micro-state is completely unambi-
guous and given. There is a message in the form of a fixed sequence of given,
                                                
14  N. Katherine Hayles, 1990: 37, 54.
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individual signals. Here, it could be added, the result of the measurement varies
solely with the measurement procedure.
For the same reason Shannon’s conceptualization of the information con-
cept is only directly justified as part of the description of statistical properties
in connection with the occurrence of symbols in different notation systems.
The stochastic interpreter contains neither a description of the syntactic
structure of the message nor of its informational content and can, precisely for
this reason, be used on any set of physical forms, including physical notation
forms.
As mentioned, there is no doubt that Shannon himself imagined that it was
possible to design complicated stochastic models which could describe the
syntactical structure of a common language, for example, as such a model
would also make it possible to define a standard for the possible content of a
message expressed as the degree of freedom in the choice of any succeeding
symbol. The consequence of this, however, would be that the ability of a
language to express a content decreases with the increasing complexity of
linguistic rules.
As Shannon’s paper indicates that he believed that we can always dis-
criminate between rule determined and meaning determined notation occur-
rences, it would have been more obvious to use the model on formal
languages in which such discrimination is obligatory, but this would have
provided no confirmation. Although any notation in formal systems occurs as
a consequence of a free - and semantically meaning-bearing - choice, the
individual notations can nevertheless appear in a multiplicity of repetitive
patterns.
It would not be difficult to construct a stochastic procedure which could
produce plausible formal expressions, but it would be difficult to convince
anybody that such a procedure thereby had any descriptive validity at all.
We need not, however, go down these blind alleys in order to derive some
benefit from Shannon’s theory and they were only of esoteric significance for
his main purpose, which was to formulate mathematical means of optimizing
transmission capacity in energy-based information media.
The definition of information as the degree of uncertainty of the occurrence
of a signal comprised, in this connection, only one of the interesting new
features.
Another lay in his account of how entropy per symbol in a text could be
converted to an expression of the frequency with which a source produces
entropy per unit of time. This conversion follows almost of its own accord
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providing that the stochastic procedure is seen as a generator which produces
symbols at a given speed.
By looking at statistical uncertainty, the information, as a function which
can be expressed in physical duration, measured in time, in addition Shannon
incorporates the information concept into a general physical scale. The purely
formal, statistical definition of the informational amount is thereby
transformed into a definition of the informational amount as a physically
determined entity.
This means that informational entropy can be measured on the same scale as
any other physical signal defined by a time function, whether it occurs with
complete certainty or with some statistical (im)probability, as time is a general
measure of duration. The concept of informational entropy thereby becomes a
common unit of measure for a comparison of the degree of uncertainty of
different stochastic procedures.
There was nothing new in describing a physical symbol structure on the
basis of the duration of the signals. On the contrary, this had been taken up by
many engineers since the introduction of the Morse alphabet for telegraphic
purposes, because the duration of the signals was a decisive factor for the
capacity of the transmission channel. The Morse alphabet was itself an
example of how a discrete notation system, such as the alphabet, where
duration is not distinctive, could be advantageously converted to a system
which uses only duration as a distinctive element. This is probably also the
reason why Shannon himself introduced the measure of time for informational
entropy without noting that this implies a reinterpretation of the concept, as it
now becomes an expression of that frequency (measured in time) whereby a
more or less unexpected, but distinct, physical phenomenon (which can also
be measured in time) occurs.
Informational entropy can, as a physical time function, only be determined
on the precondition that the time scale which defines the signals as physically
distinct signals is unambiguously connected with the time scale which defines
the frequency of unexpected occurrences.
This connection is guaranteed by the chosen stochastic procedure when it
is regarded as a product of a mechanical generator which operates at a known
speed. The generator thereby establishes both the code which separates the
signals as distinct physical values and the code which defines the average
frequency of the unexpected occurrences of such distinct signals.15
                                                
15  It is incidentally also worth recalling these principles  in connection with the discussion of
informational theories of cognition, as they give occasion to ask the question of the degree to which -
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By utilizing the time scale established by the generator, informational
entropy can both be measured 1) at the level which is concerned with omitting
the signals determined by the statistical structure, 2) at the level concerned
with minimizing the time taken to transfer the symbols which are not
determined by the structure, and 3) at the level which is concerned with
specifying the individual symbols in the most economical form with regard to
transport, for example by calculating the average necessary number of bits
which are needed for unambiguous identification (which makes subsequent
re-coding possible).
With the definition of informational entropy as the optimum, i.e. least pos-
sible, physical duration, Shannon arrived at an expression for the entropy of a
given source which could be made operational in relationship to the
transmission capacity of the channel, as this could also be expressed as a
function of the possible messages per time unit.
Shannon then attempted to demonstrate that there is always at least one
mathematical method to calculate the optimum compression of messages
which are manifested in a discrete notation system. The demonstration is
carried out partly by showing that the average transmission speed cannot be
greater than the relationship between the channel’s capacity per time unit
and the source’s entropy per symbol, while it can conversely be optimized so
that it coincides with this - calculable - value with an uncertainty that is almost
non-existent.
Shannon mentions two different methods of carrying out such an optimi-
zation. One method involves a division between the more probable messages
which are transmitted as they are, while the less probable messages are
separated and sent in a different code. In the other method the messages are
organized according to their degree of probability, after which they are re-
coded in binary form, where the more probable messages are represented by a
short code and the less probable by a long code. In both cases it can be
shown that for messages of a certain greater length, the upper limit for average
transmission speed will be determined by the relationship between the
channel’s capacity and the uncertainty of the source.
In practice the result must be modified, however, because the code pro-
cedure itself, which elapses in time, builds upon a calculation of probabilities.
Coding requires an analysis of the structure of the message. The code me-
                                                                                                                                           
parts of - the brain or consciousness operate with criteria of this sort, as a - hitherto unanswered -
empirical question.
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chanism must thus contain a store with a certain capacity. As a consequence
of this the optimization of coding is always carried out at the expense of a
certain delay in transmission. The same effect is produced at the other end of
the channel as well, where the transmitted signals must be coded back to their
original form.
In addition to this, there is yet another problem. As the theory is formulated
up to this point, it is concerned with transmission through an idealized channel
where the signals transmitted are supposed to move undisturbed through
empty space. In this case, no transmission at all is possible because all signals
are defined on the basis of some kind of physical manifestation in a medium - if
nothing else then in the apparatus that registers the signal. It is therefore
necessary to investigate how the determination of the optimum compression is
influenced by physical noise in the channel.
This problem in itself would be of a purely technical nature if it were not
precisely that the technical definition of informational entropy is identical with
the technical definition of physical noise. As a consequence of this coin-
cidence in the technical definitions, the technical possibility of distinguishing
between information and noise depends upon conditions which lie outside the
definition. The question is which?
6.3 Information and noise
With his definition of information as a random variation that can be described
relative to an order defined by an arbitrary stochastic procedure, Shannon laid
the foundation of a conceptual pattern which has since been the object of
considerable attention. The heart of this conceptual pattern can be
summarized as the thesis that it is possible to regard random variation as the
basis of an order at a higher level. In Shannon this idea comes to direct
expression, as without any detailed account, he assumes that the relative
randomness which can be observed in the occurrence of a symbol sequence in
a given message is a direct manifestation of the distinct content of the
message. The disorganization which exists when the message is regarded as a
sequence of individual symbols thus creates the basis for its meaning at the
higher, semantic level of observation.
There is therefore a partial justification for this interpretation in what
Shannon writes, but no reason is provided and his own analysis gives, on the
contrary, several indications that it is a wrong approach.
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One of these indications lies, as has already been discussed, in the descrip-
tion of informational entropy as a function of an arbitrarily chosen stochastic
process, according to which the amount of information decreases with the
increasing precision of the description of the message. It is immediately
obvious that this relationship in itself prohibits any reference to the semantic
content of the expression from being ascribed to the concept of informational
entropy. Informational entropy can either be regarded as an arbitrary statistical
function, such as is the case with the description of the source of the message,
or as a function of time in a temporally defined signal system, such as is the
case with both the description of the transmission channel and of the
stochastic procedure as a mechanical signal generator.
Another indication appears from a more detailed observation of the coin-
cidence in the definition of information and noise. The reason why Shannon
uses the same definition of both phenomena is due to the circumstance that he
is particularly interested in the mechanical transport of information, where
doubt can arise as to whether a signal appears because it has been transmitted,
or is a consequence of noise in the transmission channel. He is thus - in this
connection - not interested in irregular noise which does not distort the signal
transferred to such an extent that the receiving mechanism cannot distinguish
the transmitted signal, nor is he interested in regular noise which always
produces a certain distortion, except in those cases where this distortion can
result in two different signals being received as the same.
On the other hand, he is particularly interested in how to determine with the
greatest efficiency whether a received signal, with a legitimate physical form,
stems from the transmitter or is due to noise during transmission.
In these cases, writes Shannon, it is reasonable to assume that the signal
received can be understood as a function of two transmitted signals, one being
the transmitted signal, the other being the noise signal. As both these signals
can be understood as random variables, it can also be assumed in continuation
of the preceding analysis, that they can be individually represented by
appropriate stochastic processes.
This train of thought can be illustrated by imagining that the transmission is
sent in binary code where the question is how it is possible to be certain that a
transmitted 0 or 1 is also received as 0 or 1, if the physical noise in the channel
sometimes means that a 0 is actually received for a transmitted 1. The idea
therefore is to regard the transmitter and the noise source as two generators
each operating with a measurable entropy.
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This idea assumes that both the »informational entropy« and the noise are
manifested in the same physical form as the physical signal - namely expressed
in duration or amperage, conceived of as bits, for example.
The theoretical identification of noise and information has thus special
relevance for the mechanical handling of notation systems where it is not
immediately possible to use semantic criteria in the interpretation of the legi-
timacy of the notation unit and where the individual members of the notation
system are defined on a common physical scale of values, because the relevant
noise for the receiver occurs as though it came from the transmitter, completely
on a par with and inseparable from the legitimate signals which comprise part
of the message.
In noisy channels of this type a completely correct transmission is impos-
sible and the question therefore was whether a coding procedure could be
found which would enable a reduction in the frequency of errors or ambi-
guities in the received result to as great a degree as desired. A possibility
would be to send the same message a great number of times and let the re-
ceiving apparatus carry out a statistical analysis of the individual messages in
order to separate the most probable, correct version. The principles of the
method are simply to increase redundancy in the total set of transmitted,
identical signals which would imply a correspondingly great reduction of the
effective capacity of the channel. Shannon could show, however, that it was
possible to code the transmitted message in such a way as to minimize the
limitation which lay in this increased redundancy by introducing a correction
mechanism.
This mechanism was conceived of as an extra coding which would be ad-
ded to or incorporated into the original message and the question therefore
was whether it would be possible to determine the optimum reduction of the
channel capacity which this extra coding would bring about.
For this purpose Shannon defined the effective transmission rate as the
difference between the information transmitted and the information lacking at
the receiver - due to noise. This missing information thus expressed the
average uncertainty (»the equivocation«) which obtained for the signals
received. It therefore also expressed, wrote Shannon, »the additional
information« necessary to correct the message and this measure consequently
indicated the necessary capacity for correction.
According to this, it is possible to carry out a coding which ensures as close
an approximation of the correct transmission as desired and which only limits
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the capacity of the channel with that uncertainty whereby noise is produced
in the system.
At this point Shannon’s analysis has a theoretical character, as he only
supplies proof that on the basis of the given premises it is theoretically pos-
sible to find a coding procedure which can optimize the transmission. The
procedure which can fulfil this condition, however, depends on the specific
message.
This also appears from Shannon’s own example of such an efficient re-
coding, as he shows how a sequence of seven binary signals can be coded, x1,
x2... x7 (where the individual signal has one of two possible values). Of the
seven signals, four (x3, x5, x6, x7) comprise the content of the message, while
three (x1, x2, x4) - in Shannon’s terminology, redundant signals - comprise the
necessary number of signals which are used to correct the message, if it is
assumed that this block has either been transmitted free of error or with one
error and that these eight possibilities are equally probable.
The value of the redundant signals is determined by a simple addition of the
binary numerical values, as
x1 is defined so that x1 + x3 + x5 + x7 = 0
x2 is defined so that x2 + x3 + x6 + x7 = 0
x4 is defined so that x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 = 0
If one (and only one) error occurs during transmission this will appear from the
fact that either one, two or three of the redundant signals has become a 1
when the same test procedure is carried out by the receiver. If one of the
redundant signals has been distorted, there will be one 1 value, if x3, x5 or x6
has been distorted, there will be two, (different in each case) if x7 has been
distorted, there will be three 1 values.
As this is a question of a binary system, the wrong signal can therefore be
corrected automatically.16
Even though coding can be carried out mechanically, it is nevertheless
based on a semantic description of the message, as the binary signal values are
interpreted as numerical values which can be added to each other. In other
words, coding is brought about by ascribing a certain semantic value to the
individual notation units. Although the message is interpreted through a
formal semantics which is independent of the language in which the message
                                                
16  Shannon, (1949) 1969: 80.
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appears, a semantic interpretation is still necessary to ensure the legitimacy of
the notation unit. This is thus not a question of an asemantic coding, but on
the contrary of the use of a formal semantics in the coding of the necessary
notational redundancy. The redundant notations are then also redundant
when regarded in relationship to the meaning content of the message itself,
while both as transmitted physical signals and as notations in the formal code
they are equally as distinctive notation units as the others.
Here, Shannon formulated a fifth definition of the redundancy concept
where redundancy is determined as:
• a formal control code which can be defined by subjecting the message to a
formal calculation, the result of which is added during transmission and
removed after reception.
The - calculated - redundancy is thus not contained in the original message’s
expression and has no relation to the meaning or rule structure of the message.
Whether the individual x’s in the example above represent the letters in a
word, an arithmetical problem or the result of a physical measurement of the
temperature of sea water, or something completely different, is of no
significance whatsoever for the determination of the formal control code. This
is precisely where the advantage lies, because the method hereby becomes
generally usable.
The fact that Shannon understood this solution as an asemantic solution to
the problem of noise is first and foremost because of a confusion in his in-
formation concept, as he uses the concept both of a mathematically quantified
expression for a meaning content and of a simple physically defined notation
unit. Both views aim at an asemantic description of semantic phenomena. But
in the first case the information concept is defined as the specific meaning-
bearing part of the expression seen in contrast to the rule determined part. In
the second case the information concept is defined quite independently of the
meaning content, as the physical view is valid for any notation, whether it
belongs to a repetitive redundancy structure or not.
In other words this is a question of two different definitions of the
superfluous or »meaningless«. In the first case it is determined as the repetitive
structure which, for the same reason, can be omitted from the transmission. In
the second case it is determined as the unintended occurrence of one of the
physically defined notation forms used. In the first case the noise is thus
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identical with the rule-determined, in the second with signals occurring at
random which are only distinct from legitimate signals by not being intended.
On the other hand, there is also a certain inner connection between the two
definitions, as the use of the first definition as a means for eliminating the
redundant notations becomes definitively limited by the second noise problem
concerning the question of how to decide whether the occurrence of a
legitimate physical form is intended or not.
While Shannon’s idea that redundant notation sequences are an expression
of the rule-determined structure of the given symbol language must be
rejected, because it - as will be considered in greater detail in chapter 7 - is
neither valid for formal nor written language expression forms, his noise
theoretical analysis shows that the occurrence of redundant notations is
necessary to stabilize the recognition of the legitimacy of the physical form as
notation form.
There is also a reason to attach importance to the fact that Shannon’s phy-
sical noise problem also has a general background, because each notation can
only manifest itself in a physically possible form. The specific coincidence
between noise and information which is treated in the theory is thus also a
specific manifestation of the fact that any notation form can coincide with a
physical form which is not intended. From this it appears indirectly that there
is always an intentional and symbolic element in the definition of a physical
form as a legitimate notation unit, despite the precision in the definition of the
physical form. In other words, it is not possible to maintain Shannon’s idea of
a purely physically defined, asemantic notation.
6.4 A generalization of the physical information concept?
Warren Weawer’s comments on Shannon’s theory give it the appearance of a
generalization of Boltzmann-Szilard’s physical information theory, because
Shannon defined »informational entropy« in the same mathematical form, but
independently of the physical medium in which the information was
embedded. The same formula, however, describes two completely different
relationships. While thermodynamic entropy describes how a number of
molecules, whose individual motions are unknown, can be expected to act as a
whole, informational entropy is a measure for the irregular recurrence, but
actual occurrence, of individually identifiable single signals.
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Shannon’s definition of information as entropy, a degree of uncertainty, is
not a more general definition of the thermodynamic entropy concept, but
another specific use of the same mathematical expression. It does not differ,
however, by being a mathematical definition instead of a physical definition, as
informational entropy is a yardstick which is only used on - certain types - of
physically manifested signals.
Shannon could not have found a more inappropriate title for his work if he
had tried. It is not the mathematical theory, nor is it a purely mathematical
theory and it only concerns communication in the very special  sense of
mechanical transmission.
Not the mathematical theory
That it is not the mathematical theory appears from the later mathematical-
physical discussion, in which two different limitations were introduced. First,
the theory contains no definition of the phenomenon it can express in
quantified form, namely the concept of information and second, it has not
made the need for other quantified information measures superfluous.17
Donald Mackay describes this limitation by differentiating between quan-
tifications based on  selection from a set of preconstructed forms such as
Shannon’s and quantifications based on form construction, exemplified by
the construction of the form of a TV picture with the help of spots of light.18
The decisive point in Mackay’s argument is that the question »how much
information« must be answered in different ways depending on the given
forms of the information which are relevant in a given context. Constructive
and selective information measures - among which Shannon’s is just one of
many possible - do not therefore represent competing theories of information
either. On the contrary, they represent quantifications of an information
concept which cannot be defined by one or the other quantified measures for
an amount of information.
It would be clearly absurd to regard these various measures of amount of
information as rivals. They are no more rivals than are length, area and
                                                
17  Shannon’s theory has given rise to what are still continuing discussions. A resume - with sum-
maries of various main viewpoints - can be found in Machlup and Mansfield, 1983 and Hayles, 1990,
among others.
18  Such measures were developed  by, among others, Ronald A. Fischer in 1935 and Dennis Gabor in
1946. Gabor, who was later awarded the Nobel prize for his work on holography, used the concept a
»logon« as a measure of an amount of information, as the number of logons in a signal represented the
amount of freedom in the structure, or the smallest number of independent measures mathematically
necessary for defining the form of the signal under the limiting conditions of frequencies, band widths
and duration. Mackay, 1983: 487.
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volume as measures of size. By the same token, it would be manifestly inept
to take any of them as definitions of the concept of information itself.19
Even though these quantifications can be regarded as complementary, con-
tinues Mackay, it is not possible as a matter of course to define an information
concept through an abstraction based on the complementarity between
different quantified information measures. The quantified theories also have in
common the fact that they work with an operationally defined information
concept which only allows a definition of information as »that which
determines form«. Common to these theories is thus that they refer to
processes in which the time-spatial form of one set of events (a place)
determines the form of another set without taking into account the energy
process involved. Information is thus defined only as »something« which
flows from one place to another.
According to Mackay, this view builds upon a false analogy, as by
determining information through what it does (determines form) we look at
information in the same way as we look at energy in physics, namely through
what it does (produces acceleration) and not through what it is, namely some
kind of specific physical energy process.
Mackay bases his criticism of this analogy by pointing out the difference
between what energy is said to do: perform work of a physical character and
what information is said to do: perform work of a logical character.
In talking about information, there is always a suppressed reference to a
third party, as in the physical theory of relativity we have to relate our de-
finitions to an observer, actual or potential, before they become ope-
rationally precise.20
The third party not overtly referred to which is waiting here in the wings, pops
up precisely because the information concept, as will be discussed in more
detail in the following section, must necessarily contain a semantic dimension
connected to the choice of the viewpoint of the process.
While Mackay - on a par with George A. Miller21 in this question - takes his
point of departure in the need for other quantitative information measures,
Peter Elias adds that the many different uses of Shannon’s information
                                                
19  Mackay, 1983: 488.
20  Mackay, 1983: 486.
21  George A. Miller, 1983: 493-497.
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measure depend on specific conditions, purposes and connections in each
case. Validity does not depend on the mathematical measure, but on the
character of the given way the problem presents itself and the theory can only
hold true of transformations in which the reversible coding of a set of
sequences to another occurs.22
This is a central limitation. The theory not only lacks a definition of the
information concept, it concerns only a re-coding of an already physically
defined message.
Myron Tribus can also refer to a private conversation where Shannon in
1961 was supposed to have expressed scepticism regarding the use of the the-
ory outside the context of communication theory and acknowledged that it
does not contain a definition of the information concept.23 The contribution
that the theory makes to this does not lie at a mathematical level at all, but at a
physical level, as it is solely concerned with the physical dimension of the
symbolic expression form. That Shannon assumed there was an unambiguous
equivalence between the individual physical notation and the content of the
message was perhaps due to the fact that he regarded the formal notation form
as typical.
Not a purely mathematical theory
Shannon’s theory is not the mathematical theory, but nor is it a purely ma-
thematical theory. It is a mathematical-physical theory. Seen in comparison to
thermodynamic theory it is a matter of a different description of the re-
lationship between energy and information, as the new theory not only refers
to the special case where a certain amount of energy »contains« a certain
amount of information (on the same amount of energy) but on the contrary to
all cases where an arbitrary meaning content has been manifested in a
physically well-defined notation system. Considered in the light of Szilard’s
»narrow« information concept this represents a great expansion, as the
informational notation unit is not only emancipated from a certain meaning
content, but also from the physical, natural form. Although Shannon defines
informational notation through certain physical values, this physical form is
distinct from the physical, natural forms in two ways, as the informational
entity is limited both in relationship to physical forms which are not identical
and in relationship to physical forms which are identical, but not intended.
Each of the two definitions is thus connected with its own noise problem. One
                                                
22  Peter Elias, 1983: 500-502.
23  Myron Tribus, 1983: 475.
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that concerns the physical form and one that concerns the legitimacy of the
physical form as a valid member of the message.
The mathematical definition is thus valid only for physical systems in which
it is possible, on the basis of rules, that is instrumentally, to install the lower
noise limit which will ensure a stable distinctiveness between non-
informational physical noise variation and informationally significant, physical
variation.
In this sense, Shannon’s theory is only valid in connection with symbolic
systems which operate with a well-defined and invariant noise limit. The
quantified amount of information is at all stages determined relative to a
controlled quantity of energy, where the noise which does not exceed the
critical threshold separating the symbol from the medium can be ignored.
The physical character of the theory therefore manifests itself not only as a
physically determined limitation of the possible applications, it also manifests
itself in the sense that the theory only concerns informational entities which
are available in a physically defined form, because the critical threshold which
is the basis of the distinction between noise and information is brought about
as a definition of physical threshold values. The physical definition of the
informational entity comprises - as was also the case with the Turing machine -
a necessary, but not complete, condition for carrying out the - presumably
asemantic - re-codings, which at the time constituted a highly dramatic
innovation.
That this is a mathematical-physical and not a purely mathematical theory
follows for the same reasons, which meant that it was not the mathematical
theory, but one among many possible mathematical information measures. That
different forms of mathematical quantification can exist is due to the fact that
the individual methods each measure different physical features of the
symbolic expression units.
The whole point of mathematical theories of information is connected with
the circumstance that they allow a mathematical handling of symbol systems
solely on the basis of the physical properties which are used to define the
physical form of the symbols. One the one hand, this justifies distinguishing
between those theories of physically defined symbols and physical theories
which describe physical distinctions independently of whether they are used
for symbolic purposes. But, on the other hand, it does not justify ignoring the
fact that the theories do handle the physical properties of symbols with
mathematical methods.
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Shannon’s quantified information entities are bound by the physical
definition. But it is also a question of a new determination of this bond. The
bond is no longer, as in Szilard, naturally given as a causal connection or
isomorphic combination. Within certain limits it is an open, arbitrary bond.
Information is no longer seen as a simple, mathematically expressed function of
energy, energy is seen, on the contrary, as a function of notation. This also
implies that informational notation is subject to the demand that the notation
units used be defined on the same scale of physical value. This is thus a
question of a far more rigorous demand on the definition of the notation’s
physical form than the demand which obtains for written and formal notation,
where the demand on the physical form is related to sensory recognizability,
while informational notation is subject to the demand that it function as a
mechanically effective entity. The relationship between the different notation
systems is discussed in greater detail in chapter 7 and sections 8.1-8.3.
Shannon himself perhaps passed over the physical features of the theory
because, in all essentials, the first physical noise problem was concerned with
practical problems which were of no significance to engineering, as they could
be solved with familiar mathematical-physical methods, while the remaining
questions concerned the optimization of time consumption and the handling
of the second noise problem which has no physical solution.
The problem of noise and the ability to generate symbols
The basic demand on a physical expression form is the well-defined lower
physical limitation of the informational entities relative to the variability of the
physical medium.
The demand for such a lower limit is true in principle of all symbol systems.
For digital systems it is thus true that there is no isomorphism between the
informational process and the physical process through which the former is
performed. Turing touched on the same when he pointed out in his article in
1950 that certain mechanical systems could advantageously be regarded as
though they were discrete-state-systems, although physically considered they
are continuous.
On the face of it, it might appear as though the demand for a lower noise
limit does not have the same validity for analogue systems, which are charac-
terized by equivalence or isomorphism between physical and informational
variability. But this equivalence can only be brought about at a certain macro-
level. That isomorphism between an analogue symbol and the supporting
physical structure depends on a previous coding of the physical structure
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appears from the fact that the same physical structure can be described
independently of the sign bearing structure. As any symbol formation is
bound to a physical manifestation, the smallest symbol unit cannot be smaller
than the smallest organized physical variability, but it cannot - according to
existing physical knowledge - be equal to the smallest physical variability
either, as the micro-physical description here assumes the existence of
irreducible noise.
The demand for a lower noise limit is thus valid not only for digital, but also
for analogue symbol systems, nor does it appear possible to limit this demand
to a demand which is only valid for certain technical information systems. We
can assume that it is also valid for human perception and information
processing. On this point Shannon’s noise theoretical results therefore appear
to be general. Symbolic activity assumes both the ability to separate the
symbolic expression forms from the physical noise in the physical (or
physiological) medium used and from identical physical forms. The question
then is, how the critical threshold can be brought about and work in different
biological, human and artificial information systems.
Here, a fundamental difference between the artificial systems covered by
Shannon’s theory and human information systems makes its appearance, as
the latter possess the ability to produce codes of both the first and second
orders (and many more), while the former are characterized by only being able
to perform re-codings to the second order, if a model in the form of codes of
the first order already exists. The most significant point is not that the one
system can produce several types of code, but that it also possesses the ability
to produce the critical thresholds which are a condition for symbol systems of
both the first and second order. In Shannon’s theory, the critical threshold is
defined prior to and independently of the system. Artifactitious systems
assume that there is already a coding of the first order and a defined critical
threshold which makes re-coding to another order system possible.
To all appearances, only certain types of physical information systems
possess the ability to produce codes of the first order themselves, namely those
systems which are traditionally described as biological. As - some of - these
systems have the ability to bring about the critical threshold itself, which is a
condition for the first symbol formation, it is difficult to imagine that these
systems should not retain this ability.
In that case the biological systems which possess the ability to create con-
sciousness are characterized by the fact that they are not subject to the
demand for a preceding, once-and-for-all established threshold for a given
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system which determines the condition for the distinction between physical
noise and information as a functional condition for the artifactitious systems. It
is therefore more plausible to assume that the conscious systems not only
retain the ability to produce symbols of the first order, but that they also, at
some stage of biological history, have generated an ability to release
themselves from the established noise thresholds, for example in the form of a
semantic re-interpretation or exploitation of »noise«.
There can be little doubt that many biological information systems are
capable of maintaining a given critical threshold for a certain period. Human
beings can certainly maintain similarly critical mental thresholds, when we
calculate, perform deductive conclusions and other systematic thought
processes. In such cases, however, we usually prefer to use externalized aids
precisely because they help to stabilize or maintain invariant thresholds for
defining valid informational entities during the performance of well-delimited
tasks. The concentration required and the difficulty involved in maintaining
these thresholds for a certain time shows, however, that for consciousness to
have defined thresholds as a characteristic, its constitutive properties must be
the ability to vary and even create thresholds.
The human system has thereby a symbol producing property that compu-
ters do not have, namely the ability itself to establish the critical threshold
which makes it possible to separate informational physical variations from
physical noise variation.
The exact delimitation of what noise is, relative to a critical threshold
defined outside the system, can therefore not be transferred to human con-
sciousness. An analysis of Shannon’s noise theoretical results thus confirms
the relevance of the symbol generative test criterion for an understanding of
consciousness and intelligence, as discussed in sections 5.8-5.9.
The reach of this appears, among other things, from the fact that it is incom-
patible with a main assumption in the later theories of cognition based on
information theory, namely the idea that cognitive activity can be described as
a closed informational system which can either be understood as isomorphic in
relation to the neuro-physiological system, or as a self-supporting, learned or
inherent, logos which organizes the underlying biological and physical
components. These assumptions not only ignore that the biological theory of
the origin of the higher organisms also includes consciousness, but also that
the restrictions which apply to physical information systems of Shannon’s
type cannot be reconciled with our knowledge of our own ability to produce
codes and symbols.
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The mathematical-physical determination of the critical threshold first arose as
a relevant theme - both in the understanding of analogue and digital systems -
in connection with the appearance of a physical-technical potential for -
invisible - symbol handling based on the technical mastery of micro-physical
energy processes. This concerns performing symbol handling independently
of the perceptual and cognitive potential which provides the basis for human
symbol production.
It was this difference which gave Shannon’s ‘choice theoretical’ infor-
mation considerations far-reaching practical and thereby also cultural and
theoretical significance, as it pointed out the possibility of compensating for
physical noise by increasing redundancy in the transferral of messages in not
completely reliable electronic systems. The benefit lay in going beyond the
direct equivalence between energy and information amount.
With the mathematical measure for technical compression, Shannon created
an obvious technical advance within the area of information transport. But
looked at from the point of view of information theory it has a grave defect
because this solution assumes that the theory can only concern re-coding of
already coded messages. It is also one of the two reasons which mean that it is
not a theory of communication either.
... nor a communication theory
A reasonable demand on a communication theory is naturally that it concerns
an exchange of meaning or signification. Meaning is also included in
Shannon’s theory in the sense that it is concerned with discovering an eco-
nomical method of transferring messages without loss of meaning. Meaning is
included, however, only as the ultimate test criterion of the success of the
communication and the heart of the theory did not lie in the exchange of
meaning between the producer and the interpreter, but in the transfer of
already formed messages, as Shannon took his point of departure in the
manifest expression form of the message.
Frequently the messages have meaning that is they refer to or are correlated
according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These
semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering
problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected
from a set of possible messages. The system must be designed to operate for
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each possible selection, not just the one which will actually be chosen since
this is unknown at the time of design.24
That Shannon in spite of this - with regard to engineering, well-founded -
motivation of semantic irrelevance still concerns a communication theory is
not only due to the ultimate criterion of understanding (in the final analysis
the message must be recognized by a human interpreter), but also that he
actually uses a theoretical model of communication as a point of departure for
his engineer’s perspective.
That he again here - and now tacitly - can ignore the semantic dimension is
because he is only concerned with the reversible re-coding of existing co-
dings.
The model comprises a functional unit which includes five components: 1) a
source of information, 2) a transmitter with a built-in code set, 3) a channel, 4)
a receiving apparatus with a de-coder and 5) a receiver. As we have seen, the
weight of the theory lies in the effectivization of transport, i.e. the movement
from the second to the fourth component. The fifth component, the final
receiver, is included because all processes from 1 to 5 must operate in such a
way as to ensure that not only the signals, but also the meaning reaches the
receiver. The central operations, the establishment of the stochastic procedure
which must be used in the re-coding procedure, is carried out, however, before
the first step.
Shannon indicates that the theory includes a number of different types of
message, namely:
• Sequences of letters (such as in the telegraph and teleprinter).
• Sequences expressed in a single time function (such as the radio and
telephone).
• Sequences expressed in a time function and other variables (such as black
and white television with two spatial co-ordinates).
• Sequences expressed in two or more time functions (»three-dimensional
sound transmission« and multiplex).
• Sequences with several functions of several variables (such as colour
television).
• Various combinations (such as television coupled with sound).25
                                                
24  Shannon (1948) 1969: 31.
25  Shannon (1948): 33.
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It is true of all these examples that the communicative process occurs as a
sequential, linear physical process through one or more separate channels. It is
thus not only assumed that the message is available in a fully formulated state
before it is transmitted, but also that there must be no meaning exchange or
informational interference between the transmitter and the receiver during the
process. There is no room here for confidential conversations, or telling
glances and gesticulatory articulations of meaning.
These limitations are not of a temporary character. It is not the case that
they could be modified through an extension of the theory. They comprise its
constitutive basis, as they are contained in the demand this type of system
makes on the physical definition of informational entities. That these demands
do not apply to all systems and especially not to human communication,
appears, for example, from the fact that we cannot mistake what we can see on
a television screen, namely physically defined symbols with well-defined
critical thresholds, with what we can see on the spot, where the definition is
left entirely to the observer. What we can see on the spot has not been filtered
by the coding the transmitter must carry out in order to transmit a television
picture. There is thus a difference, because in the one case something is being
communicated which is not being communicated in the other.
Although some of this missing »information« could perhaps be analysed
and brought into a formal description, it would not remove the difference.
Touch, for example, implies something other than a symbolic representation
communicated through an electronic medium. The difference exists, among
other things, because in spite of all general definitions, any information system
is always a specific physical system implemented in a definite form.26
The artifactitious system does not cover the entire human perceptual poten-
tial because it depends on the establishment of a well defined critical
threshold. Human perception is not subject to the same demands for a well-
defined lower limit between noise and information. The lack of such a defi-
nition is, on the contrary, rather a constitutive condition for meaning pro-
duction.
                                                
26  This difference also holds true of virtual reality systems which offer a symbolically mediated,
mechanical sensory effect on an arbitrary part of the body. The mechanical effect, it is true, will also be
accompanied by physical noise, but this noise is relative to the influencing medium and therefore
different for different sensory media.
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Shannon conceals the problem of the first coding behind the second pro-
blem, that of  re-coding by simply filling up the box of information sources
with a list of different means of information transport.
As the theory with regard to definition ignores the meaning dimension both
in connection with production and exchange, it is impossible to consider it a
legitimate candidate within the area of communication theory.
But it would be equally misleading to simply dismiss the theory with
reference to Shannon’s asemantic symbol concept. Although the theory
neither includes meaning production nor oral communication, to a great de-
gree it sheds light on the understanding of the physical dimensions of both
alphabetical and pictorial symbol manifestations. And, although not
formulated as such, Shannon’s theory also presents the first theoretical at-
tempt to describe a notation system independent of the senses, where the
relationship between the individual notations is mutually conditioned.
Whether this could have been done on the basis of a semantic approach
cannot be decided. Shannon showed, apparently unwittingly, that it could be
done with the point of departure in a physical symbol definition.
6.5 The semantic ghost
If Shannon’s information concept is seen as a quantified measure of the
meaning-bearing parts of an expression, the problem arises that the amount of
information in the message grows in inverse proportion to the organization of
the expression and that the most meaning-bearing expressions are identical
with the least structured. Or in Katherine Hayles’ words, the most muddled
expression contains the maximum possible information.27
Nevertheless, in a considerable part of the later literature, the conceptual
connection between noise and information has been maintained, as this has
been joined to Shannon’s definition and the information content of the
received message described as the sum of two messages. But where Shannon
distinguishes between these two messages by operating with two mechanical
generators working within the same physical system, a distinction has been
introduced between that part of the received message which is intended by
the transmitter and that part which is not. Shannon’s distinction is thus
ascribed a semantic foundation joined to an intention.28 As Hayles remarks,
                                                
27  Hayles, 1990: 55.
28  Hayles, 1990: 56, where the later paradigmatic transformation of Shannon’s theory is described as an
extension of the significance of the noise concept, as noise is not simply seen as a potential destruction
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this re-interpretation assumes the introduction of an interpreter, who can see
the system from outside. As the transmitter and the receiver in Shannon’s
theory do not enter into a semantic relationship (the receiver is not aware of
the transmitter’s intention, but only of the message received), this description
can only be carried out by introducing an outside observer of the total system.
This observer is the only one capable of making the distinction. On the
other hand, he can therefore see both the information which is not intended as
»destructive« noise or as »constructive« additional information, not measured
in relationship to the message, but in relationship to the total system.
Within this idea lies a real emphasis of the fact that Shannon’s theory
assumes both a tacit semantic interpretation and an outside observer.
The semantic interpretation is assumed because there must be a valid, noise-
free message as a starting point and because no asemantic criterion can be
formulated for deciding the legitimacy of the received signal. This distinction
can be ensured, as we have seen, with the help of the redundancy function, as
the message can either be sent a great number of times, or be analysed and a
set of control codes prepared through which the legitimacy of the individual
signal can be determined by the surrounding signals. These codes cannot be
prepared without some kind of semantic analysis of the message.
The outside observer is assumed in the sense that there is not only a trans-
mitter and a receiver at each end of the system, but also a proof-reader, who
can observe both the total system and describe the noise structure of the
channel.
These descriptions mean that the signal process must be observed from
several places. The informational entropy, which is measured at the message
source, is thus distinct from the informational entropy which is transmitted
from the noise source and both are distinct from the informational entropy in
the received message. It is also evident from this that informational entropy
varies exclusively with the interpreter and they can only be connected on the
condition that the system is seen from outside, that a meta-interpreter also
exists.
It is also only this meta-interpreter who is capable of differentiating be-
tween information and noise, as this distinction is only relevant because the
two elements are identical in the system itself. Although this reading of
Shannon’s theory takes its point of departure in a demonstration that a meta-
interpreter is also assumed in Shannon, it still contains a semantic short-circuit
                                                                                                                                           
of the message, but also as a potential source for the reorganization of the system.
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which obscures the point which lay in considering the signal independently of
its semantic content. Instead of limiting the reach of the theory by maintaining
this, constructively seen, rational point, Shannon’s noise concept is interpreted
as though it did not depend on an outside interpreter.
The whole point of Shannon’s theory, however, lay in the fact that the
concept of noise and information coincided inasmuch as only the physical
properties which characterized the signal as a member of a symbolic notation
system should be taken into account. If the interpreter observes the noise as a
source of a new organization, he is actually looking at another system, in
which Shannon’s problem is not of importance. Shannon only had a problem
if there was noise which had no potential meaning at all.
Although Shannon was incorrect in his postulate that the meaning of the
message was irrelevant from the point of view of engineering, it is not tenable
to re-interpret his definition of the noise concept as a potential meaning-
bearing phenomenon. Shannon was not wrong because he ignored the fact
that both noise and information were meaning-bearing, but because he
overlooked the fact that the dividing line itself between information and noise
can only be a semantic distinction in the - relevant - case where noise is
manifested in the same physical form as the information. Here, on the other
hand, it is indispensable.
Shannon’s theory concerns separating those elements which physically
seen manifest themselves exactly like the intended information, but which do
not constitute information. In Shannon, therefore, noise is not something
which can be added to the original message, but exactly »something« which is
lacking, namely the knowledge of the legitimacy of the physical form.
However, Shannon not only contributed to a confusion of his own con-
cepts with the postulate that it was possible to establish an asemantic point of
view, he created just as much confusion by describing the information concept
as though it were a physically indefinite element. The theory exclusively
concerns how to handle symbols which are defined on the basis of their
physical form. This is also the only reason why the theory need concern itself
with transmission efficiency and noise, just as it is the explanation why the
theory distinguishes between discrete and continuous transmission systems.
Strangely, Shannon claimed not only that he could ignore the semantic
content, but also that he could compress a message so that it only contained
those symbols which contained the semantic content. He thus spoke both for
and against the idea that there was a connection between his definition of the
information in the message and its meaning.
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This ambiguity has manifested itself in two different directions in the recep-
tion of his theory. On the one hand, as mentioned, an interpretation which
sought to maintain that there is a connection, which not only interpreted the
information concept, but also the noise concept as signals which contain a
meaning in themselves. On the other hand, there has been a widespread
tendency, especially within linguistics, to take the asemantic postulate at face
value, as here - contrary to the idea of viewing randomness as order at a higher
level - the inclination has rather been to say that the engineering point of view
is irrelevant precisely because it ignores the semantic aspect. This view is
discussed in more detail in chapter 7.
On the face of it, neither of these two directions seem satisfactory. It is not
satisfactory to regard the most arrant nonsense as the optimum achievable
information. But nor is it satisfactory to assume that a mathematical theory on
the treatment of physically defined notation systems should have no relevance
to an understanding of notation systems.
A third possibility is to regard the engineering point of view as a contri-
bution to an understanding of the notation concept and, in this case especially
informational notation, through an approach which, as a starting point, places
semantic coding in parenthesis.
The motivation for this point of view cannot simply be that it is a more
moderate middle path between over-interpretation and under-interpretation, it
is also motivated by Shannon’s actual results.
Although, in the preceding analysis of Shannon’s theory, it has been
argued that its validity should be greatly limited and re-interpreted, it has also
been claimed that the theory still has general implications for an understanding
of notation systems as a »meeting place« between the physical and the
symbolic. There are reasons to emphasize three points in particular here.
The first is his demonstration of the specific noise theoretical problem which
is connected with the possible occurrence of legitimate, but unintended
physical forms. While the precise physical definition of the signal contains a
solution to what could be called the general noise problem (namely the
separation of physical forms, which can be included as legitimate signal values,
from illegitimate physical forms) it also produces another specific noise
problem in connection with the legitimate physical forms, as all physically
defined signals necessarily have a physical form which can exist without
having a symbolic value. In other words, the physical definition excludes in
principle the possibility of deciding whether a given, legitimate physical form
is noise or information, which again implies that we can draw the conclusion
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that it is impossible in principle to formulate a purely physical theory of
symbolic expression forms.
Although Shannon supplied all the premises for this conclusion, it also went
against his own efforts to formulate an asemantic information concept. But the
noise theoretical problem also has a more general character which holds true
of all physically manifested signals. The question thereby arises as to how this
noise problem manifests itself and is solved in different notation systems.
The second is his demonstration of the significance of the redundancy
function for ensuring the stability of the message. In spite of the fact that
Shannon uses the redundancy concept with several mutually unconnected
meanings, his analysis shows that, as far as informational notation is con-
cerned, it is possible to work with different forms of redundancy, as some of
them can substitute each other and perform the same stabilizing function. The
analysis thus produces both a need for a more consistent definition of the
redundancy concept and a closer analysis of the significance of the
redundancy function for the stability of notation systems.
The third is his demonstration that it is possible to stabilize informational
notation with the help of a formal semantics which is independent of that
semantics in which the original message is presented and which therefore does
not depend on the content of the message either. His analysis hereby shows
that it is possible to stabilize informational notation with a semantic
component which is quite independent of the semantic content represented. It
also shows that it is possible to use formal procedures as a redundancy
function that is equivalent to other forms of redundancy, which again implies
that the formal procedure in informational notation can act as a semantically
empty or a meaning indifferent procedure relative to the message contained in
the informational expression.
Although the asemantic view of the notation system thus ends by allowing
the return of semantics, it does not return as it was when abandoned.
Shannon’s analysis makes it clear that there is a semantic component in the
expression substance of informational notation and that the description of this
notation form must therefore be concerned with semantic properties on at least
three levels: 1) the level which establishes the notation system as notation
system, 2) the level which establishes the syntactic structure of the notation
and 3) the level which is concerned with the semantic interpretation of the
content of the informational notation. While the last level concerns definite
messages, the two first have to do with the general properties of the notation
system and thereby its semantic potential.
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Together, these two levels of the description of notation systems indicate
the curious circumstance that a given semantic potential always builds upon a
semantic restriction at another, underlying level. That we can ignore the
content of the expression is due to the fact that the form itself has meaning on
another level. That meaning which makes it possible to distinguish any piece
of information from any other, identical physical form.
Rather than claim that Shannon was mistaken in one or another of his two
contradictory postulates, there is thus a reason to claim that he was partly right
because he was partly mistaken in both.
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7. The semantics of notation forms
7.1 The expression substance and the semantic potential of informational
notation
Shannon’s theory left a certain terminological confusion behind it. The
concept of information merges with the concepts of noise and  signal. This is
because Shannon measured these phenomena with the same yardstick, which
relates solely to the temporal dimension of the physical form. The confusion,
however, is understandable because the theory concerns signal systems in
which noise signals with the same physical form as the intended signals occur
frequently. The interpretation of the theory must therefore take its point of
departure in the fact that there are no physical criteria for distinguishing
between the symbolic notation form (whether this is called information, signal,
notation or symbol) on the one hand, and the concept ‘noise’ in the same
physical form, on the other. This distinction is of a semantic nature and can
only be made through an interpretation which assumes an interpreter capable
of deciding whether a given physical form should be understood as an
intended symbolic notation or not.
As all physical forms which can be used as symbolic expression units can
also occur without being symbolic expression units, this is a question of
presenting the problem in terms of a general noise theory valid for all symbolic
expression forms. In other words, a symbolic component is included in the
definition of any symbolic expression form.
The question now is, whether the semantic procedure through which a
signal is distinguished as a signal, i.e. as a valid member of a message, always
has the same character no matter which notation system and no matter what
the semantic exploitation of the notation system. Is an /a/ which occurs in a
written message, for example, defined in the same way as a /+/ or an /a/ which
occur in a mathematical expression?
If this is the case, this special semantic operation can reasonably be regar-
ded as a general precondition for all symbol formation and this level can be
omitted from the description of differences between symbol systems.
If, on the other hand, we can distinguish between different forms of se-
mantic separation of notation elements it becomes necessary to include the
semantics of notation forms in the description of the languages which use
notation systems.
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The following two chapters contain my arguments for the second of these
two possibilities, as it will be demonstrated that informational notation is a
new, independent notation system, which by virtue of its definition possesses
a peculiar set of semantic potentialities which both separate themselves
from the semantic potentialities of common language and formal languages.
In writing at this point of linguistic, formal and informational semantics (or
semantic regimes) the term semantics is used in a more general sense than is
usual within linguistics, where it is used of a special discipline, the study of
linguistic meaning structures, as distinct from other linguistic disciplines. What
I mean by a semantic regime in the following is a set of (implicit or explicit)
codes which we use to produce or read a given symbolic expression, no matter
whether we are capable of providing a consistent description of these codes
or not. Over and above this, the concept of semantics will also be used in a
number of more limited senses, as a distinction is made between semantic levels
within the individual semantic regimes: those of the notation forms, those of
the syntactic structures and those of the content forms. This differentiation in
the use of the term specifies that the meaning dimension indicated by the term
is valid at all these levels and has therefore an unlimited, but not unstructured
character.
It will be shown in the following that the difference between the semantic
potentialities of common language, formal languages and informational
representation is rooted in two relationships, partly the relationship between
expression substance and expression form and partly the relationship between
notation, syntax and the general semantic regime.1
A short outline of the content of this thesis as it applies to informational
notation follows.
The significance of the expression substance for semantic potential is first
and foremost connected with the demand for mechanical execution, as this
demand 1) releases the notation system from a function which is essential - and
common - to both formal and linguistic notation systems, namely to serve as a
means for human sensory recognition and 2) determines that a limited number
of notation units, each of which is semantically empty, are used.
In both these respects, I claim that the semantic potential of the expression
form is directly related to the properties of the expression substance, as these
                                                
1  The distinction between expression substance and expression form is Hjelmslev’s. He viewed pho-
netics as the study of the spoken language’s expression substance and phonology as the study of the
spoken language’s expression form. Unlike Hjelmslev’s understanding of the »linguistic« as inde-
pendent of the expression substance, the relationship between expression substance and expression form
is interpreted here as a semantic relationship which differs in different symbolic languages.
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properties allow a number of previously unknown possible expressions,
including new possibilities and types of relationship between expression forms
and content forms. The postulate, in other words, is that that the expression
substance provides the expression form with a semantic potential it would not
have in an expression substance with other properties.2 The most far-reaching
new possible variation is included in the demand that rules must be
represented in exactly the same form - and therefore with exactly the same
possibilities for variation and editability - as all other forms of data.
The potential for semantic variation, which is rooted in the relationship
between expression substance and expression form, provides not only the
possibility of the mechanical execution of a delimited class of formal, closed
semantic operations (the properties of the universal calculating machine), it is
also the precondition for what will be described (in chapters 8 and 9) as the
multisemantic potential of informational notation, as informational notation,
unlike linguistic and formally defined notation systems, can be subjected to a
multiplicity of semantic regimes, including both linguistic and formal, but also
pictorial regimes. While linguistic and formal notation systems are
characterized as mono-semantic with a fixed - but mutually different - bond
between the notation system and the semantic regime, informational notation
is characterized by multisemantic potential. A more precise description of the
concept, multisemantic potential, is given in chapter 9. It should, however, be
noted in advance that the concept ‘multisemantic’ differs from the concept
‘polysemy’, which describes the circumstance that an expression can have
several interpretations within a given semantic regime. Both linguistic, formal
and informational expression forms can thus be polysemic - each in its own
way - but only the informational expression has multisemantic potential.
7.2 The expression substance and the sign function
The first problem in carrying out a comparative analysis of different symbolic
expression systems concerns the terminological starting point where, there is a
general choice between semiotic and formal symbol theories. As the formal
symbol theories assume full equivalence between expression form and content
form, they do not provide the necessary concepts for describing the
                                                
2  There is a similar argument in sections 7.6 and 7.7 regarding the difference between spoken and
written language, which are thus regarded as common languages with partially different semantic po-
tentialities.
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differences between formal and linguistic expressions. They lack - as was
shown by the description of Simon’s symbol theory (section 5.9) and
Shannon’s description of informational notation (chapter 6) - in particular the
concepts for describing the possibilities of semantic variation in the rela-
tionship between expression and content forms.3
I will therefore take my point of departure in semiotic concepts. As the
semiotic understanding of signs was developed, on historical grounds, with
the emphasis on the description of spoken and/or written common language,
there is also a risk here of turning a given symbolic language (in this case the
spoken/written language) into a norm for describing other symbolic
languages. This risk, however, can be averted because the semiotic point of
departure has been chosen as a means for a comparative analysis of the
differences between informational, formal and linguistic expressions.
The choice of the semiotic approach thus implies no postulate that it is
possible to fit the description of the informational and formal symbolic
languages into the sign function which characterizes common languages. On
the contrary, the choice has been made for the purpose of describing the sign
theoretical differences between these languages.
It will be evident from the following that the linguistic sign description is
inadequate with regard to an important point in the present connection, as it
will become necessary to include the expression substance in the
understanding of the sign function.
The fact that it is necessary to take this step - in spite of the conceptual
problems consequent on it, because the sign function is defined in modern
linguistic theory as a relationship between expression form and content form
(independent of expression and content substances) - is first and foremost due
to the semantic potential inherent in the relationship between expression
substance and expression form in the informational notation system.
As a consequence of this there are two possibilities. One is that the ex-
pression substance has a semantically significant meaning for the informational
sign function, but not for the linguistic function. The second is that the
relationship between expression substance and expression form can also be
included in the linguistic sign function.
The first possibility appears most attractive because it allows a greater de-
gree of correspondence to and exploitation of existing linguistic theories. But
it is the second possibility which gained the upper hand, because a
                                                
3  C.f. also L. Hjelmslev, (1943) 1961: 110 ff., where a similar criticism - but in other terms - is ad-
vanced against Rudolf Carnap’s »monoplanar semiotic«.
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comparison of informational and linguistic notation will have a different result
depending on whether the starting point is spoken or written language.
The crux of the matter here is whether it can be claimed that the difference
between the expression substance of spoken and written language can create
a basis for a distinction between the semantic potentialities of spoken and
written language. If this is the case, the relationship of the expression form to
the expression substance must also be included in the linguistic sign concepts.
Although this question has general sign theoretical implications, it can be
decided through a more limited analysis of the expression forms of spoken and
written language.
There is no demand for a complete description of the general implications,
all that is demanded is proof that the different expression substances of
spoken and written language determine that there is no complete semantic
compatibility between the two, that - in spite of a large semantic intersection
of sets - they each have a semantic marginal zone connected to the
dissimilarity of the expression substances.
The normal argument for the external and arbitrary (semantically irrelevant)
relationship of the expression substance to the linguistic expression form
builds upon the observation that the phonetic sound, or the physical form of
the grapheme, provides no information on the linguistic utilization which, on
the contrary, is assumed to be based on an »internal« linguistic system of
sound patterns (Saussure) or relationships between figurae (Hjelmslev) that are
of a psychological (or in Hjelmslev’s terminology, »immanent« linguistic) and
not physical nature. This point of view makes it possible to explain how the
same language can be manifested in different expression substances. This last
view will also be maintained here, as the analysis of Shannon’s information
concept confirmed that it is not possible to provide purely physical criteria for
the decision as to whether a given physical form is a valid member of an
expression.
None of these arguments, however, provides any reason to conclude - with
Hjelmslev - that linguistic or other symbolic expression forms are independent
of the properties of the expression substance. Although a language may use
many different expression substances, it obviously cannot use them all. But
language cannot exist without substance either, and there is nothing to
prevent different expression substances from creating different restrictions -
and possibilities - for its symbolic use. The relationship between substance and
form cannot, in other words, create a basis for an axiomatic delimitation
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between the non-linguistic and the linguistic, but must be made the object of
investigation.
The point of departure here (in section 7.3) will be taken in Umberto Eco’s
theoretical delimitation of the sign theory towards its »lower threshold« -
attached to his distinction between »signals« and »signs« - as Eco at the same
time attempts to describe a sign concept which is not only valid for (or formed
around) the linguistic sign function.
This attempt leads Eco to a dissolution of the concept of a well-delimited
language system which is outside (as a precondition of) the sign function. He
therefore defines the sign function independently of the expression form
connected with a multiplicity of possible codings, while the language system,
the structure, becomes a conceptual entity, we »pretend« exists, just as the
sign function itself is defined as a purely mental correlation of mutually
different - mental - code procedures.
If the sign function is connected with - and manifested through - different
codings, the transition between these code procedures cannot be explained at
the level of the code procedures. The way the problem presents itself therefore
gives rise - as a corollary to the noise theoretical conclusions extracted from
Shannon’s information theory - to the assumption that the formation of the
code procedure occurs through a semantic exploitation of the forms inherited
by the expression substance.
It is hardly possible to describe the complete repertoire of possibilities for
the semantic exploitation of expression substance forms, possible signals, but,
as we saw in chapter 6, any identification of a signal will depend on a
concatenation in which a physical form is linked to a symbolic legitimacy,
even in the cases where the physical  signal manifests itself without any
determinable content.
Where Eco attempted to determine the general sign function by defining it
independently of expression substance and expression form, it is claimed here
that it is necessary to include the relationship to the expression substance in
the understanding of any sign relationship and that it is possible to describe
central differences between different sign functions as differences which are
rooted in different ways of coding expression substance forms.
The central point here is that the two criteria included in any definition of
signals or physical notation forms are mutually dependent, but at the same time
comprise two independently variable axes. It is possible to carry out the
definition on the »physical« axis independently of the definition on the
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semantic axis. It is therefore also possible to connect the two axes in different
ways.
The ambiguity explains, for example, the fact that we can recognize a
multiplicity of different physical forms (variations of the substance form) as
one and the same letter, as the recognition can both rely on the knowledge of
the symbolic expression form and the expression’s meaning. This also explains
how it is possible to establish a notation system which - released from the
demand for recognition - can be based primarily on an unambiguous definition
of the physical form of the expression substance - with the modifications
which follow from the problem of noise theory. It will be evident from the
analysis (chapter 7 and sections 8.1 - 8.3) that in certain respects informational
notation is more closely related to alphabetical notation than to formal
notation (the first two use a limited number of notation units and the
individual notation units have no independent meaning). Whereas written
language notation, however, allows variation on both the physical and
semantic axes, informational notation allows only variation on the semantic,
while formal notation only allows variation on the physical axis (as a given
notation unit is defined on the basis of a semantic - fixed or variable - value of
its own). The definitions of physical form and semantic legitimacy therefore
become connected in three different ways, of which only the latter brings
about an unambiguous relationship between the expression form and its
content, while the two others allow the same physical form to manifest itself
with changing functions and values. These two, however, are also mutually
distinguished. Informational notation is based on an unambiguous relationship
between the form of the expression substance and the expression form, while
written language notation not only generally allows a variation in the physical
substantiation of the individual expression form, but also exploits certain
substance variations - such as italicization - for semantic purposes.
What is lacking therefore is a concept which describes the semantic vari-
ation possibilities which are connected with the various forms of relationship
between expression substance, expression form and content form.
In the following this relationship will be referred to with the concept ‘re-
dundancy structure’. Section 7.5 contains a theoretical definition of the
redundancy concept, while the relevance of the concept for a description of
linguistic expression forms is discussed with the starting point in a critical
analysis of Hjelmslev’s concept of figurae in section 7.6.
With this analysis as a starting point, the significance of the redundancy
function for linguistic sign formation is discussed in section 7.7. Unlike
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Hjelmslev, I claim that the different expression substances in spoken and
written language create a basis for two partially different forms of redundancy
structure, which again determine differences in semantic potential. Further to
this, I argue that redundancy structures should be understood as a
precondition for the stabilization of linguistic rule structures, as this enables an
explanation of the possibility of rule weakening, rule deviation and rule
suspension and of co-existence between mutually overlapping, but not clearly
delimited rule structures relative to the intended meanings expressed in the
sign function. As different forms of redundancy can at the same time be
semantically significant, it is correspondingly necessary - dissimilarly to
ordinary linguistic assumptions - to include the redundancy function in the
sign concept.
Section 7.8 includes a summary of the comparative analysis of the different
semantic potentialities which are connected with the use of notation systems
in common languages (written and spoken) and formal languages. Finally,
pictorial representation, which does not assume a finite set of notation units, is
included with regard to the analysis of the informational sign potential which
also embraces the possibility of pictorial representation.
A further analysis of the significance of redundancy in informational no-
tation is the subject of sections 8.1 - 8.3. A schematic survey of the relation-
ship between linguistic, formal and informational notation systems appears in
section 8.3, page 276.
As the use of informational notation is based on algorithmic organization, it
also becomes necessary to investigate whether algorithmic »syntax« places
semantic limitations on the use of informational notation. At this point, the
comparative analysis must be taken a step further to include the relationship
between the formal and informational representation of algorithmic procedures
(sections 8.4 - 8.6).
7.3 Signal, sign and code - Umberto Eco
It is symptomatic that within linguistics, information theory is often seen as a
theory of - physical - signals, which are either completely outside the domain
of linguistics or constitute a borderline area. Eco, (1976), who defines
semiotics in relationship to the subjects which are not those of semiotics, the
signals of information theory, together with physical stimuli thus comprise a
»lower threshold« which should properly be studied separately, although it
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can also be regarded as a »missing link« between »the universe of signals and
the universe of signs«.4
On the face of it, the reason for this distinction appears reliable:
The proper objects of a theory of information are not signs but rather units
of transmission which can be computed quantitatively irrespective of their
possible meaning, and which therefore must properly be called ‘signals’
and not ‘signs’.5
Although well-established, this conceptual convention contains a number of
difficulties, first and foremost that the physically defined signals which
comprise information theory’s »proper objects« are only available by virtue of
a theoretical definition, an attribution of  meaning. They are thus brought
about by a semiotic activity.
Eco can also show that the relationship between this type of signal and
other signs must rather be described as the relationship between expressions
based on different coding procedures. The central distinction is therefore not
the distinction between signal and sign, although Eco maintains this, but on
the contrary between:
I: Formal code procedures such as
a) Sets of signals ruled by internal combinatory laws, i.e. syntactic systems.
b) Sets of semantic systems, consisting of sets of (possible) semantic contents.
c) A set of possible behavioural responses, on the part of the destination and
which can be independent of b)
II: A superior code or
• A rule coupling some items from the a) system with some from the b) or c)
system.
While the signal system, semantic system and response system are all formal
code systems (designated s-codes, where s stands for system), the last coding
comprises the semiotic code procedures which, unlike the s-codes, are not
characterized by a definable structure, but on the contrary by bringing about
                                                
4  Umberto Eco, (1976) 1979: 21.
5  Umberto Eco, (1976) 1979: 20.
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the unity between signal code and content code (either a semantic set or a
behavioural response), which can constitute a sign.6
Although we may accept Eco’s concept of the missing structure as a basic
characteristic of semiotic processes, his description leaves the problem that s-
codes, which are assumed to be able to exist independently of any form of
meaning or communicative purpose, are themselves based on signals or
possible content entities which have been produced by a semiotic activity.
They can thus not simply occupy a place in sign theory as an underlying
material which creates the basis for a semiotic process.
Traffic lights have often been used to illustrate the theoretical difference
between a signal system and a sign system, as importance is attached to the
fact that the motorist need not subject the light picture to any interpretation.
Signals are regarded in these examples as stimuli which produce a mechanical
response. Although for the sake of the example we can ignore the fact that it
would be extremely dangerous to react completely mechanically to traffic
lights, the example provides no basis for the theoretical distinction. If the
motorist can react mechanically to the light signals, it will depend on two
things. First, that there is an exhaustive set of rules which prescribe an
unambiguous interpretation of the total signal system. Second, the motorist is
familiar with this total system and willing to accept the received interpretation.
He asks no questions, is not in doubt, proposes no alternative possible
interpretations. His behaviour is exactly the same as that of a man who
receives a letter containing a message of which he takes note and then
complies with any instructions it may contain. The acceptance is a semiotic
process.
Whether this acceptance is established in seconds or through years of
anxious consideration for and against with the participation of a larger or
smaller number of people, it cannot motivate a theoretical distinction between
signal and sign. The traffic lights are part of a sign function both for the
motorist and for the authorities that have established the signal system.
One of the reasons that traffic lights have been considered as a signal
system of a lower rank and outside the domain of sign theory is presumably
because the message of the traffic lights is presented in a monotonous
circularity and within an unambiguous rule system characteristic of commands.
Although the messages change with high frequency, nothing very novel is
communicated.
                                                
6  Umberto Eco, (1976) 1979: 36-47.
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That an expression does not provide the receiver with anything new,
however, does not mean that it has no semantic content, but simply that its
content is already familiar. Familiarity - which in the case of the traffic lights
does not, however, include the highly meaningful time of the message - cannot
motivate any theoretical distinction between signal and sign, among other
things because it would then be necessary to assert that a message only
contains signs when read for the first time, but not the second or third.
It would therefore be more apt to describe the traffic signal system’s
notation as a notation where each individual expression unit is connected
with a specific content meaning.
The semantic coding which indicates a physical entity (e.g. represented by
the colours red, amber and green) as members of a notation system is con-
nected with a semantic coding which connects each expression unit with a
content form that in this system has a definitory and unambiguous character.
The coding of this system at the same time includes a declaration of a set of
rules which establish the legal relationships between the individual notation
unit’s content forms. These rules are not expressed in the system itself, but are
necessary for coding and de-coding it.
Now the signal structure, as Eco points out, can also be described by itself
and possibly used in completely different meaning contexts - the signal
structure can be polysemic. It is apparently available as an independent, purely
syntactic structure which is not itself based on a sign function. But this is only
apparently, as the structure depends both on the definition of the units’
physical value and legitimacy and on the mutual relational connections - in
this case the choice of the opposition, red-green, the combination of red-amber
as respectively both-and (warning) and either-or (the state between green and
red) etc.
The simple - or »lower« - signal system (the s-codes) thus requires that the
notation system is subject to two simultaneous, but different codings, in
which the individual notation unit is defined as a notation unit and connected
with other notation units through a more general, preordained rule system. In
other words, this is a question of a genuine sign function and this coding
procedure, as will be discussed in greater detail in section 7.8 and chapter 8, is
at the same time also the common and characteristic, basic form of all formal
symbolic languages.
The double code procedure is thus included not only in the relationship
between a syntactic and a semantic coding, but also in the coding of each of
the two forms of s-codes. Eco touches on the problem when he concludes this
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part of the analysis by demonstrating that, ultimately, it is impossible to decide
whether one or the other type of coding comes first and that:
Signification encompasses the whole of cultural life, even at the lower
threshold of semiotics.7
This also expresses one of the reasons why Eco more generally argues against
the idea that scientific knowledge is a definite knowledge of phenomena.
The question is whether this reference to the chicken and the egg can
simply remain for ever as a final reference, or whether the uncertainty in the
conceptual foundation, which is connected here with the insoluble problem of
origins (where and how did semiotics begin), perhaps also has its price for the
ability of the semiotic theory to describe the difference between sign systems.
As we have seen, Eco uses the dubious distinction between sign and signal
as a foundation for the semiotic theory in opposition to the mathematical
»signal theory«, (information theory in Shannon’s sense) as a definition of a
lower threshold for the subject area of semiotic description. It even appears as
though Eco is closer to allowing traffic lights and other signal systems a place
in human sign activity than the informational signals, because the
informational signals can be studied independently of their content:
We are now in a position to recognize the difference between a signal and a
sign. A signal is a pertinent unit of a system that may be an expression
system ordered to a content, but could also be a physical system without any
semiotic purpose; as such it is studied by information theory in the stricter
sense of the term. A signal can be a stimulus that does not mean anything
but causes or elicits something; however, when used as the recognized
antecedent of a foreseen consequent it may be viewed as a sign, inasmuch as
it stands for its consequent (as far as the sender is concerned). On the other
hand a sign is always an element of an expression plane conventionally
correlated to one (or several) elements of a content plane.8
Even if we now - erroneously - accept that information theory can describe
informational notation independently of semantic content, it is not a well
chosen criterion for separating informational signals from other signals,
because we can also establish a corresponding signal consideration in all other
                                                
7  Umberto Eco, (1976) 1979: 48
8  Umberto Eco, (1976) 1979: 48.
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expression systems. But nor is information theory concerned, as we have seen,
solely with expression systems, it is also concerned with the development of a
special - and new - type of relationship between expression and content
forms.
Whereas the traffic light system and all other formal notation systems are
characterized by the simultaneous declaration of the individual notation units’
membership and establishment of internal, syntactic and semantic relationships
respectively, informational notation is characterized by a systematic distinction
between the declaration of membership and the establishment of syntactic and
semantic relationships respectively. While formal systems connect syntactic
and semantic codes by attributing a semantic value to the individual notation,
syntactic and semantic codes in informational notation are only attributed to a
cohesive sequence of units.
As the use of formal and informational notation thus builds upon two dif-
ferent principles for the formation and connection of expression and content
forms, this is not a question of two different kinds of signal, some of which are
connected with a content meaning and some of which are not, but of two
different sign functions, as expression form and content form are connected in
two different ways.
While these differences can be described within the framework of the se-
miotic/linguistic sign concept, i.e. without regard to expression substance, the
picture changes when the mechanical properties of informational notation are
also included. Where the formal expression form allows variation in
relationship to the expression substance, the informational expression form is
defined by an unambiguous bond. It was, as we saw in chapter 5, precisely
this demand which - combined with the demand for universality - made it
necessary to convert formal notation to informational notation with the result
that the informational expression is available in a form with other semantic
variation possibilities, even in the cases where it is derived completely
mechanically from a formal notation.
The physical definition of the expression form - the binding of the ex-
pression form to the expression substance - thus gives informational notation a
special semantic potential which is directly connected with the physical-
mechanical form of the expression substance and the properties of this form.
The substance of the expression form is thereby included as a specific and
constitutive part of the informational sign function in a way which separates
this both from the sign functions of formal and common languages.
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No matter what significance the expression substance has for common
language and formal sign relationships, its significance for the informational
sign relationship must lead to a re-interpretation of the structuralist sign
concept.
7.4 Eco’s sign concept - »Signals« and »signs«
The demand for a re-interpretation of Saussure-Hjelmslev’s structuralist sign
theory is not new nor in any way original. On the contrary, similar demands -
and suggestions for such re-interpretations - appear repeatedly as a kind of
lowest common denominator for post-structuralist semiotics, represented, for
example, by Jacques Derrida and Umberto Eco, where the criticism in both
cases finds a partial motif in developments within information technology and
information theory, just as post-structuralist criticism also more generally aims
at a formulation of sign concepts which include all forms of human (and
possibly other biological) sign functions.9
None of these theories, however, have made the informational sign function
the object of closer analysis and they are therefore included only to the extent
that the more general considerations of the sign concept also apply to the
significance of the expression substance for the informational sign
relationship.
Although Eco’s reformulation of the sign concept takes its point of de-
parture in a discussion of a lower threshold of semiotics, he finds no basis for
including the expression substance in the sign concept. On the contrary, he
separates the sign concept from the expression form: What is left as a possible
distinction between the signal and the sign, when we look more closely at the
definition quoted above, does not find expression at all:
We are now in a position to recognize the difference between a signal and a
sign. A signal is a pertinent unit of a system that may be an expression
system ordered to a content, but could also be a physical system without any
                                                
9  In Derrida, among other things, as part of the considerations of the alphabetical script’s linearization
of the structure of thought and regarding the conclusion of the alphabetical script’s period. Derrida
(1967) 1976: chapter 3, p. 74 ff. The idea of a general sign theory, however, is far older and is also
found in both Saussure, Hjelmslev and Peirce. It is therefore rather more appropriate to speak of yet
another unclarified borderline - or an inner tension - between the attempts to formulate a single, overall
sign concept which characterizes all forms of sign formation and attempts to differentiate the sign
concept.
211
semiotic purpose; as such it is studied by information theory in the stricter
sense of the term. A signal can be a stimulus that does not mean anything
but causes or elicits something; however, when used as the recognized
antecedent of a foreseen consequent it may be viewed as a sign, inasmuch as
it stands for its consequent (as far as the sender is concerned). On the other
hand a sign is always an element of an expression plane conventionally
correlated to one (or several) elements of a content plane.
Every time there is a correlation of this kind, recognized by a human
society, there is a sign. Only in this sense is it possible to accept Saussure’s
definition according to which a sign is the correspondence between a
signifier and a signified. This assumption entails some consequences: a) a
sign is not a physical entity, the physical entity being at most the concrete
occurrence of the expressive pertinent elements b) a sign is not a fixed
semiotic entity but rather the meeting ground for independent elements
(coming from two different systems of two different planes and meeting on
the basis of a coding correlation).10
With this definition the sign concept becomes wholly a concept of an inner,
mental procedure which is both imagined independently of the external
physical and perceptible manifestations and of the internal physiological
realization. It is impossible to decide whether a manifest expression is a signal
or a sign. The distinction depends exclusively on the question whether a
given signal - an expression system - is mentally interpreted or not. Eco
expresses this more indirectly in phrases such as »recognized by a human
society« instead of »a human mind« and in a subsequent remark that, strictly
speaking, signs do not exist, but only sign functions.
That this is the case can be confirmed through analyses of manifest ex-
pressions. At the same moment we begin to reflect about the borderline be-
tween signal and sign, the distinction disappears. We only have access to sig-
nals through interpretation, which immediately transforms them into signs.
There is no divergence here from Eco’s general sign definition »A sign is
everything which can be taken as significantly substituting for something
else«,11 but on the contrary it points out that it not only undermines the lower
threshold Eco proposes for semiotics, but also transgresses that threshold
which connects the general sign concept with a manifest expression. The sign
                                                
10  Eco (1976) 1979: 48-49.
11  Eco, (1976) 1979: 7.
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concept thereby, as Eco mentions in a note, coincides wholly with the
meaning »intelligence«.12
This sign definition is so general that it includes every articulatory design,
but this has its price, which is not willingly accepted in semiotic theory, namely
that this sign concept provides little help in the analysis of the different
semantic potentialities of expression systems.
Linguistic literature also contains many examples of spoken and written
language being understood as one - often both natural and national (!) -
language - even though the two expression forms can enter into very different
communicative connections with different demands on the expressions which
must be manifested in order to make an exchange of meaning possible.13
In Eco’s theory the problem is proposed differently because he replaces the
universal rules of language (Saussure’s »langue« or Hjelmslev’s »language
system«, or »scheme« or »building«) with a multiplicity of different -
underlying codes - which do not comprise one system and are therefore not
affected by the many exceptions in the use of language. The ghost of
linguistic theory is thereby moved from the expression system into the code
which resides in consciousness.
But it pops up again, because the code, according to Eco’s universal
definition of the sign as a non-physical, conceptual definition, is itself a sign,
although we cannot see and do not know how it - or other traits of
consciousness - are manifested in the physiological system. Like all signs, the
code is also a cultural convention and the hidden codes are subject to the
same problem of meaning balance as other signs:
                                                
12  Eco, (1976) 1979: 31, note 5. The transition from Hjelmslev to Eco at this point is not as great as
it may appear on the face of it, because Hjelmslev’s concept of the expression form is also a concept of
a mental content. The concept designates a set of mental »codes« for using the phonetic or graphic
expression substance. Hjelmslev, however, assumed that these mental codes comprised a closed
linguistic system which could be described »immanently«, i.e. without including the mental
environment. In his argumentation for this view, Hjelmslev claims, among other things, that it is not
a question of individual, and thereby psychological, but social, common codes, that language is a social
institution. But we are forced to ask - in spite of Luhmann - where this social institution is located, if
not in consciousness?
13  Havelock, 1982: 48, who views the alphabetical signs as visual representations of sounds, actually
claims that it is as good as impossible to obtain a clear distinction »between speech and the visible
symbols of speech« from linguistic theory. After Derrida, (1967) 1976, who sees the idea of oral
primacy as a logocentric illusion, Saussure has been given the main responsibility for this weakness.
Saussure saw written language as a distortion of ‘natural’ or ‘genuine’ spoken language: These phonetic
distortions do indeed belong to the language but they are not the result of its natural evolution,
Saussure, (1916) 1983: 31 (54).
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every time a structure is described something occurs within the universe of
signification which no longer makes it completely reliable.14
For semiotics as a science, the consequence for Eco is therefore that »semiotics
must proceed to isolate structures as if a definitive, general structure existed«.
When we only pretend that a definitive language structure exists, we naturally
have a great deal of latitude, as we can pretend that this structure has a host of
different forms. It is more difficult to find an appurtenant criterion for choosing
among the many possibilities.
As will appear from the next section, it is impossible to carry through this
»proceeding as if« without paying a price. The idea of a general structure is -
in spite of its fascinating character and although this idea has often led to new
insights - no longer tenable. It creates difficulties in linguistics because, among
other things, it reduces the relationship between language and the non-
linguistic to a marginal phenomenon both in connection with the relationship
between expression substance and expression form as well as the relationship
between language form, meaning form and meaning content.
The relationship to the non-linguistic is a many-headed monster which in-
cludes both the referential dimensions (to the contents of consciousness,
patterns of thought, the outside world and meaning relationships between
different linguistic entities) the expression form and the substance of ar-
ticulation. The form-substance relationship reappears in all areas, but in the
following the presentation is concentrated on the relationship between the
linguistic and non-linguistic as manifested at the level of notation.
As will be evident, different notation systems can both distinguish them-
selves by using different expression substances and by using the properties of
the expression substances in different ways, as this can both be a question of
using the different properties of the same expression substance and of using
the same property in different ways, just as, finally, different properties of
substance can be used in the same way. As the notation units in all notation
systems can act as semantic variation mechanisms, the relationship to the
expression substance can consequently also be included in the description of
the semantic potential connected with a given notation system.
Conversely, this connection implies that the functions which are handled
by the notation system in some symbolic languages can also be handled
through other means. Notational distinctiveness, which belongs to the
                                                
14  Eco (1976) 1979: 129.
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expression form, can thus sometimes be replaced by semantic distinctiveness at
the level of content form or content meaning. Notation systems do not
therefore comprise an independent, closed level, subject to an invariant rule
structure, on the contrary, they are included in the different symbolic
languages as a facultative semantic variation potential.
Although the semantic choices can embrace the suspension of underlying
notation rules and conventions, there are considerable differences between
the different notation systems, as they use different forms of rule determination
and rule suspension. As the possibilities of rule suspension and rule variation
differ in the different notation systems, these differences must also be included,
which again implies that it is not possible to provide a wholly rule based
delimitation of the individual notation systems.
As semantic use is not wholly rule based, the notation systems will instead
be regarded as redundancy systems and the different uses will be described as
different ways of using notational redundancy. This point of view therefore
makes it necessary to provide a clarification of what is understood by
redundancy and by the relationship between the redundancy and rule
concept.
7.5 The redundancy concept
Although the concept of redundancy is used in a number of disciplines, it is a
controversial concept which people often try to avoid. While most scientists
and scholars appear to agree in acknowledging the existence of redundancy
forms, many are sceptical that the concept can be used with the necessary
precision. The concept appears only sporadically in the older structuralist
linguistics because redundancy is seen here as a peripheral phenomenon on
the borders of, or outside, language structure. This use is, as such, consistent
because the concept is used with the meaning recurring structures with weak
or negligible meaning, bordering on the superfluous, while the repetitive
structures which are necessary in the linguistic expression are described by
the concept ‘language system’.
The distinction between the concept of redundancy and that of a language
system thus has nothing to do with the occurrence of a structure or a pattern,
nor with the form of the structure. Both concepts are used of recurring
structures, patterns or regularities which thus constitute a common core of
meaning. The distinction between the two, however, builds upon the function
of the structure, as a distinction is made here between necessary structures,
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which do have a function, and superfluous or random structures, which do
not.
While the concept of a language system rests on the connection between
structure and necessity, an almost scientifically obvious idea, the redundancy
concept builds on a far less obvious idea, as regularity - the recurring pattern -
is described here as something meaningless, superfluous and random. It is
apparent that such an idea can only with difficulty be reconciled with a
stringent scientific description which, almost by definition, must ascribe
meaning to any kind of pattern formation and regularity in the phenomena
described. In older structuralist linguistics the answer to the way this problem
presents itself was provided through the distinction between language system
and language use, as redundancy phenomena were applied to the latter
category.
In more recent structuralist - and post-structuralist - linguistics, which have
objected to the sharp distinction between a synchronic language system and
diachronic sequences, attempts have also been made to modify the sharp
contrast between the redundancy concept and the concept of a language
system as - in a formulation from Greimas and Courtes - it has been
acknowledged that redundancy, defined as »the iteration of given elements in
the same discourse seems significant, for it manifests the regularities which
serve its internal organization«.15
Although Greimas and Courtes do not explicitly discuss the relationship
between the concepts of redundancy and language system, they are working
towards an approximation, as they not only ascribe a more central role to the
redundancy function in the description of the structure of  sentences, but also
- as appears from their treatment of the concept »natural language« (Saussure:
langue, Hjelmslev: schema) - find it necessary to view syntactic sentence
structures as part of this construction.16
As the syntactic structures, similarly to the structures described by the
concept of a language system are repeatable patterns, it is difficult to see how
it is possible to differentiate this concept of the redundancy function  from the
concepts of syntax and language system. There are indications, however, that
they only have a more limited, perhaps stylistic definition in mind.
                                                
15  Greimas and Courtes, (1979) 1982: 259.
16  »It is becoming necessary today to bring the concepts of natural language [as a pure taxonomy or
schema] and of competence together. This rapprochement seems to demand an explicit integration of
syntactic structures in the definition of natural language [or in the terms of Saussure: langue, and
Hjelmslev: language system/schema]. Ibid: 170.
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That Greimas and Courtes still recommend that the redundancy concept
should be avoided - and suggest instead »the more natural term, recurrence« -
can hardly be due to this vagueness, but rather to their wish to mark a
distinction from Shannon’s - statistical - redundancy concept, which does not
acknowledge the significance of redundancy for the internal organization of
the message, as Shannon identifies redundancy with the superfluity of the
signals. In Shannon’s interpretation the superfluous signals were precisely
those which occurred with fixed regularity because they represented the
statistical structure of the language system, while those signals which occurred
irregularly, conversely represented the meaning of the message.
While Shannon in his definition takes the point of departure in one of the
two senses of the concept, namely the superfluity of the recurring structures,
as this concept is extended to include all types of recurring pattern, and this
means the total language system, Greimas and Courtes, on the other hand, take
their point of departure in the other, namely the meaning of these structures.
In this connection there is no criterion for distinguishing between redundancy
structures from the recurring patterns which are regarded as part of the
language system. Nor is any answer given to the question whether and
possibly how a recurring structure can be connected with a changing meaning
content. A possible explanation may be that the particular purpose only is to
describe how a simple - for example, stylistic - repetition of a form can
contribute to expressing a meaning content which would not be present
without the repetition.
Although the information theoretical definition falls short, because in op-
position to the theoretical definition it becomes necessary to acknowledge the
significance of the redundancy function for the reception of the message, it
nevertheless also points out - with the concept of the significance of the
random occurrence - a problem for the semiotic definition, where meaning is
connected to variations of fixed, recurring structures.
While the redundancy concept in both definitions is a concept of fixed,
recurring patterns, they differ in their description of the significance and
necessity of these patterns. The two viewpoints form here extremities in a
semantic field which applies to the redundancy function’s strength of signi-
fication. The two definitions can therefore only be reconciled if by redun-
dancy we understand repetitive structures which can appear with a variable -
and thereby generally indefinite, not pre-established - strength of signification.
Although they individually fix themselves in a certain position in this field,
(information theory views redundancy as having a meaning which is weak to
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the point of non-existence, while semiotic theory views it as meaning bearing),
we must see this divergence as an expression of a property of the redundancy
function itself and assume that redundancy phenomena can both be
manifested with variable strength of signification and/or changing content of
signification.
This is indirectly confirmed by Shannon’s use of the 5 previously men-
tioned definitions of the redundancy concept, as these definitions refer to
different variation axes (two axes for meaning, namely respectively indepen-
dently of and in opposition to, one axis for the rule structure, namely the sy-
stem determined part and one axis for the expression form, namely the
statistically determined part).
Such variations are a well known linguistic phenomenon and there are
hosts of examples in the stylistic and rhetorical literature. This reformulation of
the redundancy concept therefore creates no great problems.
The difficulty is rather greater when it comes to the second component of
the redundancy concept which is formed around the relationship between the
necessary and the random. As a consequence of linking the redundancy
structure and meaninglessness, information theory is forced to identify the
concept ‘meaning’ with the concept of random, non-patterned - and therefore
facultative - occurrences. Semiotics, on the other hand, connects meaning with
(variations in the relationship between) regular occurrences, as here the
random and non-patterned is connected with the meaningless and not the
meaning bearing.
None of these conceptualizations, which conflict with each other, appears
convincing, but they each point out a weak spot in the other view. While
information theory points to the possibility of free choice as a necessary
element, something which is allowed no place in the structuralist definition, the
latter, on the other hand, points to the possibility of ascribing meaning to the
recurring patterns.
This mutual contradiction is manifested as a consequence of using the same
theoretical thought structure, as in both cases an absolute opposition is
assumed between the invariant - preordained - pattern, repetition, and the
random occurrence, deviation. The conflict can therefore only be resolved by
abandoning the idea of an invariant border between the repeatable-regular
and the facultative, random deviation.
This abandonment has already been anticipated here by connecting the
concept of the random, facultative occurrence with the concept of deviation,
as the latter concept, unlike the concept of the random, not only covers the
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free - meaning-bearing - choice as a variation in relationship to a pattern, but
also the free choice as a variation in or of a pattern, in or of its meaning
respectively. The clarification at the same time makes it possible to provide a
definition of the redundancy concept which clearly distinguishes the concept
of redundancy systems from the concept of rule based symbol systems, as
redundancy systems can be understood as repeatable patterns, structures or
systems which
• are characterized by the possibility of facultative variation in the signi-
fication strength of the patterns and/or signification content and
• allows - or depends on - facultative, meaning-bearing uses of pattern de-
viation and pattern variation.
The definition maintains the concept’s two semantic components as two
connected, but individually variable, axes of signification, as the one axis al-
lows variation in signification strength, while the other allows variation and
deviation in pattern formation. Variation on both axes can at the same time be
connected with variation in signification content. As variation of signification
content can both be produced through variation of signification strength
and/or pattern and as the pattern variation conversely is not always connected
with (a certain or any) meaning variation, variation of signification content
must be regarded as a third, independent, variation axis. While variation of
signification strength depends solely on the reinforcement or weakening of an
existing meaning, variation in content can also concern discontinuation and
new meaning.
That it is the connection between these independent axes which is central
appears if we attempt to clarify the definition by focusing on one aspect or the
other. If - like Greimas and Courtes - we emphasize repeatability alone, the
meaning paradoxically coincides with the concept of regularity - with the
Shannonian consequence that the system thereby becomes empty of meaning
because it is completely rule defined and inaccessible to meaning determined
choice. If, on the other hand - like Shannon - we emphasize weakness of mea-
ning or the superfluous, the meaning conversely coincides with the
conceptual contrast: random and meaningless background noise.
Together, these two poles indicate the extremes in a three-dimensional
meaning structure formed around the variation in strength of signification,
content of signification and pattern variation. In connection with strongly
significant and invariant pattern occurrences the concept coincides with the
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concept of regularity, structure and/or a new content of signification. In
connection with occurrences of incomplete repetitions characterized by weak
meaning - deviations from or variations of patterns - the concept approaches
the meaning ‘noise’.
Although this determination of the redundancy concept has its point of
departure in - and has been kept within the framework of - the ordinary scope
of the term’s meaning, i.e. the connection of repeatable structures with
indefinite meaning, it has implications which can hardly be considered obvious
on the face of things. It is thus not immediately clear that the concept can be
used to describe certain phenomena at all, because it apparently suspends any
possibility of speaking of invariance.
It is perhaps also the fear of this slippery conceptual slope, which weakens
the concept of regularity, that lies behind the widespread scepticism regarding
its use and which prompts Greimas and Courtes to accentuate the rigorous
form repeatability in their - cautious - rehabilitation of the concept.
But if the need is greatest for semiotics, it is also the first to offer the help
which can be found in the biplanar sign concept. Where information theory
falls short, because it operates with equivalence between the expression form
and content form and assumes that the symbolic expression is subject to a
single - or several completely distinct and thereby parallel - rule systems, the
semiotic understanding of the sign implies that expression form and content
form be regarded as two different, interfering pattern formations or rule
systems. It follows from this that a pattern deviation and/or suspension and/or
meaning variation on the one plane can occur on the basis of a stabilization of
patterns on the other. As it is the sign function itself which - alone - creates the
connection between the two planes, pattern deviation on the one plane,
however, can also produce pattern deviation on the other,.
Where »monoplanar« symbol theories can only operate with rule based
stability, the biplanar understanding of signs allows rule deviation to occur
without stability being broken down, just as this understanding allows the
existence of several stable meaning hierarchies in the same expression which
are not unambiguously connected because they are not subject to clearly
separate rule sets.
Perhaps a  metaphor can help to illustrate this kind of relationship. Imagine for
instance the interaction between our legs when walking. The movement of the
legs is well co-ordinated but in such a way as to allow the movements of each
leg to be varied with a certain degree of freedom, which is basically
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constrained by the use of the other leg as the stable - and in the actual
situation »redundant« part - of the system, while at the next moment the
redundant part becomes distinct.
Some of these variations might cause a change (whether intended or not)
both in speed, rhythm or even direction. Others will effect only the rhythm, or
speed or direction and some changes might not result in any changes in these
respects at all. It is also possible to use such variations for semiotic purposes,
e.g. simulations (walking with a limp to draw attention to ourselves).  
There are different kinds of constraints on these variations. While some va-
riations may make us stagger or fall, others will make us stop walking and
others make us run, or jump on the spot etc.
The metaphor illustrates a system consisting of two co-ordinated axes in
which stability can be obtained in - at least three - different ways:  based on
the stability of one of the two legs,  based on the stability of the co-ordinated
movements of both legs at the same time. As a metaphor, however, it also illu-
strates a difference, in that the system consists of two axes of the same
category (since both legs are legs) while in symbolic systems there will always
be at least two axes of different kinds, since there must necessarily be both an
expression system and a content system, resulting in a more complex set of
possible interferences between the two axes of variation.
While sign theory thus provides a theoretical justification that it is possible to
connect the definition of the redundancy concept given here with the
necessary stability, it makes no contribution to clearing up the meaning of the
redundancy function.
This meaning can be illuminated in the relationship between the redun-
dancy concept and the concept of language system.
While, on the one hand, it is possible to describe any kind of rule formation
as a stable pattern which is maintained for a shorter or longer period in a
redundant system, on the other it is impossible to fit the redundancy function
into a rule system based on pre-established, invariant rules or patterns.
This definition of the redundancy concept can thus contain all the form
elements and rule structures which are included in the concept of a language
system, whereas the concept of a language system cannot contain the
possibilities of rule variation, suspension and variation in strength of
signification which characterize a redundancy system. The redundancy
concept can thus be seen as a more basic - and comprehensive - concept than
that of a language system. The rules of a language system are at the same time
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manifested as a system which - contained in a redundancy system - comprise a
set of facultative and variable pattern formations which can both serve as a
stabilizing background structure and be made the object of distinct meaning
articulation through variations in the strength of signification and/or in pattern
variation. A repetition structure of this kind can both act as a regulatory
stabilizer, as an expression for a specific meaning content and is also accessible
to variation in the content of signification, strength of signification and
facultative pattern variations.
The central difference between a description of language as a rule based, as
opposed to a redundant, system thus lies in the circumstance that rule
structures in redundant systems become facultative, accessible to variation,
suspension and non-rule determined interlacement, as the maintenance and
use of rules becomes connected with the formation of meaning.
These properties have an intuitive relevance for an understanding of
language, as they reproduce the infrangible connection between rule gene-
ration and meaning articulation which characterizes all linguistic articulation.
Through this, the redundancy concept also makes it possible to re-establish a
bridge between the concept of a synchronic language system and diachronic
language use, as the synchronic structures can no longer be understood as
once-and-for-all established, invariant structures which exist independently of
usage, but on the contrary as more stable patterns and language norms.
If it is possible to distinguish structures with completely stable, invariant
patterns, the concept of redundancy will coincide with the concept of struc-
ture, form or system. Any identification of a redundancy structure, however,
assumes an interpreter and the same is true of the identification of an invariant
system. An invariant system thus only exists if the interpreter cannot
imagine any instability.
The extent to which we can do without the idea of instability in the de-
scription of »monoplanar« systems will not be discussed in this connection,
but the fact that it is difficult to do without in the description of biplanar or
multiplanar systems such as the linguistic, for example, appears not only to be
confirmed by our ordinary understanding of the unruliness of language, but
also by the noise problem of information theory.
This intuitive relevance, however, is supported by the circumstance that we
must assume that any linguistic rule structure has a history both of origin and
development. Although many language patterns and norms have been
maintained for long periods of time, they must nevertheless have originated at
some stage. As we are not familiar with their genesis we cannot derive later
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language development from them, nor can we therefore base language theory
on the assumption that the total set of linguistic rule structures was formed as
a total and invariant language system which is available as a preordained
condition for language use. Of the possible explanations, this appears the least
probable.
The redundancy concept is equally as incapable as the concept of form, rule
or system of providing any clarification of how the phenomenon itself
originated. It is not claimed that there is a genetic explanation, but on the con-
trary that the indefiniteness which is connected to the genesis of language
implies that the linguistic rule structures cannot be understood on the basis of
themselves, but must be understood as (new) formations which occur in
relationship to other, linguistic or non-linguistic, structures.
As any repetition, in the nature of the case, is a repetition of something,
repetition implies that a repeatable form exists prior to the repetition. The rule
is distinct, however, from simple repetition, as regularity only becomes
regulatory when it is connected with or used for a purpose. This purpose is
not contained in the form repeated nor in the repetition itself, on the contrary,
it lies in the use of the repetition. The form that is repeated can therefore best
be described as an available expression form which, with the intentional
repetition, is connected with a - regulatory - content form. In other words, the
repetition of the form gives this a new meaning dimension as an available
pattern which can be connected with a regulatory purpose. It is thus not the
rule concept that is a precondition for the sign function, but the sign function
which is a precondition for the rule formation.
While a rule system assumes a fixed connection between the occurrence of
a form, the repetition of this and the connection of the repetition to a regu-
latory content, a redundancy system, on the contrary, is characterized by the
possibility of varying these relationships. Redundancy systems have therefore
not only the three previously determined variation axes (1: strength of
signification, 2: pattern and 3: content of signification), but also a fourth which
ranges from the first, possibly random occurrence of a form, through the
repetition of the form to the connection of the repetition with some other kind
of regulatory function which again can be connected with further meaning
variations. See section 7.7 for an exemplification and further elaboration.
That the sign function is a precondition for and thereby independent of rule
formation is not only supported by the circumstance that we have symbolic
languages with different rule structures - in other words, the symbolic forms
can be connected with different regulatory content forms - but also because
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we can only unambiguously distinguish between rule structure and that
which is regulated when confronted with formal languages. As far as common
languages are concerned this relationship can only be registered as a
difference in perspective of the view of the same expression.  It is not
possible here to distinguish between that part of the expression which
represents »the programme« and that part which represents »data«.
Put another way, the regulatory structures in common languages are
different to the regulatory structures which characterize formal languages. As
formal languages assume that both the expression form and its meaning are
entirely rule based and mutually connected, these languages allow only rule
based variation, just as the mutual relationship of the rules in the form of
extent, grouping or co-ordination are fixed. The formal sentence is in principle
a general statement which connects the situationally determined content
(data) with a general, invariant rule structure. In formal languages the rule
structure thus has its own distinctive notation form and each individual
expression unit has an independently defined semantic content which
represents either a rule or a regulated value.
In common languages the same - sequences of - notation units can both re-
present the rule structure and the meaning content, which not only means that
the same expression form has at least two overlapping determinations, but also
that the rule formation can be modified, weakened or strengthened relative to
the concrete situational and meaning determined content of the message. The
regulatory is not bound to the expression form itself, but to its semantic use.
The common languages thus allow all legitimate expression forms, including
those of the rules, to be subjected to variation in strength of signification,
extent and content of signification - such as for example is the case with the
use of tense (as respectively a neutral narrative form or distinct indicator of
time) and gender (as respectively a purely grammatical or biological indicator)
in common languages.
While the formal languages operate with a rule based expression system, the
expression system is used in common languages as a redundancy system in
which the individual expression forms are subject to several simultaneous,
mutually different and variable semantic purposes. Any rule structure can
therefore also be subjected to meaning variations through inclusion in new
sign functions.
Unlike the rule concept, the redundancy concept allows a necessary
openness in the conceptualization of the relationship between the unique and
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the general and of the unsolved problem of the origin of and transition
between levels, as it allows:
• A rule to be formed through the purposeful repetition of something which
was not a rule prior to the repetition. This may be a newly created form or a
regularly occurring, but not previously used form, or a change in a regularly
occurring form and/or its function.
• New rule and meaning levels to be formed by using established rule and
meaning levels as redundancy potentialities, as the new level is neither
completely independent of nor entirely bound to the rule structure of the
underlying level.
• Any element in a sign function - a rule structure or a meaning content - to
become an expression form for a new sign function which possibly
modifies/changes the rule structure and/or the meaning content which is the
starting point.
• A meaning expression to become a rule structure and a repetition structure
to become both a rule structure with a weak meaning and/or with a
distinctive meaning.
• A rule structure to be suspended or modified through rule deviation - partly
for semantic purposes, partly for regulating mutually overlapping rule
systems without fixed rules for »giving way«. For example, the sign
sequences of languages are subject to conventions for consonant groups,
syllable formation, word formation, syntax and semantics.
Redundancy structures are thus characterized by the possibility of distin-
guishing (and perhaps modifying) elements from a subordinate level as
members of a superior level and by placing partially stabilizing elements
between these elements, which again allows the establishment of a new level.
The description of the basic structure of language as a redundancy structure
also provides the advantage of allowing a continuous formation of new rule
structures at new, higher levels through the modifying variation of the
subordinate levels.
As rule formation is described as part of language use and meaning pro-
duction, it cannot be excluded from the sign function either, which also
appeared as a consequence of Umberto Eco’s analysis (7.3) just as it is in ac-
cordance with stylistics’ many examples of different forms of semantic
exploitation of repetitive language patterns.17
                                                
17  In a 1960 »Danish stylistics« it is said of »repetition« that it 1) is the primitive expression of po-
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The concept of style is incidentally - and not surprisingly - one of the con-
cepts which forces Hjelmslev to the - in his theory, surprising - admission that
it may well be - perhaps almost always is - necessary to encatalyze several
mutually different language systems in the analysis of the same text.
In other words, in order to establish a simple model situation we have
worked with the premiss that the given text displays structural homogeneity,
that we are justified in encatalyzing one and only one semiotic system to the
text. This premiss, however, does not hold good in practice. On the contrary,
any text that is not of so small extension that it fails to yield a sufficient
basis for deducing a system generalizable to other texts usually contains
derivates that rest on different systems.18
While the style of the text prevents it from being accommodated in the house,
the house itself becomes an element of the style, as it is the style which
determines how many houses are necessary, how they are used and how they
are connected with each other.
While Hjelmslev’s language theory demonstrates how his own monoplanar
calculus understanding of the language system entails that when analysing an
arbitrary text we must assume that there is an unarranged quantity of mutually
unconnected systems, it thereby indirectly reveals the existence of an
underlying language potential which makes any rule formation and language
norm accessible to stylistic exploitation and semantic choice. It is the existence
of this potential which justifies the redundancy concept as the most suitable,
most adequate concept for the basic structure of language formation.
The concept of style hardly plays the same role in all symbol systems, but it
always plays a certain role. The style concept is sometimes used in formal
symbol theories as an argument for preferring one - more elegant solution - to
another. There is a long-standing tradition in mathematics for supporting the
                                                                                                                                           
werful emotional agitation, 2) produces a stronger effect if it does not 3) conversely weaken the effect,
that it 4) is related to gradation, that it can be 5) lulling in its monotony, or actually 6) platitudinous.
The work also contains a syntactically based classification of a number of classical repetitive figures
based on the repetition of the same figure (epizeuxis, anaphora, symploce, epanastrophe, antimetabole,
polyptoton, as well as »several other types«, to which can be added repetitions based on variations of
the thus only partially repeated figures. Albeck, 1960: 155-179.
18  Hjelmslev, (1943) 1966: 101-102. English translation: (1953) 1961: 115. After the above quotation,
Hjelmslev introduces a number of largely stylistic examples, but also those features which distinguish
various national languages. He responds to the problem by describing these features as connotative
features which can be omitted from the elementary description of »everyday language« which are
conversely - and rather surprisingly - defined as purely denotative language.
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argumentation for the truth of a mathematical proof with its beauty. Probably
not all mathematicians would claim that this, in itself appealing, idea of the
importance of style can be ascribed an independent - or basic - status in
understanding formal languages, but we can certainly note that there is an
inner relationship between the formal languages and a certain style concept,
namely the concept of the pure and simple, non-contradictory expression.
With our point of departure in Hjelmslev’s description of formal languages
as »monoplanar«, we find here a further indication of the assumption that the
transition from multiplanar to »monoplanar« symbol systems - with full
equivalence between expression form and content form - is closely connected
with a reduction or elimination of that redundancy structure which is the basis
of the multiplanar symbol system. Such a reduction (also including the
elimination of the linguistic gender and tense functions, for example) is also a
central element in the operative procedure for producing formal expressions.
If this assumption is correct, it can explain why Hjelmslev, who attached
himself to this ideal of style, could overlook the paradoxical contradiction
between this monoplanar stylistic ideal and the biplanar phenomenon of lan-
guage he wished to describe. Moreover, it can also create the basis for a de-
scription of the difference between common languages and formal languages,
as formal languages’ identification of the expression form and content form
builds upon a freezing up of the four variation axes of the common languages’
redundancy systems (strength of signification, pattern formation, content of
signification and the axis from the first, random occurrence through repetition
of the form to the connection of the repetition with regulatory function and
possible further meaning). Formal languages only allow rule based variation -
which has been declared in advance. As these declarations are carried out at
the level of notation, any notation variation is thereby connected with a rule
based meaning variation. While the use of notational redundancy is a precon-
dition for common languages (and other informal uses of notation systems)
formal languages are based on wholly rule based notation, in which
redundancy forms, however,  can  appear at higher semantic stages.19
This difference also explains - the generally accepted assumption - that all
formal expressions can be translated into common language expressions,
                                                
19  The concept of monoplanar symbol systems is actually imprecise, as this is rather a question of
symbol systems where any given expression form always only corresponds to a single, given content
form, or several mutual, but clearly distinct forms. It is used here to distinguish this system from other
multiplanar symbol systems which operate with variation in the relationship between expression and
content form.
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whereas the opposite is not possible. Common languages have a variation
potential which cannot be represented in formal languages.
As it is thus reasonable to assume that the redundancy concept can be re-
garded as a key concept in the description of structural differences between
expression systems, the theoretical definition of it given here will be used in
the following sections to describe the different redundancy structures which
characterize the linguistic, formal and informational uses of notation systems.
7.6. Redundancy in notation systems with limited inventories
The difference between common and formal language notation was described
in the preceding section as a relationship between the use of the notation
system as a redundancy system based on the use of a limited inventory of
notation units, each of which is empty of meaning, and as a rule determined
system based on the use of an unlimited inventory of individually meaning-
defined units. This difference was described as a difference between a symbol
system, in which rule set and meaning content are connected with the same
expression constellations, and as a symbol system which builds upon a
systematic distinction between rule expression and the expression of that
which is regulated.
While this description is adequate for distinguishing between common lan-
guages and formal languages, it is not adequate for describing the relationship
between linguistic and informational notation, as in both cases they use a
limited set of notation units which are empty of meaning, so that meaning is
only connected with sequences of expression units. In both these uses,
meaning variation can still also be produced through the variation of an
individual expression unit. In other words, the individual notation must be
able to represent a meaning distinction without itself containing any meaning.
In both cases, the limited inventory of legitimate figurae comprises a set of
semantically empty, semantic variation mechanisms.
To these similar features yet another can be added, as the variation potential
of the notation system is not only concerned with meaning content, but also,
as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 8, the rule structures.
These very striking and comprehensive similarities appear on the face of it
to confirm one of the assumptions on which efforts to artificially simulate
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»natural« languages (designated common languages in the present work)20
have been based. It must therefore immediately be noted that the similar fea-
tures mentioned here will not bear such a far-reaching interpretation. The
relationship is rather the contrary, as simulation theories operate with formal
notation, while it is precisely the similarities between linguistic and
informational notation indicated here that distinguish these from formal
notation. The way this problem presents itself therefore gives occasion for a
more detailed analysis of the relationship between common languages and the
use of informational notation.
Here it is most appropriate to take our point of departure in Hjelmslev’s
commutation test. Hjelmslev formulated the commutation principle as a method
for deciding whether an expression unit is semantically distinctive, as what is
tested is whether a change in the expression also changes the meaning of the
expression. The method is a suitable means of delimiting the smallest units of
the semantic variation potential and it becomes possible in this way not only
to indicate the phonemic and graphemic expression units, but in the case of -
spoken - language also a number of other semantic variation mechanisms such
as intonation, stress, glottal stops and hesitation, at the same time as the
method makes it possible to separate semantically empty expression variations
such as individual differences in the articulation of the »same« sound. At this
level the commutation test can be used to distinguish the variation potential
used for semantic purposes from the - more comprehensive - variation
potential offered by the expression substance.
Hjelmslev used the test himself to distinguish the »figurae« at the disposal of
sign formation, as in his formulation of the law of the relationship between the
sign and the figura he states:
the transition from sign to non-sign never occurs later than the transition
from unlimited to limited inventories... Language is thus so organized that
with the help of a handful of figurae and through continuously new
juxtapositions of them, a host of new signs can be constructed.21
                                                
20  The terminological pedantry in this connection is not only due to the difficulty of accepting the
concept ‘natural’ in connection with certain cultural phenomena as opposed to others, but also to the
fact that the use of the concept as a designation for language appears to be based on a scientific un-
derstanding of rules, in accordance with which the observance of the rule is given by the rule itself.
Although this holds true as a condition of formal languages, it is not true of most other cultural
phenomena, if any, because the execution of a rule assumes the overcoming of »noise«.
21  Hjelmslev, (1943) 1966: 42-43. This passage - in fact nearly a whole page - has been omitted from
the English translation. In Hjelmslev’s terminology, a figura can both be a phoneme and a syllable.
The phoneme and the grapheme are also described as ‘functives’, where Hjelmslev differentiates between
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The definition implies, continues Hjelmslev, that language should not first and
foremost be understood as a sign system, but as a figura system which is built
up around a limited number of figurae and used for sign formation, as the
figura system comprises the foundation for the immanent functions of
language.
Hjelmslev thus saw the figurae as the material of sign formation, as at the
same time he defined the concept of a language system as a set of invariant
rules for the mutual organization of the figurae. As mentioned in section 7.5,
he was thereby forced to draw the conclusion that any, even slightly longer
text, must presumably be described as a conglomerate of elements from several
language systems, whereby an important part of his point is lost.
We can naturally - like Hjelmslev - refer any deviation from a delimited,
invariant system to another system. The consequence will be that the descri-
bed phenomenon »everyday language« in such a case becomes an aggregate
of a very large number of mutually unconnected language systems, while the
ability of everyday language to contain these mutually unconnected
constructions remains undescribed. An obvious example is variation in
pronunciation.
It is a well known fact that many individual pronunciation variations in
spoken language are precisely only pronunciation variations which are not
used as semantic variation mechanisms. It is far more difficult to draw a clear
borderline between dialectal and sociolectal pronunciation variations (as well
as those characterized by age and gender), which can both form part of
spoken language as messages with weak meanings connected with the
speaker’s background and as an emphasis with a less strong meaning of this
background (perhaps intentional in the situation), or as a central aspect of the
point of the message (such as in jokes).
The circumstance that everyday language contains individual dialectal and
sociolectal pronunciation variations, which are sometimes manifested as
semantic variation mechanisms with a positive result in a commutation test, is
seen by Hjelmslev as a less essential feature of language.
                                                                                                                                           
their occurrence in a process, in which the various letters co-exist in a »both-and« relationship (a
function Hjelmslev calls a relation) and their occurrence in a system, in which they enter into an
»either-or« relationship with each other (a function Hjelmslev calls a correlation). Ibid. pp. 34-44,
English translation: 36-48. These definitions apply at the starting point of the analysis, where an
approach is made to a definition of a formal language theory. At the other end - where the formal theory
is applied to language - the phoneme is identified with the term a ‘taxem’, i.e. the possible (virtual)
expression inventory.
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The occurrence of dialectal and sociolectal sound variations, however, leads
directly to a basic question of linguistic rule formation because this is a
question of a non-rule determined, semantically facultative break between
different dialectal or sociolectal rule structures (for the use of phonemes). Such
breaks are not only general occurrences in the individual use of language,
they also create a foundation for comprehensive and far-reaching cultural
struggles for the upholding of some rules rather than others. While the
struggle regarding linguistic rules is also carried on in language, such struggles
cannot be fought in formal languages. That such a struggle can take place is in
itself a good example of the importance of the redundancy function for the
use of linguistic rule structures, as it is a question of variation in the rules’
strength of signification, extent and content of signification, just as these
features assume the possibility of semantically motivated rule suspension.
In Hjelmslev such features create a foundation for the concept of language
norms, which on the one hand fulfil regulative purposes on a par with the
invariant language system, but on the other are accessible to variation.
Although the normative rules also regulate language use, they are not in-
cluded in Hjelmslev’s concept of a language system, but on the contrary are
included in the use of the language they regulate. In other words, the
language norm is a significant property of language which is not incorporated
into Hjelmslev’s concept of a language system. As this property can not only
fulfil the same - regulatory - purpose, but can also create a foundation for rule
deviation and rule suspension, it not only gives occasion to ask whether there
is a need for a concept of an invariant language system at all, it also raises the
question as to which criteria create the basis for separating a set of invariant
rules from the variant norms.
In Hjelmslev the distinction between variants and figurae, which creates an
invariant system that is independent of norm changes and variations in use,
appears solely as a consequence of the theoretical model. Hjelmslev, however,
can only identify the elements of the system with the help of the commutation
test, which is empirically bound. It cannot thus be used to distinguish an
invariant set of figurae, as it contains no criterion which can determine
whether a given, unused variant could be used in another case.
While Hjelmslev believed that the test could be used as a means to di-
stinguish a delimited set of linguistic figurae which could be utilized for sign
formation, it is, on the contrary, a means for distinguishing a set of actually
used figurae from a set of possible substance forms.
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Hjelmslev’s use of the commutation test to distinguish the elements of the
system is not only problematical because it is empirically limited, it is also
problematical because he overlooks the fact that the commutation principle he
is forced to use to distinguish the invariant system figurae only works on the
condition that these figurae actually occur as semantically facultative variation
mechanisms.
Where Hjelmslev claims that the figura system is invariant, as the used figu-
rae form a closed, delimited system, the test shows on the contrary that the
border between used and unused figurae depends solely upon the question as
to whether a given figura is actually used as a semantic variation mechanism.
The figurae of a language system are in other words not themselves de-
fined by the language system, they - and thereby also the system - are on the
contrary defined as the semantically used parts of the figura variation
possibilities which are contained in the expression substance.
It could now be objected that the commutation principle is only a - neces-
sary and sole - analytical means of discriminating the figurae theoretically and
that the analytical procedure provides no information on how the figurae are
used in language. Although the commutation principle prescribes that we
regard the graphemes /h/ and /c/ as semantically distinctive graphemes which
are incorporated in the language system’s figura set, as we for example can
differentiate between /hat/ and /cat/, the respective meaning content of the
two words is not connected with the two distinct figurae, but to the total
constellation.
We are also only able to point out the graphemes /h/ and /c/ as semantically
distinctive because this distinctiveness is relative to the subsequent - in this
analytical context, semantically non-distinctive - graphemes -at.
The result of the test is independent of whether the chosen words occur in
contexts where they can be confused. It therefore provides no information on
the individual grapheme’s function in a given use. The grapheme, however,
has a more distinctive value when it occurs in contexts where the mistake of a
single grapheme also changes the meaning.
As an example, we can take a not unusual error in writing the word in-
tention as /intension/. If the word appears in a text, whose subject has not yet
been revealed, the reader will be in doubt as to whether the writer was thin-
king of the concept of intension (as distinct from extension), or whether it is
rather an error for the more widespread concept intention (which has no
definite opposite concept). In this case the ‘s’ is manifested as a grapheme
with strong meaning - so strong that it causes doubt. If the word, on the other
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hand, appears in a text whose subject has been revealed, the reader will not
experience a problem of understanding - or will easily ‘skip’ the error. In this
situation the ‘s’ is manifested as a grapheme with weak meaning - so weak
that doubt does not arise or can easily be ignored.
The difference between the analytical procedure which is independent of
the actual context and the way in which we use language ourselves does not
alter the fact that we can only use this procedure (and have no other) because
the figurae of language are semantic variation mechanisms. It is the possibility
of semantic variation which decides which parts of the variation possibilities
of the expression substance that are used in language. If we do not use this
criterion we cannot distinguish the figurae which can be included in the
language system from the figura possibilities of the expression substance. If
we do use this criterion we must also draw the conclusion that the rule
structure of a language system is rooted in a figura system in which each
individual element is defined through the possibility of semantically motivated
variation which depends both on strength of signification, pattern variation
and content of signification, not only for the individual figura, but for the total
expression.
The problem with Hjelmslev’s theory is thus that the means he uses to
provide the theoretical construction with an empirical foundation itself
assumes the semantic bond the theory denies.
It is not difficult to see that the contrast between /h/ and /c/ may be deci-
sive for an understanding of the content of the sentence, while in other
situations it may be the surrounding graphemes (a or t) which handle the more
distinctive function relative to the distinctions between hat-hit, cat-cut, hat-
ham, cat-cab, for example.
The individual grapheme is thus manifested at one and the same time as
semantically distinctive relative to the surrounding graphemes and relative to
other possible graphemes in the same place. But it is manifested as less
distinctive or redundant in relationship to the surrounding, more distinctive
graphemes, as we distinguish hat from hit, cat, as well as ham.
In other words, it is only in the test situation itself that we can isolate the
distinct from the redundant. What distinguishes /hat/ and /cat/ unites /hat/ with
/hit/ and these are distinguished by one of the elements which unite /hat/ and
/cat/. As the examples can be supplemented with /cat/cab/ and /hat/ham/ we
have an example here in which commutation is positive for all graphemes in
the words cat and hat.
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The individual grapheme is manifested as distinctive in contrast to other
graphemes, which are manifested as redundant through the same contrast. But
at the same time it acts itself as a redundant background for each of the others.
The graphemes enter into a simultaneous reciprocity as each others’
foreground and background.
It is the surroundings, and not the grapheme itself, which make it possible to
define the individual grapheme’s semantic distinctiveness in the actual
figuration. Semantic distinctiveness is therefore also manifested as a variable
relative to the grapheme’s own possible occurrence in other surroundings
(including the possible occurrence at another place in the same expression).
Although the meaning is connected with the whole word and although the
different meanings do not necessarily have any graphemic representation at all
- words with different meanings can be spelt similarly (such as bow, for
example = a knot with two loops, the front of a ship, a lowering of the head
etc.) - the marking of the difference in meaning relative to the context (which
here both includes the meaning and the actual surrounding graphemic
expression forms) is clearly one of the important functions of the grapheme.
The commutative test shows just as little as other methods that certain
graphemes are always and only distinctive, on the contrary, it shows that it is
true of any semantically distinctive grapheme that it can only be semantically
distinctive because it can act less distinctively in other surroundings and, at
the same time, act as a redundant background for the distinctiveness of the
surrounding graphemes. The individual grapheme’s distinctiveness is thus
manifested in a double redundancy structure where on the one hand it is
determined in relationship to its own possible occurrence as more or less
distinctive in other circumstances and, on the other, as both distinctive and
redundant relative to the surrounding graphemes.
That it is redundant does not mean, however, that it can simply be omitted
from the expression, although this may be possible in some cases. But this can
only be determined by finding out whether meaning is lost by omitting it.
Although a certain grapheme is superfluous in one context, it is not given that
it is in another. The same figura constellations, even in the same word, can act
with a variable strength of significance - as more or less necessary for
maintaining the meaning content and/or rule structure in different occurrences.
The distinctive unit in common language can only appear with the meaning
»more« distinctive and a more distinctive unit can also appear as »less
distinctive«. If a given grapheme could only act distinctively, it need not be
manifested relative to redundant surroundings.
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Moreover, as will be described in more detail in chapter 8, it is precisely this
second possibility which is the foundation of the formal notation systems,
where the individual figure’s semantic distinctiveness is ensured by definitory
precepts which are outside the expression. The formal and informational
notation systems do not operate with the same more-less polarity and the
thereby connected variation potential.
Conversely, in linguistic notation, external definitions of the individual
figures’ distinctive meaning are not used, here distinctiveness appears, on the
other hand, in a double redundancy structure.
The redundant occurrence is the condition for the distinctive occurrence, as
this both assumes redundant graphemes in the surroundings, (redundancy in
usage) and redundant occurrences of the same grapheme in other expression
contexts (which in Hjelmslev’s terminology should mean that redundancy is
also constitutive in the language system).
For Hjelmslev it is only the distinctive function which is included in the
language system. The redundant function is not recognized as an important
feature of the structure of the language system. Redundant figurae are treated
as unused figurae - although they are actually used as conditions for the
manifestation of the semantically distinctive figurations and as semantic
variation potential.22
In a given context, as far as speech is concerned, it is also possible to use
expression substance variations in the form of dialectal and sociolectal va-
riants. Where writing is concerned there are fewer possibilities for using
substance variation, and in printing still fewer, but they are found, for example,
in the form of italicization and certainly in some choices of type faces,
typographic styles and page layouts. It could also finally be discussed
whether spaces and division into sections should be regarded as blank signs,
i.e. as independent figurae, or as variations in substance similar to the choice of
type face and typographic style.
There is thus no definite rule structure which determines how the smallest
semantic variation mechanism of language can be connected with meaning
variation. The linguistic notation figurae are each determined by their potential
use as semantic variation mechanisms and the use of them in language is
characterized by the possibility of variation along several axes:
                                                
22  As Hjelmslev, in continuation of Saussure, defines the sign concept on the basis of semantic
distinctiveness, the inner composition of the sign is subordinate. Whether the sign is manifested
through one distinctive grapheme, or a root which is manifested in many graphemes, is considered
secondary. Behind the terms, non-sign, part sign or figura lies a mixture of figurae and some of the
functions the figurae can occupy in the sign’s composition.
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• more-less distinctive compared to the occurrence of the same figura in other
contexts.
• more-less distinctive compared to the meaning of the context.
• more-less distinctive compared to the surrounding figurae within a delimited
semantic entity such as the word.
The semantic variation potential connected with this includes, finally, not only
semantic variations within the framework of the language system, but also this
system, as - exactly like meaning - it is itself manifested as an organization of
notation units which are defined by their use as semantic variation
mechanisms. It is quite true that there are several different forms of rule based
notation sequences with rules of inflection as the most rule determined, while
the notation sequences of words are subject to the syllable criterion.
The syllable criterion implies that there must be a vowel (although vowels
need not be manifested in all written languages) and very little else. To this,
the national languages each add their rather arbitrarily delimited set of customs
for legitimate and illegitimate syllable forms.
Roots and inflection forms are thereby subject to different types of
regulation of notation sequences and the two forms largely act independently
of each other. But not completely, as there may be interference from inflection
form to root. It appears moreover that every rule has a least one exception.
While the individual notation units are in principle semantically empty, the
vowels /i/ and /a/ (i, ø and å, in Danish) are also used as meaning bearing
words.
Unlike the graphemes of the roots, the graphemes which present the rules of
inflection have been given a further semantic determination as rule notation.
But although they are regulatory they are not regulatory in the same way as
the operators of formal languages. The graphemes of the inflection system do
not represent a programme which transforms one set of data to another. On
the contrary, they represent a supplementary semantic determination which
can also occur with variable semantic values, such as is true of the use of the
present tense, for example. It can hardly be by chance - and is certainly not
without significance - that the inflection system is manifested with the help of
- a selection of - the notations which are also used to manifest the roots,
whereas formal languages systematically distinguish between rule and data
notation units. In the latter case, a line is drawn between two separate
semantic rooms, where in the first there is an interference.
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The rules of language are similar to many other social rule systems, they are
not rules which carry out themselves, but rules which are - perhaps - respected
and which can be respected to a greater or lesser extent, and rule formation
often has the character of analogy - sometimes almost on the principle, if you
can get away with it, all well and good. This is impossible to get away with in
a formal system.
Although the separation between root and inflection form is unavoidable
and invariant, it is not unavoidable in the expression system. For a great
number of words (some) inflection forms are identical with the root. The
inflection form can thus also occur as a purely semantic determination as
regards content which, among other things, allows an inflection category such
as the dative case almost to disappear from a language, such as has happened
with modern Danish, for example.
The same expression form can in these cases therefore also occur with
variable semantic values. The semantic distinction is not stabilized through the
inflection system, but solely through the actual syntactic and/or semantic
context, which is thus sometimes used as a means to suspend the use of the
inflection system’s notation rules.
Under any circumstances the linguistic use of the notation system is cha-
racterized by a set of possibilities for exchange between rule distinctiveness,
custom distinctiveness and semantic distinctiveness, as all notations can serve
on all three sides, often simultaneously, although in several different ways and
with more or less weight.
In other words, there is an indissoluble discrepancy - and structural
difference - between expression form and content form which cannot thus be
described as homologous. The variation potential of the expression form is not
bound to the content forms. The change of a single expression unit can
dissolve a content form which includes a word, a sentence or a rule.
As the relationship between rule structure and meaning content can neither
be wholly rule based nor wholly unconnected, the two levels can be regarded
as reciprocal redundancy structures, i.e. as a system of variation axes in which
each axis has its own variation criteria and where the relationship between the
individual axes constitutes an independent variation axis which establishes
the meaning and function of the variations.
Double redundancy and the simultaneously redundant and distinctive
occurrence comprises one of the specific characteristics of alphabetical
writing. It does not occur in formal notation systems which are characterized
by the elimination of all redundant graphemes and it does not occur in
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pictorial expression systems which neither use a delimited notation system
such as the alphabet, nor in an unlimited system where the individual members
must be declared, such as in formal notation.
It thus appears that the redundancy which must be included in linguistic
theory’s criterion for sign distinctiveness comprises an extremely central and
characteristic linguistic feature which permits a conceptual distinction with
regard to other semantic systems such as formal and pictorial systems.
Although Hjelmslev’s description of linguistic notation as a use based
variation of an invariant set of asemantic relations between a limited set of
notation units provides a great deal of leeway for normatively established, but
principally variable, structures and relationships, his theoretical interest in the
normative is peripheral and he has no more detailed considerations regarding
the relationship between the smallest semantic variation mechanisms, rule
formation and meaning variation.
A comparison with informational notation shows, however, that there is a
characteristic difference here. Linguistic notation shares the limitation of
inventory and the demand for semantically empty, but semantically distinctive
notation units with informational notation. The smallest semantic variation
mechanisms are not only defined in different ways, however, they also allow
different forms of semantic variation, because linguistic notation also depends
on the use of notations and notation sequences which are indefinite or have
weak meaning or open meaning. Thus phenomena such as syllables,
relationships between vowels and consonants, the frequent occurrence of
preferred consonant constellations and the absence of others, as well as the
use of inflection forms are only of relevance for a description of linguistic
notation.
It is possible to further isolate this difference with the help of the commu-
tation test, as in this way we can ascertain that it is possible to eliminate quite a
number of graphemes from a written text without the meaning being lost,
whereas the omission of only a single informational notation unit can only be
made without loss of meaning if a set of control codes has been added to the
total message. This difference is again related to the circumstance that
informational notation in binary form always uses the entire expression
inventory, where language, step by step, uses only a small selection. The two
different notation systems are in other words characterized by different
stabilization structures.
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Where language is concerned this stabilization is characterized by a limited
use of rule determination which mainly only occurs in inflection systems, while
most other notation sequences are determined by tradition or meaning. The
notation system is used as a redundancy structure which allows the individual
notation units to be manifested as determined by conventions, by purposes of
meaning and by rule structure and where the individual notation’s function
can serve several purposes and vary with the contextually determined
meaning.
Informational notation, on the other hand, is highly subject to rule deter-
mination, which includes both the unambiguous demands on the physical form
and the formal semantics that is used to stabilize the notation’s legitimacy.
This semantics can be separated completely, however, from the semantic
regime in which the message is produced. Formal semantics acts here as a
redundancy structure with weak meaning seen in relationship to the meaning
of the message, while it at the same time acts as a means, with strong meaning,
of ensuring the notation’s legitimacy. The separate part of the message can
therefore not be used as a semantic variation potential in relationship to the
meaning of the message either. Finally, informational notation is also subject to
a rule based demand on the syntactic organization which stems from the
demand for mechanical efficacy.
Hjelmslev’s system theory therefore appears - curiously enough - to provide
a far more apposite description of informational notation than it does of the
linguistic, as in the first case we can clearly distinguish between the definition
of legitimate figurae and the definition of their function and meaning. The
definition of the figurae is at the same time a definition of their mutual -
asemantic - and oppositional relationship. This definition determines notation
at the physical-mechanical machine level, while the definition of their function
and meaning is a subsequent semantic determination which establishes the
function and meaning of the notations at the level of the protocol, programme
and use. The informational notation units can therefore neither be varied
individually nor as a total system through use, whereas spoken language
allows such variations, which can act both as individual and dialectical and
sociolectal variations, just as it is also possible to assimilate formal notation
systems. The latter also holds  true of written language, just as various
diacritical notations can also be introduced here. In print, the individual
variation of graphemes is limited to the choice of typefaces which are not
semantically distinctive, whereas italicization and underlining, for example, can
be used in a semantically distinctive way. Something of the same is also true of
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handwriting where individual variation, however, can also be read as a
personality trait.
Although both notation systems are bound to the use of a limited set of no-
tation units, this restriction is manifested in two different ways. Informational
notation does not use more or less superfluous notation units which are weak
of meaning, whereas linguistic notation is characterized by frequent
occurrences of more or less superfluous (but potentially meaning bearing)
notation units. The informational use of notation units is rule based, each
individual notation unit has a definite physical value and function - with
regard to the mechanical procedure - while the linguistic utilization uses the
notation system as a redundancy potential.
Excursus: In several of these respects the linguistic use of notation units is related to the
function of notes in scale-based music, where the musical expression is bound to a se-
quence of notes although the expression is changed through variation of the individual
note. Such variations can both have the effect of a deviation from a given scale, which is
common to many works, or of a variation of the thematic structure which characterizes the
individual work. While the scale establishes a sonar background structure (not necessarily
explicitly manifested in the individual work) as an invariant basic pattern for the musical
expression,  the themes which characterize the individual work are expressed through the
repetition of a limited and chosen set of the possible combinations. The relationship
between these two repetition patterns is not, however, fixed. The thematic variation, which
can include overlapping between themes and variations of the individual themes, can be
carried through right up to the dissolution of the theme. It can also lift the musical
expression out of the scale-based tonality (we could say over to another scale, although
this is perhaps only represented by a single note) and both pattern structures (that of the
scale, which is common to many works, and the choice which characterizes the individual
work) can become the objects of corresponding variations in strength of significance.
In scale-based music the individual notes are defined by a certain frequency which
additionally defines the musical borderline between noise and legitimate musical sounds.
The unlimited possibility for varying the patterns which create music thus does not
depend on a continuous, gliding sound transition, but on the circumstance that the pattern
itself is produced as a compositional, facultative structure of distinct expression units. This
holds true not only of the thematic patterns which characterize the individual work - and
its relationship to other individual works - but also of the harmonic scale pattern which
establishes a tone structure for a greater number of works.
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Although the musical sound value of this music has a well-defined physical form and a
well-defined relation to other sound values established by the scale, the musical expression
cannot be described as monoplanar sound symbolism.
The individual notes are defined both by frequency, by scale and by thematically
determined relationships to other notes. At all three - individually variable - levels this is a
question of conventional pattern formations through which sounds are defined as music -
i.e. legitimate - sounds.
The similarity between the symbolic systems of language and scale-based music lies in
the circumstance that the linguistic and musical rule structures are established, on the one
hand, in a subdivided layer of sequence structures, (those of the scale, the work’s basic
theme and the thematic variations) which on the other hand is realized in an expression
form which makes it possible to arrange these structures in variations, ranging from
complete regularity to complete dissolution, as all structures are produced through a
combination of singular facultative or variable expression units.
Now it is difficult to imagine that it would be at all possible to create music or language
if this should be done by selecting expression units one by one. But although neither
language nor music appears conceivable without restrictive conventions for the
composition of expression units, in both cases there is a need to limit and stabilize the
potential choice and not for a set of rules which can define the musical or linguistic field.
The rule structures which are included in the individual musical work or the linguistic
expression respectively, do not circumscribe the musical and the linguistic, on the
contrary, they are contained in the expression and manifested in the expression systems
which in both cases are accessible to variation which transgresses the rules.
This possibility of varying and suspending rule structures, which holds true of all
symbol systems that 1) use a finite number of expression units and 2) allow rule for-
mation to be manifested in the same expression units as meaning content, is thus based on
the circumstance that the smallest expression units are defined as semantic variation
mechanisms, but have no definite semantic rule or meaning value.
Although the individual work will always use only a very limited number of the pos-
sible variations, it is not possible to establish definite limits to variation at any of these
levels which are common to all music. The limits which appear through a description of a
given body of works thus do not represent a description of the musical »essence«, they
represent, on the contrary, the intentional, semantic considerations of the communicative
purpose and ensure that the message can be understood and received.
The purpose of this parallel is not to emphasize the music of language, but to em-
phasize that kinship between language and music which lies in the central importance of
the redundancy function for the symbolic use of what - in both cases - is a limited set of
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expression units. The kinship is not, however, interesting solely because of the similarity,
but also because of the differences.
No attempt will be made here to describe what can be understood by the meaning
content of music, nor the content forms of the musical sign function; there can, however,
hardly be any reason to deny that the musical expression is only musical because the
expression is part of a sign function and must therefore be described as a biplanar or
multiplanar symbol system. This is why John Cage could compose (and we can listen to) a
piece of music by declaring only its duration (four minutes and some seconds) using no
sounds at all. If nothing else, this work illustrates the ultimate and sole limit to musical
expression, that of the substance. In the broadest sense of language, music is a language.
The difference between speech and music, however, is not only a difference at the level of
content meaning and content form, but also at the level of the expression form, although
speech and music both use the same ethereal substance. We can therefore not speak of
more or less superfluous occurrences of notes in scale-based music, each individual
occurrence of a note is subject to the composer’s choice and the musical expression is
also bound to a far more rigorous demand on the physical definition of the notes. In
other words, this is a question of two different criteria for distinguishing legitimate forms
in the same expression substance.
Whereas it is possible in spoken language to use the forms of the expression substance
as a semantic variation potential, the scale-based musical expression is bound to a sharply
delimited set of legitimate substance forms. While the expression substance variation of
the individual sounds is included in the redundancy structure of linguistic notation, it is
not included in the scale-based musical redundancy structure - apart from that timbre
which distinguishes the same sound when played on different instruments. In scale-based
music all other variants and deviations from the rule based substance forms are, on the
contrary, always defined as noise.
As a consequence of the precise tone definition, scale-based music can also be repre-
sented extremely precisely, note for note in the form of musical notation. The difference
between the tone and the equivalent note is simply a difference in substance. Although
there are probably people who can enjoy a comprehensive and lively musical experience
by reading a musical score, music cannot normally be understood with the eye. The
sensing of the form is conditioned by and bound to the substance in which the form is
expressed.
In an article on musical notation as a means of knowledge representation (seen as a
kind of »precedent« for binary notation) Henrik Sinding-Larsen notes that the musical
information in the score »apparently as a paradox« grew in step with the development of a
notation system in which the individual notation unit »contained less and less
information« up to the point where the notes had become »exact digitalized symbols in a
242
well defined system«. This development, claims Sinding-Larsen, is typical of semiotic
systems, as these develop in a continuous abstraction in which the semiotic and syntactic
systems take on greater and greater importance, while the individual element
correspondingly loses information content.
23
While this description is perhaps adequate for a possible line of development in a for-
mal notation system such as the musical score, which is the formal re-presentation of a
tonal system, it is inadequate as a general model. First, because it allows no room for the
difference between notations which have independent semantic value and notations which
do not. Second, because it connects the »falling information content« of the individual
notation with less weight in relationship to the total system. The relationship is rather the
opposite, as a notation without an independent information content has a potential use of
far greater semantic reach. The less the value of the notation is preordained, the greater
the potential for its use as a semantic variation mechanism. Third, the individual note’s
notation value is defined by its place on the line, which is part of the rule determining
formal system.
It is exactly at these points that alphabetical writing and informational notation diffe-
rentiate themselves, because they use semantically empty notation units, while the tone
(and thereby also the note) is bound to a definite relationship in the tonal system. As
musical note notation is bound to a scale - and not to its own expression substance - it
cannot be regarded as an independent notation system. The relationship between the
phoneme and the grapheme is different from the relationship between the tone and the
note. Writing does not have the same relationship to speech as that of the score to the
music.
The music of language clearly distinguishes itself from the language of music, but the
language of music is also used for linguistic meaning articulation. We have no difficulty
in distinguishing spoken language from song, song from other musical expressions or
singing a song from song-like sounds such as humming, for example. The relationship
between these symbolic expression forms is not a relationship between two different
symbolic expression forms with clearly delimited rule systems which do not overlap. Not
only can we break into song and thereby connect the musical and linguistic norms with
the same physical sounds, we can also exploit musical structures as expression forms for
linguistic meaning articulation.
That we can connect linguistic and musical norms with the same sounds is not quite so
obvious as it - sounds, as the scale-based, musical sounds are defined by a precise
frequency, while language works with both dialectal, sociolectal and individual variants of
the »same« sound. Nevertheless the common expression substance allows an amount of
                                                
23  Henrik Sinding-Larsen, 1988: 97.
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interference between musical and linguistic sound symbolism. The exploitation of musical
structures in linguistic meaning articulation, however, is even more interesting because it is
a question of a linguistic use of a non-linguistic expression form.
If we wish to maintain the concept of an invariant language system, we must therefore
introduce musical structures as part of this system and indicate invariant thresholds for
their linguistic use. The question then is whether these thresholds, if they could be shown,
would make the gateway to language systems so high and the door so broad that there will
no longer be any room for a wall.
The comparison with scale-based music shows that the use of the expression substance
by spoken language is not only different from that of music, but also that this special
relationship to the expression substance can be used as a semantic variation mechanism.
End of excursus.
Hjelmslev does not eliminate expression substance and notational redundancy
from the structure of language because redundancy is not part of the
expression form. The explanation can rather be found in Saussure’s sign
concept, which propounds the opposition between expression and content as
an overall, controlling perspective in considering the expression side. Through
this perspective the relationship between semantic distinctiveness and
redundant expression figurations is arranged in order of precedence on the
basis of content distinctiveness which - in a short-circuit - is directly
connected with the preferential position of expression distinctiveness as the
exclusively semantic part of the expression. Content distinctiveness, however,
becomes manifested in the polarization of redundant and distinctive
manifestations.
If we wish to describe the specific linguistic utilization of alphabetical no-
tation, we cannot omit this redundancy structure. Hjelmslev’s omission of it is
also closely connected with the fact that he saw notation as an insignificant
expression material for language, except for the circumstance that the number
of permissible figurae was limited. This limitation, however, is not invariant and
not systematically determined.
It is also in the same - i.e. reversed - fashion with the content side, where
Hjelmslev’s system separates language system from meaning, as he simply
writes off the importance of the linguistic redundancy structure for
interference between language system and meaning.
If we maintain Saussure’s terminology - and precisely from his assumptions -
it becomes clear that the substance depends on the form to such a degree
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that it lives exclusively by its favor and can in no sense be said to have
independent existence.24
In spite of this almost religious rhetoric,25 which so appositely expresses the
theological roots of his idea, Hjelmslev shows immediately after, with the
sentence »I do not know« in Danish, English, French, Finnish and Eskimo,
how the same meaning de facto exists in different languages, expressed in
different content forms which »stress different factors within the amorphous
“thoughtmass”«.26 There is a further discussion here on an arbitrary
relationship, which must mean that the meaning exists in such a real sense that
it both has different features - so that it is not completely amorphous - and can
be included in various relationships with a content form.27
The sign concept is thus formed through a double delimitation: on the
expression side in relationship to the manifested redundancy, described as sign
parts, non-signs, or figurae and on the content side in relationship to the
complex meaning concept, described as an amorphous mass.
The semantic field, however, stretches across both these borders. Although
meaning is understood as an amorphous mass, in Hjelmslev’s theory structured
meaning elements are included as a necessary precondition. It is such elements
(and not content forms) which are used in the commutation test, which also
only works because it uses meaning change as a form distinctive criterion. It is
also structured, i.e. a specific, meaning content which is decisive for the sign
definition itself, for the distinction between sign and non-sign and for any
analytical segmentation of the language forms, both at the level of content and
that of expression.
When all is said and done, it is only the meaning which distinguishes any
kind of symbolic form from any other kind of form. It is also only the meaning
in a form which turns it into in-formation. Hjelmslev’s language theory does
not include the semantic tools of analysis he uses to express his own theory in
linguistic form.
Although Hjelmslev emphasized the linguistic form as the concern of
linguistics in opposition to transcendental, meaning bound language descrip-
                                                
24  Hjelmslev (1943) 1966: 46. English translation (1953) 1961: 50.
25  »by its favor« is a translation of the Danish »af dens nåde«, which has reference to the grace of God.
26  The amorphous “thoughtmass” is also referred to as »the meaning« or (content) »purport« - residing
outside the language system, but totally dependent on it.
27 See the examples with »børneren« (the kindergarten), »døgneren« (the 24-hour service kiosk), and
»fritteren« (the day-care institution) in 7.7 for further explanation.
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tions, he also used meaning as a means of deriving the language system, in
spite of his claim that the system existed independently - and transcendentally
- of meaning.
The transcendental precondition is contained in the axiomatic postulate
that it is possible to claim that any linguistic sequence can be understood as
the manifestation of a language system.
While no linguistic sequence can exist without an underlying system, there
may, it is said, be language systems which exist without there being a text
constructed in that language, i.e. virtual texts without realization in the form of
theoretically possible systems.
It is thus impossible to have a text without a language [system] lying behind
it. On the other hand, one can have a language [system] without a text
constructed in that language [system]. This means that the language
[system] in question is foreseen by linguistic theory as a possible system, but
that no process belonging to it is present as realized. The textual process is
virtual.28
It would now be highly appropriate to discuss how a mental language system
without linguistic features could possibly exist. Under any circumstances, the
idea of the primacy of the language system contains a residue of the same
transcendental precondition that Hjelmslev wished to dismiss.
If, in accordance with Hjelmslev’s intention, we wish to establish an
immanent view of language, we cannot lay the foundation by declaring that
there is a language system which exists in the form of a linguistically well-
defined island which is completely delimited from the surrounding non-
linguistic sea and prior to any linguistic articulation.
When we deny that the language system is produced by language usage,
we are left with the question as to where, when, how and by whom it was
created. Without an answer to these questions, the declaration lacks the
foundation it assumes itself. That this lack has often been accepted is perhaps
due to the fact that the idea of a fully created, closed system is ideally suited to
the deep-lying cultural assumption expressed in the idea of a divine creation.
It was at this point that Chomsky (probably without knowing it) broke
with Hjelmslev’s theory in proposing the hypothesis that humans were equip-
ped with a physiological »language motor« in the form of an innate, universal
                                                
28  Hjelmslev (1943) 1966: 36-37. English translation, (1953) 1961: 40.
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grammar.29 By identifying the system with a motor Chomsky resolved the
schism between the invariant, static system and the dynamic sequence. But
the theory does not describe how the physiological system can produce a
grammar. It fixes a long, unknown history of development in a single, giant
leap from the physiological system to a physiologically rooted grammatical
system in which it is no longer necessary to see the physiological process as a
potential source of meaning which can work both with and against the
grammatical motor.
Although Chomsky is a Darwinist in the sense that he places the innate
grammar in the physiological system, he maintains a classical dualism with the
idea of an autonomous, mental - in this case, grammatical - form which is
elevated above (and conceived independently of) material substance. The
form concept, however, is itself determined by a cognitive discrimination
which distinguishes certain elements in the matter as part of a form, a structure
or level.
If there is a grammatical motor in the physiological system - and this is still a
speculative hypothesis - it does not represent the beginning of linguistic
competence, but a late stage in its development. As the motor has not always
existed, it cannot be particularly universal either, much less inaccessible to
new, non-linguistically motivated change.
The immanent, scientific viewpoint must also go beyond this transcendental
residue in the understanding of form and take steps to look at form creation,
including that of language forms, in relation to the immanent, non-linguistic
»surroundings«. The relationship between the linguistic and the non-linguistic
is not only a question of how it is possible to use external matter to depict the
external world in the form of language which is distinct from both matter and
meaning, but rather a question of how linguistic forms are generated in the
field of tension between matter and meaning.
Probably nobody would deny that it is possible to construct languages
which follow a limited set of given rules, or that any linguistic expression can
assume some kind of regularity. The problematical point in these assumptions
lies, on the contrary, in the implicit precondition that any linguistic rule system
always constitutes a coherent, theoretically reconstructable and, in this sense,
closed system. It is the same problem which motivates Hjelmslev to suspend
further analysis of linguistic redundancy with the term ‘figura’. If a linguistic
sign is created in the establishment of a distinction between semantically more
                                                
29  Chomsky, 1957.
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distinctive and more redundant figurations, it is impossible to maintain
Hjelmslev’s - transcendental - concept of a language system, as the minimum
linguistic condition in such a case consists of the distinction between
semantically distinctive and redundant figurae and not of any particular rule
system. The redundancy structure thus appears to comprise the smallest
identifiable condition of language.
This assumption is completely in accordance with the description of a sign
as something that can stand for something else, as that which must stand for
something else can only do so by standing slightly less for itself. It thereby
conflicts with the idea that only signs can produce signs, in what Peirce
described as an infinitely continuing, self-dependent semiotic process.
That we can only speak of the world through language and that any
referentiality has a debatable quality, does not mean that the thus dubiously
referred to and always only re-presented world around us can be eliminated or
marginalized in linguistic theory. On the contrary, it means that the semantic
meaning field stretches across the gulf between language and non-language
also including, as is the case with informational notation, that of the lower
threshold to the expression substance. The elimination of the non-linguistic is
only made possible by the groundless claims on behalf of a sign concept based
on transcendental, theoretical premises which legitimizes taking the sign as
exclusively given as its own cause.
Whether we motivate the autonomy of the science of signs with the con-
cept »langue«, »language system«, or »code« cannot change the fact that in all
these cases, with these terms, we carry out a groundless separation of a special
linguistic fragment of consciousness from the rest of the contents of
consciousness - and also from the physiological manifestation form of
consciousness which comprises the mental expression substance.
In the definition of the sign function as a relationship between two different
levels, an expression and a content level, both seen as purely linguistic
dimensions, linguistic theory eliminates its possibility of understanding the
meaning of the non-linguistic for the way language works. This holds true at
the internal, mental level and at the level of the expression and therefore also
for the sign concept which is defined as the connection between them.
The idea is not in this way to be able to solve the problem of meaning in the
form of a definition of the referential status of various sign systems, but on the
contrary to investigate the ways in which the relationship to the non-linguistic
is included as an element in the linguistic.
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7.7 Linguistic redundancy structures
I have claimed in the preceding that redundant figurae are an irreducible part
of the sign’s expression form and of the semantic structure of language.
The redundant manifestation of figurae as a foundation for the mani-
festation of the more distinctive figurae is in itself an important functional
property, but it also creates the foundation for other characteristic semantic
features.
It is well known that an abundance of sign elements considerably aids
readability. We are thus often able to ignore printer’s errors, mispronunciations
and speech variations (or ascribe meaning to them) and decipher indistinct
signs, whereas notation systems without redundant sign elements - Morse
signals for example, or binary notation - are much more vulnerable.
This meaning stablilizing effect can hardly be underestimated, but on the
other hand, it is not of such importance that it can explain in itself why
language has retained its redundant elements. If redundancy only served to
support meaning recognition, it would be reasonable to expect redundant
expression units to disappear in step with increasing reading proficiency -
whether in the form of abbreviations or linguistic innovations which omit
certain sign sequences. Words which are used in a group are often subject to
this type of change in pronunciation or spelling, because the need for distinct
marking declines as a given meaning expression becomes a custom. A good
example is a Danish usage which apparently grew up among children of
kindergarten age. Here, we not only encounter ‘børnehaven’ (the
kindergarten) referred to as /‘børneren’/ (literally ‘the kinder’), but also
‘fjernsynet’ (the television) referred to as /‘fjerneren’/ (the ‘tele’, or ‘the telly’
as it is usually spelt), ‘døgnkiosken’ (24-hour service kiosk) as /‘døgneren’/
(‘the 24-hour’er’), ‘fritidsinstitution’ (the recreation centre) as /‘fritteren’/
(the ‘rec’) - and a number of other similar innovations.
The - Danish - example not only tells us something about the linguistic
creativity of children - which is often seen by adults as vulgarization - but also
something about the redundancy function. It is immediately obvious that
these changes follow the same rule for the elimination of superfluous sign
elements. But it is also clear that the familiarity which makes it possible to omit
the entire second part of a number of compound nouns is not only a linguistic
familiarity. The regularity which permits the elimination is, on the contrary, a
regularity in the world of children, where the kindergarten, television, 24-hour
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service kiosk and recreation centre in the same period have become common
and basic areas of daily life experience.
The example thus shows that a distinctive expression can become re-
dundant relative to the non-linguistic (in the actual a case a new lifestyle). But
it also shows that expression redundancy is relative to the content form. The
two different expression forms (the television/the telly) correspond to a
semantic difference, although it may be difficult to define this difference. One
possibility is to regard it as a - subjectively motivated - stylistic difference, but
it could also be claimed that the stylistic difference represents a more
comprehensive semantic distinction, /the telly/ indicates a relational
experience, a familiarity, which is not contained in the concept of /television/.
A »sui generis« explanation could attach importance to the fact that the
different examples are formed in accordance with the same rule, which could
thus be regarded as part of the language system. The rule could be formulated
as something like: the second part of compound nouns is subject to the same
tendency towards loss of distinctiveness that we are familiar with in
connection with many suffixes in Danish. There is, however, no rule for when
this rule comes into force and when it does not, for which words it affects and
which it does not and this is because it can only come into force as the
consequence of a semantic choice made by a language user and then accepted
by so many other users that it becomes adopted. The semantic choice of the
form, the first use, occurs under any circumstances before the formation of
the rule, just as the establishment of this expression form as a rule structure
contains yet another semantic choice.
The use of the rule in the examples we have seen here can only be explai-
ned by referring to the specific context. The transition from distinctiveness to
redundancy is not only fluid, it is determined by semantic decisions which are
not solely subject to linguistic rules. The redundancy structure is conversely
precisely a structure which permits such an interference between the linguistic
rules and non-linguistic influence on rule structure and rule formation, because
it permits both new and old expression forms to be manifested with
semantically motivated, variable values.
The sign economy of the linguistic expression is thus closely connected
with both meaning and the non-linguistic world in which and of which
meaning is formed. Where there is great familiarity with regard to meaning
between sender and receiver, distinctive sign sequences lose some distinc-
tiveness. This does not necessarily mean that they are no longer manifested,
but rather that they are manifested as redundant sign sequences which can
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later be eliminated or retained with the possibility of becoming distinctive
once again.
Expression redundancy thus constitutes an extremely important aspect of
the plasticity of language relative to the highly variable consensus between
the senders and receivers of language. That which is expressed is a semantic
function of the non-expressed, not only on the content side, but also on the
expression side.30
Finally, herein lies the fact that the relationship between redundant and
distinctive manifestations need not necessarily coincide for the sender and the
receiver or for different receivers.
Complete coincidence, on the other hand, is an exception which rarely or
never occurs. We never hear or read the precise meaning expressed, we hear
or read it in more or less conformity with the sender’s intention or explication.
The question therefore arises as to how one and the same linguistic - and not
least written - expression can contain this semantic openness at all, as the
expression is produced in a completely closed form.
In answering this, reference has often been made to the fact that linguistic
understanding depends on an interpretation community, which in some way
permits meaning to be received as a copy of the message transmitted and then
interpreted. But the reference to an interpretation community, which is not
completely inaccurate in itself, provides no answer to the question of how
language can contain several meanings in the same expression. The reference
to an interpretation community, however, is not quite accurate either. If we
already possess a common understanding, communication would only be a
confirmation of this concord. In this case the only reason to communicate
would be to confirm that there is no need to communicate at all. Conversely,
we can state that a basic motive for communication is to establish common
interpretations or to explore differences.
Nor will it help to regard the expression on the basis of the semantic-distinc-
tive sign manifestations, because this view either implies a semantic
unambiguousness or complete randomness in the relationship between the
                                                
30  This function is also frequently manifested in the use of »empty places«, for example the omission
of one part of the nexus relation often used in newspaper headlines: /[ ] Sends suggestion to
committee/. /[ ] Died of drink/. /Peter Hansen [ ] court tomorrow/. Here it is left to the reader to
encatalyze the missing parts. The reader’s capability to do this is considered, in Hjelmslev’s theory, as
confirmation of the existence of the language system. It is not possible, however, to encatalyze the
correct word without take meaning into account, just as the possibility itself of working with »empty
places« provides language with a characteristic property. We could perhaps cautiously compare this to
the meaning of the number 0, which is different to nothing.
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expression and the content form, whereas the relationship between the sender
and the receiver is neither unambiguous nor completely random. Polysemy
must at once be made possible in and limited by the expression itself.
But nor is it adequate to simply add that redundant sign sequences are also
included, if we thereby imply that a given expression is characterized by an -
intentional or unintentional on the part of the sender - completely defined
relationship between redundant and distinct manifestations. This would imply
that all semantic variations permitted by the expression would be variations of
an opposed character. Where the sender defined a distinctive relationship, the
receiver would have to read this as redundant, with complete randomness as a
consequence.
The only possibility which remains is to assume that the same notation
sequence permits variation in reading the relationship between the more or
less distinctive.
This variation is not limited to the circumstance that many words can be
used with different meanings and that different shades of meaning can be
manifested in certain uses. This form of polysemy, connected with semantic
entities such as the word - or sentence - is well known and obvious. In these
cases it is a question of a semantic content form which is connected with a
(variable) register of possible content meanings (old meanings may disappear
while new are created). This type of variable reading (polysemy) thus
concerns variation in the relationship between content meaning and content
form.
But in addition to this there is a possible polysemy which is connected with
the smallest semantic variation mechanisms. It is well known that it is possible
to change meaning in spoken language by changing tone or emphasis. In this
case the change of content meaning is brought about by changing the
expression form. The interesting point now is, that such a change need not
necessarily be manifested in written language. While the difference between
/en vis person/ (a certain person or a wise person) in spoken Danish is
expressed by a phonemic distinction (the former is pronounced something like
[vis] (as in ‘this’) while the latter is pronounced something like [vees]
(unvoiced ‘s’), the two persons today usually have the same expression form
in written language. The difference can be represented either by using the
archaic /ii/ (en viis person, der er klog - a wise person who is clever) or by
italicization (en vis person, der er bestemt - a certain person), but this is not
necessary and not usual.
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While meaning distinction in speech is represented here by an expression
difference, in writing it is only borne by the meaning context. The phonemic
marking of  semantic distinctiveness in spoken language is substituted by a
purely semantic distinction which has no explicit manifestation in writing. The
individual grapheme can in other words have different semantically distinctive
values in the same constellation. If we use the commutation test on this
example the peculiar result is that in written language we have genuine
commutation between the grapheme /i/ in vis (wise) and the grapheme /i/ in vis,
(certain) which are thus both identical and different graphemes.
While such a case strains the idea of an asemantically defined graphemic
system, it confirms the description of figurae as semantic variation mechanisms
which are included in a redundancy system in which the individual figurae
can occur with a variable content of significance and/or strength of
significance and that notational distinctiveness can be replaced by seman-
tically determined distinctiveness.
The example, however, also gives occasion for a closer look at the rela-
tionship between the spoken and written expression.
Writing - a system of expression and/or a language?
Hjelmslev’s language theory concerns the description of what he refers to as
the »so-called “natural” spoken language«. We could immediately ask,
however, whether the spoken language, on the whole or solely, uses sign
elements in the form of phonetic figurae in the sense that Hjelmslev assumes.
Although it is true that it is possible to establish relatively clear phonetic
inventories as typical, and the understanding of spoken language also
presumably assumes a certain correspondence between the speaker’s and the
listener’s phonetic inventories, spoken language equally indubitably permits a
far greater (individual, group determined, dialectal, stylistic etc.) phonetic
variation than is expressed in these inventories, just as at the same time it offers
a number of other, corrective possibilities for distinguishing semantic
distinctiveness (tone, facial expressions, gestures, pre-established social
expectations in the communicative context) which are regarded as peripheral
by Hjelmslev.
As spoken and written language not only use different substances, but also
use substance forms in different ways, it is not possible to speak of an
expression system common to both without further ado, nor to take either
speech or writing as a model for »language«.
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A more cautious interpretation therefore prompts us for the present to
regard the graphemic redundancy structure as a redundancy connected with
the alphabetically expressed language, where the manifestation of redundant
sign elements is the necessary precondition for the manifestation of
semantically distinctive signs.
That this is a characteristic of alphabetical writing does not necessarily
imply that it is also a characteristic of spoken language or of language as such.
Havelock, for example, claims that it is wrong to identify writing with
language and suggests that the term »language« should be reserved for
spoken language. Further to this he describes alphabetical writing as a
translation of the phonemes of speech into a visual expression which depends
on - compared to speech - a very recently developed civilizational
competence.31
According to Havelock, a true alphabet can be defined by three require-
ments which must be fulfilled simultaneously: First, that all the phonemes of
spoken language must be covered. Second, that the total number of
graphemes (letter shapes) must be limited to between 20 and 30. And third,
that a given grapheme need not handle more than one task, the individual
grapheme must be connected with a fixed and invariable acoustic identity.32
The central point in this definition is that the visual representation of spoken
language in the Greek-Roman alphabet is a re-presentation of the spoken
language’s phoneme system.
This translation depends on the one hand on a theoretical, analytical
conceptualization of the basic acoustic components of spoken language, its
»atomic structure«, with the deciphering of the vowels as the sonant element,
to which are added con-sonant start and/or stop conditions and, on the other,
on the written notation system being based on a set of distinctive forms which
have no semantic content. The graphemes of writing, letters, must on the
contrary be seen as visual signals which mechanically release an acoustic
picture in the consciousness.
The bond, which can connect speech and writing, thus lies in the demand
for a rigorous correspondence between phonetic and graphemic manifestation,
a correspondence in the elementary particles of the expression system.
According to Havelock, it is this asemantic relationship between speech and
writing which makes it possible to represent many different spoken languages
in the same written notation system. That the number of necessary graphemes
                                                
31  Havelock, 1982: 39-59, 316.
32  Havelock, 1982: 61, 77.
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can be defined with such relative clarity as being between 20 and 30, finally
depends on a combination of a mnemonic need to reduce the number of
immediately recognizable basic forms as much as possible with the demand for
complete representation of the possible number of phonemes, which again is
determined by the biologically contingent, physiological articulation
possibilities.
Havelock thus assumes that the expression elements of alphabetical writing
»ideally« correspond to those of spoken language, but he also claims at the
same time that acoustic recollection can hardly have the form of a - limited -
phonetic inventory, as he sees the spoken language as a biologically handed
down disposition comprising the mental ability to retain the enormous number
of acoustic picture constellations of spoken language. But this view is not
without its problems either, because it conceals the question of the spoken
language’s acoustic side in biology, even though the art of speaking has by
definition, so to speak, artificial dimensions. This at the same time implies that
the description of the limited phonetic inventory also in this theory is perhaps
rather a projection of the much later developed alphabetical notation.
On the other hand, both Hjelmslev’s and Havelock’s theories create the, in
this connection, regrettable problem that writing is not understood as
language. In Hjelmslev this only appears implicitly from his repeated emphasis
on the claim that the primary linguistic subject area is spoken language,
although he otherwise appears to assume that linguistic theory is so general
anyway that it includes all languages. The lack of clarity in his view of the
relationship between spoken and written language is not only shown by his
refusal to consider written language as a separate subject, but also by the fact
that when referring to the physical material (usage) he is thinking of speech,
but is mainly and perhaps exclusively writing about the »text«:
The objects of interest to linguistic theory are texts. The aim of linguistic
theory is to provide a procedural method by means of which a given text can
be comprehended through a self-consistent and exhaustive description.33
                                                
33  Hjelmslev (1943) 1966: 16. English translation: (1953) 1961: 16. The term ‘text’ is used
throughout and naturally in Prolegomena, while when referring to the fact that it is the spoken
language that is the subject, this appears in more emphatic connections. In the original Danish text, the
two reference systems sometimes meet in one and the same sentence, thus towards the end we find:  a
demand for a sure method of describing a given limited text  composed in a previously defined »natural«
[spoken] language, has, in the course of our presentation, with logical necessity, had to make way...
Hjelmslev (1943) 1966: 110. English translation (1953) 1961: 125. The English translation uses
»language« for Hjelmslev’s sprog/ dagligsprog/talesprog (language, ordinary or everyday language as
well as for spoken language).
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It is not difficult to understand the motive behind this textual reference to
spoken language which proposes the description of language sui generis as a
goal. While the written language, precisely on the expression side, appears sui
generis, the spoken language has no such »existing« property as a manifest
object. Writing exists, as a fixed manifestation, speech is unique and can only
appear as an object in a mediated and reconstructed form.
That this is a question of a deeper confusion also appears from the quite
informal and uncommented use of examples from Latin, just as all examples
which are used in the book therefore appear as written representations, while
there is a complete lack of any attempt at all to describe oral communication.
This confusion cannot be explained as a careless lapse. It is, on the contrary,
the result of the theoretical construction, as speech and writing are viewed as
two different usages, i.e. as two, for language, external and random expression
substances, or as Hjelmslev gradually defines them: as substances for an
expression system of a linguistic schemata,
Thus, various phonetic usages and various written usages can be ordered to
the expression system of one and the same linguistic schema. A language
can suffer a change of a purely phonetic nature without having the
expression system of the linguistic schema affected, and similarly it can
suffer a change of a purely semantic nature without having the content
system affected.34
There is no basis for denying these possibilities which, according to Hjelmslev,
explain, »that it is possible to distinguish between phonetic shifts and semantic
shifts on the one hand, and formal shifts on the other«. On the other hand
there are no possibilities either for denying that both phonetic shifts and
semantic shifts can also produce formal shifts. In Hjelmslev’s theory this can
only happen as an external cause whose effect in the language system is
exclusively determined by »the immanent algebra of language«.35 This
abstraction, however, cannot be observed as there is no other way of studying
the language form than through the study of notation and meaning changes.
By isolating the language form and reducing the physical medium to an
amorphous substance, the central question as to whether it is possible to
explain rules for which shifts at one level can produce shifts at one of the
                                                
34  Hjelmslev, (1943) 1966: 93. English translation (1953) 1961: 105.
35  Hjelmslev, (1943) 1966: 72. English translation (1953) 1961: 80.
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other levels, disappears, partly because the relationship is seen as peripheral,
but particularly because the idea of an amorphous substance implies that we
must ignore the structural properties which characterize the relationship to the
expression substance and provide speech and writing with different semantic
potentialities.
Where Hjelmslev is silent (but does remark that written language has still
not been studied at all and is perhaps just as »original« as speech), Havelock
offers a number of conceptual - and historically motivated - distinctions,
including the descriptions of the development and mutual relationship of the
two expression systems in ancient Greece. For Havelock this distinction
implies that we cannot use writing as a paradigm for the description of spoken
language, but at the same time he also introduces the two systems into a
mutual hierarchy where speech is seen as a biological invariant, while writing
systems are seen as specific, artificial and external notation systems.
A successful or developed writing system is one which does not think at all.
It should be the purely passive instrument of the spoken word even if, to use
a paradox, the word is spoken silently.36
As different articulation possibilities are attached to each of the systems, it is
not obvious that writing is only a passive, external medium for speech and is
not seen as language. No clear reason - over and above the biological
background - is given and it is perhaps limited, ultimately, to a manifestation of
that logocentrism which, according to Derrida, is expressed in a tacit
preference for speech as against writing, an invocatory gesture intended to
conceal the gulf between meaning and expression which is attached to the
sign concept in which the presence of the sign is a manifestation of the
absence of the thing. Whether the way the problem presents itself here can be
clarified must remain unanswered in the present work. The problem, however,
marks a possibility for regarding alphabetical writing as a specific language.
As far as the redundancy concept is concerned, it is therefore obvious to
ask, moreover, how the sign organization of alphabetical writing relates to the
spoken language. Does spoken language possess double redundancy parallel
to that of written language, or is the redundancy structure of written language,
on the contrary, a specific function which only corrects problems in
                                                
36  Havelock, 1982: 55.
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converting visual forms to the mental recollection of the spoken language’s
phonemes?
Probably both. It is well known that written language is far from capable of
reproducing spoken language when read at the level of expression units.
Linguists operate, on the contrary, with a special phonetic notation which is
subject to a far higher variability than written language. In this respect
Havelock’s correspondence theory represents an idealization of limited
durability, as any child who has learned to spell knows.
In some circumstances, redundant grapheme occurrences are undoubtedly
connected with a need to correct the incomplete correspondence of written
notation to acoustic recollection, but this does not imply that a similar
redundancy does not also hold true for the phonetic inventory. The difficulty
here is that there is no obvious symmetry between the concepts of phoneme
and grapheme.
While graphemes, in their capacity of explicit and physically fixed forms, are
constructed as distinctive and manifest forms, the concept ‘phoneme’ is
perhaps only a theoretical abstraction whereby we make the acoustic aspect
of spoken language accessible to analytical operations. There thus appears to
be a question in both Hjelmslev and Havelock of a description of the phonetic
structure on the basis of the alphabetical notation. While written notation is
based on a sequential, single-stringed organization of discrete elements,
spoken language is under any circumstances at least two-stringed. The
distinction between consonants and vowels in writing is here parallel to a co-
ordination of at least two simultaneous (and complex) physical processes: the
production of acoustic waves and the modulation of variations which can be
both continuous (sonant) and discontinuous (con-sonant). The speech
situation at the same time contains a number of other, simultaneous and
mutually interfering physical expression possibilities. A wink can influence the
speaker’s construction of a sentence, or be used to give expression to one or
more meanings etc.
That we can still claim that redundancy is not simply a function of written
notation, but is included as constitutive for language formation, is due to the
fact that redundancy is a necessary precondition for any articulation in this
world. The acoustic picture of the spoken language can - just as the musical




In the description given here of the notational redundancy structure, the
emphasis has been placed on the functionality of redundancy seen in the
relationship between the linguistic and the non-linguistic, on the one hand in
relationship to Hjelmslev’s »meaning« (intentions and references) and on the
other in relationship to the physical manifestation of language. The
relationship between the linguistic and the non-linguistic, however, cannot
simply be understood as a »national border« between distinct territories such
as has been done through the well-motivated attack on the view of language
as a mimetic mirror, or as a means of perfectly reconstructing the world around
us.
Hereby falls the idea of the possibility of a given language being described
on the basis of the jurisdiction that is indicated by the concept of language
system. The building itself is built, the rules are themselves subject to
regulatory changes in a process which is at once produced by signs and non-
signs which breed new signs. This affects not only Hjelmslev’s dream of a
language theory which would
be of use for describing and predicting not only any possible text composed
in a certain language, but, on the basis of the information that it gives
about language in general, any possible text composed in any language
whatsoever.37
it affects all theories which describe language systems as invariant, structural
precepts for language use.
It is quite true that there are many linguistic features which have not
changed much, if at all, for a period of 50, 100 and perhaps 1000 years, for
example the nexus structure of the principal clause. This shows that to a very
great degree language utilizes stabilizing rules. It does not, however, show
that there is an precept which is independent of the manifest usage, nor that
the functionality of the nexus relationship is only connected with the internal
organization of the sentence.
As long as we only consider the repetitive use of the same rules, the choice
between describing them as part of a language system, or as an expression of
stabilization in a linguistic redundancy structure, is perhaps arbitrary, but the
arbitrariness is dissolved when we consider the relationship between
                                                
37  Hjelmslev, (1943) 1966: 17. (1953) 1961: 17.
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redundancy and distinctiveness. If we see repetition as part of a
transcendental language system, in relationship to usage, we create an un-
bridgeable gulf between the - in such a case redundant - part of the linguistic
expression which represents the system and that part which represents
meaning. To each part there must belong an individual set of sign sequences,
as the rules of the language system cannot determine all sign sequences, if it is
to be possible to read a meaning into the expression.
It is not possible, however, to carry out such a complete division of sign se-
quences, but it is possible, on the other hand, to show that the sign sequences
of written language are subject to several simultaneously operating rules and
that they are included in several simultaneous relationships. Distinctive
occurrence goes hand in hand with redundant occurrence, linguistic certainty
goes hand in hand with non-linguistic certainty and linguistic certainty can
itself embrace several levels, from grammatical choice to that of genre and
style.
Abandoning the idea of a transcendental language system does not there-
fore imply that it is impossible to speak of rules, but on the contrary, that the
relationship between rules and the determination of their reach and use is itself
part of the sign formation process and that linguistic rule formation takes its
point of departure in the repertoire of existing forms whether they are already
defined in one or several  - possibly overlapping - ways or only exist as
redundant or potential forms.
It could also be said that the common spoken and written languages are
characterized by a semantic rule formation, that this is part of the practice it
regulates and that rule formation occurs in the form of a shifting balance be-
tween several different, available linguistic rules and non-linguistic inter-
ferences.
The relationship between what is preconditioned and that which is ex-
pressed is not a relationship between a precept and an execution of the
programme, but a semantic choice which delimits the expressed relative to an
intention and a receiver. Further to this comes the fact that the concept of
linguistic redundancy itself is, in an important sense, contrary to the distinction
between a programme and an execution. On the one hand the redundancy
function constitutes an alternative to precepts. Redundancy brings about a
stability which, in its absence, would have to be filled in by a programme. On
the other hand, it is not possible to speak of the concept of redundancy before
there is a manifested expression, as redundancy can only be determined
relative to physiological and semantic distinctiveness.
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It is therefore not satisfactory, as Paul Ricoeur does, to simply supplement
semiology, understood »as a science of signs in systems« with »a semantics, or
a science of usage, of the use of signs in sentence position«. Ricoeur motivates
his distinction with the point of departure in the poly-semic character of
language which
in purely synchronic terms... signifies that at a given moment a word has
more than one meaning, that its multiple meanings belong to the same state
of system .38
while in diachronic terms polysemy is the actual result of an ongoing semantic
exchange of meaning, which is again determined as follows »that the word is a
cumulative entity, capable of acquiring new dimensions of meaning without
losing the old ones«.
While the diachronic and semantic dimensions are thus characterized by »a
factor of expansion, and, at the limit, of surcharge« the synchronic system
dimension becomes »the mutual limitation of signs within the system« seen as
a necessary brake which means »that the new meaning finds its place within
the system«.
It is clear here that Ricoeur is wavering between the view of synchronic
description as a description, with regard to meaning, of a transcendental form
system »which can be treated without any reference to history« and as a
»thumbnail sketch«, a certain stage in a process - and hence a history - in
which the system is included as an acting force. He describes the relationship
between the synchronic and the diachronic as a collision process between
two completely separate systems, where the former changes the latter, but
itself remains untouched.
The condition which allows the system to work limitationally in relationship
to the semantic expansion, however, is that it is semantically sensitive itself.
The meaning of the one word cannot fall into place unless the system permits
continuous and unpredicted semantic changes in the linguistic surroundings,
i.e. changes in the extent of the rules and/or changes in the content form
and/or expression form without which a change in meaning cannot be
manifested.
That language can contain this polysemy at all, which according to Ricoeur
is the characteristic proper of language, is due to the fact that the regularity of
                                                
38  Ricoeur, (1969) 1974: 93-94.
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language is formed in continuous modulations and crystallizations in
redundancy structures which permit the same expression elements to be both
rule-bearing and meaning distinctive, often at the same time, but also in a
mutually variable relationship. This implies that the entire structure, and not
only meaning, is included in the semantic dimension. The synchronic
description must therefore be seen as an idiomatic, photographically frozen
picture of a specific state whose relationship to preceding and subsequent
states is open to semantic variation and to the introduction of new rules and
structures, or the suspension of old. Polysemy includes the rules of language,
which only exist if they are accepted and are only accepted if they further a
semantic relationship between a sender and a receiver.
If the rules of language were available in the form of an invariant rule struc-
ture, language would be highly suitable for presenting unambiguous messages,
as there would be a declarative expression rule for each meaning entity. In
such a - for example mathematical - language, an expression such as »goddag
mand økseskaft« (»hello, man axe-handle«) cannot be articulated, although in
Danish this phrase is actually used to tell people that they are talking
nonsense. Nor would a critical reading of such a text be possible.
7.8 The redundancy structure as a criterion for distinguishing between
semantic regimes
If we were asked to name the last 5-10 words - or the last sentence - we had
read, we would generally have to think for a while, it is easier to reproduce a
meaning than to repeat an expression we have read. If we were asked instead
to name the last 5 or 10 letters, or to spell the last word, this would also require
some thinking. The path to the recollection of the letter appears to go through
the recollection of the word and the path to the recollection of the words to
go through the recollection of the meaning. While the distance between word
and meaning corresponds to great freedom to choose words to express a
meaning, the distance between the word and the letter with regard to
recollection is more striking, as there are fixed bonds between the word and its
literal manifestation.
Things are different in spoken language. It is often possible to repeat with-
out difficulty something which has just been said. On the other hand, we do
not possess the same fixed codex for dissolving words into a phonetic
inventory. Whether it is possible to carry out a phonetic or phonological
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dissolution of words into sound components plays no important part in
language competence. While spelling is a facet of the ordinary learning of
written language, phonetic transcription is a purely professional
accomplishment in spite of the colossal importance we attach, individually and
collectively, to correct pronunciation.
It is clear that the phoneme does not play the same role in oral language
competence as the grapheme does in writing, but where does this difference
lie?
One possibility is that there is a structural difference between the auditive
and the visual sensory apparatus. But it is difficult to see why visual mediation
should demand closer ties between the written word and its graphemic
representation than the auditive mediation demands between the spoken
word and its phonemic representation, not least if, with Havelock, we see the
alphabet as a visual representation of the phonemic structure of spoken
language.
It is therefore more reasonable to view this difference in the light of the
different communication structures of the spoken and written word. Whereas
speech - with the air as its medium - is transient and the relationship between
speaker and listener is contemporaneous, writing is fixed and the relationship
between writer and reader is non-contemporaneous.
As contemporaneousness between speech and hearing implies physical clo-
seness between speaker and listener, the speaker is also able to use other
possibilities to express himself. The phonetic inventory does not exist alone, it
is accompanied by accentuation, stress and gesticulatory signals as means of
articulating meaning, just as the speaker can utilize the receiver’s reactions as
part of the stabilization and clarification of the message.
These structural differences determine a difference in the expression eco-
nomy of speech and writing. While the speaker, in speaking, can both use
multiple auditive, visual and possibly also tactile means of expression and
economize with the expression under the impressions of the signals which are
emitted by the receiver and the surroundings, the author of the text can only
use graphemic means of expression and must himself, in advance, establish his
interpretation of the necessary relationship between redundancy and
distinctiveness in the expression.
It appears from this difference not only that the grapheme must handle
many more tasks than the phoneme, the graphemic manifestation must also
transpose the simultaneous manifestations of speech (and those which are not
linguistically expressed, e.g. ‘shown’ meanings, gestures, for example) to
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successive sequences. The fixed graphemic structure of words, which in
writing is further emphasized by the blank sign which separates graphemic
blocks from each other, are not equivalent to the phonemic structure of
speech.
There is thus also an exceptionally good reason why the phoneme does not
play the same role for spoken language competence as the grapheme does for
competence in writing. The phonemic inventory is simply not the elementary
particle of spoken language in the same way as the grapheme is for writing.
There are three reasons for this.
First, the phoneme as a unit is larger than the smallest possible semantic
expression unit. Different accentuation, (voicing, stress, the Danish glottal
stop, strength and volume of voice), of the same phoneme can be semantically
distinctive.
Second, the phonemic manifestation is subject to great individual and group
variation. Handwriting too has its individual variations, but this variation
appears to permit far from the same rich set of possibilities for semantically
distinctive use. The individual variations of handwriting have also traditionally
been seen as a stylistic phenomenon which may characterize the personality
of the writer.
Third, consonant articulation, which in writing is represented by separate
graphemes, is precisely a con-sonant modulation of vocalization. We simply
cannot pronounce separate consonants without a minimum of a sonant
resonator. Distinctions are always distinctions in something.
Whether phonemes actually exist at all as a clearly delimited, acoustic entity
can be discussed, whereas the existence of graphemes as manifest, graphic
entities is indisputable. The difference also appears indirectly from the
difference between phonetic notation and written language, as phonetic
notation produces many phonemic variants of the same word, while written
language uses an almost complete - semantically - invariant graphemic
manifestation.
It is clear that fixed spelling serves to make word recognition easier. As a
consequence of the fact that this occurs in a different way in writing than in
speech, the economic alleviation argument must be seen in the light of the
written communication structure and not as a manifestation of a general
economic law of language.
Where writing with the blank sign and the graphemic invariance of the in-
dividual word support the word as a far more invariant and distinctive entity
than speech, it expresses a difference between the semantic potential which
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lies in the different time structures of the two languages. This difference in time
structures is given in and with the properties of the expression substance.
It is correct that, as a whole, speech, like writing and reading, can be re-
garded as a linear sequence in time, but it is not correct that the expression
elements of speech are articulated (or understood) in a linear succession similar
to that of writing.
The multi-dimensional time-space of speech is only possible because speech
elapses in time, unlike writing which appears as a closed and simultaneous
manifestation of the entire expression. Correspondingly, we can only
understand speech at the time, place and in that order it is pronounced,
whereas the reader can read at any time or place and is completely at liberty to
turn the pages backwards and forwards, skip a page, put the book down or
read it again.39
Whereas the reader, however, must take note of what he reads, put away
the text or make objections post festum, the listener has a broad range of pos-
sibilities for intervention: from the continuous confirmation of understanding,
through quizzical facial expression, interruptions, supplements, amplification,
dialogue, objections, contradictions, to argument, fighting, or departure - or
bloodiest of all - murder. The solitude of writing, however, does offer the
author the clemency of being able to exploit the distance of time - and
thought - to correct or - perhaps - protect himself before the message is sent
out into the world.
The graphemic freezing and sequencing of the contemporaneous field of
speech thus constitutes a micro-structural difference in speech as a dialogic
and writing as a monologic medium. This micro-structural difference remains,
although speech can be monologic or writing dialogic. In speech the
expression is not alone and is accessible to variation as it is produced. Writing,
on the contrary, - in order to stand for itself - must use a certain expressional
invariance speech does not need. As expression systems, speech and writing
are separated by their semantic variation possibilities.
The difference between speech and writing is therefore basically a diffe-
rence in the redundancy structures of the two expression forms, as the expres-
sion substance offers different semantic variation mechanisms. Although this
structural difference can be modulated, the two expression forms drawn closer
together, it is not so plastic that the one system can be made to cover the
entire expression potential of the other. Many sentences can without further
                                                
39  This difference can still be maintained in a modified form even though there are means (recitation,
telephone, radio and tape recorder) to repeat and/or transmit speech at a later time and/or another place.
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ado be produced in both systems, but both systems also permit meaning
expressions which cannot be produced in the other. Here we are cut off from
the possibility of providing genuine examples of spoken language which
cannot be expressed in writing, but the present text is an excellent example of
a written expression which cannot be produced in spoken language.
The difference reaches further that the difference in production potential.
Not all expressions can be translated either, once they have been produced. It
is quite true that it is possible to read any text aloud, but a number of texts
have been written which could not be understood if they were read aloud,
such as theoretical texts which operate with hierarchic sentence structures,
highly specific concept formations and low meaning redundancy.40
Conversely, written language can in many cases reproduce spoken language
through a detailed linguistic (and sequentially ordered) account of the many
non-linguistic (and simultaneously expressed) elements which are included in
the meaning expression, but not in what is pronounced in language. In this
case, it is not the complexity of the sentence structure which hinders
representation, but the complex, non-linguistically expressed - meaning
distinctive - situation, whether the meaning is given by an existing
interpretation community or is only produced during the act of speaking.
Speech and writing have different relationships to Hjelmslev’s »purport«
and »substance«, both on the expression and the content side.
Where the clear meaning in spoken language builds upon a complicated,
non-linguistic context, this context is not expressed in the spoken language
even though it is semantically distinctive. The circumstantiality with which
such a speech must be retold or written down for others reveals that con-
temporaneousness, which determines a possible interaction between the event
and the narrative and/or between the narrator and listener, also confers a
chronological dimension on the spoken language’s redundancy structure
which is unknown in invariant writing, although it is both produced and read
in a one dimensional, linear progression in time.
The difference which exists between the linguistic competence of writing
and speech corresponds to a difference between their redundancy structures,
which implies a difference between the distinctive potentialities of the two
languages.
The two languages, however, are at the same time each other’s subset. Seen
in relationship to other sign systems this kinship appears characteristically as a
                                                
40  This structural difference becomes very extreme if we also include in writing numerical-algorithmic
and mathematical notation, which can only be handled to a limited extent without writing.
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kinship in the same area, which mutually separates them, namely the
redundancy structure.
While written language is distinguished from spoken language by the
redundancy structure of graphemic notation, writing and speech have a
simultaneous manifestation of redundancy and distinctiveness in common.
These two languages thereby distinguish themselves from both pictorial and
formal expression systems.
Written language shares the manifestation’s spatial two-dimensionality with
other pictures, but not the linear sequencing of space. All relationships are
manifested at once in the picture, but are not bound by any succession
sequence. Although the distinctive features - the forms - appear against a
background and in relation to other forms, no fixed redundancy structure is
included in the pictorial expression, as no delimited notation system exists.
It is true that colour in a certain sense constitutes a kind of equivalent to the
linguistic redundancy structure, as forms can only be manifested as differences
between colours. These differences possess a plastic variability, but the
relationship between colour and form itself is invariant. Even though the form
can be determined through the critical thresholds for colour transitions, the
relationship between colour and form is different to the relationship between
redundancy and distinctiveness. Colour cannot be manifested as form, nor
form as colour, as the form always and only manifests itself as a difference
between colours. The relationship is not open to semantically motivated
change, whether the colour is seen as the form’s - random - substance or
colour variation is seen as the material structure of form.
In a certain sense it could be said that picture formation, similarly to
language formation, is characterized by over-determination (overlapping
rules), by the simultaneous effect of several norms and rules, but picture for-
mation is also characterized by irregularity rather than the possible suspension
and variation of the extent of the rules. While the individual picture
constitutes a complete, closed and ordered entity, the picture as an abstraction
has no definable order structure. No classification of the pictorial expression
can be made on the same scale as for spoken and written language because
the pictorial expression is not bound to well-delimited notation systems.
This does not mean that certain pictures cannot be classified on the basis of
a notation structure. On the contrary, it is quite possible to classify certain
types of picture in this way, as distinct from others, including groups of
pictures which use other notation structures. A typical example in this
connection is the difference between a television picture and a computer
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generated picture on a monitor which are precisely and solely distinguished
through the two different - invisible in themselves - underlying notation (or
signal) structures.
Although the grapheme is a picture form which as such can become the
object of aesthetic consideration and variation, it is at the same time subject to
an acquired interpretation regime which includes the separation of the
graphemic forms, for example in the form of an abecedarium and an established
rule set for reading - for example in the form of a linear succession. It is not
possible, on the other hand, to distinguish the letter from other pictorial forms
simply by pointing out the letter’s arbitrary, non-iconic character, as all
pictorial forms can be dissolved into non-iconic form elements with division
into individual points as the most radical subdivision.
The graphemic picture is thus determined by its belonging to an established
inventory and by a chronologically defined, usually one-dimensional reading
order. Herein also lies the fact that the grapheme is not defined by its invariant
form. That this is the case is also shown by the way we can recognize with
surprising certainty a great number of different A’s as »A« and also distinguish
many similar manifestations as »not A«, whether »not A« is another grapheme
or a non-graphemic pictorial form.41
The continuity of possible pictorial forms constitutes the redundant back-
ground for the distinctive occurrence of the grapheme. Writing thus rests on a
simultaneously redundant and distinctive utilization of pictorial forms. The
recognition of the individual grapheme, however, is at the same time supported
                                                
41  Stjernfeldt, 1990, discusses this, taking as his point of departure Douglas Hofstadter’s question,
what is A and I? Hofstadter, 1985. With support from J. Petitot, Stjernfeldt suggests a topological de-
scription of graphemes, as he assumes that the topological categories have ontological status: »The
categorical perception of writing and its base in a combinatory of topologies seems to indicate that the
reason for categorization of letters is the same as for the categorization of the phenomenal world -
thereby suggesting an interface intermediating the two being topology«. Stjernfeldt does not explain,
however, how topological mathematics - or simply J. Petitot’s idea of a mathematically describable
categorical perception - deserves such an ontologically privileged position rather than a number of other
transcendental form concepts. As the human perception apparatus itself has a history of origin and
development it is not easy to see how an invariant topological picture of perceptual structures can be
applied. The difficulty is indicated by the use of the concept »combinatory of topologies« because these
combinations are not themselves contained in the topological description. But I must admit that as far
as I know there is no other satisfactory explanation. However, it can hardly be unreasonable to assume
that an explanation must, under any circumstances, operate with indefinite, critical - mental - thresholds
for the transition between physical form and symbolic form, pictorial form and grapheme, between
graphemes mutually and, as far as notation systems are concerned, indubitably also semantic
components, as the distinction of notation systems assumes a significant competence in making
symbolic abstractions which can hardly be explained without reference to pre-existing symbolic activity
based on less established, »semi«-discrete means of expression.
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by the manifestation of other graphemes, which in this connection act as a
manifested graphemic redundancy.
While the notation system and the social bond between form elements di-
stinguishes the graphemic picture from other pictures, the picture’s contem-
poraneousness has a counterpart in spoken language. But where the picture’s
contemporaneousness is established by freezing the expression, (and
separating the sender from the receiver) the contemporaneousness of spoken
language exists between the sender and receiver who are related in a se-
quentially developed semiotic relationship which allows variation of the
expression during the articulation.
On the face of it, it may be surprising that pictorial and formal expressions,
which appear to be diametrical opposites, have in common that they
distinguish themselves from language through one and the same circumstance,
namely the absence of structural redundancy which is a characteristic of
linguistic expressions. The absence of this redundancy at the level of physical
manifestation also has a different - form.
While pictorial structures appear with no relation to the redundancy struc-
ture of language, (the redundancy structure of writing has, on the contrary,
pictorial structure as a precondition) formal notation appears through the
elimination of linguistic redundancy. The means to this elimination is a
prescriptive declaration of unambiguous rules, the purpose of which is to
overcome the polysemy of language.
While language on the one hand is characterized by the fact that any
element in the language system can be subjected to variation - just as any rule
in a computer programme can become data - on the other hand, unlike the
programme, it is characterized by the fact that variation appears as a result of a
semantic operation which is manifested as a shift in the relationship between
redundancy and distinctiveness. This shift can, as will be evident, occur
through variations on one or more axes: as a new utilization of a random form
through repetition, as a variation of a pre-established pattern, through its
strength of significance and/or through its content of significance. That this is
a semantic shift implies that it need not - such as in the programme - be
declared prior to its effectuation.
With the preceding unambiguous rule declaration the formal representation
is given a redundancy structure which is distinct from that of language, as the
rule simply defines the distinctive expression by distinguishing the indefinite
redundancy potential as superfluous. While the formulation of the rule occurs
as a semantic operation in linguistic form, the expression of the rule occurs in a
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formal form through a replacement of the linguistic notation by a formal
notation.
As both the redundant content and expression elements are thus distin-
guished from the formal expression, this expression does not have the same
semantic variation potential. To the chronological distinction (the declaration
of rules always precedes the execution) belongs a structural or logical
distinction between the open, semantic operation and the formulation of the
closed, formal expression. All transitions between redundant and distinct
occurrences thereby become subject to a sequential time relationship where
these transitions in language can be defined in a simultaneous relationship
with the definition of redundant features.
Now the definition of any redundancy structure necessarily contains the
definition of distinctiveness. It is the relationship which defines each of the
features in the relationship. It might therefore also be tempting to regard the
semantic potential of the formal expression solely on the basis of the
programme which is rooted in the semantic structure of the language, as this
can only be formulated with a linguistic articulation as a starting point and
working means.
This, however, is not sound. Although the distinct formal expression - the
operational procedure - is characterized by the fact that the semantic content,
the establishment of the relationship between redundancy and distinctiveness,
is defined in advance - and outside - the distinctive, formal expression, the
expression appears as a distinct linguistic procedure subject to a delimited,
specific to the expression, set of semantic variation rules. This set is not simply
a chosen set of linguistic variation rules, it is a set of rules which as a whole is
characterized by a different relationship to other rules than that between
linguistic rules.
This different relationship to linguistic rules is manifested in a structural dif-
ference in the definition of graphemic expressions, rules for sign sequences
and in the linguistic and formal sentence construction. In the formal ex-
pression it is necessary to declare the semantic value of each expression unit.
Although the alphabetical notation units are often used, the individual
notations do not appear with their alphabetical value or function, they no
longer belong to alphabet of language. In the same way, the rules of language
for notation sequences are also rejected in favour of the demand for a specific
definition of the relationship between a given notation and the next. Finally,
where a linguistic utterance can be a single sentence, a formal expression
always requires at least two.
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Even though, seen in isolation, the formal expression can be described as a
defined relationship between defined entities, in the most literal sense the
expression has the definition as a precondition. The semantic analysis of the
formal expression is only possible if this precondition is taken into account.
The bipartite formal sentence structure is not equivalent to the principal
clauses and subordinate clauses of language, as these are not subject to the
same declarative definition of the redundancy structure. With the demand for
declaration, the formal expression is connected with and part of language, but
with this declaration an expression system based on non-linguistic rules is
created.42
While we thus in the relationship between language and picture have two
separate expression forms where the structural connection - as far as written
language is concerned - is limited to the notation level, in the relationship
between linguistic and formal notation we have two separate expression forms
which are both included in a historical and structural internal connection of a
syntactical and semantic character. The formal expression form is an
expression of a linguistic meaning content and the formal expression’s
content is specified through a linguistic expression form.
As the formal representation overcomes the polysemy of language through
the elimination of the - for language - bearing redundancy structure, the
relationship between the two expression systems necessarily contains a tense
negation with comprehensive and often discussed epistemological
implications.
The relationship between the linguistic structure of these two languages,
however, has played a surprisingly modest role in these discussions, often
subordinated to transcendental considerations of truth. The relationship
between linguistic and formal representation has either been seen as a variant
of the relationship between everyday language and scientific language, or as a
difference between language and non-language, which, for example, could be
described as the history of arithmetic or the use of signals, where a weak
parallel to written language is only drawn in the introductory reference to the
extent of this history.
                                                
42  In formal expressions at least one decision - as a condition - has been made which need not have
been made in a linguistic expression, for example that two + two are four, while »two by two« in
language can both be four, but also, for example, refer to a procession with an indefinite number of
participants who move - two by two, or to phenomena which often occur between two, such as, for
example a widespread and well known reproductive procedure where 1 + 1 can both become 2, 3 or 4, or
almost overwhelming.
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The explanation of this circumstance should, however, hardly take the form
of a criticism of tradition. That the formal representation - in spite of its
thousands of years of history - only rarely gave rise to linguistic con-
siderations shows first and foremost that it has been far from obvious - and
perhaps not particularly relevant - to regard formal representation in its -
semantic - relationship to language.
Whether formal representation creates a foundation for a special language
can still not be taken as given. On the other hand, it is given that the dramatic
expansion of formal representation competence over the past 50 years also
includes in-depth changes in the relationship between linguistic and formal
representation.
These changes, however, are based on the appearance of informational
notation which, among other things, is distinct from both linguistic and formal
notation because it can contain them both in the same expression form.
As this revolution marks a significant historical change in symbolic repre-
sentation competence and has its centre of gravity in a new definition of the
concept of information, the new symbolic competence will be treated here
separately under the term informational representation competence.
Through a coincidence, which is perhaps more than a coincidence, a cros-
sing of a historical and structural perspective in informational representation
leads to one and the same starting point, namely the redundancy structure of
informational representation. While the structural path to here starts with the
relationship to language, the historical path starts with Shannon’s theory
which, with its establishment of a mathematical scale for measuring in-
formational redundancy, became one of the theoretical starting points for the
informational revolution.
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8. Informational notation and the algorithmic revolution
8.1 The problem of noise theory
As appeared from chapter 6, Shannon used the information concept as a con-
cept for an expression unit which could be defined independently of the
language in which it was included, as the individual notation was primarily
defined as a physical value. The exact definition of the physical form of the
notation, however, was not sufficient to define the individual notation unit
because any physically defined notation form can also exist as a physical form
without being a notation. In other words, a semantic component is also
included in the definition of informational notation.
As this holds true in general of all notation forms, the conclusion was drawn
in chapter 7 that the use of notation systems assumes a double coding of the
individual notation unit, as there must both be a coding of the physical form -
relative to the physical background noise and to the physical forms of other
notation units - and a coding relative to the occurrence of the same physical
form as an unintentional, illegitimate form.
While the first coding appears as a solution to a purely physical noise pro-
blem, the second coding appears as the solution of a semantic noise problem.
This appears, in other words, to be a question of two mutually independent
code procedures which answer two clearly distinct noise problems.
The relationship, however, is more complicated, as Shannon’s analysis also
showed that it is possible to compensate for an elimination of redundancy in
the physical notation structure with a semantically determined redundancy.
There is thus an inner and variable relationship between the two codings.
This conclusion therefore gave rise in chapter 7 to a more detailed inve-
stigation of how noise problems are solved in other notation systems - prima-
rily those of common language and formal language. It appeared from this that
there is always an internal connection in the solution of the two noise
problems in the individual notation system and that this internal connection
differs in different notation systems.
While some differences are concerned with the use of the physical pro-
perties (i.e. some of the properties) of a given expression substance in different
ways, other are concerned with utilizing different properties in the same
expression substance and others again of differences connected with the
mutual differences of expression substances. Finally comes the additional fact
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that different properties (of the same or different expression substances) can
be utilized to solve the same problem and that the different notation systems
each have a set of possibilities for substituting the use of semantic content
criteria for the use of physical form criteria.
At the same time, the criteria used to establish the limits of physical variation
establish a set of conditions for the semantic exploitation of the physical
forms. The solution to the two noise problems is thus always a solution which
establishes a set of semantic variation possibilities which can be used in a
given notation system.
Although the comparative analysis took its point of departure in Shannon’s
utilization of the redundancy function to solve the noise problem, it was not
possible to use any of his mutually inconsistent notions of redundancy to
describe the different redundancy structures of common language. Moreover,
a general definition of the redundancy concept was given and it was shown
that notational redundancy plays a central role for the properties of common
languages, as different semantic potentialities are connected with the
notational redundancy structures of written and spoken languages
respectively, just as it was shown that the use of notational redundancy
structures distinguishes the common languages from formal languages, which
are characterized by the elimination of notational redundancy.
The intention now is to resume and pursue the analysis of informational no-
tation with the point of departure in the results of the comparative analysis.
In section 8.2, I show that the redundancy functions used by Shannon
contradict his own definition of the redundancy concept, whereas it is pos-
sible to describe these functions with the help of the definition given in
chapter 7.
In 8.3 - 8.5 there is a description of the semantic variation mechanisms of
informational notation relative to linguistic and formal notation. In 8.3  the
emphasis is placed on the informational use of properties which are also used
in other notation systems, while the emphasis in 8.4 and 8.5 is on properties
which are only used in informational notation, namely 1) the notation’s
independence of the demand for sensory recognition, 2) its mechanical effect
and 3) multisemantic potential.
As the treatment of informational notation is based on the use of algorithmic
procedures, the significance of algorithmic procedures for the semantic
properties of informational notation is treated in sections 8.6 - 8.8, while the
synthetic description of the informational sign function as a whole is the
subject of chapter 9.
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8.2 The redundancy concept in information theory
The central problem of noise theory in Shannon’s analysis, as we saw in
chapter 6, was the question of how to decide whether a given physical form
appears as part of a message or as a result of an unintentional noise effect.
It is obvious that the way this problem presents itself is of particular interest
in connection with working on electrical signals, because here the signal valu-
es are expressed through threshold values between varying amperage and
duration in a continuous medium and where notation - as the most decisive
factor - is handled (transmitted) independently of the human interpreter.
Shannon thus had good reason to make the notation form the object of a
separate consideration independent of human sensory and meaning recog-
nition. He also had good reason to speak of the general character of the way
the problem presents itself, just as he found the right means to handle the
technical problem, in that he suggested that transmission could be stabilized
by increasing the redundancy of the message.
If we consider Shannon’s own redundancy concept here, however, the
suggestion is meaningless, as he used the concept of all forms of repetitive
structure which - due to the repetitive element - are regarded as superfluous
and without meaning for the content of the message. In addition, he assumes
that this concept also embraces the rule structures which are valid for the
given symbolic language and that meaning alone is contained in the signals
which occur quite arbitrarily as deviations from any form of repetitive
structure. On the basis of this redundancy concept the idea of stabilizing the
message by increasing its redundancy is a waste of time. If redundancy is
completely superfluous, it will naturally not help to add more of it to the
message.
While Shannon starts by defining redundancy as that which is without im-
portance for the meaning, he continues with two mutually different defi-
nitions of redundancy in contrast to the meaning, (the one equal to the sy-
stem-determined part, the other equal to the alternative, possible, but unused
choices). The redundancy concept he uses in the statistical description,
however, is a fourth, as redundancy is defined here independently of any
regard to meaning. With this definition, redundancy is solely determined by
the statistical procedures used.
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This redundancy - in accordance with Shannon’s asemantic approach, but
contrary to his supposition that meaning content is only manifested in the
random variations - is thus completely independent of the meaning content
and rule structure of the message. For example, Shannon would not be able to
decide, on the basis of the determination of this redundancy in a message,
whether the message existed in a common language or in formal notation. The
redundancy function is solely determined here in relationship to the physical
manifestation of the expression - i.e. the form of the expression substance.
As a consequence of this any message contains redundancy of this form,
simply if a given notation occurs more than once, or simply if a single notation
comprises some quantity of repeatable, smaller physical units.
With this definition, the idea of increasing redundancy in order to stabilize
the message immediately becomes more understandable, because the
elimination of the thus determined redundancy will unavoidably come to af-
fect the content. It is therefore all the more peculiar that the method Shannon
proposes for increasing redundancy builds upon yet another, fifth, definition,
as he suggests that redundancy can be increased by adding a set of control
codes so that the validity of the individual signal or signal sequence is
conditioned by preceding and subsequent signals. This condition could be
fulfilled by describing the notation system with the help of a formal semantics
in which a numerical value is ascribed to the individual notation units. He
thereby showed that it was possible to solve the semantic noise problem
independently of the language in which the message appeared - and in this
sense without regard to meaning.
Here, it is no longer a question of a purely statistically determined re-
dundancy structure which can be described at the level of notation, nor of a
redundancy which can be defined relative to the physical form, but of a
determination of redundancy relative to a - formal - semantic interpretation of
the notation’s value.
The codes Shannon used to increase redundancy can neither be derived
from an analysis of the physical notation nor of the stochastic procedure used.
They can only be derived from a semantic interpretation of the given message,
because the asemantic consideration - whether this is founded on the
notation’s physical form or on the statistical repetition structure - contains no
criterion for distinguishing the random variation which is emitted by the
source of the message from the random variation which is emitted by the noise
source. Shannon’s use of the redundancy concept in connection with these
control codes only has meaning if the codes are seen in relationship to the
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original meaning of the message. They are only redundant in this relationship
because when compared to the code procedure and the physical structure of
the notation, they are equally as distinctive expression units as the »meaning
bearing« signals.
That Shannon did not attach much importance to the difference between
these concepts can probably be explained by the fact that he used a formal
semantics which was independent of the semantic structure of the original
message, but in addition to this comes the point that the semantic redundancy
concept (in that form in which it was defined relative to the expression
substance) could be used on any notation system, just as it was also this
concept which provided the economical advantage in transmission, whereas
the semantic concept was an economical liability - albeit very small.
Shannon, however, not only used semantically determined redundancy be-
cause it was possible or economical, but because it was necessary, as the
asemantic approach was not sufficient. It was only possible to eliminate the
one redundancy structure by establishing another. Shannon’s analysis
therefore provides yet another important result, as it demonstrates that a va-
riation of redundancy at one level can be compensated for by a variation at
the other.
Shannon’s analysis thereby also confirms - contraintentionally - that the re-
dundancy structure is necessary in order to establish the symbolic legitimacy
of the notation units and that the physical and semantic determination of the
notation units constitutes two mutually connected variation axes.
Shannon’s demonstration of the importance of the redundancy structure
for positive physical-mechanical recognition is therefore not connected with
his mistaken idea that any form of redundancy can be described with the help
of a stochastic procedure His own analysis shows, on the contrary, that a
semantic component is always included in the stabilization of the expression
unit in the physical expression substance and that expression redundancy
enters into an internal relationship with content redundancy.
While the description of redundancy as a meaning independent »system
function« must be abandoned, Shannon’s use of a meaning related redun-
dancy structure confirms first that the redundancy function is a precondition
for stabilizing the expression form in the expression substance and, second,
that it is also a precondition for the establishment of the sign function as a link
between the expression form and the content form.
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8.3 Linguistic, formal and informational mediation between the expres-
sion substance and meaning
While Shannon’s analysis on the one hand - directly contrary to its main pur-
pose - leads to the conclusion that it is not possible to provide a purely
physical or algorithmic - or other form of asemantic - description of notation
forms, it also reveals on the other that the »physics« of notation forms, the
manifestation of notation forms in the expression substance, plays an
important role for the semantic use of the notation system.
This too only appears indirectly because Shannon uses the electrical signal
as a prototype of the concept of notation. He thereby assumes, 1) that the
informational form has an unambiguous physical value, 2) that a notation unit
in an arbitrary notation system is defined by a set of - very few - invariant
physical values (signal strength and duration), 3) that the same yardstick is
used for the definition of the different notations, and 4) that the individual
notations follow each other in a single-stringed serial order or in  synchronized
parallel series.
It appears to be possible to fulfil these four conditions with the necessary
precision as far as energy-based mechanical transmission systems are con-
cerned, where communication is understood solely as a question of repro-
ducing the same physical manifestation:
The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one
point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point.1
While these four assumptions on the one hand exhaust the possibilities of a
precise physical definition - it is not possible, on the other, to solve the second
problem of physical noise with more precise physical criteria for the definition
of notation units - they give far too narrow a picture of the possibilities we
have for utilizing the physical expression substance for symbolic purposes.
While all notation systems are based on critical thresholds which delimit the
notation system relative to the physical medium and the other notation units,
the distinction of physical forms can be brought about in several ways, each of
which is connected with a set of semantic variation mechanisms, as the
solution of the physical noise problem is connected with the solution of the
semantic noise problem.
                                                
1  Shannon, (1949) 1961: 31.
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As appeared from chapter 7, spoken language, which uses far less precise
physical criteria, contains such possibilities as sound variations, tonality, stress,
dialectal and sociolectal characteristics etc., which can be used for distinctive
purposes. Spoken language thus permits the physical values to be varied
during use, while the demand of informational notation for an exact physical
definition implies that the possibility of variation is excluded. The different
relationship to the expression substance gives the two expression systems
different semantic potentialities.
This is not only true in the sense that different stability criteria are con-
nected with the different physical expression substances, but also in the sense
that the same problem can be solved in different ways - also within the same
notation system - as the semantic component which is included in the
definition of the individual notation unit can be included in several ways.
Shannon’s own analysis also provides examples of both, as he is concerned
both with the differences between analogue and discrete signal systems which
are based on different forms of the symbolic use of the »same« physical
expression substance and - as we saw in 8.2 - both with expression and
content determined redundancy as a means of stabilizing a message in a given
notation system.
In these cases, the redundancy function serves first and foremost as a means
of stabilizing the message’s expression form in the expression substance, as
the redundancy function helps to distinguish the legitimate physical forms
from the identical - as well as the non-identical - illegitimate forms. But the
effect relative to the expression substance can on the other hand only occur
because the redundancy function also has a semantic component, so that the
stabilization downward is connected with the stabilization of a superjacent
level, whether this is the notation level or the semantic content level.
Redundancy thus also serves to distinguish and stabilize a level above an
underlying level and to make possible the formation of new superjacent levels.
The precondition for this duality is that the underlying notation system as a
whole is included as a redundancy potential for a semantic utilization at a
superjacent level.
There are examples of this in connection with linguistic notation in chapter
7, as we saw here that the legitimacy of the notations could be founded both
on habitual conventions for notation sequences, syntactic rule structures and
on the semantic context. In addition to this is the fact - compared with the
number notation system, informational notation and the Morse alphabet - that
a reasonably large number of different notation units are used, which make it
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possible to use conventions for illegal, but possible combinations, while any
combination of numbers, for example, can be legitimate. As examples of
illegitimate combinations in Danish we can mention /dn/ in the same syllable,
the occurrence of a number of consonants (e.g. - b, d, f, g, h,) before /s + vowel/
in the roots. Over and above illegitimate combinations there are also many
combinations which are not used, but which are more legitimate.
Although the different methods for solving the noise problem of written
language notation are often used simultaneously, with over-determination as a
consequence, these provide no complete guarantee. Over-determination
contributes to an increase in the stability of language, but does not exclude
such things as the occurrence of printer’s errors which completely alter the
sense of what has been written.
The solution in written language of the problem of noise, however, is not
only concerned with the establishment of criteria for legitimate occurrences.
The methods used simultaneously establish a framework and possibilities for
utilizing the notation units as semantic variation mechanisms.
The habitually established conventions, the semantic context and the
syntactic rule structures not only each make their own contribution to a
stabilization of linguistic notation, they also each provide their own set of
conditions for the use of the smallest semantic variation mechanisms, while
over-determination also provides considerable room for semantically moti-
vated deviation from rules and conventions.
The linguistic solution of the noise problem is thus connected with 1) the
use of semantically empty notation units, 2) the limited use of rule determined
notation sequences, 3) a relatively large latitude for semantically motivated
rule, norm and convention deviation.
The extent of the semantic variation potential was shown, among other
things, by the fact that the rule structures play a much smaller role for the
stability of the notation systems than the convention determined norms and
the semantic context. The rule structure thus works mainly on the relationship
between whole words (rules of word order) and suffixes (and possibly from
there back to the root).
The use of rule determined notations plays a limited role in the linguistic
solution to the noise problem and there are no overall rule structures for the
use of the various means of stabilization either. The stability of linguistic
notation depends on a plurality of different mechanisms, each of which is
accessible to semantically motivated variation. Conversely, over-determination
permits the notation forms to undergo change without meaning being
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affected. Such changes, which necessarily arise as - individual - variations,
can later emerge as new rules of expression.
Dissimilarly to this situation, formal notation systems operate only with
semantically determined notation units, as the individual notations are either
determined by a rule function or a content value.
While written language notation is stabilized through the use of a great
number of conventional notation sequences, stable rule structures, over-deter-
mination and the meaning of the context, formal notation has few built-in
stabilization mechanisms. Formal notation gains its precision by replacing the
redundancy structure of written language with a semantic definition of the
value of each notation unit. The content form is unambiguously connected
with the expression form through this definition. The formal expression
therefore not only has a different and greater vulnerability with regard to
printer’s errors - i.e. the occurrence of  unintended, physically legitimate
notation forms - it also has a different potential for semantic variation.
While the linguistic notation unit is a semantic variation mechanism which
can only work through the context - having no independent semantic value -
the formal notation unit is a semantic variation mechanism which only
influences the context through (a change in) its own semantic value. As the
declaration of the value of the individual notation (as a referent to a general
rule or to the content which is regulated) is at the same time a declaration of
the physically legitimate notations, formal language permits the use of an
indeterminately large number of »local« notations, whereas common languages
operate with a limited (although modifiable) number of general notation units.
Formal notation substitutes linguistic notation redundancy with a rule
determined notation, as the definition of semantic value is always connected
with the definition of a certain physical form.
In spite of these differences, the notations in both systems are basically
determined through their function as semantic variation mechanisms, while the
physical definition is primarily based on criteria of identity and difference
which can be registered by the senses. The sensory criterion is not distinctive
in the relationship between these notation systems, but on the contrary, to a
great extent determines the use of linguistic notation units in formal notation.
While formal notation can use any linguistic notation unit for its own
purposes, language, on the other hand, can express any formal content.
Informational notation has both a number of features in common with the
common languages, a number of other features in common with formal lan-
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guage and finally, a number of features which are unique to this notation
system.
The kinship with written language notation comes first and foremost to
expression in the fact that both notation systems are based on the use of
semantically empty notation units, that no separate rule notations are used and
that a limited set of notation units is used. But even in connection with these
points, there is still no complete identity, partly because written language in
some cases permits a notation unit to have an independent semantic value,
which is never the case with informational notation, partly because written
language permits the introduction of »locally valid« notation units, which is
not possible in informational notation either.
The two notation systems, however, are also distinguished by a number of
other points. First, written language notation is subject to the demand for
sensory recognition, where informational notation is subject to the demand for
mechanical efficacy. Second, written notation - as described in chapter 7 - uses
a number of different forms of notational redundancy which cannot be used in
informational notation, just as written language uses qualitatively different
notation units (vowels versus consonants, punctuation marks etc.) while it is
not possible to qualitatively determine the informational notation units. Third,
the entire inventory is used in all informational expressions, no matter how
short they are, whereas common language uses a variable range.
In addition to this come differences in the relationship between the notation
system and the expression substance. Both spoken and written language and
formal notation thus allow considerable latitude with regard to the physical
form of the »same notation units«. Informational notation, on the other hand, is
subject to the demand for an unambiguous, invariant definition of the physical
form of the notation units and this form cannot be varied during use.
The unambiguous definition of the physical form permits the emancipation
of the notation from the demand for direct, sensory recognition, while
conversely we must say that this demand, which holds true of the human
recognition of letters, is not based on an unambiguous invariance with regard
to form. It is thus not possible to use the physical form of letters as the smallest
physical expression units in energy based media, while it is conversely
extremely difficult to use the human sensory apparatus to handle a notation
which is defined by physical criteria that are not subject to the demand for
sensory recognition.
Different discrimination procedures are thus used in distinguishing the phy-
sical features of notation systems. Distinguishing physical characteristics
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occurs in different ways and these differences are of exceptionally far-
reaching importance for the possible uses of the physical form for symbolic
purposes.
The difference in the physical definition of different notations is not dis-
solved by the fact that it is possible to convert an expression which appears in
one form to that of another. The different forms still provide the possibility of
different kinds of use. The most striking difference is that the informational
notations lack any kind of quality in the definition implying that any possible
quality can therefore be ascribed to a constellation of the same two units.
In spite of these differences, the kinship between these notation systems is
considerably stronger mutually than the kinship between informational and
formal notation systems. First, there are simply fewer similarities between
informational and formal notation. As shown in the table of the typical
characteristics of chosen notation systems below, there are only two common
features (namely single-stringed seriality and no utilization of redundant
notation sequences), of which the first must still be modified, as we shall see in
section 8.4. Second, the differences between informational and formal
notation are of fundamental importance for the properties of the two notation
systems. Whereas formal notation only operates with semantically determined
notation qualities, as all notations are either rule or data notations, the
ascription of meaning in informational notation is connected with sequences
of notation units in which rule and data values - similarly to language - are
manifested in the same notation units. The individual unit is used both as a
notation unit in sequences which can represent a rule, and sequences which
can represent a content value.
Finally, in addition, is the fact that formal and informational notation are also
distinguished by the way the semantic value is bound to the physical ma-
nifestation. Although a semantic component is part of the definition of the
physical form of informational notation, this semantic component can be
expressed independently of the semantic content of the informational
sequence because - as was evident from Shannon’s analysis -  it could be
brought about through an appropriate code procedure which did not affect
the semantic content of the sequence. Informational notation is thus
characterized by the possibility of distinguishing the definition both of the
individual notation unit as well as of the notation system from the ascription of
semantic content value and can therefore also be used as an expression system
for a plurality of semantic regimes.
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In formal notation systems it is also possible to ascribe a new value to an
already given notation, but the relationship between the notational expression
form and the content form are wholly rule determined for each individual
notation unit and there is always a direct equivalence between the physical
form of the notation unit and its semantic value.
[Grey background indicates the greatest kinship group for the individual features – read horizontally.]
Remarks on the table:
The Morse alphabet has been included for the sake of gradation, although it is a notation system for
other notation systems and not an independent system.
As the schematic simplification increases both some similarities and differences, it is necessary to
supplement it with some remarks.
Single-stringed seriality: Where informational notation is concerned, the demand for the serial
single-stringed feature can be suspended through interactive operations. Informational notation thereby
acquires a feature which is reminiscent of that of speech, but, as will appear later, with completely
different implications. This demand on notation, on the other hand, is not suspended in parallel
processing systems (»neural networks«).
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Physical stability : The parenthesis under the Morse alphabet indicates that it can also be used in
written form.
Number limitation: For spoken and written language the limit to the number of notation units is
variable, as contextual and explicitly declared expression units can be introduced, which is not possible
in informational notation.
Demand for sensory recognition: Informational notation is distinct here, as it is subject to the
demand for mechanical effect instead.
Meaning ascription: A /+/ indicates that the ascription of meaning to the individual notation is a
necessary condition, a /-/ indicates that it is not. In spoken and written language the ascription of
meaning to the individual notation is possible in certain cases. It is not possible in informational
notation. On this point, the table thus exaggerates the similarity between linguistic and informational
notation. In the Morse alphabet, the notation units have both a distinct value as notation units for a
notation unit in written language and as expression elements for those sequences which represent the
other notations. A short signal represents both an /e/ and part of a number of other notations (letters,
numbers etc.).
Redundant notation sequences: Redundant sequences can occur in all notation sequences. A /+/
indicates that non-rule determined (customary) notation sequences occur as typical and integrated
features, a /-/ indicates that all legitimate notation sequences are rule determined, whether they are
redundant or not.
Distinct rule notations: In connection with this point the table shows the same kinship as for that
of the criteria of meaning ascription. While this kinship must be modified for meaning ascription, (c.f.
above) it is adequate for distinct rule notation.
Qualitatively different notations: Here too, the table exaggerates the similarities between, on
the one hand, the common languages and, on the other, formal notation, as it is a question of two
different forms of quality differentiation. The notation qualities of common languages are primarily
concerned with the distinction between vowels and consonants, but also of the occurrence of function
signs (punctuation marks etc.). In formal notation, quality is solely determined by the definition of the
semantic value. Qualities can possibly be classified, for example in rule and data notation, variables and
constants etc.
Formal notation systems mainly use the expression substance as a means of
stabilizing the expression, whereas the properties of the expression substance,
both in common languages and in informational notation, are used as semantic
variation mechanisms, but in a mutually very different way.
In informational notation the exact physical definition is used as a basis for
the notation’s mechanical effect. In spoken language, which has physically
weakly - or broadly - defined means of expression, the physical variation is
used for a multiplicity of semantic purposes (dialectal and sociolectal
characteristics, distortion, irony, stylistic choice etc.). In handwriting the
physical variation has a mainly individual stamp, while physical variation in
printed matter is mainly an aesthetic means, which, however, from time to time
- such as with italicization - is also used semantically distinctively.
Although the schematic arrangement cannot contain any description of the
meaning of these characteristics, either individually or as a whole, it
nevertheless shows a number of interesting connections and differences. It
thus appears - if we initially ignore the Morse alphabet - that:
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• The kinship structure between the different notation systems is different for
each of the eight criteria.
• That written notation - as the only system - always shares characteristics
with at least one other notation system, whereas the others have at least
one characteristic peculiar to themselves. The table is not exhaustive, but
does show that written notation has fewer unique features and several
affinities.
• Informational notation has three unique characteristic properties (invariable
number limitation, independence of sensory recognition, and the absence of
qualitatively different notations). Formal notation also has three (necessary
meaning ascription, no number limitation, distinct rule notations). Spoken
language has one (non-single-stringed seriality), as informational notation,
however, has one feature which is reminiscent of this2 - and
• Finally, the table demonstrates that the different notation systems together
are included in a joint redundancy system in which the individual variation
mechanisms are included in mutually different connections.
The table exaggerates the similarities in three respects.
First, those features which are reproduced as common features cover very
different variants. This holds true, as mentioned, of the qualitative differences
in formal and common language notation, the non-single-stringed seriality in
speech and informational notation, the demand for sensory recognition in
speech and writing, the - low - physical stability of speech and informational
notation.
 Second, the table does not reproduce the differences which may be con-
nected with the function of the individual qualities in the respective notation
systems, as the same quality cannot simply possess a different function in itself,
but can also possess it through the relationship with the other features.
The different demands made on the physical definition (more or less exact,
more or fewer different physical criteria etc.) thus simultaneously contain a set
of restrictions for the use of the expression substance as a semantic variation
potential. The notational rule system is included in a connection with the
overall semantic regime which is characteristic for each notation system.
                                                
2  If we include the Morse alphabet, the latter point is modified, as the Morse alphabet also possesses
two of informational notation’s otherwise unique properties (invariant number limitation and no
qualitatively different notations). Finally, the Morse alphabet is related to written language in the sense
that it too has no unique characteristics which are not shared with at least one other notation system.
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Third, the table does not reproduce the different forms of definition of the
relationship between and use of the properties of the expression substance.
Where linguistic and formal notation are primarily subject to the demand for
sensory recognition, informational notation is primarily subject to the demand
that the individual notation unit must be able to appear as a mechanically
effective entity in a machine.
With this definition of the informational form relative to the physical
medium and other informational forms there appears - for the first time in
history - a non-sensorily determined, discrete, mechanically effective and
semantically open notation system.
8.4 The unique characteristics of informational notation
Although a semantic component is always contained in the definition of a
notation system, there were two important historical innovations behind
Shannon’s idea of an asemantic, purely physically defined notation system.
One of these concerned the exact physical definition which is conditioned by
the demand for the mechanical effectiveness of the notation units. The other
concerned the definition of the semantic component of the notation.
While the semantic component in linguistic and formal notation systems is
defined through the semantic regime in which the message is produced, the
semantic component which is included in the definition of the informational
notation unit is produced with the help of a formal code procedure which is
independent of the semantic regime of the message. This coding can take
place no matter whether a given data sequence represents a rule, a set of data,
a text, a sound, a picture, or a physical machine.
It is this circumstance which makes it possible to represent both formal and
informal semantic regimes in the informational notation system, or conversely:
that informational notation can be used both as a notation for a numerical
expression, for a rule of calculation and for a logical expression - where it is a
question of using informational notation to represent a formal semantic regime
- or as an expression of a linguistic message where a given notation sequence
can represent a - semantically empty - linguistic notation unit - or as an
expression of a picture or a sound subject to pictorial or auditive semantic
regimes. At the same time, it also appears from this that it is possible to
represent both linguistically, formally, pictorially and auditively expressed
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information, each of which was formerly represented in its own notation
system (or in no notation at all) in one and the same notation system.
In other words, informational notation is not subject to one specific, overall
semantic regime in the same way as other notation systems. Shannon’s
»asemantic« consideration thus contains a description of a notation system
which is relative not to a single, but to several semantic regimes. Shannon
himself also prepared a list - under the term »information sources« of the
different semantic regimes which can utilize informational notation.3
Now it is quite true that it is also possible to use the letters of the alphabet,
for example, in formal expressions, but this use assumes that the letters are
subject to the criteria which are valid for formal notation. Only the physical
form can be transferred, not the linguistic qualities and functions which are
connected with the form - whether this be the distinction between vowel and
consonant, or conventions for notation sequences - and thereby not the
semantic variation mechanisms which are connected with the form and its
quality either. When the grapheme is used in a formal expression it no longer
belongs to the alphabet of common language.
That which thus characterizes informational notation as a special and
unique feature is the complete lack of quality in the definition of the individual
notation unit. This complete lack of quality in the definition distinguishes
informational notation equally sharply from linguistic and formal notation,
each of which operates with its own form of quality determination and this
lack is identical with complete openness to contextual determination.
Informational notation is the closest we can get to a perfect, »pure alphabet«,
and it can contain any form of symbolic content with the single - but not
unimportant - restriction that it must be possible for the symbolic content to be
manifested in a sequence of notation units belonging to a notation system
with a finite number of mutually different expression units. The decisive point
being not the number itself, but the condition that the number is established in
advance. Whether we use 2, 5, 27 or 117 notation units is theoretically of no
importance, but we can only use a definite, previously established number if
we wish to utilize the mechanical properties of the notation system.4
                                                
3  C.f. 6.4 where this list is given.
4  In the 1940’s, the binary form was the object of much discussion and the choice was made on
functional, pragmatic grounds which included such elements as the physical layout of the machine,
process efficiency and simplicity, although von Neumann also referred to the binary character of logic
as an argument for emphasizing the computer’s logical rather than arithmetical functionality. Goldstine,
1972: 260.
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Although any notation system has a built-in semantic dimension, the value
of the reductive idea of asemantic notation which lay behind the estab-
lishment of informational notation should neither be rejected nor under-
estimated. That the reach of the idea is considerably expanded because its
effect is increased by the semantic dimension can be illustrated by a related
historical precedent.
It was thus precisely such an asemantic handling of the alphabetical figures
as singular, physical entities which comprised the pioneering innovation in
Johann Gutenberg’s typographical revolution.
This is not only a convincing, but in this connection also a central historical
example. Although opinion is divided as to the correct interpretation of
Gutenberg’s typographical revolution, nobody disputes that it has had far-
reaching cultural and historical implications. Here, we will simply consider a
couple of the aspects which are of particular interest in relation to an
understanding of informational notation.5
In itself, Gutenberg’s use of movable type first and foremost implied an
effectivization of text reproduction with regard to time and money, as the
individual type could be reused for producing texts with a different content. A
direct consequence of this was that books became cheaper and it became
possible to increase the extent of book distribution.
The new technique, however, also implied a considerable improvement in
the reliability of the copied texts, as through proof-reading it became possible
to emancipate the text from the semantic bond which lay in the manual
copying techniques of the Middle Ages where the reproduction of texts was
subject both to the individual writer’s interpretations and errors. The
technique permitted - at least in principle - an asemantic proof-reading. Proof-
reading itself could also be reduced to the proof-reading of the original proof
rather than of individual copies. This advantage had become partly available
with the introduction of wooden block printing, but block printed books were
roughly as expensive as hand-written copies and a single mistake could mean
the loss of a whole block, whereas Gutenberg’s technique permitted the
making up of a single or a few lines.
At the same time the conditions for semantic control were changed. Where
this control in the Middle Ages could be exercised directly in the semantically
rooted copying process, and be done efficiently because the number of
                                                
5  See Eisenstein, 1979 for further details. Gutenberg’s personal role in the development of the new
method of printing is still unclear, but as the method was developed at a printing house under his
management, his name can still reasonably be used as a code.
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possible copies was limited, the faster and a-semantic reproduction technique
implied that semantic control had to be exercised externally - through a
separate and visibly censoring hand. The technical form thus contained a quite
obvious secular potential for posterity.
Last, but not least, it can also be mentioned here that Gutenberg’s tech-
nique made it possible to store and manage a great body of knowledge which
could not be managed, or managed only with difficulty, using the existing
technology. This holds true first and foremost of all technically, mathematically
and numerically expressed knowledge, where the demand on accuracy of
detail and the individual notation is particularly rigorous - and highly limiting
for the validity and use of manual reproduction.
The technique involved a manual trade, but as a medium for the repre-
sentation of knowledge it fulfilled one of the necessary conditions for the
entire industrialization process which followed later.
It is difficult to indicate precisely when printed knowledge became decisive
for the technical development of modern society. It was not a precondition for
the development of the early mechanical technologies - including that of
printing. An epoch-making effect can perhaps first be noticed in the energy
technologies of the 17th and 18th centuries, which were founded on technical,
physical and mathematical knowledge which could not be produced, verified
and managed without the printed book.
As a general medium  for representing knowledge the printed book not
only released a new technological and theoretical potential, it also became - as
a medium for stabilized, generally objectified and theoretical knowledge which
is available without respect of persons and power - one of the preconditions
for the development of modern society from enlightened absolutism and the
Age of Enlightenment to democratic movements and the constitutional divi-
sion of power. When we consider that the idea of a free market and modern
man’s personality emerged as results of a comprehensive theoretical work of
construction which - again through the medium of written knowledge -
brought about far-reaching strategic developments and educational initiatives,
it becomes clear that the printed book as a common, typical and distinctive
medium for representing knowledge in modern society forms an essential part
of the infrastructure of these societies.
It is thus the book rather than the computer which has made possible the
transition to a society based on the utilization of theoretical knowledge as a
strategic resource nor, therefore, does this transition - as Daniel Bell claimed -
290
characterize the relationship between industrial and post-industrial society,
but rather the transition to modern society.6
It is quite true that the printed book is not a condition for any production of
theoretical and technical knowledge since it is only a means of reproduction,
but it is to a great degree a condition for the articulation of some types of
knowledge and for the dissemination and use of existing knowledge. It is
difficult if not impossible to imagine that theoretical knowledge can become a
strategic resource in society without this or another medium with similar
properties.
While Gutenberg’s typographical inventiveness lay in the asemantic con-
sideration and handling of alphabetical notation, the cultural and historical
significance of the invention is due to the fact that this consideration paved
the way for a number of previously unknown or unexploited semantic
potentialities.
Viewed from this perspective the question therefore is not only whether the
asemantic consideration of the informational notation system was right or
wrong, but also which potentialities are embraced by this revolution in the
technology of textual representation.
8.5 A notation that is not accessible to sense perception
In using printing to emphasize the cultural and historical perspectives which
may be connected with an asemantic view of notation, it is necessary to add
that this is a question of effects which first emerged during the course of a
long period of time and as part of other cultural processes. Gutenberg
developed his technique in the 1430’s, but the printed book only became the
most important, socially supporting knowledge and script technology several
hundred years later and this was naturally not because of the medium, but of
the knowledge expressed in the medium. When we read a boring book it is
not the handling of the alphabet we criticize, it is the meaning and style.
                                                
6  Bell, 1973. Beniger, 1985 traces the strategic use of theoretical knowledge as a foundation for the
development of American society back to the building of new infrastructures around the beginning of
the 19th century, but only sporadically touches upon the script-technological preconditions for the
development strategies. It should perhaps be added that what has been written here should not be
considered as a suggestion of any form of causality between the technical media and the exploitation of
its potentialities. Many other circumstances are included in the same processes and the existence of a
potential is not the cause of anything. The exploitation of technical potential has also, suprisingly
often - perhaps almost as a rule - completely unforeseen and unforseeable consequences.
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Discussing informational notation in the same historical perspective is
impermissible in the nature of the case. If informational notation permits new
ways of expressing forms of knowledge (not to anticipate the question as to
whether it could also permit the development of new forms of knowledge) to
the same extent as Gutenberg’s printing technique - and this is not an
unreasonable expectation - an attempt to discount the cultural implications in
advance would be a foolhardy undertaking.
On the other hand, it is not impossible to discuss whether informational
notation contains new semantic potentialities, as in such a case they would be
connected with those features which distinguish informational notation from
alphabetical and other familiar sequential notation systems which, as we saw
in 8.4, include the semantically empty, quality-less notation, the finite number
limitation and the mechanical effect potential, as well as the special form of rule
determination which will be considered in 8.6 - 8.9.
Another modification, however, must be introduced here, because informa-
tional notation does possess one quality common to all notation systems, as it
has a physical value. But this quality is not only defined in another way, it also
serves a different purpose.
While the physical manifestation in alphabetical writing and formal notation
serve to ensure perceptual recognition, the informational entity is not bound
to any criterion for perceptual recognition.
This independence is ensured by the precise physical value and implies first
that it is possible to employ the mechanical processing of informational  struc-
tures, second, that it is possible to work with semantically distinctive, physical
entities of a completely different, small size and a correspondingly high
process speed and, third, makes it possible to implement notation in energy
substances.
It is quite true that there is nothing wrong in defining the smallest infor-
mational units with threshold values registrable by the senses, but this is not
simply an unnecessary restriction, it is also a contra-functional restriction. It is
only possible to utilize sensory registration if - as occurs in the alphabet and
the Morse system - we have in advance bound any given perceived entity to
an invariant - recognizable - place in the notation system. If we wish to utilize
the perceivable manifestation, we must also abandon the advantages which lie
in the unambiguous definition of the physical form of the symbols.
At the same moment an informational process is accessible to human under-
standing, it is therefore also accessible to another expression system where
informational notation is also used as a means of mechanically producing an
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output recognizable by the senses. As such a transformation is both a
necessary starting and finishing point for any use of informational notation,
this notation system will be limited, it can only exist as a means to a non-
perceptible re-presentation of other perceptible expression systems. On the
other hand, this mechanical transformation implies that informational notation
can also represent - for example, pictorial - expressions which cannot
themselves be expressed in the same sequential form.7
Informational notation has thus, as a distinct characteristic, the fact that due
to its definition it can be realized in a machine in a form which is not accessible
to the senses. Where Hjelmslev at the time was puzzled by his own statement
that »it is in the nature of language to be overlooked«8, that is, was concealed
behind the auditive or alphabetical clothing, we are puzzled today by the fact
that, as far as informational notation is concerned, it is the clothing, the ex-
pression form, which cannot be seen. The little boy in the fairy-tale may still be
right, but now the tailors are too.
That the form of the information cannot be seen does not mean that it can-
not be made visible, or that it is of an immaterial or transcendental character, it
means on the contrary that special demands are made on the threads which are
used in sewing the clothes.
It is now already clear that informational notation possesses properties
which are not only new, but also more profound than those of Gutenberg’s
invention. Where Gutenberg made a contribution to a new use of an existing
notation system, informational notation, seen as a physical expression system,
is a completely new system. It was - and could only be - developed in
connection with the development of new technical and semantic handling
methods.
Shannon developed his theory primarily with the aim of improving a num-
ber of existing communication technologies, but it rapidly became evident that
informational notation came into its own particularly in connection with the
realization of Turing’s theory. Turing had already discovered the - algorithmic
                                                
7  The demand for re-presentation in a form recognizable by the senses is handled in modern computers
by an interface. The same internal procedure can thus be transformed into an arbitrary quantity of
different expression forms which depend solely on the organization of the chosen output medium. A
»picture« transmitted to a loudspeaker will thus produce a sequence of sounds which will largely be
completely meaningless. We can therefore draw the conclusion that the meaning of the informational
procedure is formed in relation to the interface and is not immanent in the procedure.
8  Hjelmslev (1943) 1961: 5. The Danish original has »at sproget vil overses«, that is: »language ins-
ists on being overlooked«, implying that language has a will of its own.
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- thread which was necessary to utilize the new potentialities of the
informational notation system.
8.6. The algorithmic thread
When the informational entity has no solid physical form there is naturally a
great risk that the informational structure will collapse. In Turing’s theory, the
informational structure was supported by well-defined, permanent physical
sign manifestations, where a physical-mechanical operation, which also stood
for a symbolic operation, could be allocated to a given manifest form.
Turing did not use informational notation units, but notation units which
could be recognized by the senses, as he regarded the - necessary - physical
definition of the expressions of these entities as a purely technical question
and saw the notation system as a formal notation system.
On the other hand he showed how - by regarding a physical-mechanical
procedure as a relationship between one step and the next - it was possible to
organize a physical-mechanical system in such a way that it could perform any
symbolic operation which could be described step by step. Whether the next
step was established in advance, or had to be defined during the process, made
no decisive difference.
Although Turing worked with fixed, well-defined physical symbol manife-
stations, this input might well comprise new definitions of their value. The
demand was only that any change should be carried out step by step as the
result of an unambiguous declaration, whether this was given in advance in
the form of a programme or in the form of a continuous input of new
instructions.
The Turing machine was thus not only defined by physical mechanics, or
through physically determined, symbolic expressions or given symbol values,
but also through the algorithmic procedure which simultaneously organizes
the physical and symbolic process.
While the ability to maintain an informational structure in a physically fluid
substance depends on the definition of critical threshold values for the
legitimate physical forms, the ability to vary the informational notation struc-
ture is based on the algorithmic treatment of the relationship between the
physical and the symbolic structures.
Herewith, Turing had also discovered the means which could be used to
utilize the properties of informational notation independently of human
recognition.
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As informational notation and the algorithmic procedure together constitute
the necessary and sufficient foundation for the mechanical execution of
computational processes, they are also included as distinctive basic elements in
all informational signs.
As the connection between informational notation and the algorithmic pro-
cedure not only implies that it is now possible to “electrify” the algorithm, but
also indicates a deep conceptual change in the understanding and handling of
algorithmic processes, it becomes necessary to include this advance in
algorithmic management before describing the informational signs.
8.7 The multisemantic potential of the algorithmic structure
In mathematics, the term algorithm is understood generally as any precise
precept for the execution of a procedure. The algorithm defines a set of
procedural rules through which it is possible to unambiguously transform a
given set of numerical values to another, or in Trakhtenbrot’s formulation:
A list of instructions specifying a sequence of operations which will give the
answer to any problem of a given type.9
In its basic form the algorithm thus represents a system of invariant rules for
handling a set of variable data appropriate to the rules. The algorithmic
structure ensures that a calculation involving the same data will always lead to
the same result and that a calculation involving different data must be
performed in accordance with the same rules of calculation, whereas a cal-
culation involving different data does not necessarily lead to different results,
as both 3 + 5 and 4 + 4 and 14 - 6 all give 8. When there is only an algorithmic
result there is thus no algorithmic path to return on, either to the process or the
point of departure. The algorithmic result itself is empty.
The central part of the algorithmic procedure is connected with the distinc-
tion between rule and data. But the distinction is not absolute. Al-though the
rule system is available independently of the data, it is not possible to handle
any set of data with a given algorithm. The algorithmic structure makes
demands on the structure of the data set and there may also sometimes be a
demand on the permissible data values, which we are familiar with from the
                                                
9  Trakhtenbrot, (1960) 1989: 203.
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rule that the value zero may not occupy the place of the denominator in a
fraction, just as there is often an indication of upper and lower limits to the
variation of data values included in the definition of an algorithm.
Although the algorithmic procedure is not limited to handling numerical
values, but may often include symbolic and logical values and relationships
which have the character of complex semantic structures, there is a funda-
mental demand that not only the procedure, but also the data structure must
be available in the form of mono-semic values.
The algorithmic structure thus does not permit »the cumulative acquisition
of new dimensions of meaning« which, according to Ricoeur, is a characteristic
feature of linguistic expressions, nor the complementary and equally
characteristic possibility of storing meaning for an unspecified period
(including the risk that it will be forgotten if not actualized) which is also con-
tained in the linguistic redundancy structure.
The algorithmic procedure’s unambiguousness is connected with the
demand for well-defined starting conditions and sequencing, including the
demands:
• That the rules are individually unambiguous
• That the rules are used one by one, sequentially. The simultaneous use of
several rules cannot occur. The individual rule’s area of use must be defined
in extent and be clearly delimited in relation to preceding and/or
subsequent rules.
• That the transition from one rule to the next occurs immediately after an
operation has been executed
• That all values, whether they are included in the rule structure or data struc-
ture and all relationships between them, must be specifically declared before
they are used.
• And that all values must be mono-semic - or numerical in the broadest sense
of this term.
As a consequence of this unambiguousness, the formulation of the algorithmic
expression has often been seen as a goal for a scientific description of a given
problem and scientific attention has then been directed towards other
problems if this goal was achieved. The relationship between language and
algorithmic representation is seen from this perspective as a relationship
between a problem and its solution. From a linguistic point of view, however,
there is a different result, as the relationship between problem and solution is
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manifested as a relationship between polysemic and mono-semic language -
and not as a transition from a problem to a solution.
That it is a relationship between two linguistic articulation systems rather
than a relationship between problem and solution appears experientially from
the circumstance that even the purest mathematical exposition must both be
introduced and concluded with a linguistic account. This familiar experience is
not only due to a - good or bad - habit, it is on the contrary the unavoidable
result of the fact that an algorithmic expression by definition assumes an
establishment of start conditions and an interpretation of results which have
no algorithmic  expression.
As we saw in chapter 7, mono-semic expressions are formed with a starting
point in a definition of a specific linguistic redundancy structure. In the
linguistic representation this bond is expressed in the declaration of
unambiguous statements which again can create the starting point for an al-
gorithmic procedure.
The transition from an unambiguous linguistic expression to an algorithmic
procedure, however, is not a simple matter, as there is also a question of a
complete transition from one - linguistic - rule system to another - algorithmic -
rule system. This replacement of the rule system does not leave the mono-
semic expression untouched. At the same moment a mono-semic expression is
subjected to an algorithmic rule structure, it loses its referential meanings.10
Whether we multiply apples by pears, metres by kilograms, the height of the
Eiffel tower by the sound of a thunderclap, makes no difference to an
algorithmic sequence:
While the transition from polysemic to mono-semic articulation depends
on a fixed definition of the redundancy structure, the transition from mono-
semic, linguistic articulation to the algorithmic handling of mono-semic
values depends on the elimination of the expression’s referent.
The elimination, however, only holds true during the algorithmic sequence,
as it is only possible to refer to the procedure’s result as a result if it is assumed
that the mono-semic expression’s referent remains the same throughout the
sequence. This is thus a question of an abstraction procedure where the
referent is assumed or, more correctly: placed in parenthesis. This construction
of the relationship to the referent is distinctive for algorithmic expressions and
determines the relative autonomy of the algorithmic procedure, i.e.: its
                                                
10   The loss includes not only the reference to phenomena in the world, but also the linguistic meaning
relationships between words and between sentences and - naturally also - the linguistic syntax.
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existence as an expression system, which can stand for itself without standing
for anything else.
But the same construction simultaneously places the algorithmic procedure
in a position of semantic dependence on the linguistic expression. When the
parenthesis is closed, the expression must again be handled in linguistic form.
The algorithmic procedure cannot stand alone because the mono-semic values
lack their referent.
That which distinguishes the algorithmic from the linguistic procedure, at
the same time places it in a one-sided relationship of dependency on this.11
As the relationship to the linguistic referent is placed in parenthesis, how-
ever, it becomes possible to change the referent and transfer an algorithmic
procedure from a linguistic reference system to another without, for this
reason, bringing about any identity or connection between the referents
(formal polysemy). It was this property that Boltzmann saw as a frequently
used and characteristic feature in and of mathematical physics and this appears
to support the view of the algorithmic procedure as an immanent, purely
formally defined procedure which runs in accordance with its own rules. The
relationship to the linguistic referent, however, is more complicated.
While there are rigorous demands on the definition of the individual rule, on
the sequential linking of rules and on the relationship between rule structure
and data structure, there are no  general demands on the choice and
combination of rules. Although any algorithmic expression is completely
deterministic, there are no general syntactic rules for the composition of the
algorithmic expression. We can multiply, divide, integrate and differentiate as
much as we wish, as long as the sequence of each individual operation has
been established. As the rules are individually established, the choice of rules
is therefore a semantic choice which cannot be made without a linguistic
referent.
This naturally does not mean that we have a free hand in the referential
interpretation of any algorithm, but only that a given algorithmic procedure
constitutes a compositional whole which does not itself have an algorithmic
form. The composition is therefore not determined by the algorithmic functions
either.
                                                
11   In Hjelmslev’s terminology, this relationship is called a determination, i.e. a relationship between a
functive, (the linguistic antecedent) which is necessary for the occurrence of another functive (the
algorithmic procedure). Hjelmslev (1943) 1961: 34-35. In Hjelmslev’s rather awkward use of the term
determination it would be expressed: that the algorithmic procedure determines the linguistic sentence.
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The algorithmic function cannot motivate the choice of itself and the al-
gorithmic procedure cannot motivate its own continuance. While all algorith-
mic procedures are completely deterministic, each procedure is based on a
series of arbitrary, semantically motivated choices. The algorithmic procedure
can therefore be described rather as a rule system for co-ordinating
linguistically motivated entities where both the individual part alone and the
total expression as a whole have placed the linguistic referents in parenthesis.
The algorithmic form’s semantic bond, however, not only embraces the
parenthetical relationship to the linguistic expression’s referents, the form is
also - seen as a detached expression form - subject to structural limitations of a
semantic nature. Any algorithmic expression is both determined in its relation
to one or more sets of general rules (here we can rightfully speak of a
language system) and a specific realization in the form of a correspondingly
distinct usage. As any algorithm can be described as a relationship between a
precept and a data structure, and as a given precept also establishes the
conditions for adequate data structures, it is evident that the relationship
between precept and data (i.e. language use) is a semantically distinct
relationship. The semantically motivated choice of precept is also a semantic
choice of data structure. The same holds true of the relationship between a
given precept and the established set of possible calculational or procedural
rules, as the precept can be seen as a choice of calculational rules from a formal
language.
The semantics of algorithms thus includes at least three levels. First, the in-
dividual expression unit is always defined as a unit which connects the
notation’s form with a mono-semic value. Second, the specific relationship be-
tween precept and data structure is semantically distinctive in the sense that a
given precept - a defined rule system - can only handle a certain amount of
structurally uniform data sets. Third, the total composition of a given
algorithmic expression is based on a semantically motivated choice of the
possible rules of procedure which are contained in the »language system«. If
this is a calculation algorithm, the language system is thus constituted by the
existing rules of calculation. As the term language system here may remind us
of Hjelmslev’s terminology, it must be added that the rules of a language
system are only included in an algorithmic expression if they are declared as
a referent for a specific notation unit, such as is the case, for example, when
we refer to the rules of addition with the notation +.
Unlike common languages, these different semantic choices are distin-
guished in a series of distinct semantic choices because all choices are subject
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to the mono-semic restriction and the demand for a delimited area of effect for
chosen rules. The algorithmic procedure, unlike the linguistic expression, thus
contains no semantic interference between expression elements, on the other
hand the algorithmic language demands that rules are manifested as distinct
expression elements.
The algorithmic language not only has a polynomial semantic structure
relative to common language, but is also itself structured at several formal
levels. Whereas the language system is constituted by the available set of
procedural rules, usage is constituted partly by a precept and partly by a data
structure. It is not difficult to distinguish the system from the usage, as the
system is constituted by the legitimate rules of operation.
This clear distinction determines, on the one hand, that it is both possible to
construct new general rules and freely choose rules for use with specific
purposes. As the rules of formal language systems are fully deterministic, it is
quite true that they place certain limitations on the possible combinations, but
these limitations can be avoided through delimiting the areas of use of the
individual rules.
While a formal language system as a whole can be described as an inde-
pendent and total system of well-defined procedural rules, usage which is
constituted by the chosen combination of rules and mono-semic value sets is
rather more difficult to describe.
Seen in relationship to a given data structure, it is not possible to choose
any - but perhaps several - rule structures and seen in relationship to a given
rule structure, it is not possible to handle any data structure. As the
relationship between rule and data structure is thus characterized by a mutual
bond of solidarity, it is not possible, on the face of it, to identify the rule
structure, the precept, as a superior interpreter relative to the data structure
and the data this permits. The relationship between rule and data certainly
possesses certain features which could perhaps be seen as reminiscent of the
linguistic relationship between expression and referent, as the relationship
between rule and data is derived from the linguistic definition of the mono-
semic referents.12
In a certain sense, it might also be possible to claim that the solidarity be-
tween programme structure and data structure implies that the algorithmic ex-
pression - over and above the parenthetic relationship to the linguistic referent
                                                
12   It might perhaps be possible to describe a definition as a specific linguistic form different to other
linguistic expressions - as explicit designations of chosen referents, as the referent is normally taken as
given and is therefore not included in the linguistic expression.
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- also itself contains an immanent referential function between programme and
data structure and that the linguistic referent is thus not the sole referent. On
the other hand, the relationship between rule structure and data also possesses
features which clearly distinguish themselves from the relationship between
word and referent, as both parts are manifested. Together they comprise the
basic syntactic structure, which is why they are rather equivalent to the nexus
relationship of the sentence.
Where a sentence, however, produces a meaning, the algorithmic procedure
instead produces the transformation of one expression to another. While both
the construction as a whole and each individual element are semantically
motivated, the transformation procedure which occurs from a given input to a
given output, is asemantic, as the connection between input and output is
accessible to - and completely dependent on - an interpretation which is
independent of the procedure. The procedure guarantees that there can be a
connection, but says nothing regarding in what it consists.
As the choice of referent and semantic regime can thus be distinguished
from algorithmic syntax, the syntactic structure itself is open to several se-
mantic regimes. 13
This multisemantic property not only makes it possible to develop different
algorithmic procedures for different semantic regimes (whether logical,
numerical, linguistic, pictorial or auditive), it also permits one and the same
algorithmic structure to serve as a basis for any semantic regime.
The description given here of the algorithmic expression can be summarized
as follows:
• While each individual notation unit in an algorithmic expression has a well-
defined value (a referent which is either a data or a rule value), the total
algorithmic expression has no definite referent. The same algorithmic
procedures can represent a plurality of significations, purposes or meanings
and different algorithms can represent the same signification, purpose or
meaning. The algorithmic procedure is also characterized by the fact that it
can be executed quite independently of these meanings and the result of
                                                
13  Since an algorithm is a formal expression, it may appear that this contradicts the statement in
chapter 7: that formal systems can be polysemic but not multisemantic systems. Only a modification,
however, is necessary, since the multisemantic potential of algorithms presupposes that the algorithm
is itself conceived as a purely syntactic structure, without any reference to or dependence on a semantic
interpretation. But even so, there is still a significant difference between the multisemantic potential of
algorithms expressed in formal and informational notation systems, since the latter, as will be described
in chapter 9, allows a wider range of possible variations.   
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the procedure is semantically empty. The algorithmic procedure does not
prevent us from comparing or multiplying the height of the Eiffel tower
with or by the sound of a thunderclap.
• While any algorithmic expression is completely determined, there are no
general rules for combining algorithmic sequences. All data can be multi-
plied, divided, integrated, differentiated and combined to our heart’s
content, as long as the sequence for each operation is described.
• The algorithm’s start and stop conditions cannot themselves be expressed
in algorithmic form. The algorithmic expression cannot contain its own
interpretation. This must be interpreted in another language and the same
goes for the algorithmic rules of procedure. The algorithmic expression
contains references to formal rules, but the rules are not contained in the
expression, they are, on the contrary, re-presented by a distinct and
declared notation which refers to a rule outside the expression.
• The number of notation units used can be freely varied, depending on the
task and purpose.
8.8 The algorithmic revolution
With his description of the mechanical process as an algorithmic sequence of
local, step-by-step determinations, Turing was apparently the first to discover
the unique syntactic properties of algorithms, just as he was also the first to see
how it was possible to bring mechanical procedures into a logical regime by
first reducing finite, formal procedures to mechanical procedures.
Although this was an epoch-making breakthrough, the construction
contained a decisive obstacle to the description of the syntactic potential he
had discovered.
Within the logical regime the dissolution of mechanical procedures into
individual steps could immediately be interpreted on the basis of a classical
understanding of determination, as the superior, general determination was
now ensured by the logical and not the mechanical totality. He was not aware
that the local determination could also form the basis of other and not least,
non-deterministic semantic regimes - nor, apparently, did it interest him, as he
saw the choice machine as a less successful version of the automatic machine.
This limitation is not particularly surprising and naturally does not detract
from Turing’s original efforts.
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Turing’s limitation on this point, however, cannot simply be explained by
regarding it as due to the dominant currents of contemporary science, it can
also be understood as a consequence of the fact that it only became possible
to illustrate and handle the new syntactic potential once the machine Turing
had thought out came into existence.
Although in many respects there are good reasons to regard the human
brain as superior relative to any existing - conception of - computers, all com-
puters are superior to the human brain when it comes to handling exactly this
type of step-by-step process which creates the foundation for algorithmic
syntax.
If the algorithmic handling of symbols created the basis for Turing’s idea of
the universal computer, the later computer technology also created the basis
for a revolution in algorithmic management.
The concept of revolution may perhaps appear rather hackneyed and
produce meagre descriptive associations, but in this connection it is an
apposite concept, because it unites a reference to a definite, fundamental
change with a reference to the change’s equally fundamental indefiniteness
and incalculability. It is thus hardly possible to provide a total picture of the
course of this development as it is still an ongoing - and uncontrollable -
process which runs along a multiplicity of mutually unconnected paths.
As far as I am aware, no general investigation of this development up to the
present exists and naturally even less an informed opinion as to how it will
develop further. How far it has progressed today and how it will develop
tomorrow must remain open questions.
A picture of the point of departure and some of the lines of development
which issue from here, however, have gradually begun to delineate themselves
through a number of spread, sometimes sporadic, contributions in various
available sources. As the subject, both in extent and with regard to the
demand on insight, considerably exceeds my competence, the reader must be
content with a more summary account based on a relatively limited choice of
sources.
On the face of it, the most eye-catching feature is without doubt the
tremendous explosion in the number of available, written algorithms itself. In a
standard textbook on algorithms from 1983, Robert Sedgewick thus starts by
stating that as good as all algorithms mentioned in the book are less than 25
years old, while a few have been known for a couple of thousand years -
although under a different designation, as algorithms owe their name to
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mathematician, Mohammed ibn Al-Khowarizimi, who published an - epoch-
making - arithmetical textbook around the year 850.14
The quantitative growth in the production of new algorithms includes both
the development of new algorithms for old purposes and the development of
algorithms for new purposes. Among the new purposes the development of
computer technology is one of the most important and advances within this
area led during the 1950’s to the introduction of computer science as an
independent subject distinct from mathematics.
In addition, there is another remarkable new departure, as algorithmic
models were developed in a number of new areas. Where the algorithmic
procedure had hitherto only occupied a central place in mathematics, logic,
physics and economics, it now began to occupy a central position in areas of
biology, psychology and linguistic and a wider range of social sciences.15
Subject areas which still hesitate, such as a number of disciplines within the
humanities, appear to be correspondingly losing esteem.
The technological potential of this expansion is immediately visible. Where
mechanical manipulation had hitherto had its centre of gravity in the handling
of knowledge extracted from studies of inorganic, physical nature, the way is
now clear for a corresponding, algorithmically based mechanical handling of
knowledge extracted from the study of living organisms, mental and social
processes.16
There appears to be little doubt that the two new departures developed in
close mutual interplay? The sources provide a multiplicity of examples of
intersecting lines of inspiration and none of those involved appear to have
any precise, not to mention concurrent, picture of these lines. Nevertheless, the
two lines of development also contain an inner conflict.
One the one hand, the computationally oriented development of algorithms
is necessarily and strongly bound to and determined by the way the technical
problems present themselves and the understanding of algorithmic functions is
                                                
14   Sedgewick, 1983: 7. Williams, 1985, 21-24.
15   Where psychology is concerned the developments of the 1950’s are described in Miller, Galanter and
Pribram, 1960, among others, in an attempt to create a foundation for algorithmic psychology in a
break with behaviourist psychology. Within linguistics, Hjelmslev is one of the pioneers of an
algorithmically oriented theory, but the dynamic process perspective was first formulated in Chomsky’s
generative grammar. In the biological field, corresponding ways of presenting the problem are discussed
by such authors as Emmeche, 1990 from a Peirce inspired viewpoint.
16   That there is also a great potential in this for an industrial expansion based on the development and
use of industrial methods for handling biological and mental natural resources, is moreover often
overlooked or underestimated in the many theories on »post-industrial« society.
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characterized by the abstract and arbitrary functionalism of algorithms. The
internal algorithmic functionality is central and the understanding of the
algorithm is closely connected with its effectuation as a process which elapses
in time. Algorithmic process time, which had played no role in mathematics and
logic, has thus become a central element in computer science.
On the other hand, the use of algorithms in a growing number of disciplines
is rather understood as a goal for scientific description in a more or less explicit
analogy to classical mathematical physics, but naturally with the addition that
it is now a question of handling algorithms at a higher, more complex level.
There are a number of reasons why this conflict in the conceptualization of
the algorithmic procedure has been under-emphasized. First, the fact that there
was a common root in the classical mathematical-physical tradition, so that the
new departure was seen as an expansion of the potential of this tradition.
Second, the fact that many of the divergences appeared as divergences
between the special ways problems present themselves within different
disciplines. Third, the fact that there was also common ground in a general
automatization perspective and last, but not least, the fact that as a whole this
was a question of a development where trying out the many new -
immeasurable - possibilities necessarily came to occupy a dominant position as
a guiding principle.
That it is reasonable to describe this expansion in quantity and areas of use
as a revolution proper in algorithmic management competence, is also due to
the fact that the quantitative growth of algorithmic procedures and areas of
use are closely connected with a fundamental leap in the history of algorithmic
methodology. This leap also has its centre of gravity in the new computer
technology and began in the 1940’s.
According to Wells17  this change is expressed as a growing clarification,
structuring and abstraction in the formulation of algorithmic procedures.
Where previously, algorithms had been seen and worked with as short
sequences related to specific problems in a given context, they now became
regarded as detached, independent expressions which could be utilized in
long sequences, structured in blocks and released from the specific data
connected with the given subjects.
The same view leads to a more systematic use of the distinction between
procedure and data - manifested among other things in the introduction of
                                                
17   Wells, 1980: 276 ff.
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such terms as data and data structures - as references to data are now (solely
and completely) established as a definition of input parameters.
The mechanical execution of these procedures at the same time produced a
number of other methodological innovations, among them the calculation of
process times, problem-solving times and expression complexity.
An important fulcrum in this development, according to Knuth and Trabb
Pardo, was the appearance of the assignment function as distinct from the
mathematical »equal to« expression. The assignment function was first used by
Konrad Zuse in 1945 in his »Plankalkül«, which at the same time was the first
general programming language.18  The Plankalkül, however, was first published
in its entirety in 1972. Although shorter excerpts appeared in 1948 and 1959,
his work had no demonstrable significance for the new trend in algorithmic
development.
According to Knuth and Trabb Pardo, the first significant step towards
distinguishing the assignment function was taken instead by Herman
Goldstine and John von Neumann with their suggestion of the - graphic -
representation of algorithmic procedures as flow diagrams - or flow charts -
from 1946-1947.19
Although Goldstine and von Neumann do not define the assignment func-
tion here, it was waiting - certainly in retrospect - say Knuth and Trabb Pardo -
in the wings, as the block divided algorithmic sequence is connected with
directional, irreversible transitions (marked in the diagrams by arrows), where
the mathematical »equal-to« designates reversible transitions. The assignment
function, however, is also distinct from the mathematical equal to function, as it
replaces an automatic or determined connection with a semantic and
facultative connection.
As a whole, flow diagrams represented under any circumstances a pio-
neering innovation with their procedural and functional view of the algo-
rithmic sequence.
If the flow diagram - and Wiener’s cybernetic feedback mechanism -
represent the first step in the transformation of the concept of algorithms, the
next step is the transition to an understanding of the algorithmic procedure as
a programme which can be designed with arbitrary, formal-logical symbols.
                                                
18   Knuth and Trabb Pardo, (1977) 1980: 202 ff. According to Williams 1985: 225, the Plankalkül
uses by far the greater number of basic programming functions, among them variable functions, con-
ditional sentences, loops, subscripts and parameter determined procedures, but not recursive functions,
i.e. procedures which contain themselves.
19   Published in H.H. Goldstine and John von Neumann (1947-1948).
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Hamming describes this development as a conceptual transition from the
‘number crushing’ metaphor to an understanding of programming as a -
logical - symbol manipulation and believes that this change made its
breakthrough with those involved - himself among them - in 1952-1953, in this
case coinciding with the appearance of the first compilers which gradually
emancipated programming from the built-in machine language.
Hamming admits that Turing perhaps developed this symbol understanding
rather earlier, but believes that it is still the idea of the number crusher that is
the basis of Burks’, Goldstine’s and von Neumann’s pioneering work on the
logical construction of electronic computers from 1946, where they formulated
the basic principles of the modern serial computer (von Neumann architecture)
with a stored programme.20  Hamming’s view is indirectly confirmed by
Goldstine who, in referring to the ideas of the 1940’s exclusively mentions the
mathematical perspectives for use, although both a logical description of the
computer, the idea of the stored programme and a control system, which made
it possible for the machine to alter its own programme structure, had been
developed.21
While it is thus possible to date the emergence of a new perspective on
algorithmic representation to the 1940’s, the more systematic utilization in the
form of fixed programme functions and a programming language proper
stretches over a rather longer period. According to Wells it is only possible to
speak of a general algorithmic language with the emergence of block
structuring, structural control, data structuring, data abstraction - and two-
dimensional notation and set theoretic notation in the 1960’s. The
programming language, ALGOL, which was completed by Peter Naur in 1960
is indicated by many sources as the first fully developed programming
language with a general and consistent syntactic notation.22
As the final part of this summary account of the algorithmic revolution we
must also include the fact that the practical developments created the
                                                
20   R.W. Hamming, 1980: 7-8. The work referred to is by Burks, Goldstine and von Neumann (1946)
1989. von Neumann had formulated the logical principles of a machine with a stored programme in
First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC from June 1945 and in Memorandum on the Program of the
High-Speed Computer Project from 8 November 1945. They contained, however, no description of the
coding and programming process. C.f. Goldstine, 1972: 191-203, 242, 253, 266.
21   Goldstine, 1983. Especially chapter 2 and Beeson, 1988: 200.
22   Wells, 1980: 277-283. A more detailed account of various aspects of the development of
programming language can be found in, among others, Goldstine, 1972, Simon and Newell, 1972,
Metropolis et al, 1980, Herken (ed.), 1988 and, to a lesser extent also Williams, 1985, who mainly
discusses the development of hardware.
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foundation for the appearance of the first algorithmic theories proper with the
Russian mathematician A. A. Markov’s Theory of Algorithms from 1954 as
the first. Here, Markov made a direct connection with Gödel’s, Church’s and
Turing’s work from the 1930’s, but aimed at a more precise, mathematical
analysis of the computability of various algorithmic systems. As, according to
Markov, it was possible to show that there is a series of mathematical problems
which demonstrably could not be solved through algorithmic means, he
naturally also rejected the idea that it would be possible to design a machine
capable of solving problems of the same type.
If an algorithm solving every isolated problem of a given class is impossible,
then a machine solving every such problem is likewise impossible.
This deprives of their very foundations the stories published in foreign
(especially American) literature concerning machines capable of solving
any problem, and automata replacing the scholar... Therefore the conative
research enterprise in mathematics (as well as in any other branch of
learning) will never be transferred to machines, capable only of assisting
man but not replacing him.23
Against this it is often claimed, especially in areas of the American tradition,
that it is not possible to generalize over and above the existing algorithmic
competence - that we can never say never - and therefore cannot exclude the
possibility of new algorithmic revolutions.24  What remains is the fact that the
algorithmic revolution up to the present has not brought about such an
automated, general problem solving method, neither in mathematics nor any
other area.
The control and automation perspective has played a central role as a
motivating and driving force in the algorithmic revolution, but is not suitable
for describing the result of the process. The explanation of this circumstance is
of a linguistic character. The automatic procedure assumes that the semantic
value of symbols is first frozen and then placed in parenthesis. As the
automatic procedure therefore cannot contain its own preconditions, it cannot
describe its own results either.
It can hardly be disputed that the algorithmic revolution implies a consi-
derable expansion of the possibilities for designing and executing automatic
                                                
23   Markov, (1954) 1961: 441.
24   A view which is taken as a basis in Haugeland, (1985) 1987, among others.
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processes. This automatization, however, includes only problems that have
already been unambiguously formulated and automatization in addition
describes only one part of the potential which lies in the transition from
physically bound to programmed mechanical operation. At the same time, with
programming comes a complete dissolution of the automatic bond, as each
individual step in any sequence can be made the object of choice, because the
stored programme is distinct from the machine’s control unit which can thus
be used to control and alter the stored instructions.25  As the algorithmic
expression is available in informational form these changes can be executed at
the level of the individual notations, quite independently of the original
algorithmic expression’s rule and data structure.
This property appears to a great degree to contradict the properties nor-
mally ascribed to an algorithmic procedure and it also apparently contradicts
another of the properties which motivated the use of the algorithmic
procedure in computers, namely to guarantee the reliable, automatic handling
of the - otherwise inaccessible and unmanageable - informational processes.
The explanation for this apparent paradox lies in the fact that the compu-
tational programme structure not only permits the algorithmically controlled,
automatic handling of data, but also the algorithmic handling of algorithmic
expressions which are available in the informational notation form. Although it
may be possible to find older examples of such a second-order handling of
algorithms, there has never previously been an operative procedure which was
independent of the task, not to mention any mechanical apparatus by which
such a second-order handling could be performed relative to any informational
notation unit, whether this is included as part of the expression of a rule or a
data value. The methodological leap from first to second order handling of
algorithms is therefore the central element in the algorithmic revolution.
                                                
25   This property was not clearly in evidence in Turing’s theoretical model from 1936 although he
actually allowed the machine to alter its instructions and moreover stored both the programme and data
in the same medium. But this was a central element in von Neumann’s logical description from 1945.
Goldstine, 1972: 259.
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9. The informational sign function
9.1 The algorithm in the machine
If the algorithmic revolution is characterized by abstraction, block structuring
and hierarchical division with the centre of gravity in the distinction between
code instruction and control unit, as well as programme and data structure
with second-order handling of algorithms as a consequence, this is
undoubtedly a far-reaching methodological break in the history of algorithmic
management. But it is not immediately obvious that this should also occasion
new linguistic considerations, as there is no element included in it which in
itself touches on the relationship to the semantic surroundings. It is a
revolution inside a concluded parenthesis.
At the same moment, however, as we take this second-order handling into
account as it is performed in a computer, the picture changes, as was
theoretically anticipated by Turing.
What has been changed is first and foremost the possibility of utilizing the
access to the step-by-step choice of a new instruction at the notational level.
While the algorithmic first-order procedure was formerly characterized by dia-
chronic determination, which stretches from the beginning to the end, the
algorithm in the computer is available in a form which dissolves the diachronic
determination, as all determination in the computer is locally limited so that it is
only valid for the transition from one step to the next.
The diachronic, algorithmic expression is not only available as a sequence
of informational notation units. It is available in a synchronic form where an
arbitrary notation unit can become the object of the next operation,
independently of its position in the preceding diachronic sequence. As the
synchronic manifestation is produced as a result of previous states, they can
be contained in this manifestation, but they need not determine the next step.
It is difficult to decide whether the access to the step-by-step choice of new
rules should be seen as a result of a new conceptualization of algorithmic
procedures, or as a product of the new possibility for the mechanical handling
of these procedures. Under any circumstances, both parts work in the same
direction. With mechanical handling the algorithm appears in a secularized
form, distinct from any specific overall semantics  and accessible to a step-by-
step handling with the help of other algorithms which themselves must be
dissolved into individual steps at the level of informational notation.
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In the following I shall argue that the step-by-step procedure and the
synchronic representation of the algorithmic structure imply that the
algorithmic revolution inside the concluded parenthesis stretches beyond this
parenthesis with the formation of a new sign system, the informational sign
system, as a consequence.
H. Goldstine and John von Neumann were the first to diagnose the crux of
the matter in this process. They referred to it as a transition from a static to a
dynamic decision procedure, but it was evident from their description that this
was only a half-truth. The new procedure contained not one, but two dynamic
agents. The dynamic procedure runs as an exchange between a coded
instruction and the machine’s control organ, which implies the possibility of
continuous modification of codes during the process. It could not be assumed,
they wrote, that the code’s instructions simply stood for an actually defined
content at a certain point in the process. A given code can obtain a changing
content, as it can both be summoned for use on a content, which is modified
during the process, or can itself be modified as a consequence of other
instructions which can be similarly modified.
Hence, it will not be possible in general to foresee in advance and comple-
tely the actual course of C [the control organ], its character and the se-
quence of its omissions on one hand and of its multiple passages over the
same place on the other as well as the actual instructions it finds along this
course, and their changes through various successive occasions at the same
place, if that place is multiply traversed by the course of C. These
circumstances develop in their actually assumed forms only during the
process (the calculation) itself, i.e. while C actually runs through its
gradually unfolding course.1
That the computational process, seen from the control organ’s point of view, is
manifested as an unpredictable process, follows from the fact that the control
organ can change the codes which control its own operations. The decisive
aspect is not the relationship between programme and data, but the division of
the controlling function in code and control organ as two distinct features
which control each other step by step.
Just as for Goldstine and von Neumann, for later computer architects it was
an - easily understandable and well-founded - main motive to develop me-
                                                
1  Goldstine and von Neumann, (1947-48), quoted here after the excerpt in Goldstine, 1972: 269.
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thods which could control this unpredictable process. The computer has
therefore often been defined on the basis of the programme emphasizing the
overall logical structure as the basic characteristic of the automatic, com-
putational procedure, whether they worked with arbitrary, imperative
functions (such as the assignment function and the go-to function) or with
syntactic or logical programming methodology, where the use of arbitrary
steps is often described as »dirty tricks«.2
The very existence of these two conflicting views of programming not only
reflects the fact that programming is a necessary condition for the use of a
computer, but also that this necessity is not determined by the machine, but by
the human use of it. The differences are not a question of what is possible, but
of what is considered correct. The programme expresses a conceptualization at
a semantic level which concerns human interpretation and use for specific pur-
poses. The machine will work with any programme notwithstanding its
semantic structure, as long as it is used in an informational notation system
which is in accordance with the physical structure of the machine.
Nor does the programme therefore constitute the most basic conceptual
frame for a description of the computer. The necessity of the programme stems
on the contrary from the fact that the computer, due to local determination and
the distinction between the stored programme and the control mechanism,
possesses a more basic and anarchic property, where each next step is acces-
sible - in principle - to a free choice.
We would not make much progress if we were to attempt to exploit this
possibility of choice to its full extent. Any use depends on a semantically
motivated choice which is utilized in regulating the diachronic sequence.
Local determination is nevertheless of central importance because it implies
that the former states exercise no determination on the subsequent states.
Although the system’s actual state is produced by a predetermined rule
structure, the next step can not only be executed independently of these rules,
the actual state can also create the starting point for new steps which build
upon other semantic interpretations of the actual state. As a consequence of
this, any rule can both be modified, suspended and/or have a new function
and meaning ascribed to it.
This conflicts with the understanding of the computational process as a se-
quence determined by an algorithm or a programme.
                                                
2  C.f. Trakhtenbrot, 1988: 620, who argues that certainly some of the imperative programming
features can be contained in a structured programming language based on Church’s λ calculation.
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It also conflicts with the experience we have of handling linguistic and
formal notations which build upon - mutually different sets of - stable syntac-
tic rules for the sequential organization of notation units. The most incal-
culable element, however, is probably that this dissolution of the rule structure
conflicts with the basic ideas of the relationship between the rules and that
which is regulated. Whether we think here of the idea of natural laws or of
social conventions, in both cases we employ the idea of a precept or inherent
structure which cannot be influenced by the system the precept regulates.
As described in chapter 5, it was a similar idea which created the foundation
for Allen Newell’s and Herbert Simon’s theory of »physical symbol systems«,
where the rules are given outside the regulated (physical) system. Where the
computer is concerned we know that the programmer can formulate such rules
(including rule systems which can generate new rules), but also that they must
be dissolved and converted to another notation system in which the rules are
produced as the effect of a mechanical process which is not bound by the
symbolic rules. The individual, mechanically effective symbolic entities, as
described in chapters 7 and 8, have no definite content value and there is no
directly compelling equivalence between a certain symbolic content and its
mechanical execution.
In other words, Newell and Simon’s symbol theory gives an incorrect
description of the computational process, as the description ignores those
features which characterize informational notation as distinct from formal
notation systems.
The same idea of the rule system given from outside which controls the
process also underlies the use of concepts such as operative systems and
programmes. These concepts are often highly functional because they indicate
a delimitation according to purpose and task, but at the same time also give a
misleading idea of the semantic freedom of choice which is connected with the
diachronic process, because they describe the sequence as a process in which
the former states determine the following states. In the computer, however,
every symbolic rule effect appears as the result of the process the rules are
supposed to regulate.
In order to describe the diachronic process, it is also necessary to include
another conceptual difficulty which appears in the implementation of the
algorithmic procedures in the machine, as this implementation at the same time
implies that the algorithmic expression (whether this is the prescribed
programme or a given data structure) be converted from a sequentially
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organized, diachronic structure to a  synchronic manifestation of the total
expression.
While the algorithmic expression - just like the alphabetical-linguistic ex-
pression - is manifested as sequences of successive notations in which the
individual notations are defined relative to the preceding and subsequent
notations in a linearly organized sequence of relationships, local determination
in the computer implies that the functional value of each notation unit is
exclusively defined by the total system’s actual - simultaneous - state, or in
Turing’s words: by the relationship between the machine figuration qn and the
actual symbol (the instruction) - described by Turing as S(r) - as the pair, qn,
S(r) comprise the total figuration which determines the machine’s possible
behaviour.3
The concept of the synchronically manifested notation corresponds to
Turing’s concept of the system’s actual state, the machine figuration, but with
the emphasis on the fact that this figuration is available as a notation structure
which is not subject to any specific diachronic determination.
The concept of a synchronic structure itself is derived from linguistics
where, however, it creates great theoretical problems. On the other hand, it is
an extremely apposite term for the circumstance that, at any given moment,
informational notation is available as a simultaneously manifested whole. Its
use in linguistics will be discussed in more detail in the next section, but there
is a reason to point out that in linguistics the concept refers to an underlying,
invariant rule structure such as in Saussure, for example, who uses it on a
presumed stable linguistic state, or in Hjelmslev, who uses it of a language
system, while it is used here of a manifest notation structure.
The circumstance that every next step is determined solely by the relation-
ship between the actual state of the system and the actual notation implies
that the informational expression has a unique character, because while the
individual step only embraces the relationship between two bits, every
individual step at the same time implies a change in the state of the total
system.
While the smallest expression unit in the synchronic expression is consti-
tuted by the informational notation unit, there is no invariant, smallest ex-
pression unit which corresponds to the bit, the grapheme or phoneme in the
diachronic sequence. The smallest expression unit here is constituted by a
complex expression, namely the constellation of bits which comprises the total
                                                
3  Turing, (1936) 1965: 117.
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system’s actual state. The relationship between the total system’s actual
state and the next individual step thus comprises the smallest semantic
expression unit and it therefore represents the basic form of the in-
formational sign.
The circumstance that the smallest diachronic expression unit is itself a
complex, synchronic notation structure which coincides with the smallest sign
function distinguishes the informational sign system from other symbolic sign
systems.
The expression form of this sign structure can be described with complete
precision, but this can only be done by describing it as a sequence of suc-
cessive system states which are not connected by a general, underlying rule
structure. Although all computational procedures assume a specific syntactic
and semantic composition of the sequence structure, there is no general syntax
for the diachronic sequence. The semantic restrictions are determined solely by
the demand on the notation form and not by the demand for a specific
syntactic and semantic regime, as is the case with the linguistic utilization of
the alphabet and the use of formal notation.
The choice of syntactic structure and the interpretation of its significance is
on the contrary a semantically motivated choice. While other sign systems
(among other things) are characterized by syntactic stabilization rules for the
use of notation elements, the informational sign system is characterized by
syntactic freedom. Here, the notation structure is the stable element for
syntactic variation. For the same reason, the development of - new - syntactic
structures is therefore a general - and inexhaustible - source of innovation. The
rapidly growing number of different programming and system development
theories could also be described as a huge reservoir of syntactic structures or
models relative to different uses. Finally, the synchronically manifested
notation implies that there is no invariant relationship between a certain
syntactic structure and a certain semantic regime.
Compared with other notation systems, the risk structure of informational
notation is also different with regard to semantic breakdown and corre-
spondingly requires other control and redundancy structures. The smallest
synchronic expression unit can thus bring about a more radical semantic
variation than the smallest expression units in other notation systems, as a
single incorrect bit can imply the complete dissolution of the expression.
Conversely, it has a weaker intrinsic meaning because its notation value is
completely fixed relative to the system’s actual state. Informational notation
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has, as we saw in chapter 8, no independent qualities over and above its
physical value and notational legitimacy.
The synchronic manifestation creates the foundation for an incalculable ex-
pansion of the potential choice which is connected with the step-by-step
procedure and syntactic freedom in the choice of the diachronic sequence.
There are certain cases where it would be quite correct to say that a syn-
chronically manifested notation represents a programme for the execution of a
process, namely those cases where we do not utilize the possibility of making
new choices during the process, as we use a given synchronic starting state as
a determinant for the following diachronic process.
In these cases we are not describing a universal Turing machine, but a de-
dicated machine for performing a limited set of tasks. Such a description is not
a description of the computational procedure, it is on the contrary a
description of a given step in the performance of a pre-established task where
we do not utilize the potential choice. Here, all that it necessary is simply to
turn on the machine.
In all other cases the synchronic states are on the contrary subject to a
diachronic determination which is not bound to any definite rule structure.
The diachronic sequence cannot be described through the concept of a pro-
gramme which determines the process.
The objections to the view of the computer as a machine which is deter-
mined by a programme can be summarized in two points.
First, it is difficult, if not impossible, to provide a clear definition of the
concept ‘programme’, as we have no criterion which can determine when a
given data sequence can be referred to as a programme and when a sequence
must be referred to as something else.
If, for example, by a programme we understand a collection of precepts
which control a sequence from beginning to end, the concept will include
neither operative systems nor application programmes, such as word-proces-
sing programmes. Using this definition we must say on the contrary that we
start a programme when we open the system, a new programme when we
open the word-processing programme and yet another when we strike a key
in order to produce a letter, change a typeface or adjust a margin. The word-
processing programme therefore does not contain a set of precepts which
determine which data sequences are used in which order, just as this type of
programme is not defined by any invariant set of functions either.
In practice, the programme concept is not used in any consistent sense. It is
used, on the contrary, as a pragmatic, common name which covers different
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forms of semantic organization of data sequences. Some programmes are based
on a purely mathematical or logical, formal, closed semantic. Others are based
on an informal semantic and the kind (or level) of semantic is determined by
the user. The user is thus not bound to intervene at only one, e.g. logical or
linguistic level. It is both possible to intervene at the level of the informational
notation unit, at the level where we use a sequence of bits as a representation
of a notation unit in another symbolic language (for example, in the form of
the ASCII code) and at the syntactic level, as we can use a sequence of bits as
a syntactic structure which performs a rule of calculation, and at a semantic
level, as a sequence of bits can represent a mathematical or formal way of
presenting a problem, a logical retrieval procedure, a text, a picture and so on.
That which is referred to as a programme is a freely selected number of no-
tation sequences, but what makes these sequences a programme has nothing
to do with the specific sequences, but on the contrary with the circumstance
that there is some purpose which could, in general, be fulfilled by completely
different sequences, just as the given sequences could well have been used for
other purposes.
The second, and most decisive, objection to describing the computer as a
machine which handles data with the help of a programme is that the
computer can only execute a programme by treating it in exactly the same
way as all other data and that it can only handle data which are represented in
the informational notation system.
Here, every rule and all data values are present in the same notation and
manifested in a synchronic form which makes it possible to handle each
individual notation unit independently of the previous values, whether as part
of a rule or of data.
The concept ‘programme’ can therefore only be distinguished from the
concept ‘algorithm’ by connecting a given purpose to a given quantity of in-
formational sequences. It is not the programme which organizes the notational
structure, but the notational structure which creates the foundation for
programmatic variation.
The synchronic structure not only permits an absolute division between the
preceding and subsequent states, but also provides the possibility of a
facultative utilization and interpretation of arbitrary elements which are pro-
duced through the previous states. This dividing line determines that it is both
possible to implement the assignment and go-to functions with the arbitrary
definition of the next step relative to the preceding steps and to change
operation mode, for example, from process execution to programme changes.
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Both can be seen as specific uses of the more general possibility of choosing
the next step without taking the preceding diachronic sequence into account.
As both the execution of the preceding steps and the result of the process are
only available as a synchronically manifested notation structure, this
independence holds true not only of the choice of new data or the possibility
of switching between programmes, it also holds true of the choice of the
semantic regime for further handling.
This arbitrariness is not limited to the free choice of the fragments we will
use, it also includes the possibility of choosing the syntactic functions and
semantic values of the fragments used, because all functions and values are
only available as a set of synchronically manifested notation units. The
synchronic expression constellation thereby constitutes a redundancy
structure, as defined in chapter 7, for the diachronic use.
It is precisely this redundancy function which both makes it possible for a
user to respect and/or modify or suspend the precepts the programmer has laid
down in the system. From the programmer’s point of view the informational
expression form is an expression of a semantic purpose, i.e. an expression of a
content form. The user can - hopefully - understand the message, but is only
bound to take over the expression form and this bond is moreover only valid
for the user’s starting point, as the user can both change the expression form
and/or its interpretation, because the expression is available in the
informational notation structure.
The diachronic structure is thus a semantically open structure which is
neither congruent with the idea of a programme which is executed, nor with
the synchronic structure. A congruence between these structures only takes
place when the machine is used as a dedicated automaton. For this purpose, it
will moreover often be an advantage to exclude a number of symbolic choices
by incorporating a number of procedures in the hardware. In all other cases,
the programme, the synchronic manifestation and the diachronic sequence will
require three different descriptions, of which the last is the superior.
The crux of the matter here is that the possible semantic regimes not only
embrace formal and closed regimes, but also informal and open regimes, as the
only semantic restriction on the process lies in the demand that it must be
possible to represent the semantic content in a discrete notation system with a
finite number of members.
It is this circumstance which explains how it is possible to use the machine
both as a typewriter, where notation is subject to such elements as linguistic
syntax and semantics, as a calculating machine, where it is subject to the
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syntax of the rules of calculation, as a picture processing machine, where the
notation is subject to a pictorial semantic regime, just as it is a precondition for
the use of graphic interfaces4 as well as Virtual Reality systems in which the
user can represent selected fragments of his or her own behavior and interact
with symbols generated by a programme.5
This peculiar circumstance can be illustrated by comparing the letters of
written notation with the corresponding informational representation of the
letters we see on the screen. While a letter - for example an /a/ in writing
constitutes the smallest notation unit, an /a/ on the monitor screen is the result
of a - rapidly executed - but extremely large number of individual steps
comprising a series of changing synchronic states.
This sequence in itself can be described as the execution of a closed algo-
rithmic procedure, or a little programme, but it is clear at the same time that
there is no fixed relationship between this programme and the diachronic
sequence in which the programme is utilized. The programme for executing
such an /a/ works as a - composite - notation unit when using a word-
processor. In this case the diachronic process is linguistically defined. In other
cases, such as when used for calculation, such computer programmes can act
as syntactic structures and in yet others - for example for performing logical
demonstrations - as semantic structures. In the case of Virtual Reality the
diachronic process is a result of the interaction between a programme and the
behavior of the user, which again may be determined by a variety of motives.
The informational notation structure prescribes no interpretation plane. Nor
does the algorithmic linking of the individual notations into longer sequences.
This special syntactic and semantic freedom when interpreting the binary,
synchronic representation is determined by the physical definition of the nota-
tion system, which once again thus appears as a vital, central element in un-
derstanding the symbolic properties of the symbolic machine.
The facultative handling of the synchronic notation includes the possibility
of replacing, re-interpreting or suspending the syntactic rules and/or semantic
values. It is this structure which makes it possible to regulate computational
processes with linguistic and pictorial semantics and/or bodily behaviour, even
                                                
4  A comprehensive sign theoretical analysis of graphic screen communication can be found in P. Bøgh
Andersen, 1990, which is discussed in more detail in sections 9.3-9.5.
5 In spite of the name Virtual Reality, there is neither more »virtuality« nor »reality« in those systems
than in any other symbolic system such as ordinary language, for instance. In both cases we use a part
of our own body to produce symbols, whether as a symbolic expression of a movement we make in the
actual situation or as an expression of something which is not present such as when we talk of cows,
for instance, without having one at hand.
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though we are not capable of formulating these semantic regimes in the form
of programmes.
The use of a computer for word-processing which, during the course of less
than ten years has changed from an almost unknown to an almost everyday
occurrence, is a good example of how the computer’s multisemantic potential
can be used.
If we take our starting point in the image on the screen, it can be described
as a combination of a pictorial semantic and linguistic control of the com-
putational procedure. The pictorial semantic control, which is a precondition
for the linguistic, (because it is the precondition for the visually simultaneous
representation of a serial process), is at the same time subject to the linguistic
semantic, which as mentioned above exploits a number of algorithmic se-
quences each of which corresponds to a single unit in alphabetical notation.
Word-processing is thus an excellent example of the fact that the semantic
use of informational signs is not bound to formal, closed semantic regimes. The
same goes for picture processing, as here, the formal procedure alone defines
the elementary particles of the picture and a sequential procedure for
constructing the picture in a given output medium. Here, there is only a
physical-mechanical connection between the symbolic precept and the picture
content it represents. While the formal picture construction elapses in time, the
reading off of the picture is bound to the possibility of perceiving the whole
picture simultaneously.
The semantic restriction lies neither in the binary form nor in the demand for
finite algorithmic procedures, but solely in the demand that the semantic
regime can be expressed in a discrete notation system with a finite number of
members.
On the other hand, this demand implies a sharp restriction on the kind of
rule structures which can be implemented as automatic procedures, as it only
holds true of finite, formal rule systems. For symbols which are not expressed
in a notation system - such as pictures - another restriction holds true, namely
that they cannot be represented without loss of information since they can
only be represented by the help of a coding which defines certain selected
physical values as legitimate informational units, while other physical traits are
ignored. The coding is irreversible, there is no path  from the informational
representation back to the original.
Although the user, in the case of word-processing, controls the computa-
tional process with a linguistically rooted semantic in a way similar to that in
which a typewriter is used, there are also several important differences, since a
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number of mechanical typewriter functions have been replaced by a series of
small programmes, The use of a computer for word-processing not only
requires that the letters are available as programmed notation sequences, the
paper that is written on must also be available in a symbolic representation in
the same notation system. This symbolic representation can either be a precept
for the background of the screen image, or a precept for a printing routine. It is
naturally preferable to have both.
The peculiar conceptual consequence of this circumstance is that here
writing is represented in the same symbolic notation as its background and
that both parts are available at all times in the same synchronically manifested
form. The same goes for a number of other physical-mechanical typewriter
functions, such as margin and correction functions which can be simulated
with the help of iconographic control.
Whereas the word-processing programme can be described as a symbolic
representation of the mechanical typewriter and regulated with the same
semantic, the two apparatuses produce the »same« text in two different
symbol systems with very different editing and handling possibilities. These
differences are connected with the underlying informational notation, which is
characterized partly by being independent of the demand for direct perceptual
recognition, partly by the fact that all rules are contained in the same notation
as that which is regulated, partly by the fact that the text - or any other
simulated phenomenon/process - is represented in a synchronically manifested
notation and thereby within another time structure and finally by the fact that
the simulation of the typewriter presupposes a transformation of - at least some
- physical constraints into symbolic constraints whereby the physically
invariant constraints becomes optional.
Each of these elements constitutes a distinct and unique feature which,
together with the dynamic properties, characterizes the informational sign sy-
stem as distinct from other sign systems.
Word-processing programmes use only a small fraction of these options, but
they show that it is possible to control the computational process with the
help of several - co-ordinated - semantic regimes.
If the more user-oriented design architecture which made its breakthrough
in the 1980’s is a marked expression of the possibilities which lie in the use of
the informational sign system’s synchronic structure and the radical, step-by-
step freedom of choice - as is claimed here - it must be added that this use also
has a regressive character, as the algorithmic and formal semantics which were
formerly dominant have been replaced by more traditional semantic regimes.
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User orientation has generally been utilized in metaphorical imitation -
whether in the form of the typewriter, keyboard, paper, pencil, drawing board,
tape recorder, filing cabinet or some other more closely delimited area of the
existing working processes. This conservatism has also been the object of
increasing discussion and criticism in several of the design-theoretical
reflections of recent years.6
Metaphors cannot and should not be avoided in developmental work. The
arbitrary synchronism of the informational sign system is not only a basic
structure, but also one that is difficult to handle and which can only be used
through self-chosen semantic restrictions which are not only significant for the
purpose, but also for the construction of the syntactic organization. As the
informational system’s syntax, however, is not related to a specific semantic
regime, the user-oriented perspective, whether utilized in one or another
metaphorical model, can hardly be understood as more than a first step in the
direction of a more radical leap from the mono-semantic to the multisemantic
machine.
One of the next steps is a question of releasing the user perspective from
the visually bound handling of the informational signs at the interface level,
because this understanding of the user perspective cuts the user off from the
potentialities which lie in the non-visually represented, underlying notation
structure. As this question, which will be discussed further in section 9.5, also
concerns human competence, developments here will presumably be the result
of a slow and insidious process of change which is far removed from the
common idea of rapid technological changes in society.
The multisemantic potential is perhaps that element which, more than any
other, can motivate a comparison with human consciousness, while at the same
time it distinguishes the computer from other symbolic representation media
because it is connected with the specific, arbitrary and synchronic structure
which makes it possible to store any input and retrieve any stored element
whatsoever.
It is nevertheless more relevant to regard the informational sign system on
the basis of its differences to other expression systems because the com-
bination of synchronic determination and diachronic freedom of choice
assumes explicit, descriptive declarations.
                                                
6  Thus in Ehn, 1988, Bannon, 1990, Bannon and Schmidt, 1990 and P. Bøgh Andersen, 1990.
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The multisemantic potential also exists exclusively as a human relationship
to the system.
9.2 The informational sign system
As informational signs are based on a synchronically manifested structure, it
might be imagined that the linguistic concept of the synchronic language
system would come into its own precisely in the description of these signs,
although - as claimed in chapter 7 - it is not suitable for describing the common
languages.
In linguistic theory, the concept of the synchronic structure appears as a
concept of the invariant language system at a given time which not only
organizes the linguistic sequence (usage), it also creates the framework for
diachronic changes in the language system itself. The synchronic structure is
thus seen as the superior instance at all times. Basically, the concept serves to
establish a sharp distinction between two forms of diachrony, namely that of
usage and that diachrony manifested as changes in the language system.
Hjelmslev, who takes over and tightens up Saussure’s concept of the syn-
chronic structure, thus acknowledged at a very early stage that the concept
assumes a postulate to the effect that changes in usage and language norms
can never bring about any change in the system. He therefore proposes the
thesis that changes in the language system can only occur as the result of
(tensions in) the synchronic system’s structure, as this can thereby be
regarded »as a self-sufficient totality, a structure sui generis«, or what is called
today a self-regulating or ‘autopoietic’ system.7 The dynamic forces which are
incorporated in this system are not described further, but Hjelmslev presumes
that they have a algebraic form.
The interesting point in the present connection is not the theory’s lack of
validity for linguistic analysis, but on the contrary, that Hjelmslev’s idea of an
invariant synchronic structure forces him to distinguish between two
completely separate types of diachronic processes, those changing the
synchronic structure itself and those manifested in the actual usage, although
the rules for - or constraints on - both types are given in the synchronic
structure.
                                                
7  Hjelmslev (1934) 1972: 38 and (1943) 1961: 6.
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In the informational sign system, however, the synchronic structure con-
tains no invariant rules for diachronic sequences. On the contrary, it is itself in-
cluded as a redundancy structure through which the former states and se-
quences - taking in all rule structures - become accessible to change through
use. It is not only that the system can be changed through use, it is also the
fact that it is the only possibility for both constructing it and for changing
what has already been constructed.
The informational sign structure, which is available in a distinct synchronic
state at all times, is thus an excellent example of how synchronic structures
can be included in a redundancy system in which the rules can be modified
and changed through the use they regulate.
This example also shows how such a system can also contain algorithmic
procedures.
It is not possible, however, to maintain the concept of an asemantic - al-
gorithmic - structure in the description of the diachronic sequence. These
structures act as stabilizing elements through semantic codings which include
both the composition of the algorithmic sequence and the possibility of
variation, suspension and/or dissolution of the algorithmic procedure and/or its
meaning.
The diachronic sequence is established by separating an individual element
(a notation unit or a synchronically manifested sequence of notations) step by
step into a series of synchronic states. In the given state, the element which is
separated constitutes the semantically distinctive element, whereas the actual
figuration constitutes the actual redundancy structure in a given state. The
diachronic redundancy structure does not, on the contrary, have the same
unambiguous and delimited character. The individual bits in a sequence of
states can alternately act as semantically distinctive and redundant and the
function of each bit is determined by the total sequence. Here, there is no
semantically independent, constant structure. Any element in the informational
sign can act both as redundant and as semantically distinctive, but not - as in
common languages - simultaneously.
It can thus be noted that the structuralistic interpretation of the concept of
the synchronic structure falls short in the description of informational signs on
exactly the point it fell short in the description of common languages,
although the informational sign system is distinct from these. It is not possible
to describe either the linguistic or the informational sign structure without
taking the semantic content into account and this is manifested in both sign
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systems in - mutually different - continuous modulations of a redundancy
structure which, for the same reason, can have no delimited, distinct form.
As Hjelmslev assumes that the synchronic structure creates definite and
restrictive rules for diachronic succession it is clear that using his theory to
describe the informational sign requires the theory to be greatly modified,
partly because the synchronic construction here is produced as a manifested
notation structure, partly because the informational sign system is charac-
terized by a free, arbitrary and step-by-step choice, precisely at the point
Hjelmslev places all linguistic determination.
A modification of Hjelmslev’s theory is thus also the starting point for Peter
Bøgh Andersen’s theory of computer semiotics which, together with James H.
Fetzer’s theory, constitute two significant attempts to analyse, on the basis of
sign theory, what Peter Bøgh Andersen calls computer-based signs, while
Fetzer, taking his starting point in a critique of the Cognitive Science/AI
approaches to the analysis of informational symbol systems, dismisses the idea
that informational symbol manipulation - with Newell and Simon’s definition
as a prototype - can be regarded as a semiotic process.8
While both theories formulate the semiotic approach as an alternative to the
Cognitive Science computer paradigm, (in the classical version which
Haugeland dubbed the GOFAI version),9 they thus lead to two diametrically
opposed conclusions. Where Bøgh Andersen would introduce the sign
concept, Fetzer would exclude it.
This disagreement becomes no less striking when we add that Bøgh
Andersen takes his point of departure in the semiotics of Saussure-Hjelmslev,
which contains no concept concerning the structural relationship between the
sign system and human use, while his analysis has this use relationship as its
cardinal point. Fetzer, on the other hand, takes his point of departure in
Peirce’s triadic semiotics, but completely ignores the relationship between the
informational system and its human interpreter(s).
The difference between the two analyses leads to one of the central pro-
blems in the semiotic description of the informational sign system, namely the
relationship between the (chosen) semiotic theory and the analytical results
the theory can produce when brought into play in the analysis of a never
previously described sign system which is radically different to the sign
systems which created the foundation for the formulation of the theory.
                                                
8  Peter Bøgh Andersen, 1990 and James H. Fetzer, 1990.
9  Haugeland, 1985: 112. GOFAI is an acronym for Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence.
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The two theses make a pointedly different response to this question.
Fetzer’s strength lies in his theoretical analysis of Newell and Simon’s, in many
respects well-defined, symbol-theoretical basis for the AI paradigm, in which
he also admits that the problem presents itself in a number of new ways.10
Fetzer, however, completely avoids the question as to whether there is a new
sign system at all. This - taking into account the semiotic starting point - must
be considered as quite remarkable. On the face of it, the explanation is quite
simple. Fetzer assumes in advance that the symbol-theoretical paradigm
constitutes an adequate description of the informational sign system (or at
least of the most advanced or »intelligent« forms).
This assumption is not only an expression of a praiseworthy effort to avoid
misrepresenting the symbolic-theoretical paradigm, it is also motivated by
Fetzer’s more general enterprise, which is not concerned with the analysis of
different sign systems, but on the contrary with replacing the symbol theory
with semiotics as the rightful interpreter of human consciousness, as he
disputes that the symbol theory can constitute a stable basis for an
understanding of genuine semiotic processes, including the human sign
production which, according to him, can be described on the basis of Peirce’s
triadic sign concept.
...the evidence that has been assembled here would appear to support the
conclusion that the semiotic-system approach clarifies connections between
mental activity as semiotic activity and behavioral tendencies as deliberate
behavior - connections which, by virtue of its restricted range of
applicability, the system-symbol approach cannot accommodate. By
combining distinctions between different kinds (or types) of mental activity
together with psychological criteria concerning the sorts of capacities
distinctive of systems of the different kinds (or types), the semiotic approach
provides a powerful combination of (explanatory and predictive) principles,
an account that, at least in relation to human and non-human animals, the
symbolic-system hypothesis cannot begin to rival. From this point of view,
the semiotic system-conception, but not the symbol system conception,
appears to qualify as a theory of mind.11
                                                
10   Newell and Simon’s symbol definition is quoted in chapter 5 and is also discussed in the epilogue.
11   Fetzer, 1990: 52.
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The first victim of the struggle for the right to occupy the place as the inter-
preter of consciousness is thus the analysis of that sign system which is the
starting point for the struggle.
The next victim, however - with due respect to Fetzer’s other merits - is the
semiotic theory’s demand that it is the adequate and general theory of human
sign production, as the semiotic theory - certainly in Fetzer’s Peircian form -
does not include the sign production humans carry out with the computer.
The question is whether this omission is connected with Fetzer’s interpre-
tation of the theory as to whether all that is lacking is an application of the
theory to the computer, or whether it is a necessary consequence of the
theory’s structure?
Under any circumstances it is remarkable that the semiotic theory can divert
attention from its own subject area to such a degree and, apparently,
completely lack concepts for delimiting different sign systems and guidelines
for the way in which it can be applied to the analysis of specific sign systems.
The central argument for claiming semiotics’ primacy as a paradigm for a
theory of consciousness, according to Fetzer, is that semiotic theory provides
the space for different forms of sign formation and sign production which
cannot be described with the symbol-theoretical paradigm. This thereby raises
the question as to what constitutes the common and constitutive feature of
semiotic systems as distinct from other systems. Fetzer answers - with a slant in
the direction of Eco’s intriguing dictum that signs are »everything which can
be used in order to lie«12  - that the most apposite criterion for identifying a
semiotic system is: »the capacity to make a mistake.«13
It would be wrong to deny that a theory of human consciousness must
make room for the ability to make a mistake. But when precisely this ability is
made the distinctive criterion of semiotic systems, it is no longer sufficient to
refer to fallibility in general, what is required instead is a clear definition of
what a mistake is. Fetzer also defines the possibility of a mistake as follows:
In order to make a mistake, something must take something to stand for
something other than that for which it stands, a reliable evidential indica-
                                                
12   »Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign. A sign is everything which
can be taken as significantly substituting for something else. This something else does not necessarily
have to exist or to actually be somewhere at the moment in which the sign stands in for it. Thus
semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie. If
something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be used to tell the truth: it cannot in fact be
used ‘to tell’ at all.« Eco (1976) 1979: 7.
13   Fetzer, 1990: 40, with a discussion of the possible fallibility of purely syntactic systems, p. 56 ff.
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tor that something has the capacity to take something to stand for some-
thing, which is the right result... to mis-take something for other than that
for which it stands appears to afford conclusive evidence that something
has a mind.14
It is difficult to see how it would be possible to decide whether the semiotic
definition of the possibility of a mistake is exhaustive, on the other hand it is
not difficult to see that a semiotic definition of a mistake excludes the
possibility that the mistake can at the same time define semiotics.
This circular semiotic conclusion also conceals the problem that semiotics
has no criterion at all for deciding whether something is understood as an
»expression of something other than that it stands for«. Although the mistake
criterion has its roots in a justified opposition to ontological truth criteria, used
as a theoretical, distinct concept, it stumbles over the same problem. Deciding
what is false contains exactly the same problems as deciding what is true. The
decision regarding the one is also the decision regarding the other. It is
therefore advisable to take care in introducing references to decisions of this
character into the epistemological foundations of science, which can rather be
motivated by referring to the undecided.15
As mentioned, Bøgh Andersen, unlike Fetzer, takes his point of departure in
Saussure’s sign definition rather than in Peirce’s. Neither, however, provides
any reason for his respective choice of theoretical starting point, nor does this
choice appear to be particularly motivated by the respective subjects. There
appears to be nothing wrong with using Saussure’s sign theory to arrive at
Fetzer’s conclusions - as the distinction between the symbol theory and
semiotics is drawn primarily between the syntactic structure of the symbol
theory paradigm and the semantic structure of the semiotic paradigm. Nor, on
the face of it, does there appear to be anything to prevent Bøgh Andersen
from using a triadic sign concept, as he attempts to add a third dimension to
the Saussure-Hjelmslevian concept, which certainly bears a family resemblance
to Peirce’s interpreter.
The most important difference between the two theories rather has its roots
in the different purposes which motivate them. Where Fetzer aims at a general
theory of conscious, human sign production, Bøgh Andersen’s goal is to
                                                
14   Fetzer, 1990: 40.
15   C.f. Finnemann, 1990b.
328
develop a semiotic conceptual inventory with special reference to the com-
puter as a communicative medium.
Seen in relationship to the symbol-theoretical paradigm, the medium per-
spective is an inversion of the relationship between the theory’s original sub-
ject area and the new area of use. In the symbol-theoretical paradigm (AI and
the later Cognitive Science),16  the symbol definition has been used as a
theoretical foundation for the description of what have been referred to, with
an unfortunate term, as »natural languages«.
The opposite path is taken with regard to the medium perspective, as here
the linguistic theory which was developed in the description of spoken and
written languages is transferred to the description of a different symbol
system. In justifying this inversion, Bøgh Andersen introduces four objections
to the formal symbol theory.
The first objection is that symbol-theoretical approaches to language de-
scription are based on logical or psychological symbol theories rather than
linguistic theories. As language is treated as an expression of something else
and not as language, the central linguistic insights are simply overlooked.
The second objection is directed towards a general assumption in the AI/CS
tradition, namely that it is possible to describe consciousness and language as
a well-delimited - individually borne - system, whereas the linguistic viewpoint
emphasizes the fact that language is a basic cultural and social phenomenon
which exists in the relationship between individuals.
The third objection concerns the more or less explicit mimetic or naturalistic
view of representation which in particular lacks the ability to describe that
variability which exists between the signifier and the signified due to the
arbitrary character of the relationship.
As a corollary to this, the fourth objection is introduced as a criticism of the
general leitmotif in AI research, namely the idea of imitating human con-
sciousness, which is seen partly as a false analogy, not least with regard to
                                                
16   As separate terms, AI refers primarily to the rationalistic symbol theories of the 1950’s and 1960’s
(among them those of Newell and Simon) and Cognitive Science to the 1970’s and 1980’s (including
Fodor and Pylyshyn). The journal “Cognitive Science” was founded in 1977. AI is also used as a
common, general concept for both directions and sometimes also includes the empirical network
theories. The latter is also true of Cognitive Science. This terminological sliding reflects an increasing
tendency to define areas of research on the basis of methodological criteria, although a definition based
on the subject area cannot completely be abandoned. A permanent discipline, however, must
increasingly emancipate itself from purely methodological definitory criteria, as otherwise it will end as
a victim of its own dogmatism. On the other hand, a direct binding of the method to the subject area
would block the investigation of the subject area, not least when it comes to investigating those areas
where disciplines draw their mutual borderlines.
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language competence, partly as an expression of an effort to replace people
with machines, where it would be both more correct and better to look at
computers from the point of view of their meaning to those who use them.
These delimitations contribute to two purposes in particular. One is to mo-
tivate a return to especially Hjelmslev’s theory. The other is to include the sign
production, which stems from the symbol theory tradition, in the description of
computer-based signs by viewing the AI/CS tradition as a producer of a
special type of computer-based sign - to the extent that the results produced
can actually be implemented.
However, a position made up of negative statements like »AI is nothing
but...«, »AI is not...« effectively discourages one from working seriously with
AI. This is unfortunate since AI techniques are both exciting and potentially
useful.
A more fruitful attitude in the present framework would be to describe AI
as a special mode of sign production. Instead of describing a question-
answering system as a case of machine-intelligence, one could describe the
question-answering pairs as a special kind of computer-based signs. This
would imply moving AI-questions from the »language as knowledge« box to
[the] »language as art(ifacts)« box, reinterpreting AI as a discipline
concerned with [the] invention of a new kind of signs.17
The combination of these two purposes provides a double advantage. By
demanding of the semiotic theory that it also include the - new - forms of sign
production which are carried out with computers - it becomes clear at the same
time that the semiotic theory cannot be expected to be available in an
adequate form either.
Computer-based sign are new, very few systematic descriptions exist, and...
the glossematic procedure only gives advice for presenting scientific
descriptions of well-known domains.
The problem related to working with little known symbol-systems was not
recognized in the earlier stages of glossematics where the analytical
procedure was mixed up with the discovery procedure.18
                                                
17   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 24. C.f. also the use of this viewpoint for developing »narrative systems«,
Bøgh Andersen and Berit Holmqvist, 1990.
18   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 16.
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The theory - like any programme in relation to data - is on the same agenda as
its subject.
9.3 The computer-based sign
To isolate the concept of the computer-based sign, Bøgh Andersen takes his
point of departure in a sign model which includes four possible perspectives in
the consideration and analysis of signs, namely:
• The semiotic perspective - studying signs as systems.
• The psychological, psycho-linguistic and cognitive science perspectives,
studying signs as knowledge.
• The sociological and socio-linguistic perspectives, studying signs as
behaviour.
• The aesthetic perspective, studying signs as art(ifacts).19
The primary purpose of the model is to place the semiotic description in rela-
tionship to other approaches by pointing out the advantages of the approach.
When semiotics, in a graphic illustration, is thus placed in the centre from
which the other approaches branch out like the legs on a milking stool, this
does not express - at least in advance - a postulate to the effect that semiotics
should or can create the foundation for other approaches. The reason, on the
contrary, is that semiotics is regarded as the most suitable theory for describing
the sign system which is the main theme of the book.
Semiotic theory is thus seen as a specific perspective which views »the
subject area through a particular pair of glasses«, relative to other perspectives,
as the semiotic perspective can only include »a subset of phenomena in the
field«.20
In spite of this delimitation, the semiotic point of view is principally applied
to all computer systems and use contexts, as the presence of the sign function
is the ultimate criterion for delimiting the subject area of semiotics.
Hereby, the borderlines just established again become fluid, as both the
psychological, sociological and aesthetic approaches are based on sign
functions. If a border between these perspectives must be maintained, we must
                                                
19   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 18-20.
20   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 20.
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therefore assume that the semiotic theory is not seen as an exhaustive theory
of signs.
Whether this is a principle limitation or the expression of an evaluation of
the, as yet incomplete, character of the semiotic description is not made quite
clear in Bøgh Andersen’s exposition. The missing answer, however, is not
necessarily a weakness or a flaw, but rather one of the productive questions
which motivate the exposition. The relationship between the linguistic and
non-linguistic must therefore also be seen as one of the central, unsolved
theoretical problems in semiotic theory, as the theory on the one hand
concerns all sign formation and thereby becomes a factor in the self-reflection
of other sciences, while on the other hand it indicates the sign function as a
specific subject area which can be studied separately from the knowledge
content expressed in the sign function.
In addition to the - perhaps provisional - borderlines which are initially
drawn in order to place the computer-semiotic theory, there is another bor-
derline, however, which is drawn with rather more distinctiveness, namely the
borderline between the semiotic description of the computer as a sign system
and the AI/CS descriptions of the computer as a symbol system.
While the four different perspectives regarding the sign concept previously
mentioned can be understood as different - complementary or competing -
suggestions for the interpretation of the computational system’s relationships
to non-linguistic contexts, the relationship between the semiotic and symbol-
theoretical descriptions is more a dispute regarding the way the system is
included in a sign function.
Where the symbol-theoretical views regard the system as a depiction of the
external world - and, if it is consciousness which is being depicted, also
therefore as an autonomous or self-dependent, sign producing system - Bøgh
Andersen sees the system as an expression substance which can be used in
human sign production.
As the system itself thus contains no signs, it cannot be part of a commu-
nicative process. On the other hand, it can be included as a medium for
communication between users.21
This critique is partly inspired by Winograd and Flores (1986), who denied
that the computer system itself had any form of semantic content.
                                                
21   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 120.
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There is nothing in the design of the machine or the operation of the
program that depends in any way on the fact that the symbol structures are
viewed as representing anything at all.22
The description of the machine processes as symbolic processes requires a
motivation which qualifies this description as distinct from a description of the
computer process as a purely physical process. As this motivation cannot be
produced by any known machine, just as there is not even the hint of an idea
as to how such a machine could be built, it is not difficult to follow Winograd
and Flores’ main point of view: »the significance of what is stored in the
machine is externally attributed«.
Hereby, however, all that is produced is a new problem, as a description  of
how this attribution can take place is still lacking. There is a certain vagueness
in Winograd and Flores’ argumentation on this point. While, on the one hand,
they insist that the system as a whole must be seen in relation to a outside
interpreter - and thereby as part of a sign function - on the other they are
inclined to believe that this sign function can be defined solely from the use
perspective and independently of the system.
While Bøgh Andersen joins Winograd and Flores on this aspect of their
thinking, which goes against the symbol-theoretical understanding of the
system as an independent and semantically closed system which possesses a
meaning content independent of the interpreter, he deviates in his view of
how the system can be described, as he uses the linguistic distinction between
the expression form and content form to describe the system as:
a calculus of empty expression units, some of which can be part of the sign
system that emerges when the system is used and interpreted by humans.23
Where Winograd and Flores attempted to subsume the view of the system
under the use perspective, Bøgh Andersen emphasized the description of how
- part of - the system can be included in a - use-motivated - sign function. As a
consequence of this, the critique of the symbol-theoretical description of the
system as an autonomous system is not directed towards the idea that meaning
can be ascribed to the system, but towards the idea that only one meaning can
                                                
22   Winograd and Flores 1986: 86.
23   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 120.
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be ascribed to it. The system is a - semantically empty - expression system to
which several meanings can be ascribed.
The symbol-theoretical descriptions are thus rejected because they lack the
semiotic distinction between expression form and content form. This
distinction can be avoided, it is claimed, by assuming that the same form - the
system perspective - can describe both the expression and content planes.24
According to Bøgh Andersen, such homomorphism is certainly not always
unimaginable, but it places unnecessary - and often also incorrect - restrictions
on the understanding of the informational potential, as it can be shown that
the practical use of computers introduces structures into the system process
which are not contained in the system’s own structure.
Since content and interface are not properties that can be assigned to the
system in itself, but are a relation between system and use, it follows that the
system should not be viewed as a semiotic schema in which content and
expression planes are homomorphic, but rather as a mechanism for
generating the expression substance for one or more interfaces.25
The symbol theoretical description thus constitutes a valid description of the
system only in those cases where the interpreter allows the system to
determine the use completely. It is not the system itself, however, which con-
tains the meaning, but the interpreter who establishes the semantic content by
using the system as a means of expression in a sign relationship. Computers
are correspondingly described as »sign vehicles that can only exist as real
signs in situations where users interpret them«.26
There are good reasons to accept - and emphasize - the possibility of using
the same system to create different interfaces where different parts of the
system are used in different sign functions. But the description of the system
as a semantically empty expression substance is not without its problems. One
of these  problems appears directly if we put a programmer in the user’s place,
as it will hereby become evident that the semantically empty expression
substance itself is produced through a sign production in which the
programmer expresses a meaning content.
Bearing the programmer in mind, Bøgh Andersen himself also takes a step
towards modifying the description of the system as a semantically empty
                                                
24   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 128.
25   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 130.
26   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 23.
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expression substance, as he moves the expression elements in the system
closer to an independent sign function by describing them as »sign
candidates« which almost represent an intentional meaning content.
To say that the computer itself is an empty expression system is only a half
truth: by relating it to other semiotic systems, e.g. the existing work
language, the designer can strongly invite certain interpretations and a
certain content system.
I will say that the computer system generates sign candidates, reflecting
the view and intention of the designers.27
The same, however, can be said of the relationship between an author, his
book and its reader. But the relationship between the programmer’s sign
production and the user’s differs from the relationship between an author and
a reader because it is possible for the user to process each individual notation
unit in the notation structure which comprises the communicative link.
The vagueness which appears here is due to the fact that Bøgh Andersen,
fully in line with Winograd and Flores, treats the interpreter function as an
occasional function which only commences when the system is being used. As
the system itself, however, is the result of a sign production, the description of
the use must consequently include at least two interpreters whose mutual
relationship is distinct from the classical relationship between sender and
receiver.
The central question here is not so much the relationship between the two
semantic objectives which meet in use, but rather the question as to how they
interfere at the expression level.
Although Bøgh Andersen accepts that the programmer has supplied the
system with a hint of a semantic relationship, he still maintains the overall
understanding of the system as an expression substance, as he connects up
with Hjelmslev’s description of the asemantic language system as a set of rules
for using the figures of language.
Here, Bøgh Andersen utilizes Hjelmslev’s view of the system as an aseman-
tic structure which does not represent a content, but unlike Hjelmslev, he does
not see the system as a determinator of the sequence. On the contrary, the
sequence is bound to an interpreter function which is first manifested in use.
                                                
27   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 131.
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This adaptation of Hjelmslev’s theory for analysing the informational sy-
stem raises a problem, however, because the informational system, unlike
Hjelmslev’s language system, is available as an explicitly expressed notation
system which itself can become the object of interpretation and which ad-
ditionally contains the rules Hjelmslev considered as invariant. As Hjelmslev’s
concept of an asemantic language system stands or falls with the demand that
the rules which comprise the system are not themselves an explicit part of the
linguistic expression, because in such a case they would be accessible to
semantically motivated variation, it is not possible to transfer it to the
description of the informational system.
Bøgh Andersen’s attempt also leads to an untenable distinction between
one part of the manifested expression substance (or the sign candidates)
which are assigned to the »system«, because they presumably do not enter
into a sign function, and the other part which does. Of the manifested
expression elements there are thus only some which can be utilized in a sign
function.
But what, we may ask, about the part that is not used? Could this be
dispensed with? Or how many possible uses should be taken into account in
order to be able to establish such a borderline between notation sequences
which are included in a sign function and sequences which are »only« unused
substance? How long, for example, must use be observed in order to delimit
what is used?
These questions concern not only that plethora of - often unused, yet
usable - possible instructions which nowadays characterize any good pro-
gramme, but also the relationship between the parts of a programme which are
necessary for the system and which are described as underlying instructions
(e.g. the operative system and many of the other automatic sequences which
can enter into the performance of a programme) and those which are included
as expression elements in sign production.
Nor is this a question of the extent to which it is both meaningful and
necessary to work with hierarchic structures which prevent a large number of
instructions from becoming used operationally in a given use, but on the
contrary of the extent to which such an operative borderline between the
concept of use and the concept of system is a borderline between sign and
non-sign.
As the manifest »unused« notation elements which comprise a necessary
condition for the functionality of the system are the result of a sign production
and are accessible to potential use in new sign functions - depending solely on
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the user’s competence and the purpose of the use - it is difficult to see how it
is possible to exclude part of the informational notation from the sign-
theoretical description. The definition of borderlines between the sign
candidates which are at the user’s disposal and those which are not,
constitutes not only a - significant - part of the programmer’s work, it is also
included in the factual, implemented system which is accessible to the user’s
processing.
As the user’s possibility of using all parts of the system to regenerate it in
other expression forms is not limited by the system, but by his own com-
petence, it is not possible to eliminate any part of the system from the de-
scription of the sign function. And as the sign function does not first enter into
the picture when a system is used, but already in the construction of the
system, the relationship between the system and the user must rather be seen
as a meeting place where two sign functions, the one that is included in the
system and the one that is included in the use, must interfere. The possibility of
such an interference is due to the fact that the synchronically manifested
notational structure can be used as a redundancy structure.
That the user can use the programmer’s work as a tool for his own purpose
- without thinking for a second of the programmer’s sign production - does
not mean that the programmer does not produce signs, but on the contrary
that the user turns these signs into tools by accepting the programmer’s
symbolic definition.
If the distinction between user and programmer (or the corresponding »in-
ternal« distinction between system and interface) constitutes a relevant
distinction at all, this is not due to the fact that it coincides with the borderline
between sign and non-sign, the distinction first and foremost indicates  a
difference between purposes of use and between competences in sign hand-
ling.
That it is possible to connect these two different ways of sign handling at
all in the computer based »communication« is due to the fact that the syn-
chronous manifestation implies that the informational sign system can be
subject to two different semantic regimes at one and the same time.
The problem which emerges here is a question - in linguistic terminology -
of the description of a communicative process where the same notation and
syntactic structure contains several possibilities for semantic organization and
interference between several semantic regimes.
This, however, also indicates a limitation on the applicability of linguistic
terminology, because in spite of the sharp distinction between the semantic
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and syntactic planes, linguistics assumes that a given semantic potential
corresponds to a given syntactic structure. Syntax parallels semantics.
As it holds true of other communicative media - such as the book, the film,
the television, the telephone - that they build upon a semantic regime which is
common to the sender and the receiver, it is also possible to conclude that the
simultaneous, multisemantic regime constitutes one of this medium’s specific
communicative properties.
While the conformity between semantic regimes is a basic and general con-
dition for other communicative media  and languages, the possibility of
conformity in the computer medium simply constitutes a specific threshold
case. The programmer cannot, in Bøgh Andersen’s words, control the user’s
utilization.
Although a skilled programmer can be said to have full control over the
computational processes that manifest the interface, he can only partially
control which of its features the user exploits in his interpretation and how
he exploits them.28
In the terminology used in the preceding chapters, we can say that Bøgh
Andersen rightfully criticizes the symbol-theoretical views which regard the
diachronic process as a function of the synchronic state, as he points out that
the diachronic process permits semantic regimes which are not bound to the
semantic description of the synchronic representation.
It thereby appears at the same time that the semantic interference between
programmer and user has its characteristic form precisely because the
programmer’s total sign work is in the form of a synchronic re-presentation.
The synchronic form can be described as a meeting place between two
different diachronic - and individually semantically determined - sequences;
that which is determined by the programmer and that which is determined by
the user. It is thus the user who decides the extent to which - and at which
semantic level - he will subject himself to the diachronic bond the programmer
has prepared. The limit to this independence lies, as previously described,
exclusively in the demand that the semantic regime must be expressed in a
                                                
28   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 183. One might object here that it is always possible for the receiver to in-
terpret any message independently of the intentions of the sender - and hence not under his control, but
the synchronous manifestation still provides the computer with a multisemantic potential of its own,
since it both allows the receiver to take the position of the sender as editor of the message (the
programme), to use the message as intended in a variety of ways, and to use the message in a variety of
ways which were not foreseen, by reinterpreting various features.
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physically defined, synchronically manifested notation system which can be
used as a redundancy system.
Although the user does not re-interpret the system as a whole, it is part of
his sign activity. That it will often be purposeless, or directly contrafunctional
to re-interpret large parts of the system, does not change this structural
relationship. If the process is regarded simply as the transition between two
steps, it is quite true that it is possible to isolate part of the system as the
unused part. The unused part acts here as a chosen, completely passive
redundancy. As soon as there is a question of a sequence involving several
transitions, however, the possibility of making a sharp distinction between the
redundant and the distinctive parts of the system is lost. Those parts which are
redundant in one state may become distinctive in the next.
The synchronic redundancy structure which is manifested in the transition
between two states does not therefore coincide with the diachronic. The
synchronic redundancy structure can be described precisely, but only at the
level of notation where it includes the entire system, except the actual
instruction and the entity the instruction handles. As the diachronic sequence
comprises the transitions between different synchronic states, where
alternating parts of the notation system are used distinctively, it is also
characterized by a variable, semantically defined redundancy structure which
does not include a specially delimited part of the notation system.
Redundancy in the diachronic sequence cannot be described at the level of
notation, here it is a function of the syntactic and semantic choices.
The synchronic structure is thus the condition for the exchange between
the programmer’s and the user’s two different semantic expressions, which
individually have a diachronic structure.
When Bøgh Andersen draws the untenable conclusion that only part of the
synchronic notation structure is included in the diachronic sign function, it is
not simply a consequence of the fact that language theory has no concepts
with which to describe the relationship between the synchronic and
diachronic processes. The explanation must also be found in the design
theoretical purpose which motivates the semiotic description of the computer
system, as the point of departure here is the design strategic distinction
between a given system and the abundance of different possible interfaces
between system and user.
It is thus the description of the interface as a mediation between system and
user which forms the foundation of the definition of the concept of the
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computer-based sign, which does not include all the system processes it is
based on.
While the system’s processes are defined without recourse to the sign
concept - which »permits all the computer processes and the system’s struc-
ture« - all computer based signs are defined as:
a sign whose expression plane is manifested in the processes changing the
substance of the input and output media of the computer (screen,
loudspeaker, keyboard, mouse, printer etc.).29
This definition again creates a foundation for a linguistic definition of the
interface concept as a collection of computer-based signs which include all the
parts of the system process which can be seen, heard, used and interpreted by
users.
The important thing in this definition of interface is that it denotes a relation
between the perceptible parts of a computer system and its users. The system
processes are substances that can be turned into expressions of computer
based signs in an interpretative process that simultaneously establishes
their content. The definition is one more example of a structuralist shift from
focus on objects to their interrelation.30
It is also, however, an example of how the description of the interface
structure in Bøgh Andersen is limited by yet another premise of linguistic
theory, as the interface, which is defined as a collection of computer-based
signs, is delimited by the perceptibility criterion which may well be a valid
linguistic criterion for the definition of linguistic expressions, but is not valid
for the computational expression system which is precisely distinguished by
the use of a physically defined notation system which is not bound to the
senses.
Bøgh Andersen himself also refers directly to linguistic theory in his justi-
fication of the point of view, as he introduces the perceptibility criterion as the
first of six important characteristics for the semiotic view:
                                                
29   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 129. By defining the figures without recourse to the sign concept, Bøgh
Andersen moreover breaks with Hjelmslev’s premise, as the figures here can only be distinguished
through a sign analytical dissolution of the expression into the smallest units.
30   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 129.
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The default requirement for a sign is that a human interpreter must be able
to perceive it. Without expression, no content.31
Although it is correct that the sign function, defined by the relationship
between a content and expression plane, must necessarily have an expression
and even though it is correct that the sign function has to be perceptually
accessible, it is not correct that the two requirements justify each other. The
demand for perceptibility need not necessarily be valid for the notation. It
may, as is the case with the computer, be fulfilled through mechanically
executed transformations to an output medium with the help of physical
notation which is not accessible to the senses. Nor, conversely, does the
demand for notation always serve the need for perceptual recognition. It may,
as is also the case with the computer, similarly serve as a non-perceptible,
physically-mechanically organized, but semantically controlled manipulation
of the notation system.
That the perceptibility criterion is not suitable for delimiting the sign
function is also indirectly indicated by Bøgh Andersen’s own analysis, as this
includes invisible sign manifestations - c.f. next section - just as he also
introduces a special class of invisible »ghost signs« which are defined as:
... signs that lack both permanent and transient features [which are visible].
They are not represented by icons or other identifiable graphical elements,
and they cannot be manipulated directly. However, they do have a function
to other [visible] signs. Like controller signs they show their existence by
influencing the behaviour of other non-ghost signs.32
The visual criterion for the definition of the expression form appears here as a
filter which conceals the unique properties of the informational sign system,
namely that any informational sign element, unlike those from other sign
systems, always has an invisible manifestation. The possibilities for
transforming these expressions into a visually recognizable expression mecha-
nically are always limited, a complete representation of the notation during the
process is not possible - and certainly not desirable.
That the visual criterion for the definition of the sign function’s expression
plane is misleading is finally also indicated indirectly by Bøgh Andersen’s
                                                
31   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 188.
32   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 221.
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presentation, as he motivates the analysis of the visual representation as a
design-strategic goal. The visual expression, the interface structure, is
produced as a result of sign work which uses non-visible notation forms. It is
also indirectly evident from this that the criterion of perceptibility has its
relevance because the informational sign system is not available in a form
accessible to the senses, as visualization is seen as a means to make the user’s
handling of the notation system easier.
Because of the supremacy of the interface and its functions regarding the
work context, a good system structure is one that makes it easy for the
designer to experiment with the different effects for achieving a given
communicative purpose, and makes visible the role of the different system
parts in the creation of meaning.33
The concept of the computer based sign is thus defined as a - visual -
mediation - a symbolic interface - between system and use.
9.4 The properties of computer-based signs
The concept of the computer-based sign is described here on the basis of a
productive contradiction between two linguistic theories, related to system
and use respectively. Among other things,  the productive aspect in this is that
it locates the relationship between the two poles as a centre of gravity
whereas the linguistic tradition has to a great degree been formed in the
struggle between theories, which give prominence to the one aspect at the
expense of the other.
The background for this accentuation is correspondingly clear, the system
does not play the same explicitly preordained role in spoken and written
languages as it plays in the informational processes.
The concept of the computer-based sign, however, is not only interesting
because it accentuates the relationship between system and use, but also
because it gives rise to a classification of a number of informational sign
properties - described at the interface level.
                                                
33   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 175.
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In Bøgh Andersen’s classification the - prototypical - computer-based sign
is created as a composition of three features, a handling feature, a permanent
feature and a transient feature.
The handling feature embraces the possibilities available to the user for
influencing the system with given, physical input mechanisms. Permanent
features, on the other hand, are features which are generated by the system,
they are constant in a given sign expression’s »lifetime«, they serve to identify
the sign and represent the system’s components. Transient features are also
generated by the computer system, but unlike the permanent features, are
subject to variation during use and therefore represent changes in the system
state.34
That computer-based sign expressions can have permanent features is only
surprising inasmuch as this feature has not previously been specified in the
description of sign systems. The fact that it now acts as a specified feature is
not only because it has become relativized and specific relative to the two
other features, but also because the permanent features of the computer-based
sign possess, in spite of everything, no more permanency than lies in the fact
that they are defined, facultative and editable features. The same naturally also
goes for the so-called transient features. The permanent features are thus not
parts of an invariant language system, »behind« the sign function, but are on
the contrary established in a manifested sign function. The »permanence« itself
is defined as a specific symbolic value and part of the expression.
That which characterizes the sign features which are »generated by the
system« is therefore the structural possibility of operating with the combina-
tion of features which are maintained and the features which are varied. This is
also an expression structure which is unique to informational systems. That
Bøgh Andersen places great emphasis on the unique aspects of handling
features which are generated by the user is probably connected with the
general attempt to extend the potential use of the medium.
The characteristic feature of computer systems is the availability of
handling features. The active hand movements of the »reader« are an essen-
tial ingredient of computer-based signs... Because of the handling features,
the computer medium differs from the older ones in having properties also
known from tools. This shows up in the interpretation of the signs... what we
                                                
34   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 176 ff. with examples and a more detailed analysis.
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see are not objects, tools and actions - we see and use signs signifying these
phenomena.35
If, however, there is to be an advantage in emphasizing the difference between
the tool and the sign for the tool, this must be due to the fact that the sign
function is not bound to be maintained. It is also a quite banal experience that
we can use the same machine both to simulate and/or execute many different
tool functions, whereby we once again come to the conclusion that there is no
expression element in the system which is external to the informational sign
system.
This also means that the features Bøgh Andersen connects with the inter-
face structure must rather be seen as a more specific utilization of the general
properties which are connected with the informational sign system as such.
If we similarly maintain that the sign function is connected with human use
- there is nobody else who can point out the referent - whether this is a
question of the design of the physical circuit, programming the machine, the
preparation or adaptation of applications, or the end user’s utilization for a
given purpose, we can conclude that the handling feature is not just a new,
marginal sign property in the informational sign system, but on the contrary
the basic property whereby we both define permanent, variable and new
handling features. All computational processes begin with a user-defined
command which produces a physically organized effect in the machine.
While the handling feature at the interface level appears as determined by
the system, a more general viewpoint of the informational sign system shows
that is not simply a secondary or derived sign feature, but on the contrary that
feature which defines the informational sign system. The sign theoretical
definition of the handling feature simply constitutes the semiotic concept of
the programming process which constitutes the informational sign as distinct
from all other known sign systems.
Unlike the more established programming concepts which are connected
with the idea of a  semantically closed whole, the sign theoretical definition of
the handling feature, however, points both to the semantic and compositional
freedom of choice in the construction of handling precepts and leaves no
theoretical gulf between the system, the interface structure and the use
context. On the other hand, it actualizes, as Bøgh Andersen moreover
discusses in detail in his analysis of the work language’s relationship to the
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non-linguistic, the theoretical and practical problems in our understanding of
the relationship between symbolic and non-symbolic actions.
The concept of the symbolic handling feature not only reveals that often
overlooked semantic freedom of choice in the programmed composition, it also
reveals that feature which makes it possible to use Turing’s choice machine, as
this feature creates a foundation for yet another unique sign function, namely
the interactive sign.
Bøgh Andersen defines the interactive sign as a composite sign which, un-
like other composite signs as actors, object signs and controllers, is formed in a
compositional structure of system and user-generated instructions.
The interactive sign possesses both permanent and variable features, but is
distinct from other sign compositions because the variable features can be
regulated by the user-defined action. Named as typical examples of this
interactive sign function are the hero figure in innumerable games, the scroll
function and a number of other tool functions from ordinary application
programmes.36
As it stands, the theory of the computer-based sign is motivated in particular
by design theoretical considerations which are profiled partly in rela-
tionship to other design strategies and partly in relationship to linguistic
sign theories.
As the interactive sign is defined as a specific utilization of the action
component, it appears - if only indirectly - that it is not simply a sign function
at the interface level, it also occupies a central place in the general infor-
mational sign concept.
While such a generalization is necessary, on the one hand, because all
elements in the informational system both emanate from and can be included
in a sign production, on the other it raises the question as to how it is possible
to describe the symbolic dimensions of the interface level.
9.5 The interface between the internal and the external
The main emphasis in the theoretical profiling is placed on the difference  to
symbol theoretical views characterized by the description of the compu-
                                                
36   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 199 ff., where the typology is described in more detail.
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tational process as a symbolic imitation, either of mental processes (such as
Simon and Newell’s neo-Cartesian AI paradigm) or of processes in the sur-
rounding world (represented, among other things, by model and object orien-
ted programming strategies which, with regard to the representation theory,
operate with a mimetic relationship between system and external reality).
The basic reservation of Bøgh Andersen towards these theories concerns
the idea that the computational system has any representational content at all
which can be described independently of a human interpreter. On this point,
Bøgh Andersen is completely in accord with Fetzer’s critique and other Peirce
inspired critiques of the symbol theoretical paradigm. The theoretical
objection, however, is utilized in a different way, as Bøgh Andersen attaches
himself to tool-oriented design strategies, primarily those of the American
Human Computer Interaction tradition and the Scandinavian activity and
work-oriented design tradition.37
While these strategies, and with them also those of Bøgh Andersen, have a
common focus at the interface level, which is seen as a strategic key point for
the integration of the system into a use context, they diverge in the theoretical
description of the connection between the system’s »text« and the context. It
was this difference which motivated Bøgh Andersen to distinguish between a
semiotic, psychological and aesthetic approach to the interpretation of what in
linguistic terminology can be described as the contextual referent.
The semiotic approach, however, also implies an opposition to one of the
principal design ideals in the use and work-oriented strategies, namely the idea
of the »transparent« interface which does not attract the user’s attention
because such attention would disturb the execution of the tasks the tool is to
be used for.
This opposition is a direct consequence of the element which constitutes
the merit of semiotic theory, namely the focus on the possible interplay be-
tween the expression form and the content form. From the semiotic point of
view, the demand for transparency with regard to the tool is an expression of a
one-sided concentration on the content side of the sign function which leads
to the loss of the semantic variation possibilities which are connected with the
sign relation between content and expression form.
                                                
37   The »Scandinavian tradition« is usually traced back to the Norwegian computer scientist, Kresten
Nygård. The label ‘activity-oriented’ »human activity approach« is taken from Susanne Bødker, 1987,
who provides an analysis of the interface concept. The label »work-oriented« is taken from the title of
Pelle Ehn’s book, 1988, where he discusses a number of the Scandinavian tradition’s projects as an
approach to an extension and renewal of the design concept.
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If the idea of the invisible or transparent screen, the screen as a window on
the world, is a central element in the use-oriented strategies, semiotic theory is
concerned with the visible screen, the screen as a pictorial or symbolic con-
struction. The difference which is manifested through the different views of
the screen, however, emerges because what is to appear on the screen must be
obtained from two different places. Whereas the use and work oriented
strategies regard the screen as a medium for semantic regimes in the
surrounding world, in semiotic theory the screen is regarded to a higher degree
as a medium for articulating a selected part of the semantic potential of the
internal informational system.
If the two different views of the screen emerge because the screen is ap-
proached from two different directions, they need not necessarily conflict with
each other. The difference can also be viewed as a result of the double
determination of the interface level itself.
In Bøgh Andersen’s definition, the interface comprises a collection of per-
ceptually accessible computer-based signs, where the signs are used and
interpreted in a given use context. Like other definitions of the interface
concept, this definition was formulated with regard to the development of
design strategies. The interface concept is thus defined as a working area from
the point of view of the designer, as it serves to thematize the question as to
how the designer can meet the user’s needs. There is no reason to deny that
such needs exist, but there are reasons to consider why a professional
management of this need is necessary at all.
Perhaps the most obvious answer is that the need to design good interfaces
stems from the fact that the lay user does not possess - and should not have to
possess - professional programming competence. A good interface can thus be
seen as a means of maintaining an appropriate division of labour.
This sounds like a plausible reason. But it cannot explain precisely why the
interface concept originates and how it acquires its special significance for the
efficient division of labour in connection with computer technology, where in
many other cases the division of labour can be established without
correspondingly specialized and professional mediation between different
areas of competence.
If the consideration regarding efficiency is the correct reason for working
with the design of interface structures, this must therefore be conditioned by
the fact that a special kind of incongruousness exists in this area.
Most interface theories ascribe the need to the many different areas of use,
each of which requires its own specific interface structure, which must thus be
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modified relative to the different use contexts. No matter which special use is
in question, however, they all have one thing in common,  namely the need for
an interface. While the answers to the problem differ from case to case, the
source is always the same. The need to design the many different interface
structures does not stem from one or another of the use contexts, or the special
features of working competence, but from the character of the computer and
the informational representation.
It would therefore appear most obvious to define the interface concept
relative to the informational system.
If we take our point of departure in the lay user’s standpoint, it is natural to
point to the formal descriptive languages, which have often been used to
handle the informational process, as a central competence barrier. This,
however, can be compensated for through training without removing the need
for an interface. An interface structure is also required in order to utilize formal
languages to control the informational process. The need for an interface does
not thus stem from the formal language, on the contrary, it stems from the
mechanical form of the informational process which is not accessible to the
senses.
The demand for perceptual accessibility is therefore rightfully included as a
basic criterion in Bøgh Andersen’s definition of the interface concept as »the
relation between the perceptible parts of a computer system and its users«.38
In opposition to the older system theoretical definitions, which describe the
interface as part of the system, he connects the criterion of perceptibility to the
needs of the lay user, as the perceptible part of the system is seen at the same
time as a set of restrictions placed on the lay user through the system.
Both  the programmer and the lay user, however, must always handle the
informational process through some kind of interface which uses perceptible
expressions to handle the internal process in the machine which is inaccessible
to the senses, just as all operations involve a change in the total state of the
system, no matter which parts are accessible to the senses. The interface must
therefore be described as a medium which permits the necessary exchange
between a perceptible expression form and the non-perceptible informational
notation. In its general form the concept therefore embraces any kind of input
or output medium, which is also in accordance with the postulate that the
interface is not necessary because of the user’s - lack of - competence, but due
to the character of the technology involved.
                                                
38   Bøgh Andersen, 1990: 129.
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Although we may theoretically be able to imagine that the conversion from
perceptible to non-perceptible expression forms takes place as a complete
conversion - for example with the use of the binary notation of input and
output - such a complete conversion would in reality imply that the computer
could not be used as a computer. Pure binary notation contains no syntactic
or semantic structures. Consequently these structures can only come to
expression at the interface level which, for exactly the same reason, must be
designed as a selective - perceptible - compression of an internal notation
structure which is not accessible to the senses.
The informational sign system is thus characterized by a double expression
structure, whether the machine is used to control another machine, to simulate
a calculating machine, a logical procedure, a drawing apparatus, a typewriter,
or as a medium for storing and processing information.
If the machine is used as a dedicated machine which must always execute
the same set of repetitive procedures notwithstanding their complexity,
designing the interface constitutes a one-off problem. If the syntactic and
semantic structure required for executing these procedures has been dis-
covered, the machine can work as an automaton and the demand for per-
ceptibility will only be in evidence before, after and in the case of distur-
bances. This borderline case at the same time reveals that the demand for
perceptibility is closely connected with the utilization of the computer’s
syntactic and semantic potential and that this potential can only be expressed
at the interface level, while it is effectuated at the internal notation level.
This background also makes it possible to understand the use of the screen
as a central interface medium. The screen, as will be familiar, is not a necessary
part of a computer system and even though the first screen was made use of in
the middle of the 1950’s, a quarter of a century would elapse before the
comprehensive syntactic and semantic control potential made possible by the
use of the screen was taken up in earnest.39
Looked at from the lay user’s point of view, these possibilities lie especially
in the introduction of graphic and linguistic means of control which redress
                                                
39   René Moreau, (1981) 1984: 86. The first screen used as a medium for the operator’s intervention in
the process is believed to have been used for the first time in 1954 in a machine built by IBM (NORC,
or Naval Ordnance Research Calculator, which was inaugurated by John von Neumann on 2 December
1954). Cathode ray tubes and radar had formerly been used for more specific purposes where visual
access was required to particularly critical parts of the process. Visual representation, however, was only
regarded as an auxiliary function in monitoring the system process and the screen image was usually
defined in very few parameters, for example a fixed number of lines with a fixed number of signs per
line, whereas the graphic screen image is typically defined by dots.
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the formal description barrier. From the designer’s point of view, the same
possibilities offer the opportunity to include information on later use in system
development.
The result was a significant breakthrough, a new epoch, both in computer
technology and in the history of society. There are nevertheless reasons to see
the convergence between the two attempts as a provisional convergence,
with the two parties each taking their own direction, which in both cases
raises a more general problem of competence.
Where the designer is on his way out into the world, the user is on his way
into the system. A good interface does not therefore help to remove the
barrier, neither for the designer nor the user, on the contrary, it extends it
because it implies that both parties will find it necessary to acquire more
knowledge of an unfamiliar area of competence.
To the immediate and in itself far-reaching advantage which lay in the use-
oriented definition of the interface can thus be added another, which may also
have far-reaching effects, namely the advantage that lies in the fact that the
same interface has both a semantic component, which is determined through
the system, and one which is determined through use. This implies that the
definition of the interface - including the screen - must be abandoned as a
limited meeting place between two distinct components. The actual meeting
between these areas of competence does not take place at the screen’s
interface level, but between two different interpreters who regard the screen in
different ways.
In order to describe the relationship between these interpreters it is ne-
cessary to describe the interface as a synchronic transitional state between
two - or more - different diachronic, semantic sequences.
Seen in relationship to the internal notation structure, the interface repro-
duces only a segment which originates as a semantically motivated selection
carried out by the system’s designer. There is thus no question of a complete
representation of the system’s synchronic structure at a given stage, but of a
semantically motivated compression which distinguishes a sequence of
diachronic transitions at the level of internal notation as a perceptually
accessible semantic structure. The synchronic re-presentation on the screen,
seen from inside the notation, is a fiction, the image on the screen is only
synchronic if it is seen as a semantic structure without taking into account the
flicker which reveals that the constant image itself is diachronically
constructed.
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 While the screen image, seen from the system’s side, appears as an output,
from the user’s side it is at the same time the point of departure for an input,
where it is not only possible to utilize the perceptible output, but the entire
system. Screen representation, therefore, permits a transition between output
and input without loss of the informational notation.
Even though the synchronic interface is produced as semantically defined
restrictions which are meant to help the user to handle the internal process, the
synchronic form, however, means that the user also gains semantic freedom
with regard to these restrictions. Not only can he choose between what is
offered, but - solely dependent on his competence - can also choose to
redefine the semantic structure by ignoring what is offered or by using it for
other purposes.
On the face of it, while this possibility appears contrafunctional viewed
from the use-oriented design viewpoint, it is not necessarily the case that this
really is so from the user’s. The central question here is the degree to which it
is relevant for the user also to acquire areas of competence which make him
capable of utilizing this potential of the informational sign system.
As poles in this area, we have on the one hand the fully developed, finalized
application system which, for this very reason, approaches a functional use
similar to that of a traditional machine and, on the other, a machine which only
works as a heater. The interesting area, however, is all the possible
intermediate forms between these two mechanical poles, as it is only these
which make the machine a computer, determined by its symbolic properties.
If the idea that we must all become programmers is untenable, which there is
at present good reason to accept, because it unnecessarily disregards the
advantages of the division of labour, the idea that most of us should only be
innocent users is equally so. The informational medium has its own properties
which can only be used by those who learn to express themselves through
them.
Just like the picture of the automatic machine, the picture of the perfect in-
terface is also the picture of a computer which is not a computer. In these
cases, the machine wins out over the sign. In all other cases, the thought wins
out over the sign and the machine because there is a functional relationship
between at least two semantic regimes which require two different forms of
sign work, the programmer’s and the user’s. In order to edit the programme,
the user himself must execute the programmer’s sign work.
If, however, we wish to use this for a purpose, we must necessarily perform
another sign work - namely the user’s. The informational sign system’s
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syntactic structure is always subject to both semantic regimes, which coincide
only in certain borderline cases. The informational sign system, relative to
other sign systems, thus implies a structural doubling of the sign work.
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10. Epilogue
10.1 What is a computer?
With the analysis of the computer’s symbolic properties given here it is pos-
sible both to distinguish this machine from all other machines, whether these
be clocks, steam engines, thermostats, or automatic calculating machines, from
all other symbolic media such as the telephone, the telegraph, the radio, the
television, the VCR and from all other symbolic languages, whether these be
written languages and other visual languages, speech and other auditive
languages, or music, as well as all formal symbolic languages, just as it  is also
possible to distinguish the symbolic properties of this machine from those of
the human mind.
The description hereby fulfils a basic demand which must be made on any
description of the computer, as the idea itself of describing the computer
assumes that it exists as a distinct phenomenon.
As the computer possesses properties which are related both to those of the
machine, other symbolic media and other symbolic languages and can be used
to execute a great number of mental processes mechanically, the description of
these properties raises a number of questions which are also connected with
previous views, not only of the computer, but also of these more or less related
phenomena.
This holds true in particular of the understanding of the relationship be-
tween the mechanical and the symbolic, the relationship between the symbolic
expression and the content and the relationship between the rule and its
execution.
It is not my purpose to provide any complete answer to these problems,
which, however, it has not been possible to ignore either. The conclusions in
the book are therefore divided into two parts, as in this section there is a
summary of the analysis of the computer, while in the following sections there
is a short account of the theoretical and cultural perspectives.
The most obvious place to start a description of the computer’s symbolic
properties is in relationship to the automatic calculating machine. There are
historical reasons to do so, as the computer was a product of attempts to build
a calculating machine which could execute any calculable operation mechani-
cally. But this is even more obvious and informative because the comparison
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leads directly to the basic principles which provide the computer with its
unique characteristics.
By what could resemble a historical accident, Alan Turing presented the
first theoretical description of the principles of the modern computer almost at
the same time as the German engineer, Konrad Zuse, built the hitherto most
perfect automatic calculating machine. While Zuse’s machine, however, used a
mechanical calculator and thereby assumed that the rules of calculation were
incorporated into the machine’s physical architecture, Turing’s theoretical
analysis showed that a universal calculating machine assumed that the rules of
calculation were not incorporated into the invariant physical architecture.
Where Zuse’s machine could and should only be fed with the data for
calculation, the Turing machine could and should also be fed with data which
could produce the rules of calculation that were to be executed.
There is a world of difference between these two construction principles
because the demand that the machine must be fed with data which produce
the rules of calculation means that the rules must not only be specified, they
must also be expressed in the same notation units as the data for calculation.
As a consequence of this, the Turing machine cannot operate with formal
notation systems because formal notation contains no explicit description of
the rules which the notation refers to and does not permit rules and data to be
expressed in the same notation units.
The epoch-making leap forward from the automatic calculating machine to
the universal symbol handler was thus brought about in and through the
development of a new notation system. This event occurred, by and large, in a
couple of pages of Turing’s article On Computable Numbers, where he
converted the formal expression to the notation form necessary for mechanical
execution.
Turing himself saw this conversion as an operation which was necessary
from a purely technical point of view, as the new notation could be read as
completely defined by the original formal expression.
It was nevertheless a question of a new notation system with a number of
new properties. Those features which make the Turing machine a universal
calculating machine also make the machine a universal symbol handler, as the
new notation can contain not only formal symbolic procedures, but any
symbolic expression which can be formulated in a discrete notation system
with a finite number of previously defined notation units, as the demand on
this definition is primarily a demand that the notation must have a physical
form which is capable of producing a simple mechanical effect.
354
The conditions made on this notation can be summarized in three points,
which also express the necessary and sufficient condition allowing both
symbolic and non-symbolic processes to be represented or simulated in a
computer:
• All rules which must be executed mechanically must be available in the
same notation units as data, the individual notation units must have a phy-
sically distinct value on the same scale as the other notation units because
the notation must be mechanically active.
• There must be a previously established, finite number of notation units. The
number is arbitrary, but in practice binary notation is used. There are no
other general rules for establishing the value of the notation units and the
notation system is independent of the demand for perceptual recognition.
• No independent semantic value can be ascribed to the individual expres-
sion unit, which can thus be defined as a semantically empty, semantic
variation mechanism.
In addition to this - as a kind of negative condition - a fourth condition, comes
a demand that there be a purpose which is not represented in the system.
This condition stems from the demand on the physically defined notation
system. As the notation is solely defined on the basis of physical (mechanically
active) values, it can also be manifested as a purely physical form which
activates the same mechanical effects in the system without being intended. In
other words, the machine cannot decide whether a given physical value is
simply a physical value which is produced as a noise effect, or whether it is the
physical expression of an intended notation unit. Any definition of notation
systems thus contains an intentional element, but this element cannot be
implemented in a mechanical machine. The problem can be solved in practice
by using control codes whereby each signal’s validity as a notation is
determined by the surrounding signals.
With this description of the notation system it is possible to provide an
initial, elementary description of the computer, partly as distinct from other
machines and partly as distinct from other symbolic media, as:
• Unlike other machines, the computer is based on a complete dissolution of
physical-mechanical determination into its »atomistic« components. The
physical determination always only includes a step between two states and
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this step can either involve changing one notation unit to another, or
allowing it to remain unchanged.
• The same dissolution also goes for the symbolic interpretation of the physical
process, as it must be possible to produce any symbolic process through
such a step-by-step, physical-mechanical process, where it is possible, in
principle, to intervene step by step.
This simultaneous dissolution of and connection between the mechanical and
symbolic procedures represents both an innovation in the history of
mechanical and symbolic theory, in the history of machine technology and of
symbolic media.
Now, the use of informational notation is determined by the algorithmic
linking of shorter or longer sequences of notation units and it might therefore
be asked whether the notation system’s multisemantic openness is limited by
the algorithmic condition. A closer look at the algorithmic procedure, however,
shows that this is not the case. First, because the algorithmic structure itself
has polysemic properties, second, because when the algorithm is implemented
in a computer it is represented in a notation system which permits an arbitrary
modification or suspension of the algorithmic structure which creates the basis
for the machine’s multisemantic potential.
The first argument can be expressed in the following points:
• While each notation unit in an algorithmic expression has a well-defined
value (a referent which is either a data or rule value), the total algorithmic
expression has no definite referent. The same algorithmic procedure can
represent a plurality of significations, purposes or meanings and different
algorithms can represent the same signification, purpose or meaning. At the
same time, the algorithmic procedure is characterized by the fact that it can
be executed quite independently of these meanings and the result of the
procedure is semantically empty. The algorithmic procedure does not
prevent us from comparing or multiplying the height of the Eiffel tower
with or by the sound of a thunderclap.
• While any algorithmic expression is completely determined, there are no ge-
neral rules for joining algorithmic sequences. All expressions can be
multiplied, divided, integrated, differentiated and combined as much as
desired, as long as the order for each operation is described.
• The algorithm’s start and stop conditions cannot be expressed in algorith-
mic form. The algorithmic expression cannot contain its own interpretation.
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It must be interpreted in another language and the same goes for the
algorithmic rules of procedure. The algorithmic expression contains
references to formal rules, but the rules are not contained in the expression,
they are, on the contrary, represented by a distinct and declared notation
which refers to a rule outside the expression.
• The number of notation units used can be freely varied, depending on the
task and the purpose.
The algorithmic expression can be described on this basis as a deterministic,
syntactic structure with polysemic potential. In linguistic terms it could be said
that the algorithmic procedure represents an empty expression system, a
syntactic structure, which is emancipated from the content form. This
emancipation is only relative, however, because the algorithmic expression is
produced through a linguistically articulated definition of premises, just as the
interpretation of the procedure and its result depend upon the re-
establishment of a sign function which links the expression form with a
content form.
The features of the algorithmic procedure which are drawn attention to here
are perhaps not the most important features when we work with algorithms
ourselves, but they are central when it comes to understanding what happens
when the algorithmic procedure is converted to a mechanically executable
form, because this conversion takes its point of departure solely in the
algorithmic expression form. This conversion also implies a dissolution of
semantic determination and the result of this can be summarized in the
following points:
• When an algorithmic expression is to be implemented in a computer, it must
be converted to another notation system which comprises a finite and
invariant number of notation units. The individual notation units have no
referent, the same notation units act both as expression parts for data and
algorithmic rules of procedure.
• When the algorithmic procedure, which itself is sequentially constructed, is
stored in the computer it is also available as a synchronic redundancy
structure which implies that it is possible to move from any place to any
other place and thereby break the sequential order, as the system is always
completely determined by the relationship between the actual state and the
next, individual step.
• An algorithmic procedure can represent both:
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- A semantic content (e.g. in the form of logical rules or knowledge)
- A syntactic content (e.g. as a programme for constructing a digital picture,
where the result of the serial process must be available to us in a visual,
simultaneous form).
- A notation unit in another notation system (e.g. a letter, a number or a 
pictorial element).
• We can therefore intervene both from these different planes and intervene
in the system at the corresponding planes (the binary plane, the algorithmic-
syntactic planes, which may be hierarchically stratified, and the semantic
plane).
While the automatically executed procedure can be described as an inter-
vention, where the semantic intervention plane is maintained over a sequence,
for each new intervention we can choose to vary the intervention plane »up
and down«, or between different semantic regimes, whether these be formal
regimes which can be mechanically executed, or informal, where it is the user
who effectuates the semantic regime through his choice of input.
If this description of the symbolic properties of the algorithmic procedure is
correct, we can draw the conclusion that the algorithmic procedure does not
place any limitation on utilizing the multisemantic potential which is contained
in the informational notation system.
While there are still sharp restrictions regarding which rules can be exe-
cuted mechanically, there is only a single restriction regarding which symbolic
and non-symbolic expressions can be represented and handled in a computer.
With respect to the latter, this restriction is constituted solely by the demand
that it must be possible to express the given content in a finite notation system
with a finite number of empty notation units. With respect to the former, the
question as to which rule systems can be implemented in a computer, it is still
the case that the rule system must be characterized by well-defined start and
stop conditions, that several rules cannot be used simultaneously, that there
must be no unclarified overlapping between the extent of different rules (no
over-determination, such as in common languages), that there must be no part
of the total expression which is not subject to a given rule (no under-
determination) and that the rules (or rules for creating new rules) must be
declared in advance.
As Turing showed, these demands can be fulfilled for all formal procedures
which can be executed through a finite number of steps. Whereas there has
since been an explosive development in the number of procedures which fulfil
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these demands, no rule system has hitherto emerged which fulfils both these
demands and at the same time completely covers the description of a specific
subject area, except that of abstract, formal systems. The explanation for this is
to be found in the circumstance that we are not capable of fulfilling the
demand for a precise definition of start and stop conditions in the description
of non-symbolic relationships and are only able to fulfil this demand for a very
limited set of artefacts produced by humans, including theoretically delimited,
finite physical or logical »spaces«.
As the computer is a symbolic machine, a semantic dimension is included in
all uses and as it can be subjected to a plurality of semantic regimes, it is
consequently described as a multisemantic machine.
By a semantic regime we understand that set of codes we use to produce
and read a symbolic expression, whether we are capable of formulating these
codes in a complete or incomplete form or not. In this terminology, written and
spoken languages comprise two semantic regimes which again distinguish
themselves from formal regimes because they are based on different codes. In
addition, there are a number of other semantic regimes, some of which are
pictorial, others auditive. The concept is used both of symbolic expressions
which are available as distinct notation units and as symbolic expressions (as
pictures) which are not - or need not necessarily be.
It follows from this that the different semantic regimes need not necessarily
build upon one and the same sign function and a description is therefore given
of the way in which the relationship between the expression form and the
content form are formed in different symbolic languages, as the emphasis is
placed on the function of the notation forms.
The general results of the comparative analysis can be summarized in the
following points:
• As all physical forms which can be used as notation forms can also occur
without being notation forms, any use of notation systems is connected
with two problems of noise theory, as it must both be possible to 1) delimit
the individual notation unit relative to the physical medium and to other
legitimate notation units, and 2) relative to the occurrence of an identical
physical form which is not a valid member of the message. There is thus
always a semantic component in the definition of a valid notation.
• The different notation systems build on different solutions to the two basic
problems of noise, but the solution of the one noise problem is always
included in an internal relation with the solution of the other, as the
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individual notation systems possess - mutually different - possibilities for
varying the relationship between the physical and semantic components
which are included in the solution. This semantic component is therefore
included in different ways in different notation systems.
• A given notation system always uses only a limited selection of the possible
variations the expression substance permits, but different notation systems
operate with different criteria for this restriction and these criteria also
establish the - mutually different - smallest semantic variation mechanisms
which characterize the given notation system.
• While the different notation systems can operate with different degrees of
precision in connection with the demand for physical definition, the
demands on the physical definition in the individual notation system can
also be varied relative to the semantic component. The physical and
semantic criteria thus form two mutually connected variation axes, so that
the one axis permits variation in pattern formation and the other in the
content of signification and/or strength of signification, as variation on the
one axis can both be independent of and connected with variation on the
other.
• As some kind of uncertainty is always inherent in the relationship between
the components which are included in the definition of a notation system,
notation systems cannot be described as completely rule determined. The
comparative analysis is therefore based on a theoretical definition of the
concept of redundancy and the individual notation systems are
characterized by the different criteria for the use of both physical and
semantic redundancy, as these criteria are both included in the solution of
the two problems of noise and establish the smallest semantic variation
mechanisms which characterize the mutually distinctive features of different
symbolic languages.
Although this description is not exhaustive with regard to each symbolic
language, it is sufficient to show that they use different expression forms and
substances and that these differences provides a basis for the use of different
reading codes. The comparative analysis thereby also provides the possibility
of amplifying and going into greater detail in the description of the special
relationship between the expression form and the reading code which
characterize informational notation.
In formal and common languages the definition of the semantic component
of the notations is thus closely connected with the given, superior semantic
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regime. In these cases there is a fixed bond which connects a given expression
form with (a set of) reading codes. While such a bond appears to be a
precondition for the use of other notation systems, it is not a precondition for
the use of informational notation, as the semantic component, which is
included in the definition of the notation unit, is defined through a formal
semantic which is independent of the superior semantic regime. The
background for this difference lies in the circumstance that informational
notation is not directly defined relative to human sense and meaning
recognition, but on the contrary, relative to the demand for mechanical
effectiveness, which implies that the semantic component must always be
manifested in a physical expression.
This is thus a question of a difference which justifies speaking of a symbol
system of a new type. The absence of the fixed bond between the expression
form and the reading code gives this symbol system a central property, as the
absence is a precondition for the fact that we can represent all these other
symbolic expressions in the informational notation system. In other words, it is
the precondition for the multisemantic properties of the machine.
By multisemantic properties, the three following circumstances should be
understood:
• That it is possible to use this machine to handle symbolic expressions which
belong to different semantic regimes (linguistic, formal - including both
mechanical, mathematical and logical - as well as pictorial, auditive and so
on) with the sole restriction that the expression which is handled can be
represented in a notation system comprising a finite number of expression
units.
• That it is also possible to control the machine (or the computational pro-
cess) with different semantic regimes with the same restriction, as this con-
trol, however, can only be effectuated mechanically for a limited class of
procedures, while for others it requires the semantic regime to be exercised
through continuous intervention.
• That any process executed in the machine runs as a relationship between at
least two semantic regimes, namely those which are laid down in the
system and those which are contained in the use. The two regimes may
coincide, as can happen when a programmer is editing a programme, or
when there is a question of an execution of a closed semantic procedure
such as in the form of  an automatic execution of a demonstration. Usually,
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however, this will rather be a question of a plurality of semantic regimes, but
always at least two.
With this description it now becomes possible to add yet another criterion
both to the distinction between a computer and other machines and to the
distinction between the computer and other symbolic expression media.
While other machines can be described as mono-semantic machines in
which a given, invariant rule set, which establishes the machine’s functional
mode of operation in the machine’s physical architecture, has been im-
plemented, the computer is a multisemantic machine based on informational
architecture which is established by the materials the machine processes.
While other symbolic expression forms can be described as mono-semantic
regimes with rule sets which connect the semantic regime with notation and
syntax, the computer is a multisemantic symbolic medium in which it is
possible to simulate both formal and informal symbolic languages as well as
non-symbolic processes, just as this simulation can be carried out through
formal and informal semantic regimes.
Together, these two delimitations contain a third, important criterion for the
definition of the computer, as a computer can be defined as a medium in which
there is no invariant threshold between the information which is implemented
in the machine’s architecture and the information which is processed by that
architecture.
On the basis of this analysis of the properties of the computer it is possible
to draw the conclusion that the computer, seen as a medium for the
representation of knowledge, not only has the same general properties as
written language, but also properties which create a new historical yardstick
both for the concept of a mechanical machine and for the symbolic represen-
tation of knowledge.
Although this thesis hereby follows the research traditions which are in
accord with the belief that it is possible to provide an unambiguous answer to
the question as to whether the computer sets new historical standards, the
interpretation given here deviates both in the understanding of the
computer’s mechanical and symbolic properties. It will therefore be reasonable
to round off this section by characterizing and motivating this deviation.
When the computer is considered in continuation of the history of the
mechanical technologies, the discussion has particularly centred on the extent
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to which and how this machine contributes to the transition from an industrial
society to an information society.
Within this descriptive framework, the computer is seen as a technology
which makes it possible to reduce the industrial production sector and control
the industrial functions through information processes. It seems, however, to
lead to the paradox of controlling industry by industrial means of control.1 It
could, therefore, be claimed with equal justification, that this is also a question
of a machine which can contribute to an expansion of industrialization, as it
permits both a) mechanization of control functions which were formerly
handled (or not handled) with other means; this holds true of many
administrative functions, for example, b) the use of mechanical methods in new
areas, for example in biology and psychology, but also in handling purely
physical material and c) the use of mechanical registration and processing of
data in connection with phenomena not accessible to the senses (including
macrocosmic, micro-physical and molecular-biological phenomena). Whether
the historical result can actually best be described as a transition from an
industrial to an informational social paradigm, or as a qualitative renewal and
extension of the industrial paradigm can hardly be considered as decided.2
We can, however, establish that the mechanical procedure can now be
dissolved (or subdivided) into »atomistic« components and manipulated and
organized as sequences of individual steps. In this perspective, the question is
one of an extension of the mechanical handling potential through an
analytical dissolution of the mechanical procedure and thereby the operative
intervention plane.
This new handling potential not only permits a much greater differentiation
between various kinds of industrial use, but also provides the possibility of
choosing other uses which fall outside both old as well as renewed
mechanical-industrial paradigms. The computer can be used as an indu-
                                                
1 A paradox because the need to control industrial processes reflects the fact that industrial processes do
not provide control by themselves.
2  Present-day society is sometimes described as an information society with reference to the fact that
more than half the people employed work with information services. If we use this definition of the
information society, the computer may well be the instrument for a transition from this to a new
industrial society, as many of these information services can be executed mechanically. On the other
hand, however, all societies could be described as information societies because knowledge and the
organized exchange of information are necessary conditions for any society. Under any circumstances, it
is therefore necessary to differentiate between the »information« society we are familiar with today and
the possible social forms which can be created with the computer as the basic information technology
in society. Such a distinction can be established with the point of departure in a conceptual distinction
between information technologies which have no informational architecture and information
technologies such as the computer, which have.
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strialization machine, but it can also, as such, be used in several ways, although
even together these do not constitute the only possibility. It offers a choice (or
a combination of several choices) which, in the social scale, have the same
multisemantic dimensions as the machine itself.
The concept of the computer, on which the idea of a transition from
industrial society to information society is based, is highly debatable, but the
description given here also gives occasion to consider whether the industrial
society and the mechanical-industrial paradigms are the right parameter for a
description of the properties of the new technology and its implications.
There is one circumstance in particular which gives occasion to raise this
problem, namely that with the computer we have obtained a symbol-con-
trolled, mechanical machine in which we can represent all the forms of
knowledge which were developed in the industrial society in one and the
same symbolic system, where in the industrial society we represented different
forms of knowledge in different symbolic expression systems. This means that
the computer possesses a set of properties which make it a new, general
medium for the representation of knowledge.
Although as yet we can only have vague ideas of what this implies, it is
certain that this technology will bring about a change in the possibilities we
have for producing, processing, storing, reproducing and distributing
knowledge. In other words, this is a question of a change at level of
knowledge technology, which forms an infrastructural basis of the industrial
society.
Although the industrial societies have produced a great number of new,
largely electrical and electronic symbolic media - including the telephone, the
telegraph, the radio, the magnetic tape, the television and the VCR - writing
and the printed book have maintained their position as the most important
knowledge media with regard to the functioning of society. The computer,
however, shakes this knowledge technological foundation.
It is therefore also reasonable to assert that it is writing and the printed
book and not industrial mechanics, the calculating machine or the former use
of mechanical energy systems for symbolic purposes which are the most
important parameters for comparison and this implies that the horizon within
which we relate to the cultural implications of the computer cannot be less
broad than the horizon delimited by the role of writing and the printed book
as media for knowledge in modern Euro-American history from the
Renaissance up until today. The postulate is not that we can take in this field
at a glance, it is simply that the computer revolution has a range which will
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affect all the themes inherent in the history of modernity since the
Renaissance. In other words, an extremely comprehensive, and in many
respects probably new history of modernization. For the present, however,
only vaguely outlined.
Just as little as other views, the view of the computer presented in the
preceding pages can naturally not be used to predict the future. This is parti-
cularly so because, according to this view, it is a technology which offers
many possible choices and variations with very few invariant features. This so-
called prediction machine’s own development has also hitherto evolved in the
face of all predictions. Regarding factors such as speed and capacity, all
predictions have been superseded by reality, the same goes for the dif-
ferentiation of potential use, whereas the introduction of this technology has
often created results which were completely different to those which were
expected in the form of greater efficiency, breadth of perspective and control.
Whereas 20-30 years ago in Denmark, it was expected that very few
mainframe machines would be sufficient to cover Danish society’s need for
calculating power - and nobody imagined that the machine would be used for
very much else - today, there is still a need which has not been catered for in
spite of an enormously expanded calculating capacity. Where, only ten years
ago, these machines could be marketed in the name of the ‘paper-less’ society,
they have instead created even higher stacks of paper.
The fact that the predictions which describe the meaning of the computer as
a means for achieving some definite purpose have often been completely
wrong can to a great degree be explained on the basis of the machine’s
multisemantic properties, as these imply that the machine is not determined by
or bound to the purposes which are implemented in the same way as other
machines. In respect of this point too, it is more relevant to compare the
computer with other knowledge media, as such a comparison reveals that it is
not possible to draw direct conclusions from a description of the medium to
the content of that which is expressed in the medium. The individual book
does not decrease the need for new books, it increases the need.
Similarly to the book, the computer is a medium of knowledge and both
produce a set of - mutually different - conditions for the articulation of
knowledge with regard to form. While the medium’s form is thus probably part
of the message, the content of the individual book, its effect or significance,
cannot be predicted on the basis of this form.
The comparison with other knowledge media, however, shows not only the
dubious aspect of a certain type of prediction, it also contains a point of
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departure for another type, as the description of the computer as a knowledge
medium also indicates the cultural plane, that sphere in society which is
undergoing change, notwithstanding the way in which the medium is used.
It is also possible, on the basis of the description of the machine presented
in the preceding, to suggest some of the structural features which characterize
this new knowledge medium.
The first link in this sketch concerns the structural changes in the or-
ganization of knowledge as a whole, while the second concerns the changes
which come into play at each link in the chain.
Where structural changes are concerned, at least three main points can be
indicated, as the computer:
• First, is both a medium for producing, editing, processing, storing, copy-
ing, distributing, searching and retrieving knowledge. It thereby
integrates the production of knowledge, the production of books,
bookselling and library into a single symbol system and medium.
• Second, is both a medium for presenting linguistically (spoken and writ-
ten) formally, pictorially and auditively expressed knowledge. It thereby
integrates all modern society’s staple forms of knowledge into the same
medium and in the same symbolic representation system and thereby also
provides the possibility of integrating written and pictorial forms of
knowledge with auditive forms.
• Third, it is a medium for communication. It thereby integrates the most im-
portant previous means of communication, such as mail, telegraph, radio,
telephone, television etc. whether one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-many
and both close to real-time interactive communication and communication,
independently of the presence of the receiver.
In itself, the integration of all these functions, which were formerly distributed
between different media and functions, is epoch-making, but in addition to this
comes the fact that the computer’s properties also change the conditions and
possibilities in each of these individual areas. Although these cannot be
described under the same heading, they have, however, a common
background in the general properties of the machine. It is possible here to
point out three important aspects which will be of significance in all areas:
• First, the machine operates with an independent symbol system (with re-
spect to notation, syntax and semantics and the relationship between these
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planes) and there is no invariant borderline between the knowledge which
is incorporated in the machine’s construction and the knowledge it
processes. In other words, working with this machine requires an area of
competence which is different to those areas of competence which are
connected with other symbolic expression systems.
• Second, it integrates a symbolically controlled mechanics with the mecha-
nical execution of symbol manipulation. In other words, working with this
machine permits a number of new knowledge processing and knowledge
retrieval systems. It therefore requires new forms of knowledge validation.
• Third, a great number of the restrictions which were formerly connected
with the physically bound architecture of the symbolic media are here trans-
formed into facultative symbolic restrictions which are implemented in a
physically variable (energy-based) form. Symbolic representation is thus
available in a permanently editable form.
10.2 A new technology for textual representation.
Although the symbolic properties of the computer go far beyond the capa-
cities of any previously known means of representation, there are two basic
limitations.
First, that any representation in computers is conditioned by a series of
sequentially processed notational units. No matter what the specific function
or semantic format used, and no matter what the specific purpose, any use of
computers is conditioned by a representation in a new type of alphabet, im-
plying that the content is manifested in an invisible, textual form, which can be
edited at the level of this alphabet.
Second, that the global reach is conditioned and limited by the actual pre-
sence of and access to the machinery.
Taken together, these limits delineate a system for knowledge representa-
tion which is most properly conceived of as a new global archive of
knowledge in which anything represented is manifested and processed se-
quentially as a permanently editable text.
Hence, the computer is basically a technology for textual representation,
but as such it changes the structures and principles of textual representation
as known from written and printed texts, whether they belong to common or
formal languages.
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The character of this structural change, however, goes far beyond the in-
ternal structure of textual representations, because - due to the integration of
both linguistic, formal, visual and auditive formats of knowledge - it widens
the range and logic of textual representation and - due to the integration of
globally distributed archives in one system - widens the social and cultural
reach of any kind of textual representation.
We can therefore say that, as an agent of change, the computer provides a
new textual infrastructure for the social organization of knowledge.
The basic principle in this change is inherent in the structural relation
between the hidden text and its visible representation. While the informational
notation shares linear sequencing with other kinds of textual representation, it
is always randomly accessible as a synchronic manifestation from which a
plenitude of »hypertexts« can be derived independently of previous
sequential constraints. What is at stake here, however, is not a change from
seriality to non-seriality, but a change in which any sequential constraint can
be overcome by the help of other sequences, as anything represented in the
computer is represented in a serially processed substructure.
One of the significant implications is that sequences defined by a sender
can be separated - and rearranged and reinterpreted - with sequences defined
by any receiver, while the position of receiver in the same act is changed to a
more active role as »writer«, »co-writer« or simply as user. Hence, interactivity
becomes a property inherent in the serial substructure and available as an
optional choice for the user, limited only by his or her skills and intentions.
 Seriality persists, even in the case of non-serial expressions such as photo-
graphs and paintings, since non-serial representation is only the result of an
iteration of a selected set of serially processed sequences. The same is true of
the representation of any stable expression, whether of a certain state or of a
dynamically processed repetitive structure and even in those cases where one
or another binary sequence is made perceptible for editing as a first order re-
presentation.
As an interplay between the textual substructure and any superstructure
(whether textual or not) is indispensable in any computer process, this is the
core of the structural change in the principles of textual representation.
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10.3 Computerization of visual representation as a triumph of modern
textual culture.
The inclusion of pictorial representation seems to be one of the most sig-
nificant indicators of the new range and logic of textual representation,  as
now, for the first time in history, we have an alphabet in which any picture can
be represented as  a sequential text.
Textual representation is a feature common to all computer-based pictures,
and defines their specificity by contrast with other pictures. Since any picture
in a computer has to be processed in the identical - binary - alphabet, it follows
that any picture can be edited at this level, implying that any computer-based
picture can be transformed into any other picture in this alphabet. Morphing
may perhaps in many cases be only a curiosity, but the basic principle that any
computerized picture is always the result of an editable textualized process
performed in time is far from a curiosity since it changes the very notion of a
picture as a synchronously and not serially manifested whole.
Seriality and time are not only introduced into the notion of pictures as an
invisible background condition, they are also introduced at the semantic and
perceptible levels, since the textualized basis allows the representation of - edi-
table - time to be introduced at both these levels. While the synchronously
manifested whole is an axiomatic property of a painting or a photograph -
even though they are produced serially in time - the same property in the
computer has to be specified and declared as a variable at the same level as
any other feature whether it belongs to the motive, to the compositional
structure or to the relation between foreground and background. Variability
and invariance become free and equal options on the same scale, applicable to
any pictorial element which implies that there is no element of the picture
whatsoever which is not optionally defined and permanently editable.
There is of course a price to be paid for this new triumph of textualization,
as the textual representation presupposes a coding of the picture into an al-
phabet. The basic principle in this coding is the substitution of physically
defined notational units for physical substance, implying a definition of a fixed
set of legitimate physical differences (i.e.: differences in colours) which are
allowed to be taken into account. Since we cannot go back to the original if
we only have a digitized version, the coding is irreversible and the possible se-
condary codings and transformations will therefore always be constrained by
the primary coding.
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The relevance and weight of this constraint is itself a variable which has to
be taken into account in the use of computer-based representations, but in
general there are two main aspects.
First, that some of the substance qualities of the original will always be
missing since there is a change of expression substance. There will therefore
always be some doubt about the validity of the reference to the original. This
is obviously a serious constraint on the scholarly study of art.
Second, that the definition of a fixed set of legitimate physical differences at
the time of the original coding may later prove to be misleading, in that
physical differences which are not taken into account may be of significance.
Since the computer-based picture is conditioned by an invariant distinction
between differences in noise and information in the substance, there may be
cases - in medical diagnostics, for instance - in which a reinterpretation of this
distinction is needed.
The constraint here is directly related to the logical interrelation between
noise and information, which implies that information can only be defined by
the delimitation and treatment of potential information as noise, since
information is always manifested in one or another kind of substance.
While missing information concerning some qualities of substance cannot
be completely avoided, computerization at the same time allows a broad re-
pertoire of possible enrichments concerning global accessibility, as well as ana-
lytical and interpretational procedures.
Since the constraints on informational representation are basically those of
notation and process time, it is not possible to define any other invariant se-
mantic or syntactic limitations to these enrichments. That this is itself a
significant property can be seen by comparing previously known pictorial re-
presentations for which there does exist one kind or another of textual repre-
sentation, such as those described in Euclidean geometry for instance, by the
analytical geometry of Descartes, or in the various other forms of syntactically
defined pictures, whether based on a well-defined perspective or a well-
defined iconic or diagrammatic system.
The basic and general change in representational form towards any of these
representations can be described as a transition from representation at a syn-
tactic level to representation at the level of letters (those of the new alphabet).
The textual representation of geometrical figures defines a naked syntactic
structure, whether two-dimensional or three-dimensional, without regard to
substance qualities such as colours etc., while any syntactic structure in a
computer-based representation of a picture can be dissolved into a series of
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notation units, including the representation of some kind of substance. Al-
though this is a change from a higher to a lower level of stable organization, it
is for the same reason a change from a more restricted set to a more elaborate
set of variation potentialities in which the higher level structures become ac-
cessible to manipulation at the lower level. In the first case the picture is
defined by a stable syntactic structure - to which can be added certain rules
for variation, while in the latter, stability is defined solely at the level of nota-
tional representation - to which it is possible to ascribe a plenitude of - editable
- syntactic and compositional structures as well as to integrate representations
(only partially, however) of substance qualities such as colours and
backgrounds at the same textual level. Form, structure and rule become
editable on the same scale as substance. The representation of substance is
necessary, but need not, however, be a simulation of the substance of the ori-
ginal, the representation of an arbitrarily defined and itself editable back-
ground on the screen will suffice.
Moreover, informational notation is a common denominator in which some
substance qualities, the syntax as well as the motive, are manifested on a par
with each other. As any sequence representing one or another element of a
picture can be selected and related to other sequences in various ways and
possibly ascribed various functions as well (i.e. add an referential function,
which is itself editable, to other sequences) it follows that any fragment of a
picture or a picture as a whole can be integrated into a still increasing - or de-
creasing - syntactic and semantic hierarchy completely independently of the
original form and source. The insecurity in the referential relation to the
original is thus complementary to the enrichment of possible hierarchies and
frames of reference.
Perspective becomes optional and variable and so do other kinds of repre-
sentational structures such as representation based on the size and positioning
of motifs and the choice of colours in accordance with semantic importance, as
was often used during the Middle Ages. The resurrection of - or a return to -
the Middle Ages, however, is not on the agenda of computerization, since no
single, non-optional hierarchy of values can be established.
When seen from the cognitive point of view this is a radical extension of
the ways in which cognitive content can be manifested in pictorial representa-
tions, whether in iconic, diagrammatic or geometrical form. When seen from the
pictorial point of view, it is a radical extension of the ways in which the repre-
sentation of both physical objects and pictures can be made subject to cog-
nitive treatment.
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Much of this is a result of the fact that the computer-based representation
of stable structures has to be »played« in time, but since time has already been
represented in the film and on the television screen, the proposition must be
qualified accordingly.
In the case of film making the basic difference is that the definition or se-
lection of perspective is constrained by the optical artefacts - the lenses of the
camera - used, while the definition of perspective in the computer has to be
defined as - a still editable - part of the same text as the motif, which implies
that the very division between the optical constraints and motif becomes
editable. So with regard to freedom of choice the computerized picture more
closely resembles the animated cartoon than the film.
In the case of television the difference is primarily the result of the no-
tational definition of the signals, as the stable picture on the TV screen is only
the - perceptible - result of serial processes. As will be familiar, a basic con-
straint on real time digital television is the enormous amount of binary letters
needed to represent what was formerly an analogue signal. This is a constraint,
however, which at the same time transgresses a series of other constraints
which characterize the old-fashioned television of the 20th century. The most
far-reaching of these is probably the possible breakdown of the one-way
transmission and communication. Since a receiving computer can also be a
sender, the receiver can also become the editor of the editors, able to decide
what and when he will receive from whom. And since the computer is not
only a medium for communication but also for storing in a completely editable
form, the new medium transgresses the documentation monopoly of senders
too.
If, as has often argued in media studies, other modern electronic media
contribute to a revitalization of visual and oral culture - although in a mediated
secondary form, as claimed by Walter J. Ong - at the expense of the hegemonic
regime of the »typographic culture« as it was claimed by Marshall McLuhan,
the computer can more properly be understood as a medium by which the
reach of modern discursive culture is extended to embrace visuality and
pictorial expressions by the textualization of electronics, which at the same
time allows the representation of other media as genres within this medium.
It is  not only the picture or any other visual object which can now be
embraced by a text. As the author of a discursive text is able to represent
himself in the text, so the observer or spectator - given the appropriate para-
phernalia of »virtual reality - is now able to represent himself as an interacting
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part of any picture. In both cases however, only as a fragmentary
representation.
Under any circumstances, computerization implies that some physical and
organizational constraints and invariants (whether substantial, structural or
conventional) are converted to text and hence becoming optional variables.
10.4 One world, one archive.
That the computer - due to the properties described - has the potential to
become a new general and globally distributed network medium for represen-
ting knowledge does not necessarily imply that it will actually do so.
There are, however, strong indications that it will.
First of all it seems beyond reasonable doubt that the use of computers will
spread almost everywhere, whether this is rational or not, due to a widespread,
powerful human fascination. The spread of computers into a still growing
number of fields - and throughout the world - indicates that a profound
change in the basic infrastructural level of all societies has already begun.
Although we are not able to predict what will happen in the future, there
are very few reasons to believe that this process can be stopped and the only
argument which should not be marginalized seems to be the risk of a break-
down due to inadequate electricity supplies.
Computerization in general need not to be argued for and arguments given
in the past have often turned out to be wrong, or have had no particular
impact.
If we are only able to guess at what may happen anyway, we might ask
why we should bother about this matter at all. In this connection I should
therefore like to mention two arguments which could indicate a high degree of
social and cultural necessity resultant on the process of computerization.
The first argument is closely related to changes in the global reach of mo-
dernity. While the global perspective - inherent both in the claim of universa-
lity for human rights and western rationality in general, as well as in the
process of colonization - is as old as modernity itself, most decisions in modern
societies have until recently depended mainly on knowledge based on a more
limited - locally restricted - scale. Today, however, a rapidly increasing number
of local decisions on local issues depend on knowledge based on global
considerations. This is true both of economical, political, military and especially
ecological information and, in consequence, there is also a need for a global
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scale for cultural issues. While some might argue that it would be better to
attempt to re-establish a local economy and local political and military
government, there no longer appears to be any room left for the idea of a
locally restricted ecology.
Given that an increasing number of local decisions concerning ecological
issues need to be based on a corpus of knowledge of global dimensions, there
is no real alternative to the computer.
While this is an argument of the natural conditions for cultural survival, the
second argument comes from within culture and is a consequence of the expo-
nential growth in the production of knowledge anticipated by J. D. Bernal in
the 1930’s and Vannevar Bush in the 1940’s and later described in the
steadily growing number of books, papers and articles which have appeared
since the pioneering work of Derek de Solla Price, among others,3 in the early
1960’s. Whether measured in number of universities, academic journals, publis-
hed articles, or the number of scientists and scholars in the world, or the
number of reports prepared for politicians for making decisions etc., the overall
tendency is the same. Limits to the growth of knowledge production are in
sight - whether seen from an economical or organizational point of view, or as
a general perspective on a chaotic system in which nobody can keep abreast
of what is known even within his or her own specialized field.
Basic structural changes are inevitable, whether in the form of a cultural
collapse or a cultural reorganization. The computer is obviously not the solu-
tion to the handling and reorganization of this exponential growth, but is an
inevitable part of any viable solution, since any cultural reorganization must
include a repertoire of remedies for storing, editing, compressing, searching,
retrieving, communicating etc., which can only be provided by computers.
 The computer may widen some cultural gaps, but if it were not used there
might be no cultural gaps to bridge, since there might be no culture.
10. 5 Modernity modernized.
It should be evident from this that the computer is in the process of becoming
a new platform for the social organization of knowledge and communication
based on textual representation. While the very idea of a universal computer
was the outcome of a short-circuiting of the modern dualism between mind
                                                
3 J. D. Bernal, 1939. Vannevar Bush (1945) 1989. Derek de Solla Price, (1961) 1975.
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and mechanical nature and hence represented a rupture in the principles of
discursive representation in modernity, it became at the same time a means
with which to expand modern discursive representation, but in a new form as
a hidden second- order representation beneath perceptible first-order re-
presentations.
Although it may seem odd seen from previous modern viewpoints, it is a
change which is in complete accordance with one the most stable and per-
sistent principles of modernity, i.e. that of placing former axioms on the agenda
as objects for investigation, description and thereby textual representation. 4
The principle of transgressing a former conceptual framework by placing
the axioms on the agenda can be found at work throughout the history of
modernity, but although it is a general principle, the outcome naturally
depends on the conceptual structure of the specific axioms to which the
principle is applied. For this reason the same principle may cause different
effects, which implies that modernity can only exist as a history of permanent
self-transgression. In consequence, a conceptual rupture related to the trans-
gression of axioms becomes a basic principle of continuity in modern culture.
If this is the case, modernity cannot exist without a history in which
progressive expansion is based on theoretical regression, i.e. the theoretical
undermining of previous theories.
There would be no modern history, however, if continuity were only
represented in the form of conceptual ruptures. On the contrary, they can only
exist in the distinct modern form as conceptual ruptures at the level of axio-
matics because they are always manifested in and bound to discursive textua-
lization.
 Since computerization is completely in accordance with both these modern
principles of continuity, it can most properly be seen as a genuine modern phe-
nomenon contributing to the ongoing process of modernizing modernity.
                                                
4 Previous examples which could be mentioned are: the transgression of the Newtonian distinction be-
tween physical matter and immaterial forces manifested in the new concept of material energy in 19th
century physics; the transgression of the absolute distinction between matter and energy inherent in
Einstein’s theories of the early 20th century; the transgression of the definition of substance as form
inherent in 20th century theories of structuralism, information theory, functionalism and pragmatism,
among others; the transgression of formalist axiomatics inherent in Gödel’s theory; the inclusion of
human emotionalism and sexuality in the concept of man inherent in late 18th century philosophy and
Romantic literature. Or in more general terms the transgression of the concept of a static universe
inherent in 19th century theories of evolution, development and growth, the transgression of 19th cen-
tury materialistic dynamics inherent in 20th century functional dynamics, such as that manifested in
Chomsky’s generative grammar theory, for instance.
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 The main impact of computerization on this process is beyond doubt the
modernization of the modern textual infrastructure, which implies that the pro-
cess of modernization has now come to embrace the primary medium of truth
in modern societies. If discursive textual representation formed the basis for
the modern secularization of the human relationship to nature, the very same
process has now come include the textual representation itself.
There seems to be a kind of logic in this process of secularization, which
takes its point of departure in the notion of inanimate and external nature -
initially conceived of as materially well-defined entities moved by immaterial
forces, later as well-defined material entities and energy processes - and
expanded to include biological processes leading towards the inclusion of
mental processes and symbolic representation, which imply that the observer is
observed and included in the very same world as any observed phenomenon.
It may seem that this is only a form of logic concerning the movement
towards an all-embracing inclusion of subject matter, as the story of theoretical
and epistemological developments is in many respects one of increasing diver-
gence, in spite of many vigorous efforts to create a unified, scientifically based
corpus of knowledge. Even though this may be true, it is also true that there is
a logic in theoretical and epistemological developments as the movement
towards the inclusion of all subject matter, whether physical, biological or
mental, is related as a main cause to the history of axiomatic transgressions.
While the theories of the 16th and 17th centuries relate to the axioms of a
static universe based on fixed entities and substance defined by form, 19th
century theories relate to - various - axioms of dynamic and developmental
systems based on variable entities, while 20th century theories predominantly
differ from both of these, in that the notion of form is now separated from the
notion of substance and is hence seen as a self-reliant structure or pattern
which can organize arbitrary substances. In these theories substance does not
matter. The computer is one of the fruits of this development, caused among
other things by inner tensions in mechanical theories and most theories
relating to the computer are still based today on the same type of axiomatics.
So, how then, is it possible to predict that computerization will bring about
a new transgression of axioms? A new textual infrastructure as such would
not, if it were not at the same time based on the very fact that substance does
matter, and does so because - contrary to the main axiomatics of the 20th
century and contrary to the ideas necessary for the invention - substance can
neither be identified with form nor reduced to amorphous matter without
affecting form.
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This being so, we can predict that computerization will necessarily return
substance to the theoretical and epistemological agenda, from which it was
removed in late 19th and early 20th century theories.  It will not, however,
return as it was when removed. The return of substance will not take the
shape of a notion defined by - extensional form - nor will it return leaving the
notion of self-reliant forms untouched. On the contrary, it will return primarily
as a resource which will force a change in the notion of form, as the same
substance can be the carrier - itself transformed - of various forms, patterns and
repetitive or unique structures.
Just as in modern physics, where energy under certain circumstances is
converted into corpuscular matter, which implies a complete substitution of
properties (from those of interfering waves to those of colliding particles),
material substance seems to need an interpretation as a generic resource or
material which allows the formation and change of various forms and
structures.
In the case of complete substitution, there seems to be nothing left for fur-
ther description except the curious fact that two completely different sets of
properties are ascribed to the very same »phenomenon«. To say that energy is
completely transformed into matter implies that a specific amount of energy is
identical with a specific amount of matter, although they have no common
properties except the rule of exchange.
Now since there is a physical process taking place in time and space before
as well as after the conversion, we may wonder how it could be possible to
maintain that the process of exchange is not itself a process which takes place
in time and space? And since there is substance before as well as after it would
seem that there must also necessarily be substance in between. Whether there
is a way to get around this question in physics, it is impossible to say that
substance can be identified with only a single invariant form.
Thus the break with early modern concepts of form as something which
defines substance must be maintained, while a break with late modern
concepts of self-reliant forms is placed on the agenda.
A most intriguing aspect of this is that the very notion of rules and coding
procedures must now be included as processes taking place in time, space and
substance, in a world identical to that of the coded substances.
The logic of this process is the logic of progressive secularization, as it
moves from the idea of the transcendental, cosmological rules of the Middle
Ages and Renaissance, passing through the Enlightenment reinterpretation as
natural laws immanently given in the world, but still seen as axiomatically
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given invariants and functioning as transcendentally given on the phenomena
ruled (as the rules of language were still described in 20th century
structuralism) while we are now confronted with a third step in the transition
from transcendentally to immanently given rules, that of the breakdown of the
idea that rules are functionally transcendental invariants to the ruled.
Even if the notion of a rule or code must imply a dividing borderline be-
tween the code and the coded, there is no way to maintain that the borderline
is invariant, as it can only be established through the very same process as the
coding itself.
Although it may be convenient to assume that some codes have existed sin-
ce the very origin of the universe, this does not tell us much, as the very idea
of such an origin can only refer to the idea of some divinely given invariant
codes. There may or may not be such transcendentally given codes which are
not the result of processes taking place in time, space and substance, but there
is certainly a multitude of codes which can only exist as the result of coding
procedures which actually do take place in time, space and substance.
A basic conceptual inversion implicitly comes from the need to explain how
stability is possible at any level, including the question as to how levels come
into existence. The very question implies that the notion of stability, rule, code
and invariance must be moved from the field of axiomatics to the field of what
is to be explained.
This is exactly the type of question posed by computerization, as the rules
governing the processes in the computer must come in the same package as
the governed, ready to be processed and edited in exactly the same way. To
the notion of rule based systems we must now add the notion of rule-
generating systems. Among the properties of such systems, redundancy
functions seem to be one of the most important, as these functions can
provide stability, although they allow existing rules and levels to be sus-
pended or modified and new rules and levels to be created in ways which are
not possible in strictly rule based systems.
Although the computer is not a rule-generating system such as we - in some
respects - are ourselves, it transgresses the constraints which define strictly
rule based systems, placing the very notion of rules on the agenda and thereby
removing this notion from its sacred position of axiomatically given
phenomena. A position in which nothing now appears to remain.
 What has been said here about notions of substance, rules and codes is pa-
rallel to what could be said about the notion of the observer, the brain-mind
relationship, the notion of human subjectivity and so forth. The process of
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modernization has come to embrace exactly those notions on which the
process itself has been based in previous epochs. If this is the case, we are
heading towards a secularization of the relationship to the secularizing mind
or a transition from modernizing on a first-order scale to modernizing on a se-
cond-order scale. A continuation of modernity both through the integrative
transgression of former axioms and through the extension of global reach,
whether in the form of second-order textualization of such things as visual re-
presentation or second-order integration on a global scale. A continuation,
however, which is only possible because the principles of modernity are not
those of rule based systems, but those of rule-generative systems based on re-
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